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**African Liberation and Unity in Nkrumah's
Ghana:**

**A Study of the Role of
"Pan-African Institutions" in the making of
Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957 - 1966**

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geboren te Rome in 1985

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**African Liberation and Unity in Nkrumah's
Ghana:**

**A Study of the Role of
"Pan-African Institutions" in the making of
Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957 - 1966**

Thesis

To grant

The degree of Doctor by the University of Pavia,
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Curriculum Vitae

Matteo Grilli is a historian specialized in the history of modern Africa, dealing in particular with the history of decolonization and Pan-Africanism. Previously he also worked on the history of European migration in Africa. He obtained his BA in Medieval, Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Rome “Sapienza” in 2008 and he completed his MA in “Afro-Asian Studies” at the University of Pavia in 2010. The PhD project of which this dissertation is the result, began in November 2010.

SAMENVATTING

Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de studie van het Pan-Afrikaanse beleid zoals dat gevoerd werd door Kwame Nkrumah, de eerste president van het onafhankelijke Ghana. Het onderzoekt de rol van drie Ghanese instellingen die specifiek ontwikkeld werden om de bevrijding en eenheid van Afrika te bewerkstelligen en te ondersteunen. Deze instellingen waren, de Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), het African Affairs Centre (AAC), en de Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute te Winneba, Ghana. Deze instellingen hebben tussen 1957 en 1966 geprobeerd om Afrikaanse bevrijdingsbewegingen in Ghana als ook elders in Afrika te ondersteunen met woord en daad. Daarbij droegen zij bij aan de verspreiding van het Panafricanisme en Nkrumahism door het hele continent. Voor lange tijd waren maar zeer weinig documenten over dit onderwerp beschikbaar, vooral omdat een groot deel van het archiefmateriaal over het buitenlandse beleid van Ghana verloren ging na de staatsgreep van 1966. Een belangrijk doel van dit onderzoek was dan ook om nieuwe bronnen te verzamelen om deze lacune aan kennis te vullen, en het aandragen van waardevolle elementen ter bevordering van een beter begrip van de werking en het doel van de "Pan-Afrikaanse" instellingen van Ghana onder het bewind van Kwame Nkrumah.

Dit proefschrift is het eindresultaat van elf maanden onderzoek (interviews en archiefonderzoek) in Ghana en Groot-Brittannië. Het terugvinden van belangrijke nieuwe bronnen, stelde de auteur in staat om Accra's eigen perspectief te reconstrueren en te doorgronden. Er wordt in dit proefschrift inzicht verschaft in de dagelijkse activiteiten van de drie "Pan-Afrikaanse" instellingen. En er wordt onderzocht en in kaart gebracht wat de impact van deze drie instellingen en hun activiteiten waren op de Afrikaanse bevrijdingsbewegingen en de Ghanese staat. Door de documentatie van de "Pan-Afrikaanse" instellingen van Ghana tussen 1957 en 1966 te lezen en te analyseren, is men nu in staat om te begrijpen hoever de invloed van het Ghana van Kwame Nkrumah reikte op het Afrikaanse continent. Deze studie schijnt nieuw licht op de geschiedenis van het buitenlandse beleid van Kwame Nkrumah tussen 1957, toen Ghana onafhankelijk werd, en de coup d'etat van 1966, dat een einde bracht aan het bewind van Nkrumah.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation contributes to the study of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy by examining the role played by three Ghanaian institutions specifically created to support African liberation and unity: the Bureau of African Affairs, the African Affairs Centre, and the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba. Between 1957 and 1966, these institutions have worked for supporting African liberation movements both in Ghana and on the battlefields. Moreover, they contributed to spread Pan-Africanism and Nkrumahism in the whole continent. For decades, very few documents concerning this subject have been available, as the great part of the archival sources on Ghana's foreign policy was destroyed or lost after the coup of 1966. The main aim of this research project was to collect new sources in order to fill this gap and provide valuable elements for a deeper understanding of the functioning and the purpose of the "Pan-African" institutions. This thesis is the final result of eleven months of oral and archival research in Ghana and Great Britain. After the recovery of important new sources, the author has been able to adopt Accra's own perspective on the question and to provide an insight into the daily activities of the three institutions examining the impact of their activity on African liberation movements and on the Ghanaian state. As for the first aspect, only by analyzing the documentation produced by the "Pan-African" institutions, it is possible to understand the real degree of influence that Nkrumah's Ghana exerted in Africa until the coup of 1966 and, therefore, to reconsider the history of Nkrumah's foreign policy in a new light.

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I dedicate this work to my friend Matteo

ABBREVIATIONS:

AAC	African Affairs Centre
AAPC	All-African People's Conference
AAPSO	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
AAS	African Affairs Secretariat
AATUF	All-African Trade Unions Federation
ABAKO	Alliance des Bakongo
AEF	Afrique Équatoriale Française
AG	Action Group
AGPL	Archive of the George Padmore Research Library on African Affairs
ANC	African National Congress
ARPS	Aborigines' Rights Protection Society
BAA	Bureau of African Affairs
BCP	Basutoland Congress Party
BJSTT	British Joint Services Training Team
BNA	British National Archives
BPP	Bechuanaland People's Party
CAF	Central African Federation
COREMO	Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique
CPP	Convention People's Party
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office
CSC	Counter-Subversion Committee
DCA	Democratic Congress Alliance
DOPC	Defence and Overseas Policy Committee
EAF	East African Federation
FNL	Front de Libération Nationale
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
FO (UK)	Foreign Office (UK)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GDR	German Democratic Republic

IAFA	International African Friends of Abyssinia
IAS	Independent African States
IASB	International African Service Bureau
IASC	Independent African States Conference
IPGE	Idea Popular de Guinea Equatorial
IRD	Information Research Department
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KNDP	Kamerun National Democratic Party
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MNC	Mouvement National Congolais
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MSA - Sawaba	Mouvement Socialiste Africain - Sawaba
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People
NAC	Nyasaland African Congress
NASSO	National Association of Socialist Students Organization
NCBWA	National Congress of British West Africa
NCHER	National Council for Higher Education and Research
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NDC	Nakuru District Congress
NDP	National Democratic Party
NLC	National Liberation Council
NNLC	Ngwane National Liberatory Congress
NPCP	Nairobi People's Convention Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCAM	Organisation Commune Africaine et Magache
OK	One Kamerun
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
PAF	Pan-African Federation
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde
PAPSA	Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa

PPN	Parti Progressiste Nigérien
PRA	Parti du Regroupement Africain
PRAAD	Public Records and Archive Administration Department of Ghana
RDA	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
RILU	Red International of Labor Unions
SPA	Swazi Progressive Association
SPP	Swaziland Progressive Party
SWANU	South West Africa National Union
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UAR	United Arab Republic
UAS	Union of African States
UDENAMO	União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique
UGCC	United Cold Coast Convention
UNC	Union Nationale Camerounaise
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UP	United Party
UPA	Uniao dos Povos de Angola
UPC (Cameroon)	Union des Populations du Cameroun
UPC (Uganda)	Uganda People's Congress
VOA	Voice of Africa
WANS	West African National Secretariat
WASU	West African Students' Association
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

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Introduction

Almost sixty years after its fall - occurred in a coup d'état on 24 February 1966 - Nkrumah's government in Ghana is still unanimously considered as one of the most influential but also controversial political experiences in the history of modern Africa. Its importance lies undoubtedly in the peculiarities of its internal policies and in the influence it exerted in Africa during the crucial years of the first wave of independence. Several aspects of Nkrumah's policy led this small West African country - without any visible strategic relevance - to act as a political giant becoming the torchbearer of Pan-Africanism and socialism in the continent. Between 1957 and 1966, Nkrumah transformed Ghana into a political laboratory where he could actualize his vision, known since 1960 as "Nkrumahism".ⁱ This vision can be summarized as the achievement of three goals: national unity, economic transformation (towards socialism) and Africa's total liberation and unity.ⁱⁱ The latter point of Nkrumah's political agenda coincided with the actualization of Pan-Africanism and will be defined in this thesis as Ghana's Pan-African policy.ⁱⁱⁱ

In line with the indications of the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress, Nkrumah considered the independence of his country only as the first step towards the liberation and unification of the whole continent. Thus, he aimed to link the destiny of Ghana with that of

ⁱ Nkrumahism can be regarded as the sum of all Nkrumah's political convictions, codified into a brand-new ideology. In 1960, it was systematized for the first time by Kofi Baako (CPP member and Nkrumah's Minister). The definition of "Nkrumahism" includes references to nationalism, socialism, Pan-Africanism, African Personality and Nonalignment. See K. Agyeman, *Ideological Education and Nationalism in Ghana under Nkrumah and Busia*, Ghana Universities Press, Accra, 1988, p.7. See also W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State*, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 257. Since 1962, the term "Nkrumahism" was officially adopted in every aspect of the Ghanaian political life. Finally, in 1964, a sort of manual of "Nkrumahism" made its first appearance. It was Nkrumah's famous "Consciencism". K. Nkrumah, *Consciencism, Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution*, Heinemann, London, 1964. See also W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.113 and pp.257-258 and The Spark (edited by), *Some Essential Features of Nkrumahism*, Panaf Books, London, 1970. An interesting study about the actualization of "Nkrumahism" in the Ghanaian daily life is J.S. Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism: Nation, State, and Pan-Africanism in Ghana*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011.

ⁱⁱ D. Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy*, Sub-Saharan Publishers, 1988, p.15.

ⁱⁱⁱ The same definition is also used by Armah. See K., Armah, *Peace Without Power, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966*, Ghana University Press, Ghana, 2004, pp.9-10.

Africa. As he claimed in March 1957: “The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is not linked with the total liberation of Africa”.^{iv} This assertion was far from being a mere rhetorical statement. Ghana became the first state in the history of Africa to endorse Pan-Africanism as one of the pillars of its foreign policy.

Since 1957, Accra was transformed into a shelter for African freedom fighters and a base from where to launch their attacks against colonial or “neo-colonial” entities. Nkrumah’s government provided African liberation movements with funds, political support and every other resource they needed, including political and military training. As a result, the nationalist parties and the Ghanaian government developed strong alliances, which assured Nkrumah with an important political return. Within the ranks of African freedom fighters, Accra could also promote the unity of the continent, envisaged as an amalgamation of radical, Pan-Africanist states.

Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore were the fathers of Ghana’s Pan-African policy, conceived after years of elaboration. Then, between 1957 and 1959 (the year of Padmore’s death) they worked to actualize this vision by drawing a complex and unique foreign policy system. As part of this system, they also set the foundations for three special “Pan-African” institutions in order to work for the liberation and unity of the continent: the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), the African Affairs Centre (AAC) and the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute.^v Hundreds of African activists, freedom fighters and political refugees

^{iv} Nkrumah, midnight pronouncement of Independence at Polo Ground, Accra, 5 March 1957, extract in K. Nkrumah, *Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah, Freedom Fighters Edition*, International Publishers, New York, 1969, p.77.

^v In this thesis, the three institutions will be defined as “Pan-African” because they were established mainly (but not only) to fulfill the targets of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. The BAA was an office created with the purpose of collecting information about the liberation movements and to support African freedom fighters in Ghana or on the battlefields. It was founded in 1957 under the name of “The Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs” and was run by Padmore until his death in 1959, when it changed its name into BAA. The Bureau became a powerful body with a strong influence also on other institutions of Ghana. Under the management of A.K. Barden - Padmore’s “successor” - it acted as a sort of intelligence office, able to keep track of spies and enemies both inside and outside the state. The AAC was a hostel in Accra where hundreds of political refugees were sheltered and trained politically. The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba - after 1962 known as Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science - can be considered both as a “Pan-African” institution and as a party school. It was established in 1961 but had been already conceived before 1959. It was designed for two main purposes. First of all, at the Institute, CPP members and civil servants were trained in ideology, economics and administration. Secondly, it provided the

were hosted, trained and financed through these three institutions. As a result, several African nationalist parties also became deeply influenced by the Nkrumahist ideology sponsored by the BAA, AAC and the Institute.

This dissertation provides a contribution to the study of the history of Ghana's Pan-African policy with a clear focus on the role played by the "Pan-African" institutions. For decades, very few sources about this subject had been available, as the great part of the archival sources on Ghana's foreign policy was destroyed or lost after the coup of 1966. The first target of this research project was to recover valuable sources in order to fill this gap and provide new elements for a deeper understanding of the functioning and the purposes of the "Pan-African" institutions. It is necessary to underline that this dissertation has no pretension to be a conclusive study on the history of the BAA, AAC, the Institute and the whole Pan-African policy of Ghana. This research topic needs further developments.

Aims of the research

Through the examination of the history of the "Pan-African" institutions and Ghana's Pan-African policy, this thesis aims to analyze four main themes.

The first analytical point concerns the nature of the Pan-Africanist and Nkrumahist ideologies and the evolution of the political message spread by Ghana among the African liberation movements. This dissertation provides an overview of the theoretical bases of Ghana's Pan-African policy as it was elaborated by Padmore and Nkrumah over years of political activity. Padmore chose Ghana as his political home only after Nkrumah had successfully put the Pan-Africanist theory into practice by establishing the CPP and by leading the Gold Coast to independence. The impact of the Manchester Pan-African

same training also to freedom fighters, in order to support the development of an African intelligentsia in the post-independence phase.

Congress was particularly profound in both of these achievements. The same political heritage was then transferred from Ghana to the liberation movements to ensure the creation of a front of Pan-Africanist parties and governments in the continent. This passage is fundamental in order to understand the rationale behind the selection of the liberation movements supported by Ghana through its “Pan-African” Institutions. Nkrumah was not willing to provide aid to any nationalist party, but only to those which would endorse Pan-Africanism and which would follow the indications of Manchester as the CPP had done before 1957. This work also attempts to describe the evolution of the Pan-Africanist ideology in Ghana and its consequences on the political message channeled from Accra to the African freedom fighters. After Nkrumahism was adopted as the official ideology of the state, only the more radical, Pan-Africanist parties were still supported by Ghana. This dissertation provides examples of the impact of the Ghanaian ideology on a number of liberation movements, trying to analyze Nkrumah’s influence in Africa during Ghana’s different political seasons.

The second theme regards the actualization of Ghana’s Pan-African policy and the functioning of the system to attain its targets. The analysis focuses specifically on the establishment of the “Pan-African” institutions and their relationship with the other bodies of the Ghanaian state. Even in this case, Nkrumah and Padmore’s past experiences proved fundamental to put the basis of the BAA, the AAC and, indirectly, of the Institute.^{vi} At the time, the Ghanaian Prime Minister and the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist considered the Foreign Service unsuited for dealing with anti-imperialist activities. Thus, they decided to recreate in Ghana the same model of anti-colonial agencies where they had worked in the past. As a result, they established two parallel systems of foreign policy. As Michael Dei-Anang explained in his memories, one was meant to work on “orthodox diplomatic lines”, the other one on “unorthodox” ones.^{vii} While the Foreign Service was part of the first

^{vi} The Institute was conceived for the first time in the fall of 1959 shortly after Padmore’s death. However, it was most probably an early idea of both Nkrumah and Padmore.

^{vii} Michael Dei-Anang was the first one to use the definition of orthodox and unorthodox diplomatic lines when referring to Ghana’s Foreign Service. He introduced this distinction in order to underline the different approaches between the traditional diplomacy and the institution specifically devoted to the attainment of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. He himself defined the institution he was running, the African Affairs Secretariat

system, the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs - after 1959 known as the Bureau of African Affairs - was the most important among the “unorthodox” institutions. Even the AAC and the Institute can be ideally inscribed in this category although they were not actually offices dealing with foreign affairs. Still, they were contributing to the fulfillment of specific targets of Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. This thesis aims to describe in detail the functioning of this system of “parallel agencies” with a clear focus on the Bureau and its predecessor, the men who run the institutions and their special relationship with Nkrumah. This dissertation also presents cases of strong clashes between the two parallel systems of foreign policy. The main reason for their hostility is to be found in the different nature of the two types of institutions. The first type was modeled on British institutions and run by “moderate” civil servants, the second one on anti-colonial offices of the 1930s and 1940s and run by “radical” activists. Their diverse natures also reflected on their different approaches to foreign policy. The “unorthodox” methods of the Bureau often caused diplomatic accidents that the Ghanaian diplomats had to solve. Moreover, the Bureau itself controlled some of the embassies and high commissions through a net of agents and political attaches. The power of the director of the BAA over the Foreign Service reached the point where he could influence the appointment of diplomats. This dissertation tries to explain in detail these aspects by providing evidences of several cases of conflict between the two systems.

The third theme of the thesis consists of an analysis of the means used by the “Pan-African” institutions to spread Nkrumah’s message in Africa through the net of freedom fighters supported by Ghana, and of an attempt to quantify the political return of this operation for Nkrumah’s government. Thanks to the channels established with the liberation movements, the institutions contributed to the expansion of Pan-Africanism and

(AAS - est. 1961), as part of Ghana’s unorthodox system together with Padmore’s Office (later known as the Bureau of African Affairs). See M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations, 1957-1966: A Personal Memoir*, 1975, pp.14, 29 and 31. Kwesi Armah, at the time a key figure of the diplomatic corps of Ghana, included Dei-Anang’s definition in his book. He defined the Bureau of African Affairs as an institution which operated “outside the orthodox government machinery”. See K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, pp.27-29. Even if the author of the thesis finds Dei-Anang’s definition as more than appropriate, he prefers to consider the AAS as being halfway between the two categories.

Nkrumahism in the continent. The first way to influence politically the African freedom fighters was through the Ghanaian propaganda machinery. This dissertation offers new materials concerning the functioning of Radio Ghana and also the production of political press to be distributed in the whole continent. The second and most important way to influence politically the African liberation movements was through political and military training offered directly in the Ghanaian territory. The outstanding unpublished documentations of the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs supplies new information about the presence of African students and freedom fighters in Ghanaian schools and institutes of higher education (including the Ideological Institute). The dissertation provides also useful elements to understand which type of courses were provided to freedom fighters and other African students and how the contents of the lectures changed with the evolution of the ideology in Ghana.

The forth and last theme of this thesis is the reaction of moderate African countries and the Western world to Ghana's radical foreign policy and its consequences on the achievement of the missions of BAA, AAC and the Institute. With regard to the West, by examining specifically the role played by Great Britain, the dissertation provides an analysis of the impact of the Cold War on Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. The thesis offers a detailed analysis of the involvement of Ghana in crucial questions such as the Congo Crisis or the fight against the apartheid regime of South Africa. The former scenario was a crucial one for the evolution of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy, since after the failures suffered at Leopoldville in 1960, Nkrumah had to reconsider its strategy in the African continent. With the Congo crisis, Ghana was definitely involved in the Cold War, and its position in Africa was influenced accordingly. Another important question concerning the relationship between Ghana and the Western world was the impact of the "subversion" issue. Nkrumah often paid the political price of supporting opposition parties by being ostracized in Africa by moderate governments. Indeed, the latter – backed by the West – worked for diminishing Nkrumah's influence in the continent. In this context, the Bureau was often described as one of the most powerful sources of "subversion" in the continent. It

was also considered – together with the AAC and the Institute – as an instrument for the penetration of the communist countries in Africa.

Sources

For decades, scholars did not have sufficient archival materials to provide an in-depth investigation on the history of the “Pan-African” institutions. Indeed, after the coup of February 1966, most of the documentation concerning Ghana’s foreign policy was destroyed.^{viii} Few documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the African Affairs Secretariat and the Office of the President survived the coup, whereas the whole archives of the African Affairs Centre and the Ideological Institute got lost. On the contrary, the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs was kept intact but it was immediately seized by the National Liberation Council (NLC), the military government which overthrew Nkrumah. Only in the late 1980s, the archive of the Bureau was “re-discovered”. Back in 1966, the NLC used part of the materials of the BAA to prepare two booklets to discredit the former government. They were: *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa* and *Nkrumah’s Deception of Africa*.

For years, the only known sources for studying the history of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute have been the two NLC publications. Both of them include a collection of documents and information relating to the activities of the three “Pan-African” institutions. The books present only materials on Nkrumah’s “subversive” activities. They make very few references to the actual history of the three institutions and their relationships with

^{viii} Scott W. Thompson, probably the most important historian who has ever worked on Nkrumah’s foreign policy was an eye-witness of the destruction of most of the archival materials of Ghana concerning African Affairs just after the coup. Thompson himself explained which was the fate of much of the diplomatic materials held at Flagstaff House (the seat of the Presidency and the African Affairs Secretariat) immediately after the coup. In a specific appendix on sources at the end of his *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, Thompson pointed out in detail which type of sources were still available after February 1966 (some of them were taken out of Ghana by Thompson himself) and which ones he used for his study. See S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp. 441-443.

other bodies of the Ghanaian government. Moreover, these booklets also present a purely ideological vision of the nature of the “Pan-African” institutions, failing to provide any proof for their statements. According to the authors, the Bureau, the Centre and the Ideological Institute were merely instruments of an alleged plan of Kwame Nkrumah to rule Africa. His Pan-Africanist rhetoric was presented as a cover for such a plan. The documentation was specifically selected to attack the former government, leaving other useful information out. The clear political operation makes the historian wonder about the evident limitations of relating only on these sources.

Still, even Thompson— the author of the most comprehensive study on Ghana’s foreign policy, published in 1969 – relates to the information collected by the NLC in his analysis of the functioning of BAA, AAC and the Institute.^{ix} The only other sources he used were very few documents he personally collected at the time of the coup and a significant series of interviews, a kind of source which the historian must consider critically.^x Even though Thompson’s study does not focus specifically on these institutions, it can still be considered as the most comprehensive study ever written on this subject.

Soon after the coup of 1966, a series of memoirs composed by the protagonists of Nkrumah’s times begun to add fundamental information for a better understanding of the history of Ghana’s foreign policy. Books like the ones by Bing (1968), James (1977), Adamafio (1982) and Powell (1984), contributed to a first revision of the historical figure

^{ix} Reading through Thompson’s *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, the critical opinion of the author about Nkrumah’s government and the key radical figures involved in Ghanaian politics at the time emerges quite clearly. Ahlman includes him in a list of what he calls “anti-Nkrumah writers”, such as Austin, Russel Warren Howe, Bretton and Peter Omari. In Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism*, p.202. See Russell Warren Howe, “*Did Nkrumah Favour Pan-Africanism?*”, *Transition* 27, 1966, pp.13-15; H.L. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967; T. Peter Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship*, Africana Publishing Corporation, New York, 1970. For critical analyses on Nkrumah’s foreign policy see also A. Mazrui, *Africa’s International Relations – The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*, Westview, Boulder, 1984 and T.M. Shaw and O. Aluko, *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy*, Gower, Aldershot, 1984.

^x Most of the interviews were collected by the author immediately after the coup, featuring informants directly connected with Ghanaian politics or directly involved in the coup. Thompson himself admits that a problem of interpretation existed. He referred to the interviews as “[...]a principal and perhaps the most suspect source”, in W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.442. Still, the American author amply related to this kind of source, especially when describing the most delicate phases of policy-making of Nkrumah’s government.

of Nkrumah.^{xi} These can be considered as useful sources for the historian, since they often provide new information and they also bring new perspectives on the events. Some memoirs, such as the ones by Ikoku (1970), Makonnen (1973) and Batsa (1981), have provided for the first time an insight into the work of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute.^{xii} Fundamental details about Nkrumah's foreign policy begun to emerge from the memoirs of its protagonists, for instance Bosumtwi-Sam (2001).^{xiii} In this context, the works of Michael Dei-Anang (1975) and Kwesi Armah (2004) are particularly relevant since they are, at the same time, memoirs and studies on the history of Nkrumah's foreign policy.^{xiv} They analyzed the complexity of the system designed by Nkrumah's government to attain the targets of its foreign policy. This thesis makes ample use of these memoirs and studies.

In the last decades, other interesting studies on Nkrumah's foreign policy had been published, even after new sources became available both in Ghana and abroad.^{xv} Still, no scholar has ever tried to adopt new sources to work on a comprehensive history of the BAA, the AAC and the Ideological Institute.^{xvi} This thesis tries to introduce new elements of analysis on the subject under review, counting mainly on new archival sources but also on a critical examination of the existing bibliography.

A considerable amount of new archival materials have been analyzed. The first and most important one is undoubtedly the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs, kept at the

^{xi} Bing, G., *Reap the Whirlwind. An Account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950 to 1966*, McGibbon & Kee, London, 1968; C.R.L., James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, Allison & Busby, London, 1977; T. Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's Side - The Labour and the Wounds*, Westcoast & Collings, London, 1982; Powell, E., *Private Secretary /Female/ Gold Coast*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1984.

^{xii} S.G. Ikoku (Julius Sago), *Le Ghana de Nkrumah, autopsie de la 1^{re} République (1957-1966)*, François Maspero, Paris, 1971; R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, Oxford University Press, 1973, p.212; K. Batsa, *The Spark : Times Behind Me – From Kwame Nkrumah to Limann*, Rex Collings, London, 1985.

^{xiii} D. Bosumtwi-Sam, *Landmarks of Dr Kwame Nkrumah*, Ussh Graphic Designs, Accra 2001.

^{xiv} Dei-Anang's *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations* and Armah's *Peace without Power*.

^{xv} See, for instance, S.K.B Asante, *Ghana and the promotion of Pan-Africanism and regionalism*, Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, Accra 2007; R.Y. Owusu, *Kwame Nkrumah's Liberation Thought: a Paradigm for Religious Advocacy*, Africa World, Trenton, 2006; E.L Dumor, *Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa*, Ghana University Press, Accra, 1991; Z. Poe, *Kwame Nkrumah's contribution to Pan-Africanism: an Afrocentric analysis*, Routledge, New York, 2003; O. Asamoah, *Nkrumah's Foreign Policy 1951-1966*, in K. Ahrin, , *The Life And Work of Kwame Nkrumah*, African World Press, Trenton, 1993.

^{xvi} The only exception is an unpublished thesis of a Ghanaian archivist who, for the first time, catalogued part of the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs. See J.J. Mensah, *The Bureau of African Affairs in the Kwame Nkrumah Administration from 1951 to 1966*, unpublished thesis, University of Ghana, 1989.

George Padmore Library in Accra. This archive includes all the papers of the BAA which had not been removed by the NLC for preparing its booklets.^{xvii} Thanks to these documents, it has been possible to analyze the activities of the Bureau since its establishment as “The Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs”, its denomination during Padmore’s activity in Ghana (1957-1959). The papers include information on the relations between the BAA and several other institutions of Ghana. Moreover, they also include unique documents of the African Affairs Centre and the Ideological Institute.

Interesting documents have been also recovered from the Accra section of the Public Records and Archive Administration Department of Ghana (former National Archives of Ghana), where few papers of the Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the African Affairs Secretariat had survived the coup.

A whole series of de-classified materials kept at the British National Archives has been analyzed as well. This type of source has proved to be particularly useful, since the British kept constant track of the activities of the three “Pan-African” institutions in order to plan counter-measures against them. Thanks to the files of the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Information Research Department and the Cabinet (including the Joint Intelligence Committee and other bodies), it was possible to provide a first overview of the role of the Western powers in influencing Ghana’s internal and external policies.

Finally, interviews with meaningful protagonists of the Ghanaian Foreign Service and the Bureau added fundamental information to understand the functioning of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute and the relations between the three institutions and the rest of the state.

^{xvii} The fate of materials removed by the NLC is still unknown. Most probably the documents were destroyed after being published.

Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided in five chapters, each one indicating a specific phase of the history of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. Each passage signifies a change of approach of Nkrumah's government with regard to its Pan-African policy. Each passage also focuses on the changes in the structures of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute and/or changes of strategies with regard to their mission to support African liberation and unity.

The first chapter opens with an overview of the conception of Ghana's Pan-African policy before March 1957, in the attempt to trace the *file rouge* between Nkrumah's and Padmore's past experiences and their work in Ghana since the early 1950s. The chapter covers the period between March 1957 and December 1958. It describes the actualization of Ghana's Pan-African policy during the first phase of Nkrumah's government, a period dominated by a cautious, yet radical, foreign policy. It focuses on the establishment of the first two "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana: the Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs (also referred to, in this thesis, as Padmore's Office) and the African Affairs Centre.

Chapter Two explores the making and performance of Ghana's Pan-African policy actualized by Padmore's Office and the AAC between January and September 1959. In this period, Ghana defined for the first time its policies for the support of political refugees, African students and opposition parties, also clarifying its stand towards the use of armed struggle in the liberation process. Finally, Padmore's Office set up the basis for a proper Pan-Africanist propaganda. Generally speaking, this chapter deals with a period of changes that influenced Ghana's internal and external policies in the short and in the long period. The months under examination coincide also with Padmore's last months before his death. His imprint on his Office and the AAC was bound to last for years after his death.

The Third Chapter covers the period between September 1959 and December 1960, a crucial passage for the evolution of Ghana's Pan-African policy and the "Pan-African" institutions. During 1960, seventeen countries reached independence, leading to a revolution of the political map of the continent. Ghana had to face the different problems

emerged in this period, starting with the crisis in Congo. The “Pan-African” institutions of Ghana were reformed and their powers were strengthened in order to deal with these challenges. Generally speaking, Ghana’s Pan-African policy was radicalized. Still, despite the efforts, Nkrumah failed to achieve his targets in Congo. The fall of Lumumba signified the end of a “soft” approach towards the attainment of Pan-Africanism and it produced a further process of radicalization. This chapter describes this passage and displays the bases for further evolutions of Ghana’s Pan-African policy after 1960.

The Forth Chapter describes a period of radicalization (January 1961- August 1962). Since 1961, the Ghanaian President decided to respond to the failures of the previous year with a more radical Pan-African policy. Considering the strength of its enemies, Ghana had to invest much more resources in the struggle for African liberation and unity. A new radical “Ministry of foreign affairs” was established to deal specifically with the African continent: the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS). The propaganda machinery was also developed in order to reach every corner of Africa and to counteract that of the moderate pro-Western states. Moreover, Ghana had to invest more resources in the training of African freedom fighters with the intent to influence them politically. In 1961, the Ideological Institute of Winneba was finally opened to both Ghanaians and freedom fighters. In the same year, Ghana had begun to provide African nationalist with military training, a crucial turning point for Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. Even if the chapter covers the whole year of 1962, the life attempt of Kulungugu (11th August ‘62) is considered as a crucial passage for the development of the events described in the next chapter.

The goal of the Fifth chapter is to outline the history of the last phase of Nkrumah’s government (1963-1966). It is a period in which Ghana’s Pan-African policy reached the peak of radicalism. The chapter explains how the political situation evolved after Kulungugu and how the missions of the BAA changed accordingly. Moreover, it describes the reaction of the West to Barden’s moves in Africa. Finally, the chapter examines the changes occurred in 1965 after Barden’s removal as the director of the BAA. This year proved to be crucial as Ghana’s foreign policy was entirely put under revision in order to

cope with the failures of the previous years. Changes occurred in both the structures and policies performed by the Bureau. Two different approaches emerged. On one side, Nkrumah made a last attempt to use diplomacy for re-launching a Continental Union Government. On the other side, he kept sponsoring revolutionary parties and he also planned a vast military intervention to solve the Southern Rhodesia question. The latter mission – which never turned into a real project - was the last of Ghana's Pan-African policy.

1. Ghana's Pan-African Policy from Independence to the AAPC (March 1957- December 1958)

Introduction

Immediately since its independence, Ghana became one of the main sponsors of African liberation and unity in the continent. The whole foreign policy of Nkrumah's government was based primarily on the achievement of these two targets, both relating to Pan-Africanism. All the strategies designed by Nkrumah to support the unification of Africa and its independence from colonialism will be defined in this thesis as his Pan-African policy.

The first chapter will describe the conception and actualization of Ghana's Pan-African policy during the first phase of Nkrumah's government (March 1957- December 1958).¹ It will focus in particular on the establishment of the first two "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana: the Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs and the African Affairs Centre.

The first two sub-chapters will present briefly the basis of Ghana's foreign policy as it was elaborated before March 1957.² Indeed, its genesis dates back to the period Nkrumah

¹ That is, from Ghana's independence (6 March 1957) to the All African Peoples' Conference (a Pan-African conference held in Accra on 5-13 December 1958). Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) began his political career by being elected Leader of the Government Business of the Gold Coast colony in 1951. He became Prime Minister of the Gold Coast in 1952. He then led the colony to independence winning other two rounds of elections during this path (1954 and 1956). At the time of the Gold Coast independence - when the country changed its name into Ghana - Nkrumah became the first Prime Minister of the country. Until 1960, Ghana's state was still formally headed by the Queen of the United Kingdom, officially represented in the African country by a Governor-General (the last Governor-General, holding the office from March 1957 to July 1960, was Lord Listowell). Only in July 1960, the Republic of Ghana was officially proclaimed and Kwame Nkrumah became its President.

² Some of the most important studies on the history of this period make brief references to the early conception of Ghana's foreign policy. See, for instance, See D. Austin, *Politics in Ghana 1946-60*, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, p. 395. Even in the case of studies specifically devoted to the history of Ghana's foreign policy, the part concerning the period before 1957 is often not analyzed in depth. See, for instance, K. Armah, *Peace without Power* and M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*. W. Scott Thompson in his *Ghana's Foreign Policy* describes in length the period before Ghana's independence.

spent abroad. There will be a particular focus on his early political experiences and the influence exerted by George Padmore on the young African leader, especially on his Pan-Africanist positions.³ The figure of Padmore is absolutely crucial. Indeed, the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist did not only support politically Nkrumah but he became a protagonist of the conception and implementation of Ghana's foreign policy. The first sub-chapter will try to trace the *file rouge* between Nkrumah and Padmore's past experiences and their work in the Gold Coast and then in Ghana since the early 1950s. The second one will move the analysis forward, examining in depth the ideological basis of Ghana's liberation and unity policies and the political model Nkrumah wanted to export among the African liberations movements.

The rest of the chapter will describe Ghana's Pan-African policy in the first two years of Nkrumah's rule. This period was dominated by a cautious, yet radical, foreign policy. Since 1957, Nkrumah presented his country as a political guide for the liberation movements in the rest of the continent, promoting nonviolence as the best weapon to conduct the liberation struggle in Africa. Ghana's Prime Minister organized two international conferences to attract governments, parties and movements to the Pan-Africanist principles: the Independent African States Conference (IASC) and the All-African People's Conference. In addition, he established a union with Guinea (November 1958), in order to pave the way for a continental unity project.

In this period, Nkrumah and Padmore worked also on the establishment of two institutions, specifically designed to perform Ghana's Pan-African policy: the Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs - headed by George Padmore himself - and the African Affairs Centre (AAC). The former became one of the most important institutions of Ghana; established outside the control of the Foreign Service, it was meant to operate using "un-orthodox" diplomatic means.

However, he provides a very critical analysis of Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore's contribution to the making of the complex system of Ghana's foreign policy. See W.S., Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp. 3-27.

³ George Padmore (28 June 1903 – 23 September 1959) was one of the most important and renown Pan-Africanists. Born in Trinidad, he collected political experiences in both socialist and Pan-Africanist circles since the 1920s. He worked as a journalist and activist in the United States, Soviet Union, Germany and the United Kingdom. In 1945, he met Kwame Nkrumah in London.

Padmore's entry into Ghana's politics was not uncontested. He particularly resented the opposition of several elements of the Ghanaian civil service. This troubled relationship was bound to evolve in a general confrontation between the "orthodox" and "unorthodox" machineries of Ghana's foreign policy system. This chapter will present evidences of the clashes between Padmore and other members of the service. There will also be an analysis of the functioning of the brand-new institutions, their aims and targets and the composition of their staff.

1.1. From Manchester to Accra

Ghana's Pan-African policy cannot be understood in all its complexity without making reference to the political biographies of Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore, the very protagonists of its conception. A young African student one and a Trinidadian journalist the other, they both became supporters of Pan-Africanism in the 1930s, when they also acquired their first experiences in the anti-colonial struggle. Their lives definitely changed once their paths crossed at the Manchester Pan-African Congress, where they started working together to actualize their ideals into a solid political project. Between 1945 and 1957, they began to give shape to what was going to become Ghana's Pan-African policy.

The experience Kwame Nkrumah acquired during the period he spent abroad (1935 - 1947) proved fundamental to give shape to his political thoughts and to provide him with the know-how of politics. In 1935, he left his homeland, the Gold Coast, for the first time, for the United States, where he had planned to pursue higher education. At the time, he was still not involved much in politics. He had also a very general idea on nationalism and Pan-Africanism.⁴ The trip to the US was going to change all of that.

⁴ In his autobiography, Nkrumah devotes only few pages to his political experiences before his trip to United States. He mentions his involvement in an association of teachers in the early 1930s. He also refers to his early introduction to politics thanks to Mr. S.R. Wood, at the time secretary of the National Congress of British West Africa, the nationalist party established by Casely Hayford a decade before. He recalls having

During the American period Nkrumah began studying intensively the most known and influential ideologies.⁵ He also examined the activities of American political parties in order to understand how to organize his own.⁶ It was in this period, that he met C.R.L. James, a fundamental figure for him and George Padmore.⁷ According to Nkrumah himself, James gave an important contribution to his political background as he taught him “how an underground movement worked”.⁸ While in the US, Nkrumah also began to be engaged in political activity. He became a leader of the African Students’ Association and he published a political newspaper, “The African Interpreter”.⁹

After ten years in the US, Nkrumah was essentially formed as a politician and ready to undertake the fight for African independence. However, he needed one more step forward. At the time, he was still cut out from the actual front of the anti-colonial struggle

met Nnamdi Azikiwe and to knowing Wallace-Johnson from his articles and his activity with the labor organizations in Sierra Leone. He also underlines that he was supported for his trip to US by George Grant, the first president of the United Gold Coast Convention, the first party to which Nkrumah was associated after his return from London in late 1947. Still, according to him, it was the news about Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia, heard while he was in the UK, which brought him definitely into politics. Quoting from his autobiography: “[...] I heard an excited newspaper boy shouting something unintelligible as he grabbed a bundle of the latest editions from a motor van, and on the placard I read: ‘MUSSOLINI INVADES ETHIOPIA’. That was all I needed. [...] My nationalism surged to the fore; I was ready and willing to go through hell itself, if need be, in order to achieve my object”, in K. Nkrumah, *Ghana: the Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, Nelson, Edinburgh 1957, p.27. The episode might sound novelized and Nkrumah’s words rather rhetorical. However, it might also tell a part of the truth on Nkrumah’s path towards political commitment. Before getting into contact with the Western world and generally with world politics, Nkrumah could not have a complete vision of the colonial question. The question of the invasion of Ethiopia was a general catalyst of all the anti-colonial sentiments in the world, including probably the one of Nkrumah himself.

⁵ Nkrumah underlines in particular the influence exerted by Marx and Lenin on his vision of socialism and the influence of Garvey for what concerns Pan-Africanism. Quoting from his autobiography: “I concentrated on finding a formula by which the whole colonial question and the problem of imperialism could be solved. I read Hegel, Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini. The writings of these men did much to influence me in my revolutionary ideas and activities, and Karl Marx and Lenin particularly impressed me as I felt sure that their philosophy was capable of solving these problems. But I think that of all the literature that I studied, the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey* published in 1923”, in K., Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p.45. With regard to Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah quoted Garvey only as his source of inspiration. Undoubtedly, he was far more influenced by the political visions of Edward Du Bois and George Padmore than the one of Garvey. For an insight into Padmore’s opinion about Du Bois and Garvey see G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, Dennis Dobson, London, 1956, pp.87-151.

⁶ They included: Republicans, Democrats, Communist and Trotskyites. See K., Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p.44.

⁷ Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901-1989) was a Trinidadian historian, journalist and political activist. He is known to be one of the most important Pan-Africanists of his time and also one of the most radical. James himself wrote about Nkrumah when he traced a political history of his government in Ghana. The book is: C.R.L., James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p.44

⁹ K., Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p.43; Ako Adjei and Jones Quartey were also involved in the publication.

and he needed to come into contact with other important African leaders. Furthermore, he had to acquire other political experiences in order to transform his ideals into a solid political project.

The perfect solution to Nkrumah's needs proved to be his participation to the Fifth Pan-African Congress, held at Manchester in December 1945.¹⁰ By working for the organization of the Congress, he made his final entry into the most advanced anti-colonial circles of the time. Moreover, he could also meet the renowned Pan-Africanist George Padmore, the man who was meant to change his conception of politics forever.

In May 1945, Nkrumah left New York for London in order to participate to the work for the Congress. George Padmore was his only contact in the British capital city and he was the one who welcomed the young African leader at his arrival.¹¹ At the time, Padmore was heading the Pan-African Federation (PAF), the organization chosen by Du Bois to arrange the conference.¹² As the official head of the Congress organization, Padmore immediately involved Nkrumah into the activities of the PAF and he started working with him hand by hand in the practical work for the Conference, appointing him also as secretary of the Conference itself.

¹⁰ The congress of 1945 was the fifth of its kind. The others took place in Paris (1919), London and Brussels (1921), London and Lisbon (1923) and New York (1927). They were all preceded by the 1900 London Pan-African Conference. See G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, pp.152-170 and Thompson Bakpetu, *Africa and Unity*, Longman Pub Group, 1977, pp.57-60. Legum is the only author who counts the congresses starting with the 1900 conference. The 1945 Manchester congress becomes then the sixth Pan-African congress. See C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism, A Short Political Guide*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1962, pp.24-32.

¹¹ K. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p. 49.

¹² William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868-1863) is generally considered as one of the fathers of Pan-Africanism. As the "spiritual" leader of the movement, he had an enormous influence on Padmore, especially since the latter break with the communists in the early 1930s. At the time of the conference, he was unanimously considered as the most important personality of the Pan-African movement and he had theoretically the last words in any decision. Still, according to L.E. James, who quotes Adi's "George Padmore and the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress", Padmore and his PAF co-opted Du Bois into the congress and not the other way around. See L.E. James, "*What we put in black and white*": *George Padmore and the practice of anti-imperial politics*. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2012, pp.147-148 and H. Adi-M. Sherwood, *The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited*, New Beacon Books, London, 1995, pp.66-96. Padmore and C.R.L. James' accounts are quite different, since both of them declared that it was Du Bois who involved the PAF in the first place. See C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p.65. See also G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, p.154. For further information on Padmore's biography see G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary. George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-Africanism*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1967; C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution* and M. Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, Routledge, London, 2003.

This meeting marked the life of both of them. As for Nkrumah, he found both a mentor and an ally to strengthen his political project. As for Padmore, he met the young and radical African leader he was looking for: someone ready to hand over the Pan-African torch from the “Diaspora” to the Africans.¹³

For Nkrumah, working with Padmore was a fundamental experience. The latter provided him with all his knowledge, acquired in his long years of anti-colonial activities in different countries and with different means.¹⁴ Nkrumah could also appreciate how wide Padmore’s net of political contacts was and how important was this work for the Pan-Africanist struggle.¹⁵ Everything surrounding the conference was a fertile ground for

¹³ According to L.E. James, Padmore saw in Nkrumah the figure of a “statesman”. See L.E. James, “*What we put in black and white*”, p. 194.

¹⁴ Padmore had collected his first political experiences in the United States during the 1920s. Then, he worked in the USSR in the early 1930s as an American specialist and later as the head of the RILU (The Red International of Labor Unions, commonly known as the Profintern) Negro Bureau. At the same time he was lecturer at the Kutvu University and he also became a member of the Moscow City Soviet. While in the USSR, he collected useful political experiences in anti-colonial activities, he dealt with political contacts (for instance, Jomo Kenyatta) and he could travel throughout Africa. When Padmore moved to London, in 1935, he came into contact with the West African Students’ Union (WASU), led by the famous Pan-Africanist Ladipo Solanke. He then joined the International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA), an association established after Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in order to coordinate the protests against it. C.R.L. James was its chairman (C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p. 64.). Through the IAFA, Padmore came into contact even with West African politics as the organization was born after the so-called Gold Coast Committee. Behind this Committee there were both the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society (ARPS) and several representatives of the chiefs of the Gold Coast. See G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, pp. 144-146. In 1937, together with some of the members of the IAFA, he established the International African Service Bureau (IASB), the forerunner of the Pan-African Federation (the organization responsible for organizing the 1945 Manchester Congress). Among its leaders were George Padmore, Wallace Johnson, C.R.L. James, Jomo Kenyatta and Ras Makonnen. The Bureau was a politically independent office devoted to create and held contacts with Pan-African activists worldwide. The aim of the IASB was: “[...] to help enlighten public opinion, particularly in Great Britain (and other democratic countries possessing colonies inhabited by Africans and people of African descent) as to the true conditions in the various colonies, protectorates and mandated territories in Africa and the West Indies”. In Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, p. 147. The final step for the IASB was to absorb even Du Bois’s experience and revive early Pan-Africanism. During the war, Du Bois’s “Pan-African Congress” was linked with the Bureau. This association brought, in June 1944, to the creation of the Pan-African Federation. See C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p. 65.

¹⁵ Padmore had long-term experiences in managing a wide net of contacts. Manchester was the first conference he ever organized in his long political life. However, he had already a solid experience in organizing hundreds of activists worldwide and in dealing with political press. He had worked in these fields in the United States, Russia and Germany before moving to the UK in 1935. While working for the RILU in USSR he dealt with hundreds of African activists. According to James: “In the course of this work [at RILU] he was constantly in contact with African nationalist revolutionaries all over the world and himself visited and helped to organize revolutionary activities in various parts of Africa, acquiring an immense practical and theoretical experience”. In C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p. 63. In Great Britain, the experiences with the IAFA (chaired by James) and then with the IASB provided him with further experiences in this field. James wrote

Nkrumah's evolution as a politician. As James underlined: "It was to this circle with its accumulated knowledge, experience and wide contacts that Nkrumah was introduced in June 1945. Nowhere in the world could he have found a better school".¹⁶

Padmore was for Nkrumah also a source of ideological inspiration. As Mensah had rightly underlined, the former influenced the latter in connecting organically the question of Gold Coast's independence with the liberation of the whole African continent.¹⁷ While in the US, Nkrumah had already declared himself a Pan-Africanist but his call to the coordination of nationalist parties was still limited to British West Africa.¹⁸ In line with this

about Padmore's experience into the IASB: "Padmore himself carried on an unceasing correspondence with people all over the world. He made a precarious living by being correspondent for a great number of papers in the United States, in the West Indies, in West Africa, in East Africa, everywhere, and, through limited by the political opinions of his employees he gave his readers a steady stream of information about European matters that affected them. The Bureau published a journal in which it was free to say what it pleased and this was sent over the world.[...] The basis of that work and the development of ideas was Padmore's encyclopedic knowledge of Africa, of African politics and African personalities, his timeless correspondence with Africans who made the Bureau and its chairman their political headquarters when in London. C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p.65. When Nkrumah and Padmore started working for organizing the conference, Padmore's experience emerged. Nkrumah devoted some lines of his autobiography to their work for the conference. "[...] We worked night and day in George's flat. We used to sit in his small kitchen, the wooden table completely covered by papers, a pot of tea which we always forgot until it had been made two or three hours and George typing at his small typewriter so fast that the papers were churned out they were being rolled off a printing press. We dispatched hundreds and hundreds of letters to the various organizations throughout Africa and the West Indies explaining the aims of the Congress and the political tactics that should be adopted to achieve liberation in the colonies." K. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p. 52.

¹⁶ C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p.77.

¹⁷ J.J. Mensah, *The Bureau of African Affairs*, p.34.

¹⁸ In his autobiography Nkrumah recalls his political experience in the US with African students and his attempts to organize them under one Pan-African framework. Still, no references were made to solid projects of political union apart from an ideal call for unity in a non-specified future. Nkrumah wrote: "I and the Gold Coast students [...] felt strongly that the question of territorial solidarity - that is to say, each territory mapping out and planning its own liberation - could not hope for ultimate success until it was linked up with the other movements in West Africa. We believed that unless territorial freedom was ultimately linked up with the Pan-African movement for the liberation of the whole continent, there would be no hope of freedom and equality for the African and for people of African descent in any part of the world. The idea of West African unity, which, of course, I strongly supported, became the accepted philosophy of the African Students' Association and we directed the students that when they returned to their respective territories they should work hard politically to organize particular areas, but that in so doing they should maintain close contact with the political activities of their territories. By this means they would maintain not only unity within their own territories, but would pave the way for unity among all the territories in West Africa". In K. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, pp.43-44. Nkrumah was undoubtedly influenced by Joseph Ephraim Casely-Hayford (1866-1930), probably the most famous Pan-Africanist of the Gold Coast of his times. Just few years before, Casely-Hayford had established something between a nationalist and a Pan-Africanist organization: the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), which was active between 1920 and 1930. The NCBWA had tried to connect all the nationalists of British West Africa, providing them with a common platform in order to present protests and requests to London. Nkrumah proved his admiration for Casely-Hayford by quoting him in his "Towards Colonial Freedom" (1945): "The future of West Africa demands that the youth of West Africa should start life

position, at the Manchester Congress, he represented the West African region and he advocated the inclusion of a call for unity of the region among the resolutions.¹⁹ Padmore contributed to extend this call to the whole continent, radicalizing his conception of Pan-Africanism.²⁰ On his part, Nkrumah showed Padmore his own growing political skills and his eagerness to take the lead of the struggle for African liberation and unity.²¹

The Manchester Congress was the occasion for Nkrumah to discuss unification projects with other leaders (for instance, Azikiwe) and to put the basis for a Pan-African platform. Immediately after its closing, he contributed to the establishment of the Pan-Africanist organization West African National Secretariat (WANS) and he became its first secretary-general. This body was created to unite West African nationalist movements under one flag, inheriting the tradition of Casely Hayford's National Congress of British West Africa. The WANS had a short life, immediately interrupted after Nkrumah's return to the Gold Coast (1947). It was, however, an important step forward towards the establishment of a solid Pan-Africanist platform. For the first time, the WANS made reference to a union of African states. Indeed, a secret revolutionary group within the organization called "The Circle" produced a project for a union of socialist republics to be established in British West Africa. Nkrumah and Padmore were both members of the group.²²

During the period spent in UK, Nkrumah worked also with African students connecting their struggles with the Pan-African one. In 1945, he became Vice President of

with a distinct objective. Of brain power we are assured. If mechanical skill there is no dearth. What is wanted is the directing hand which will point to the right goal. A united West Africa arises, chastened and inspired with a conviction that in union is her strength, her weakness in discord", K. Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom*, Panaf, London, 1962, p. vii.

¹⁹ G. Padmore (ed. by), *History of the Pan-African Congress*, Hammersmith Bookshop, London 1963, p.32.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p.55.

²¹ During the period spent in Great Britain (1945-1947), Nkrumah kept exploring the world of politics by studying - as he had done in the US - the local parties in action. He recalls in his autobiography: "When I was in England I had associated myself with all parties ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left in order to gain as much knowledge as I could to help me in organizing my own nationalist party on the best possible lines when I eventually returned to my country", K. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, pp. 79-80.

²² The third important member of the group after Padmore and Nkrumah was Kojo Botsio (1916-2001), one of Nkrumah's closest friend and political ally. On the "The Circle" affair see K. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, pp.79-81 and pp.85-87. Interestingly, according to Nkrumah, the British authorities misquoted a passage of a document of The Circle in his possession after being arrested. They reported that the aim of The Circle was to establish a "Union of West African Soviet Socialist Republics". The original document did not include the word "Soviet". For the text of the document see K. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, pp.303-304.

Solanke's West African Students' Union (WASU), at the time one of the most important Pan-Africanist organizations. With the WASU, Nkrumah understood the potential of the net of African students to spread Manchester's ideals worldwide. At the time of Ghana's independence, the support to African students became an integral part of Accra's foreign policy.

Padmore was impressed by Nkrumah's ability in dealing with the net of African activists and also by his conviction in the Pan-African cause. With the WANS, Nkrumah had showed him that the time was ripe for the "West Indians" to pass the Pan-African torch to the African continent.²³ Moreover, the future Prime Minister of Ghana also impressed him when he became the first leader to apply the indications of the Pan-African Congress to the struggle for the independence of the Gold Coast, another important achievement towards the road to put Pan-Africanism in practice.

At the Manchester Congress, Nkrumah had discussed concrete strategies for achieving African freedom and he had developed his own conception of nationalism. After the Congress, he worked for translating all the indications of the congress into the reality of the struggle for the Gold Coast's independence. Manchester's final resolutions included two main guidelines to be used by liberation movements: the use of nonviolence and the need to "organize the masses" in order to unite them under one nationalist flag and avoid the rise of tribalism.²⁴ Nkrumah absorbed both indications and he transformed them into

²³ Quoting from James: "Nkrumah not only took, he gave [...] to theoretical study, propaganda and agitation, the building and maintaining of contacts abroad he added the organization politically of Africans and people of African descent in London. He helped to found a West African National Secretariat in London for the purpose of organizing the struggle in West Africa. The leading members of this were Africans, and thus Africans with roots in Africa began to take over from the West Indians who had hitherto been the leaders". In C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p.77.

²⁴ On the "organization of the masses" see G. Padmore, (ed. by), *History of the Pan-African Congress*, p.7. With regard to nonviolence, Manchester marked an historical change in this direction on the field of anti-colonialism. Before to the Second World War, the radical wings of the anti-colonial movements were influenced by the communist theories of the people's war of liberation. However, the lack of any revolutionary process in Europe after the war and the success of Gandhi's non violent anti-colonial resistance led the radical Pan-Africanists to choose nonviolence as their main weapon for the independence' struggle. C.R.L. James perfectly describes the shift from the idea of an armed rebellion to that of nonviolence just after the Second World War. C.R.L. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, pp.71-74; For an outline of the question of violence related to Pan-Africanism see E.L. Dumor, *Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa*, pp.33 and ff. Violence became the last resort, to be "held in reserve" (C.R.L., James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p.71) and to be used against colonialism just in case of an armed repression of liberation movements.

successful tactical weapons for the independence struggle of his country. Indeed, he developed his own non-violent resistance method, the “Positive Action” and he established his own mass nationalist party: the Convention People’s Party (CPP).

Once he got back to the Gold Coast, Nkrumah ran the youth wing of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) for almost two years. At the time, the UGCC was the main nationalist party of the colony but it still represented only the higher classes of urban populations. Nkrumah worked hard to transform it into a true mass nationalist party by spreading UGCC branches throughout the colony. However, he soon realized that he needed a break from the Gold Coast Convention if he wanted to follow the steps indicated by the Pan-African Congress.

In 1949, he finally established a brand new mass nationalist party, the Convention People’s Party. The CPP represented all the classes and ethnicities of the Gold Coast, sponsoring centralization against any federal solution – that is - national unity versus tribalism. On January 1950 - thanks to the strength of the party - Nkrumah could launch the “Positive Action campaign”, a series of protests and boycotts which threatened the stability of the colonial government.²⁵ The campaign was a successful one: elections for the self-government followed (1951) and the CPP won the majority of the seats. Nkrumah became the first “Leader of the Government Business”.

Padmore was impressed by Nkrumah’s achievements in the field of African liberation. According to Padmore, the victory of the CPP was the result of Nkrumah’s effort to build a modern centralized nationalist movement and his choice to use the Positive Action as its main weapon.²⁶ These were precisely Manchester’s indication put into practice. According to Padmore, Nkrumah’s experience in the Gold Coast was the last tract

²⁵ For Nkrumah’s personal account of the use of Positive Action in the struggle for the Gold Coast self-government see K. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, pp.110-122. See also G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, pp.171-185; See also K. Nkrumah, “*What I mean by Positive Action*”, undated CPP pamphlet.

²⁶ L.E. James quotes Padmore on the question of federalism in 1954: “The West Indies leaders are divided as those in Nigeria on the question of: to who is political power to be transferred in a federal set-up? The only colonial territory that has met this essential prerequisite and which the British Government is ready to make final arrangements...is the Gold Coast”. In G. Padmore, *Labour Party Backs Gold Coast Independence*, Ashanti Pioneer, 3 Sept. 1954, quoted in L.E. James, “*What we put in black and white*”, p.202.

of a path begun with the early Pan-Africanists like Sylvester Williams or Blyden. It was “Pan-Africanism in Action”.²⁷ Padmore wrote on Nkrumah’s victory of 1951:

This was the first victory for the ideology of Pan-Africanism. It proved definitely the effectiveness of organization and Positive Action based on non-violent methods. ‘Organization decides everything’ emphasized Nkrumah. Ever since that initial victory, the continued strength of the CPP has rested on its superb organization. In the words of the Declaration of the Fifth Pan-African Congress, ‘today there is only one road to effective action – the organization of the masses’.²⁸

Later, even James underlined the strict link between Nkrumah’s successful struggle and the Fifth Pan-African Congress: “It took the revolution in the Gold Coast itself to make possible a true evaluation of this policy [the Pan-Africanist one] elaborated in 1945. So it always is with a theory”.²⁹

Following Nkrumah’s victory, Padmore finally chose the Gold Coast as his new political and physical home. Interestingly, until then, he had kept different options opened. After Manchester, he was still working with the PAF and he had also supported different nationalist movements in Africa.³⁰ He was particularly close to Azikiwe, who was a successful political leader in Nigeria and an early supporter of Pan-Africanism.³¹ In the years 1947-1951, Padmore had followed the political developments in both Azikiwe’s Nigeria and Nkrumah’s Gold Coast, examining the moves of the two leaders.³² Nkrumah’s

²⁷ “Pan-Africanism in Action” is the name of a chapter of *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* referring to Nkrumah’s struggle for independence and its links to the political indications of Manchester, see G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, pp.171-185.

²⁸ G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, p.178. He wrote also: “There is absolutely no doubt that the Fifth Pan-African Congress played a key role as the rallying point of the anti-imperialist struggle, and that its resolutions and resulting programs inspired the leaders who participated in its deliberations to carry forward their endeavors in their native territories. [...] That Congress [...] set precise objectives for attainment which formed in essence the basic program of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party, and governed its organization”. In G. Padmore, (ed. by), *History of the Pan-African Congress*, p.7.

²⁹ C.R.L., James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p.74.

³⁰ At the time, the organization published a journal, “Pan-African” edited by Ras Makonnen (1900-1983), a famous Pan-Africanist activists who became head of the African Affairs Centre in late 1958.

³¹ After Manchester, Padmore published many articles on Azikiwe’s newspaper “West African Pilot”, see L.E. James, “*What we put in black and white*”, p.164.

³² Since the late 1940s Padmore produced a series of articles for the Gold Coast newspaper “The Ashanti Pioneer”.

success at the 1951 elections finally convinced him that Accra was on the right political path.

According to Padmore, Nkrumah had a tremendous opportunity in his hands. The young Leader of the Government Business could transform the Gold Coast into a guide for other nationalist movements in the continent.³³ From Accra, they could work together on a project to extend nationalism, socialism and Pan-Africanism to the whole continent. Padmore stated: "The Gold Coast is like a lighthouse in a dark continent showing the blacks the way safely into port".³⁴ Nkrumah's words were similar to his.³⁵

Since 1951, Padmore had begun working for both the CPP and Nkrumah's government. He contributed to the evolution of the party organization and he also worked for the constitutional revision of the colony.³⁶ According to him, Nkrumah's Gold Coast had far more chances than any other African territory to gain independence, including Azikiwe's Nigeria. This was due mainly to Nkrumah's practical achievements, which had given a concrete contribution to the Pan-African cause.³⁷

The two of them begun working together on a sort of Pan-African foreign policy, since the early 1950s. They considered the CPP as a model for liberation movements in Africa and other colonial territories.³⁸ Similarly, they promoted the Gold Coast liberation struggle as the ideal path towards independence. The latter became the main theme of a

³³ Padmore wrote in 1953: "It's time that K[wame] and his colleagues see themselves in relation to the rest of Africa and not as something isolated. They are the beacon light, and in more than their own interests they cannot afford to fall down". George Padmore to Ivar Holm, April 1953. Nkrumah MSS/Howard, box 154-41, folder 14, quotes in L.E. James, *"What we put in black and white"*, p.203.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p.203.

³⁵ In the so-called Motion of Destiny Speech, of 10 July 1953, Nkrumah stated: "Our Aim is to make this country a worthy place for all its citizens, a country that will be a shining light throughout the whole continent of Africa, giving inspiration far beyond its frontiers". Quoted in Motion of Destiny speech, 10 July 1953, in K. Nkrumah, *Axioms*, p.76. On the 31st of December 1955, Nkrumah had underlined to his fellow citizens the importance of their struggle for all the continent: "[...] I would like every citizen in the Gold Coast - on the coast, in Ashanti, in the Northern Territories - to remember that the hopes of millions of Africans living in our great continent are pinned upon the success of our experiment here!". Quoted in D. Bosumtwi-Sam, *Landmarks of Dr Kwame Nkrumah*, p.39.

³⁶ L.E. James, *"What we put in black and white"*, pp.205-207. On Padmore's contribution to the ideological development of the CPP see also D. Apter, *Ghana in Transition*, Atheneum, New York, 1963, p.349.

³⁷ Nkrumah was showing Padmore how to be politically concrete. On the contrary, at the time, Padmore had become restless with "café intellectuals" see L.E. James, *"What we put in black and white"*, p.190.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, pp.203-204.

series of articles and it was also the theme of the book “The Gold Coast Revolution”, published in 1953.³⁹

In the meantime, Nkrumah and Padmore had begun working to re-launch a Pan-African platform from the Gold Coast. In 1953, the former organized a new Pan-African Congress in Kumasi.⁴⁰ The latter did not participate to the congress, but he started working for the one scheduled next, in 1955 (which never took place).

In view of the proposed congress of 1955, Padmore wrote his most important book, “Pan-Africanism or Communism?”, meant to be distributed at the congress and to be provided to CPP party members. It was, at the same time, a manual of Pan-Africanism and a first attempt to make a history of this political philosophy. With this book, Padmore’s analysis reached the apex. He outlined a program to spread Pan-Africanism from the Gold Coast to the whole African continent and he also presented Nkrumah’s political successes as the model to be followed by the nationalist movements. The book can be considered as a first outline of what later became the Pan-African policy of Nkrumah’s government.

The new African nation – which became independent with the name of Ghana in March 1957 – was planned to become the very center of the struggle for African liberation and unity in the continent. Padmore and Nkrumah had worked for years and years to be ready for an occasion such as this one. Finally, Pan-Africanism could be put into practice and it could be spread from Accra to the whole continent.

Ghana’s independence was approaching and Nkrumah and Padmore had already elaborated the theoretical basis of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. They only had to create proper institutions to attain its targets and to specify the guidelines that the Ghanaian institutions had to follow when dealing with African liberation movements.

³⁹ G. Padmore, *The Gold Coast Revolution*, Dennis Dobson, London, 1953.

⁴⁰ At the conference, Azikiwe met with Nkrumah to discuss how to fulfill “The liberation of Africa and [...] a strong West African Federation”. Cit. in J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.118-119; Padmore missed the conference and he never mentioned it in his writings. See also W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp.4-5.

1.2. The Pillars of Ghana's Pan-African Policy and the Guidelines for the African Liberation Movements Supported by Accra

In the Gold Coast, Pan-Africanism and nationalism had won an important battle. Ghana's independence meant the victory of Manchester's model: the theory had been put into practice. The next step was to export this model to the rest of Africa, developing a proper "Pan-African" policy for Ghana. Nkrumah and Padmore conceived its outline just before independence. Accra was planned to become a shelter for African liberation movements, provided their adherence to the Pan-Africanist ideology. Ghana had to become the "Mecca" of African freedom fighters and, ultimately, the sponsor of a union of African states.⁴¹ In order to achieve these targets, Nkrumah and Padmore worked on the establishment of proper "Pan-African" institutions. Before describing their nature, it is important to analyze the policies they had to perform. Only then it will be possible to understand to what extent Ghana influenced the development of nationalist movements in Africa.

The primary goal of Ghana's Pan-African policy was to support African liberation movements. At the time of independence, Nkrumah and Padmore had to find the best solutions in order to capitalize on Ghana's political strength and to make good use of the available resources. They needed to operate a selection among the liberation movements, in order to create a front of Pan-Africanist parties all over the continent. Finally, they elaborated specific guidelines to be followed by other nationalist movements that were seeking Ghana's support. These were essentially based on the Pan-Africanist theory, but they also included elements taken by the experience Nkrumah acquired during Ghana's independence struggle. They were: a) the development of mass nationalist movements or parties without references to class or ethnicity, supporting centralized states against federalist options (national unity versus tribalism); b) the use of nonviolence in the independence struggle, unless guerrilla warfare was strictly necessary; c) the adherence to nonalignment in world politics. The parties or movements supported by Ghana were meant

⁴¹ T. Adamafio, *By Nkrumah's Side*, p. 103.

to follow to a certain degree these three guidelines, provided their support to African unity as their final goal.

As for the first point, Nkrumah and Padmore both strongly supported nationalism, but neither of them wanted to promote a division of Africa after the fall of colonialism. As other important Pan-Africanists before them, they considered the independence of African nations only as the first step towards a progressive process of unity of the continent. After the liberation of Africa was assured, the new political entities were meant to merge together into a union based on the model of the United States and USSR. Nationalism, in this sense, was a means, not an end.

Nkrumah and Padmore considered nationalism as the best way to avoid any return to pre-colonial past, an option which could undermine the actualization of the Pan-African targets. Indeed, going back to pre-colonial times would have meant to strengthen “tribalism” and further the “balkanization” of Africa.⁴² From this point of view, they considered even federalism as a danger for the African unity project. During the 1950s, Nkrumah had strongly opposed any federalist plan in the Gold Coast and Padmore had backed him in this battle. The next move was to export this policy elsewhere. One of the targets of Ghana’s Pan-African policy became, then, the support to nationalist parties which could fight against federalism and ethnic divisions. Thus, Ghana supported the most representative and inclusive liberation movements, provided their ideological stand was close to Ghana’s.⁴³ If a single nationalist party or organization could not gain the hegemony of the liberation struggle, Accra supported a united front formed by the most representative

⁴² On Padmore’s opposition to tribalism see L.E. James, “*What we put in black and white*”, pp.207-216 and also pp.228-229. According to Nkrumah, the African states were already potentially weak as they were, they did not need to become even more fragmented. The “balkanization of Africa” was the result of the scramble for Africa of the XIX century and it was the reason why Africa was in danger of alien control even after its liberation. Nkrumah stated in 1961: “The political situation in Africa is heartening and at the same time disturbing. It is heartening to see so many new flags hosted in place of the old; it is disturbing to see so many countries of varying sizes and at different levels of development, weak, and, in some cases, almost helpless. If this terrible state of fragmentation is allowed to continue it may well be disastrous for us all”. In K. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, Heinemann, London, 1961 p. xiii. In 1963, he also stated: “So long as we remain balkanized, regionally or territorially, we shall be at the mercy of colonialism and imperialism”. In K. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1963, p.218. These two passages can be found also in K. Nkrumah, *Axioms*, pp.25-26.

⁴³ In some cases, Ghana did not support the most representative groups but it backed minorities parties. The reasons behind these choices differ case by case and they will be analyzed further in the thesis.

groups. This policy was made effective especially in Southern Africa, where ethnic or political divisions often created a strong rivalry among liberation movements.

The second pillar of Ghana's Pan-African policy was the belief in nonviolence - particularly in the form of "Positive Action" - as the best way to confront colonialism. The Positive Action had been developed by Nkrumah after Manchester.⁴⁴ It was essentially an adaptation of Gandhism to the needs of the Gold Coast independence struggle. As previously noted, Padmore was impressed by the result of the Positive Action campaign of 1950. He devoted several pages of his "Pan-Africanism or Communism?" to the use of nonviolence, presenting Nkrumah's Positive Action as the most successful experiment of this kind in Africa. He wished that all Africans would follow "[...] the footsteps of the Gold Coast along the road of non-violent revolution instead of Mau Mauism".⁴⁵

Since Ghana's independence, Padmore and Nkrumah supported nonviolence over guerrilla warfare, pushing other liberation movements to experiment Positive Action in their liberation struggles. The reason behind this choice was related to tactics rather than to moral considerations. A military confrontation with colonial powers was considered, at least, a suicidal mission. On the contrary, the use of Positive Action could achieve better results with fewer risks of human losses and political disasters than an anti-colonial war. Thus, the use of violence was strongly opposed not because it was wrong in itself but because it was evidently dangerous. The ultimate success of nonviolence was possible, however, only through the development of channels of communication between a mass nationalist party and the colonial government, as it had happened in the Gold Coast.⁴⁶

Both Padmore and Nkrumah knew that in some cases the use of violence was inevitable.⁴⁷ In the first period of Nkrumah's rule in Ghana, while the government and its institutions strongly supported nonviolence, they also prepared the ground for giving

⁴⁴ The concept was first introduced by Garba-Jahumpa at the Manchester Pan-African Congress.

⁴⁵ In G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, p.185; Padmore devoted also an entire chapter of his book to Mau-Mauism, in order to present his ideas on Kenyan politics and to compare the situation in Kenya to the one in the Gold Coast.

⁴⁶ In this sense, what happened in Kenya with Mau-Mauism represented quite the opposite situation. See L.E. James, *"What we put in black and white"*, p.194.

⁴⁷ According to Kwaku Bapui Asante (former Principal Secretary of the African Affairs Secretariat (1961-1966) Nkrumah was essentially a realist. He preferred nonviolence above all but he was ready to use violence in case the colonialists or neo-colonialists would push African freedom fighters towards an open war. Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 6th September 2012.

support to the armed rebellion, when it was necessary. During the years 1957-1958, Ghana's official position on the use of violence reflected this duality to the point of being contradictory.

The third pillar of Ghana's Pan-African policy was the support to nonalignment. In line with its position in Cold War politics, Accra strongly sponsored those parties which could maintain an equal distance between the East and the West. Since Manchester's Congress, nonalignment had become a peculiar tract of the Pan-Africanist field. When the Cold War erupted, even Nkrumah and Padmore refused to take a stand for one bloc or the other. Pan-Africanism had to be neutral, as its success could not depend on the events of the Cold War. The liberation movements had only to absorb the best the two blocs could offer in order to defeat colonialism and neo-colonialism. In Nkrumah's political discourse, neutrality lost its negative acceptation and became "Positive Neutrality" or "Positive Nonalignment". It became the weapon to affirm the "African personality", that is to say, the peculiar needs, the values, the desires and the aspirations of the inhabitants of the African continent.⁴⁸ No one was ever to speak for Africans in the international stage, nor, clearly, in their own nations.

⁴⁸ The two ideas of Positive Neutrality and African Personality were strictly related. The concept of African Personality in foreign relations consisted in the promotion of African thoughts and targets for the liberation and development of the continent. The first to use this term had been the famous Pan-Africanist Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-1912). See E.L. Dumor, *Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa*, p.28 and C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, pp.4-5. Nkrumah used it once he adjusted it to the peculiar needs of his period. He wanted to provide Africa with a strong voice on the international ground. According to him, the continent could contribute to world peace, especially through active nonalignment (Positive Neutrality), the application of the African Personality and the support to the United Nations. He stated in 1958: "Our earnest and passionate desire is to exert through our African Personality whatever influence we can bring to bear on the side of peace, in the hope of persuading the two main power blocs to come together to find a peaceful and permanent solution to their outstanding differences within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations", quoted in A. Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound, Reflection of an African Statesman*, F.A. Praeger Pub., New York, 1963, p.36. As for the "Positive Neutrality", Armah explains in few words its basic principles as part of part of Nkrumah's foreign policy: "They [the non-aligned countries] would even go to the extent of taking sides in the dispute, but, as a matter of principle, they declared themselves against any permanent or long-term involvement on the side of one or the other of the parties to the cold war. [...] Nkrumah's principle of positive neutrality or Positive Nonalignment was pragmatic. It was essentially a foreign policy of pragmatic non-committal. By eschewing commitment to super power bloc alliances in the early post-independence period, and by rejecting the notion of automatic alignment in the cold war, Ghana gave herself time to think. Nonalignment as a foreign policy was well suited to that period of experimentation". In K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.141.

Ghana had joined the group of non-aligned states - including India, Egypt and Indonesia - since the 1955 Bandung's conference, when it was still called Gold Coast.⁴⁹ After independence, nonalignment became an integral part of its foreign policy and, at least in the period between 1957 and 1958, it was substantially respected. Since 1957, Accra promoted Positive Neutrality both in international gatherings and among the nationalist parties supported. Nonalignment could assure the liberation movements a true freedom of action before, during and after independence. Only with this freedom, Pan-Africanism could be finally victorious in the continent.

The three pillars discussed above were the very foundation of Ghana's Pan-African policy and they were the main tracts requested by Accra to the parties which were seeking its support. The next step for Nkrumah and Padmore was to create proper instruments to perform this policy and to channel the African liberation movements on these binaries. Nkrumah's first move was to involve Padmore in the foreign relation system of Ghana. It was a mutual benefit for both of them: the former could be assured on the effectiveness of Ghana's Pan-African policy; the latter could finally acquire the resources he needed to launch a Pan-African and socialist revolution in Africa.

1.3. The Establishment of the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs

Padmore and Nkrumah had worked for years to bring Pan-Africanism into action. The first step had been made. Ghana was independent, ready to support African liberation and unity and also to sponsor its political model in Africa. After the Pan-African policy was drafted, it was time to work on the instruments to enact it. Since 1957, new institutions had to be designed and old ones had to be re-designed. The first of a series of "Pan-African" institutions was established outside the "orthodox" government machinery: the Office of

⁴⁹ The Gold Coast Government had sent an observer, since it was still a colony. For further information on the Gold Coast delegation to Bandung see M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, pp.19-20.

the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs. The new body, headed by Padmore himself, was essentially involved in the recovery of information and in giving support to liberation movements in Africa. It had a difficult genesis: both Nkrumah and Padmore had to work to win the resistance of part of the civil service and also part of the CPP against its establishment. This opposition unveiled a clear difference of outlook between “radicals” and “non-radicals”, a confrontation which characterized Ghana also in the following years.

At the independence celebrations, Nkrumah made it clear to his compatriots that Ghana was called to fulfill a mission for the whole continent.⁵⁰ At midnight of 6th March 1957, he pronounced his famous statement: “The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent”.⁵¹ The Prime Minister summarized in one sentence the very core of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. Unless the whole continent was freed, no real achievement could be made towards a true independence, not even for Ghana. Only a free and united Africa could assure a true progress and the final entry of the African territories among the nations of the world. Ghana was bound to play a leading role in this process and every resource of the new-born nation had to be spent to achieve the target. Thus, the whole system of foreign policy of Ghana had to focus on the support to African liberation and Unity.

In September, Nkrumah invited Padmore in Ghana as he wanted to work with him on the actualization of this political project. Their primary goal was to examine every possible solution to transform Ghana’s foreign policy system into a Pan-Africanist instrument. Nkrumah himself took over the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs in order to take control of the situation.⁵² They finally elaborated two solutions to achieve this target. In both cases, Padmore was meant to play a key role.

Nkrumah’s first option was to involve Padmore in the Ghanaian government by appointing him to a cabinet post, possibly at the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs

⁵⁰ Padmore attended the celebrations as one of the most prestigious guests. His presence testified the political alliance and the personal friendship between him and Nkrumah. He was also wearing the *kente* cloth robe to show symbolically his support to Ghana’s independence. G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.130. See also L.E. James, “*What we put in black and white*”, p.221.

⁵¹ Nkrumah, Midnight pronouncement of Independence at Polo Ground, Accra, 5 March 1957, extract in K. Nkrumah, *Axioms*, p.77.

⁵² The Ministry of Defence and External Affairs was renamed Ministry of External Affairs in July 1958. In May 1961 it became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

or to grant him with a post of Adviser on African Affairs at the Ministry itself. This way, the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist could work on the “radicalization” of the institution, since the Foreign Service was hardly considered ready to perform a progressive Pan-African policy. It must be underlined that the original members of the Foreign Service had all been trained by the British back in 1955-1956.⁵³

This option had two main critical points. First of all, Nkrumah and Padmore did not want to involve the British-trained civil service in the anti-colonial struggle. They also thought that some men of the Foreign Service were not even experienced in this kind of activities. Secondly, part of the government and the Foreign Service had doubts about Padmore’s appointment to a post related to African affairs since he was a non-African foreigner and thus supposedly not qualified for the job.

As for the first point, Nkrumah was dubious not only about the Foreign Service but also about part of the civil service as a whole. Generally speaking, he always had some reservations towards men trained by colonial authorities. Even if he usually appreciated the British-trained personnel, he feared to count too much on them, especially when dealing with African liberation and unity.⁵⁴ Modeled on the colonial civil service, the Ghanaian civil service was - or held to be - apolitical and “neutral in matters of a partisan nature”.⁵⁵ On the contrary, Nkrumah and Padmore needed reliable, but also ideologically aligned

⁵³ In September 1955, a group of eighteen men had been selected to receive a training program by the Commonwealth Relations Office. They were: Grant, Quarshie, Anthony, Kofi, Quaison-Sackey, Arkhurst, Dadzie, Akwei, Boaten, Amonoo, Debrah, Kumi, Asante, Sekyi, Brew, Addae, Quarm and Arthur. As Dei-Anang points out: “The more senior officers in these groups were sent on attachment to British embassies and high commissions after brief orientation courses at the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office in London. The others were sent to the London School of Economics for a six months course before their allocation to British missions overseas and by 1956 they were posted to British diplomatic missions overseas”. In M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations*, p.11. See also. T. Adamafio, *By Nkrumah’s Side*, p.8.

⁵⁴ According to Dei-Anang, Nkrumah considered the disadvantages but also the advantages of dealing with British trained personnel: “With his declaration of the policy of total liberation from colonial rule, Nkrumah could not overlook the fact that Britain was one of the two countries with the largest colonial territories in Africa. If he had had his way, he might have wished that his first team of Foreign Service officers had been trained elsewhere than in Britain. In the other hand, their training in Britain had some advantages. Britain was a great world power and her capital was a busy nerve center and an useful listening post in international affairs”. In M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations*, p.12.

⁵⁵ K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.26; a number of Civil Servants, including the ones of the Foreign Service, were trained during the Colonial period by the British. See T. Adamafio, *By Nkrumah’s Side*, p.87.

men.⁵⁶ Since 1957, the Ghanaian Prime Minister pushed for the establishment of a politicized civil service.⁵⁷ The Foreign Service made no exception. Michael Dei-Anang succeeds in few words to describe Nkrumah's point of view:

From independence Nkrumah entertained misgivings about the Foreign Service. He had doubts about its capacity to interpret his African policies with his own vigor and vision. It was unrealistic to expect British training of the new Ghana Foreign Service personnel to be marked by any degree of enthusiasm for decolonization: Nkrumah was neither foolish nor naïve enough to believe that Britain would train Africans in anti-imperialistic tactics.⁵⁸

The lack of experience of the Foreign Service in anti-colonial and Pan-Africanist activities was also a issue.⁵⁹ A good curriculum could not replace the skills acquired while fighting for African liberation and unity.

The other difficulty with Padmore's appointment at the Ministry was the opposition of several men of the Foreign Service and also of some members of the government. Since he was not a Ghanaian or an African, they considered him ill-suited to work in the African Affairs.⁶⁰ Generally speaking, they disliked the presence of too many foreigners hired by Nkrumah as his advisers or directly within the ranks of the government.⁶¹ They also

⁵⁶ They needed men with "African personality". Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.

⁵⁷ Nkrumah's radical projects for Ghana included also the establishment of a radicalized civil service. Still, for years tactical considerations contributed to convince Nkrumah to slow down the process. The main reason for that was, at first, the lack of personnel to form a radicalized civil service. The great majority of civil servants had acquired their knowledge in colonial times with British training and Nkrumah needed them during the first years of his government. For creating a radicalized civil service, Nkrumah had to work on creating a school of administration which at the same time could also work as an ideological school. Such a project was realized in 1961 with the foundation of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba.

⁵⁸ M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.12.

⁵⁹ K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.27. When Armah describes the establishment of Padmore's Office, he refers to it with the name "Bureau of African Affairs". This is a mistake as the BAA was created only after Padmore's death as the evolution of the previous office.

⁶⁰ J.J. Mensah, *The Bureau of African Affairs*, p.37; interviews with K.B. Asante, D. Bosumtwi-Sam and E.A. Richter; G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.132.

⁶¹ See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.20-23. According to Senkyire - at the time head of the National Association of Socialist Students Organization (NASSO) and later Minister of Cooperatives - these criticisms must not be over-emphasized. Generally speaking, the members of the Ghanaian government and the Ghanaian civil service did not have problems with the presence of foreigners. Interview with Baffour Kwaben Senkyire, Accra, 11th November 2013.

criticized Ghana's involvement into the Pan-African question as it was not in the interest of the nation.⁶²

Due to the uneasiness of the "Foreign Service" option, Nkrumah and Padmore had to opt for a second solution: the establishment of an institution specifically designed to work for African liberation unity. This office was planned to work outside the direct control of the Ministry, although it was still officially part of it. In this context, Padmore would depend only on Nkrumah and he could solve the confrontation with the "non-radical" civil servants by choosing his own staff. The name of the new institution - established in September - was: the "Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs" and Padmore was appointed its head.

The Office – in line with Padmore's past experiences - was designed as a small agency, acting like an "investigative body, a propaganda forum" and a "center for exchanging views with other African leaders".⁶³ Its first task was to recover information and contacts, both useful instruments for the Pan-Africanist struggle. At the beginning, Padmore capitalized on his personal contacts and then he worked to enlarge Ghana's political net.

The new institution had also to fulfill another fundamental duty: to provide political and financial aid to African liberation movements. The work consisted mainly in assisting political refugees in Ghana and to support the nationalist parties both in Accra and on the battlefields. The institution also became an instrument to spread Ghana's influence throughout the continent, since it promoted nationalist and pan-Africanist propaganda within the ranks of the liberation movements and in other political circles. Finally, the Office had to work for African unity. In this particular field, the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs and the CPP were also directly involved. Thus, the Office had to cooperate

⁶² In 1957, according to Thompson, the men of the Foreign Service openly criticized Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. However, he does not provide evidences on how many they were. According to him, few of them "took Nkrumah's phrase, that Ghana's independence was meaningless until Africa was free, very seriously". W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.20. The American historian also include Alex Quaison-Sackey in the list of the most critical ones, despite few years later the Ghanaian diplomat became one of most radical elements of the Foreign Service. The latter also wrote a book to present the very basis of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy: A. Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound: Reflection of an African Statesman*, F.A. Praeger., New York, 1963.

⁶³ NLC (National Liberation Council), *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa, Documentary evidences of Nkrumah's interference in the affairs of other African states*, Ministry of Information, Accra, 1966, p.3.

with them. For instance, it participated together with the Ministry and the Party to the organization of the Pan-Africanist conferences held in Ghana in 1957-1958. Padmore himself acted as a sort of Ghanaian diplomat by taking part in several trips to promote the gatherings and to support the African unity project.

For Padmore, the work in Ghana was rewarding. He could work in his field but in a completely new and favorable environment. As James stated: “Once more George sat in an office with adequate resources, doing the work he had done in the Kremlin and in his little London flat”.⁶⁴ The big difference between this experience and the previous ones was that he had more money, more power and more freedom of action to put his ideas into practice.⁶⁵

The Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs was officially registered under the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs, but it was completely autonomous from it. It was *de facto* responsible only to the Minister, at the time Nkrumah himself. Padmore had to report only to him.⁶⁶ For the following two years, the expenses of Padmore’s office were recorded under those of the Ministry as “extraordinary” and, as such, controlled by Nkrumah alone.⁶⁷ This way, the financial autonomy - and therefore the political autonomy - of Padmore were guaranteed. Nobody in the government or in the Parliament had access to the extensive financial figures of the Office and this independent status was bound to be inherited (and strengthened) by the Bureau of African Affairs after Padmore’s death.⁶⁸

The establishment of the new “Pan-African” institution of Ghana had only one obstacle: criticisms by the Foreign Service. For months, several civil servants of the Ministry criticized Padmore’s appointment to the post of Adviser on African Affairs and they also opposed the establishment of the Office itself. Apparently, the bases of the

⁶⁴ C.R.L. James, “*Notes on the Life of George Padmore*”, unpublished manuscript, p.61, quoted in W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp.29-30.

⁶⁵ Hooker defined the period spent in Ghana as his “months of power”. See G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.109-140.

⁶⁶ K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.27.

⁶⁷ PRAAD, SC/BAA/357, “Yearly Expenditure – Ministry of Defense and External Affairs – 1957/1960”, (handwriting).; Still, officially, the budget of Padmore’s Office was under Adu’s control. In W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.29.

⁶⁸ Interview with Ernest Anthony Richter, Accra, 23rd December 2011.

criticism were still the same: Padmore was not considered qualified for the job, nor was the Office perceived as useful for Ghana's foreign policy. As Thompson wrote in his *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, the strongest attacks came from A.L. Adu, who was Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs.⁶⁹ According to the historian, Adu criticized Padmore's appointment on the ground that he was not competent on African Affairs, since he was a West Indian.⁷⁰

In fact, the situation was even more complicated. There were also other reasons, more solid, for Adu's criticism and for those of other civil servants. At the time, Nkrumah and Padmore did not make clear to the Foreign Service the role the new Office was going to play. The Ministry had been cut out from the work with the liberation movements, but the Prime Minister had failed to explain the reason why. The real reason behind this was that Nkrumah and Padmore considered the Foreign Service not sufficiently fit ideologically to work in anti-colonial activities. Once this passage was clarified, Adu partially withdrew his attacks, although he was still skeptical on Nkrumah's mistrust of the Service. As he wrote years later:

It took some time before Nkrumah defined the role Padmore was to play, namely, to head an office outside the orthodox government machinery to carry through his policy for the emancipation of those parts of Africa still under foreign rule and therefore to work with nationalist movements and political parties, an area of activity which it would be inappropriate for civil servants to engage in at that time. Once he made his position clear, I not only withdrew my opposition but in fact collaborated enthusiastically in getting his office established, including negotiating for a vote for him.⁷¹

Adu essentially denied that the difference of outlook between the Foreign Service and Nkrumah was so wide. He acted as the voice of those in the Ministry who felt distrusted by the Prime Minister:

⁶⁹ Adu was *de facto* the head of the Ghanaian Foreign Service since 1956. See M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, pp.11-12.

⁷⁰ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.29. Few years later, Adu became Secretary to the Cabinet, See K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.27.

⁷¹ M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.13.

I can say that the Service was constantly seeking to know what Nkrumah expected of it and to organize itself to respond. The prejudice against the so-called colonial mentality of civil servants generally was, however, very strong. The difference was therefore more imaginary on the part of the politicians than real.⁷²

Adu's criticisms did not have any repercussion on Padmore's appointment. However, it represented the first episode of the confrontation between the "unorthodox" and "orthodox" systems of Ghana's foreign policy that was going to last for years.

In the period spent at the Office, Padmore showed a cold attitude towards the Foreign Service, Adu *in primis*. At first, he obviously did not appreciate the opposition to him and to the Office. Later, he also started criticizing the interferences of the Ghanaian bureaucracy, including the one of the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, in his work. He considered his office as a fully independent body and wanted it to be a "light", flexible institution, capable of performing its missions in a short amount of time. Bureaucracy could only endanger the independence and efficiency of the institution. In July 1958, Padmore was already complaining about the delays caused by bureaucracy. He wrote to the administrative officer of his office:

Please note that unless this office frees itself from much of the traditional bureaucratic procedure which weighs like the Alps upon us, we shall not be able to devote our efforts to constructive work. We shall be failing in the main purpose for which the Prime Minister established this office directly under his personal supervision and control.[...] from now on, let us "stream-line" the work of this office as much as possible without unduly offending the "sacred cow", bureaucracy, especially as you and others in this office are members of the Service.⁷³

⁷² M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.13. Adu is fundamentally right: the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs proved to be ready to deal with some of the Government's Pan-African policies, namely, the diplomatic support to the unification of the continent and the support to Nonalignment. On the contrary, the de-colonization policy was handled by Padmore's Office alone. See K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.28.

⁷³ PRAAD, SC/BAA/165, Letter, Padmore to the Administrative Officer, 30th July 1958.

The conflict between Padmore and the bureaucrats, as Hooker highlights, must not be considered strange since “[...] bureaucrats necessarily would have a horror of the unorthodox approach practiced by this ex-Comintern figure”.⁷⁴

Padmore had to work hard to find the right men among the Ghanaian civil servants to run the Office. Due to the difference of outlook he had with the civil service, he had to look outside of Ghana to find what he was looking for. One detail was important: the key figures of the Office had to be experienced in anti-colonial activities and they had to be ideologically aligned to Padmore himself.

1.4. The Staff of Padmore’s Office in the Years 1957 and 1958

Padmore had resources only to run a small office, so he could not hire many employees. He had to choose them carefully among the ranks of the civil service.⁷⁵ In the case of his personal collaborators, the selection criteria were even stricter. He had to be sure to find reliable men, with a solid ideological stand as well as a deep experience in the anti-colonial struggle, the same characteristics he pretended by his collaborators in his past experiences. Eventually, he chose a Ghanaian and a man of the Diaspora, James Markham and Ras Makonnen. Both men were “radicals” and they had solid political backgrounds. They were also strong supporters of the Pan-Africanist ideology. Padmore did not choose them by chance. He selected them precisely for these reasons and consequently he gave them the most important positions of the Office. Up to winter 1958, the institution was practically run by Markham, Padmore and Makonnen, a sort of triumvirate.⁷⁶ With the appointments of

⁷⁴ G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p. 135. According to Legum, quoted by Hooker, the Foreign Office “refused to let Padmore use their cable service and denied him access to their files”.

⁷⁵ All the members of the Office, apart from Padmore and one of his collaborators, were Ghanaians. The list of the employees, with references also to their ethnicity, can be found in AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued “Gabon File”, *Members of staff*, typescript, undated.

⁷⁶ G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.133.

his two collaborators, Padmore confirmed his will to run the institution with his own rules, including the staff selection criteria.

Markham was an Ewe, former editor of the *Evening News* of Accra in 1949, who helped Nkrumah in organizing the election campaign of 1951.⁷⁷ Later, he worked for the Anti-Colonial Bureau of the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon (where he spent two years) and he attended the Bandung Conference in 1955. In the same year, the CPP called him to run the office of the Pan-African Movement launched at the 1953 Kumasi Conference.⁷⁸ Markham was a perfect example of what Padmore was looking for: a radical who also had previous experiences in Pan-Africanist activities.⁷⁹ Moreover, he had a useful background in journalism, one of the activities of the Office that Padmore wanted to expand in order to spread Pan-African propaganda throughout Africa.

Markham began working for the Office on 16th December 1957, carrying out the duty of Information and Research officer.⁸⁰ He became, *de facto*, the most important man after Padmore during 1957-1958. The list of his duties covered practically every aspect of the work of the Office. He was responsible for the recovery of information in the African territories, he had to keep contacts with the freedom fighters and he had to supervise the production of monthly bulletins on African Affairs. He also had to work for the organization of conferences in Ghana, including the production and distribution of publications that followed them. Finally, he had to coordinate the support to political refugees in Ghana and in the rest of Africa.⁸¹

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁸ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.5 e D. Austin, *Politics in Ghana 1946-60*, pp.283-84. The Office, however, never opened.

⁷⁹ Markham was the one who introduced Kofi Batsa (future editor of the radical Pan-Africanist magazine *The Voice of Africa*) to the journalism career and to the world of socialism. K. Batsa, *The Spark*, pp.6-7.

⁸⁰ AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued file/All African People's Conf., Letter (typescript), Padmore to Adu, 17th December 1958.

⁸¹ The list of duties of Markham is the following: "1) Collecting back-ground and current information on political, economic and cultural developments on all dependent African territories under British, French, Portuguese Administration as well as trust territories under United Nations. 2) Keeping regular contacts with leaders of the various political parties in those territories and briefing the Government on trends in those countries in order to formulate its attitude on specific matters in pursuance of its "African personality". 3) Producing monthly bulletins on current developments in the territories mentioned in paragraph one as well as those independent African States where Ghana has not yet any diplomatic Mission. 4) Responsibility for all pre-conference arrangements. 5) Implementation of Conference Resolutions and editing of all Conference publications. 6) Drawing of memoranda on such subjects as directed by the Adviser on African Affairs. 7)

While Markham was a Ghanaian, Makonnen, like Padmore, was a man of the Diaspora. Born as George Thomas N. Griffith in British Guyana, he had entered the world of Pan-African politics in the 1930s, when he changed his name in Ras Makonnen. A “gifted speaker”, as Nkrumah defined him, Makonnen had been treasurer of the IASB, administrator of the hostel of the same organization, general secretary of the Pan-African Federation and editor of *Pan-Africa*, the journal established after the Fifth Pan-African Congress.⁸²

Padmore had met him for the first time in 1935 in London and he worked with him for years. He particularly appreciated Makonnen’s ability in dealing with finances and Pan-Africanist propaganda.⁸³ As a veteran of anti-colonial organizations, Makonnen had a perfect profile for a post at the Office. Ideologically speaking, he was also very much in line with Padmore.

Makonnen had settled in Ghana in 1956, prior to independence.⁸⁴ In December ‘57, Padmore hired him at the Office, and his choice was backed by Nkrumah. For almost a year, Makonnen worked side by side with the Adviser on African Affairs, trying to make good use of their common experiences at the IASB and PAF. During this period, they also conducted an internal struggle on ideology with elements of the CPP and the National Association of Socialist Students Organization (NASSO).⁸⁵ This can be considered as one

Responsibility for matters dealing with African political refugees seeking asylum etc. in Ghana. 8) General administrative duties relating to the office. 9) General Correspondence.” See AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued “Gabon File”, “Present Duties of Mr. Markham”, undated typescript (most probably 1958).

⁸² As for the definition of “gifted speaker” see K. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p.52.

⁸³ In *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, Padmore devoted some lines to Makonnen: “Mr. Makonnen was elected honorary treasurer [of the IASB]. It was largely through his exertions that the International African Service Bureau and later the Pan-African Federation were able to establish themselves successfully and launch the International African Opinion. As financial officer, Makonnen was responsible for raising most of the funds to defray the expenses of the Fifth Pan-African Congress. He later took the initiative of establishing *Pan-Africa*, a journal of African life and letters, which became the principal medium through which the ideology of Pan-Africanism was expounded throughout the Black World”. In G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, pp.146-47.

⁸⁴ K.K. Prah, *Ras Makonnen: True Pan-Africanist*, The Weekly Review (Nairobi), January 6th, 1984 in *Beyond the Color Line: Pan-Africanist disputations, selected sketches, letters, papers and reviews*, Africa World Press, Trenton, 1997, p.23.

⁸⁵ According to Hooker, Padmore, Makonnen and Markham “[...] shared serious doubts about the socialist convictions of many CPP luminaries, and they were not discreet in their criticisms. The ostentation and arrogance that had previously characterized many of these leaders was undoubtedly distasteful to Padmore, who ridiculed their small-time pomp and objected to their definition of socialism. With this in mind, he did

of the first examples of the struggle between “radicals” and “moderates” within the Ghanaian state and the Party.

Padmore had found in Markham and Makonnen the right men to run the Office. He could rely on them for the solution of the delicate questions of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. The decision had not been easy. The Adviser on African Affairs had to choose carefully the perfect profiles to fulfill the duties of the Office. After that, the institution was ready to support Nkrumah’s first moves on the African scene.

1.5. Ghana’s First Moves on the African Scene and the Role of Padmore’s Office

In the years 1957-1958, Ghana performed a very careful foreign policy. In order to avoid the fears of the West, Nkrumah worked hard to improve the relationship with the US, the Commonwealth and the UN. Padmore’s Office begun to support this policy, in particular the work at the UN. In the meantime, the Ghanaian Prime Minister and his Adviser on African Affairs started working for the first Conference of Independent African States (IAS), to be held in Ghana in April 1958. The IAS Conference was one of the first chances to present Ghana’s Pan-African policy. Thus, Padmore’s Office was directly involved in the arrangements for this important gathering.

Before working for the actualization of Ghana’s Pan-African policy, Nkrumah had to prepare the political ground. The first indication of Manchester was to maintain African liberation and unity out of the confrontation between the two blocs. Thus, Nkrumah’s first mission was to make clear to USA and USSR that Ghana wanted to maintain a “Positive Neutrality”. In 1957 and 1958, he promoted Ghana’s image as the one of a non-aligned and non-radical country, opened to both the two sides of the cold war. The operation was

what he could to instill proper views in the CPP youth. The organ he concentrated upon was the National Association of Socialist Students Organization (NASSO) [...]”. In G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.133.

successful, even though more with the West than with the East. Ghana, indeed, strengthen its relationship particularly with the two main powers of the West (USA and UK) and, through their support, joined the UN.

The Americans particularly welcomed Ghana's attitude towards them. According to Thompson, at the time, Ghana could have even been considered as a Pro-West country.⁸⁶ In 1957, Washington inaugurated its embassy in Accra. One year later, Nkrumah visited the United States and he had a meeting with Eisenhower. To achieve the same results, the USSR had to wait respectively the years 1959 and 1961.

In 1957, the Ghanaian Prime Minister also made his nation become a member of the Commonwealth, one of the most important associations of states in the world. Again, by entering the Commonwealth, he particularly pleased the West, specifically the ex colonial motherland Great Britain.

At first, Nkrumah did not express his radicalism in the Commonwealth. He used its platform to assure again the West of the goodwill of Ghana. At the 1957 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, Nkrumah succeeded in presenting himself as a non-aligned leader with no will of revenge against Ghana's ex-colonial master. He also confirmed his refusal of the Communist ideology.⁸⁷

Ghana had an immediate political return. The Commonwealth sponsored its entry in the United Nations, one of the main targets of Nkrumah's foreign policy in this period. Accra's adherence to the UN had a strong political meaning. Indeed, since the times of

⁸⁶ Thompson particularly supports this idea. According to him, due to Ghana's economical needs (financing of the Volta River Project above all), Nkrumah was more interested in forming relations with the West than with the East. He also explains, quite convincingly, why Ghana's neutralism was welcomed by the West: "They [the Ghanaians] could announce without fear that their foreign policy would be one of «positive neutralism», because the hard Western attitude towards nonalignment was on the retreat at this time, just after Suez". In W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.15; At the independence celebration, the United States were represented by the Vice-President Richard Nixon, while USSR was represented only by the Minister of state farms. Egypt, at the time one of most radical African countries, was not even invited. See *Ibidem*, pp.28-29.

⁸⁷ With regards to Nkrumah's declarations against Communism at the Commonwealth conference see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.42; at the time he was Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, Nkrumah refused to hire public servants with attested communist convictions (February 1954). For further details on this issue see: "Communists Barred from Jobs", *West Africa*, 6th March 1954; "Gold Coast Attitude to Communists in Public Service", Extract from 'Commonwealth Survey', 5th March 1954; "Gold Coast Action on Communists, Employment Banned in Public Posts", *The Times*, 26th February 1954. All these documents can be found in BNA, BW/90/240/ *West Africa: General* (1954-1973).

Manchester, the UN was considered the best ally for the Pan-African cause.⁸⁸ In the following years, Nkrumah sponsored the UN as a guardian of the rights of the new African nations, at least until the Congo crisis showed the weaknesses of the international organization. As the Ghanaian Prime Minister announced to the National Assembly, the respect for the principles of the UN charter became “an integral part of [Ghana] foreign policy”.⁸⁹

Nkrumah used the UN as a platform to present his Pan-Africanist ideas to the world and to spread Ghana’s influence throughout the continent. From the chairs of the assembly, Ghanaians began to denounce colonialism and they presented a project to unite Africa politically. They also worked with other independent African countries to form an “African group” in order to vote together on relevant questions concerning the continent. Ghana also joined important commissions of the UN. Padmore’s Office monitored and supervised all these activities.

One of the first task of Padmore as the Adviser on African Affairs was to work on the establishment of the *United Nations Regional Economic Commission for Africa*. In January 1958, Nkrumah himself asked him to deal with this matter.⁹⁰ Padmore had to make sure that Ghana had an important role in the commission, possibly having its headquarters established in Accra. The question involved a sort of competition with three other independent African countries: Egypt (since January ’58, UAR), Sudan and Ethiopia.⁹¹ Padmore’s mission was to ensure that Ghana prevailed over possible competitors in the struggle for the political influence in Africa.⁹²

⁸⁸ As the *Atlantic Charter* had been the basis of the struggle for self-determination in West Africa, the *Charter of the United Nations* was sponsored by the Pan-African movement as a guarantee of the rights of freedom and self-determination for the African people. A group of West African newspaper editors headed by Nnamdi Azikiwe published a memorandum entitled *The Atlantic Charter and British West Africa* in 1943. See G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, pp.152-153.

⁸⁹ Nkrumah’s speech at the National Assembly, Accra, 3 September 1958. In K. Nkrumah, *Axioms*, p.131.

⁹⁰ PRAAD, SC/BAA/165, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1958.

⁹¹ Egypt changed its name in United Arab Republic when the union with Syria was established on 11th January 1958.

⁹² Padmore’s work on the United Nations Regional Economic Commission for Africa issue allows to introduce some interesting elements. In order to solve the problem, Padmore had to work hand by hand with the Minister of Defence and External Affairs. Padmore came into contact with the Ghanaian ambassador in Washington, Daniel Chapman, in order to work on the matter. After discussing the issue with Ako Adjei, Padmore suggested Chapman some guidelines he could use. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/165, Letter, Padmore to Chapman, 14 January 1958. This must not be considered strange. Padmore was more than willing to work

Immediately after, the Adviser on African Affairs had begun working to the organization of a conference with all the independent African states, the main target of Ghana's foreign policy in 1958. The first Independent African States' Conference (IASC) was planned to be held in Accra, in April 1958. At the beginning of the year, Padmore himself took part in a tour of the seven other independent African countries, in order to invite them to the conference.

The IASC had been conceived at the 1957 Commonwealth Conference. It was one of the first attempts ever made to reunite North African countries with Sub-Saharan countries, namely Liberia, Ethiopia and Ghana. Nkrumah wanted to promote cooperation between the participants, but he also wanted to present them his ideas on African Personality and African unity. The IASC was considered as an instrument of Ghana's Pan-African policy. No project of African unity could be, indeed, realized without the participation of the other independent African states. For this reason, Padmore's Office had a key role in the conference arrangements.⁹³

At first, the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs held a very low profile. Padmore and Nkrumah had tried as much as possible to cut out the Foreign Service from the organization of the IASC. They did not trust the service in dealing with this issue, especially since the conference was meant to be an instrument to spread the Pan-Africanist ideology in the rest of independent Africa. Adu - who had been appointed conference's secretary general by the ambassadors - was not confirmed in his post by Nkrumah. Instead, the Ghanaian Prime Minister and Padmore tried to have him substituted with Appadorai, an Indian diplomat.⁹⁴

together with the Minister, provided his Office could maintain its independence. Padmore also supported the Minister with his personal political contacts, in this case the Israeli, long time friends of his, who could offer them the political support that Ghana needed in the UN to have the commission established. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/165, Cable, Mordechai Kidron (Deputy Head of Israel's permanent delegation to the UN) to Padmore, undated.

⁹³ Padmore wrote to his friend Dobson just before the conference: "The arrangements...are largely in my hands". J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.135. He also tried to provide a number of copies of his *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* for the conference. Unfortunately, the copies arrived only after the IASC was closed. In J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.136.

⁹⁴ The story is told in two versions by two different sources. One is told by Adu himself, who recalls the appointment of Appadorai, an Indian diplomat, as secretary-general of the conference by Kwame Nkrumah. There are no references to Padmore's role in the issue. Quoting from Adu's notes: "I recall Nkrumah's deep uneasiness about the Foreign Service's competence to organize the first Conference of Independent African

However, the situation changed during the conference. At the closing of the IASC, the Foreign Service proved itself more reliable than expected. Thus, Nkrumah and Padmore declined part of their criticisms.⁹⁵ The Ministry could be involved in the struggle for African liberation and unity, provided the special role played by the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs on these matters.

After the IASC, Padmore continued working on the political platform born out of it. He, Nkrumah and Kofi, a diplomat, took part to a trip among all the countries that attended the conference, in order to discuss the establishment of an UN African Group. Moreover, the trip was made to strengthen the contacts with independent African countries since any project of unity could only be achieved with their participation.

Ghana's Pan-African policy was finally being implemented. The IASC had been only the first of a series of initiatives to spread Nkrumah's ideas on African liberation and unity. Others followed. The most important one is undoubtedly the All-African People's Conference (AAPC), a Pan-African gathering of nationalist parties to be held in Accra at the end of the year.

The AAPC was conceived as a sort of new Pan-African congress. Organized officially by the CPP, this conference was conceived as an opportunity to gather together as many African liberation movements as possible and to discuss with them African liberation and nationalism. Being a Pan-African gathering, Padmore's Office had obviously a key role in the organization.

States because of his belief that the Service, including me, was not tuned in to the African movement. He even tried to recruit an Indian diplomat, Dr Appadorai 'Secretary-General of the Indian Council of Foreign Affairs' to take charge of the arrangements". In M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.13. The other account is the one of Thompson, who attributes Adu's exclusion from the conference arrangement to Padmore alone. Quoting from Thompson: "The ambassadors made Adu the conference's secretary-general [...] Padmore had not thought Adu competent to organize the conference (their rivalry was in the open by this time) and so arranged behind Adu's back for the services of Dr. A. Appadorai, the secretary-general of the Indian Council on Foreign Affairs". In W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.34.

⁹⁵ According to Adu, Nkrumah was "[...] very generous in his tribute to the Foreign Service when the Conference proved that it had measured up to all that was required of it and that, in comparison with the officials from the other seven African states who later joined the Conference Secretariat, our officials stood out in terms of their ability and grasp of the objectives that the Conference sought to achieve". In M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.13.

With the work for the IASC, the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs had fulfilled its first mission within the Pan-African strategy of the government. In this first case, the tasks of the institution were still very limited, since even Nkrumah was making cautious steps on the African scene. In the following months, he definitely made his entry into African politics and Padmore's office began operating to support Ghana's struggle for African liberation and unity.

1.6. African Unity and the Ghana-Guinea Union

At the IAS Conference, African unity was discussed, but no concrete proposals were put on the table. The opportunity to transform the Pan-African theory of unity into reality came just a few months later. In October 1958, Guinea finally achieved a troubled independence from France. The country was left by the French in a terrible state and the Guinean leader Sékou Touré was ready to seek help from anywhere. Nkrumah took advantage of the situation and proposed a deal to Touré: Ghana would support Guinea in exchange for a political union of the two. Padmore had sponsored this project since it could have been a useful instrument to propose African unity to other countries. The idea of uniting the African continent under the same flag had always been part of Nkrumah and Padmore's political agendas. For years, however, they also acknowledged the need for an intermediate step towards regional unions. In the 1950s, they supported West African Unity, while at the same time they were still working for the unification of the whole continent.⁹⁶

At the time of Ghana's independence, Nkrumah and Padmore eventually diverged on the "regionalist" question. The former began supporting a straight path towards the "United States of Africa", while the latter persisted in his idea of establishing regional

⁹⁶ The 1953 Kumasi conference, for instance, was organized to bring together all West African nationalists, like Azikiwe, who could share the same idea of a Federation of West African states. D. Austin, *Politics in Ghana 1946-60*, pp.283-84.

federations to be later merged into a united Africa. In *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, Padmore exposed his point of view:

Pan-Africanism looks above the narrow confines of class, race, tribe and religion. [...] Its vision stretches beyond the limited frontiers of the nation-state. Its perspective embraces the federation of regional self-governing countries and their ultimate amalgamation into a United States of Africa. In such a Commonwealth, all men, regardless of tribe, race, colour or creed, shall be free and equal. And all the national units comprising the regional federations shall be autonomous in all matters regional, yet united in all matters of common interests to the African Union. This is our vision of the Africa of Tomorrow – the goal of Pan-Africanism.⁹⁷

In the first period of Ghana's independence neither Nkrumah's vision nor Padmore's prevailed. In 1958, however, the "Guinea question" put the discussion on "Regionalism" back on the table.

In October, Sékou Touré led Guinea towards independence after a harsh political confrontation with the ex-colonial master, culminated with the "no" vote at the French Constitutional Referendum. The French left the country, but only after having despoiled it completely. Guinea was now finally independent but completely ruined economically. In order to avoid a disaster, Touré could only seek help elsewhere in Africa. Ghana was the best candidate to answer this call.

Both Padmore and Nkrumah considered supporting Guinea as the best occasion to launch a project of political unity. Ghana would come to Guinea's assistance, but only in exchange of Touré's promise to sign a union between the two states. According to Mensah, Padmore was the one who suggested Nkrumah to provide a loan of 10 million pounds to

⁹⁷ G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, p.379. According to Botsio, Adjei and Markham, -interviewed by Thompson - Padmore had lost his hopes in a "continental union" project during his trip around Africa in February. W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.60. Probably, Thompson is referring to the fact that Padmore had lost his hopes in a straight and quick "continental union" project, without any passage through a long process of establishment of regional federations. But, as it has been underlined just above, this is nothing new. It was already clear that Padmore believed in the need of regional integration to attain the final goal of the "United States of Africa", which in the end remained his final hope and dream.

Guinea to save the country's economy.⁹⁸ Thanks to this generous offer, Touré could not refuse to discuss the proposal of unification, and he eventually accepted Nkrumah's deal.

The Ghana-Guinea Union was proclaimed the 23rd of November 1958, even before a proper constitutional chart was signed. At first, the Union was meant to have a symbolic meaning rather than a practical utility. Indeed, the AAPC was approaching and the Union was a way to show to other liberation movements the path towards a united Africa.

Padmore and Nkrumah's vision of the union differed considerably. The former was supporting the idea that the Ghana-Guinea Union was a regional federation to be merged with other federations only at a later stage. The latter wanted to present the Union as the base for a continental state. At first, Padmore's position prevailed and Nkrumah and Touré's first communiqué announced the establishment of a union of West African states.⁹⁹

In line with Padmore's point of view on African unity, the "Call" to the AAPC conference - written by Padmore himself - advocated the "amalgamation or federation of territories on a regional basis".¹⁰⁰ Opening the AAPC, Nkrumah advocated the need for a union of West African states to be included in a continental union only at a later stage.¹⁰¹ Padmore had won the day, at least for the moment. He had succeeded in convincing Nkrumah to present a "regionalist" plan for African unity. In such way, small, non-radical

⁹⁸ J.J. Mensah, *The Bureau of African Affairs*, p.52.

⁹⁹ C.E. Welch, *Dream of Unity, Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca N.Y., 1966, p.301.

¹⁰⁰ "The Call", All-African Peoples Conference, Accra, 1958, quoted in W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.61. At the conference, projects of regional unions were amply discussed.

¹⁰¹ At the opening speech of the AAPC, Nkrumah stated: "[...] And looking forward, we see that, coupled with the consuming aspiration for freedom spreading like a forest fire across Africa today, there is an equally irresistible current which is rising higher and higher as the final day of liberation advances. And that is the burning desire among all the peoples of Africa to establish a community of their own, to give political expression in some form or another to the African Personality. It is this desire which animated my Government and the Government of Guinea to initiate recently certain action which we hope will constitute the nucleus of a United West Africa which will gain the adherence of other independent States as well as those yet to come. We further hope that this coming together will evolve eventually into a Union of African States just as the original thirteen American colonies have now developed into the 49 States constituting the American community. We are convinced that it is only in the inter-dependence of such African unity that we shall be able truly to safeguard our individual national freedom. We have no illusions about this being an easy task. But with the spirit and determination there, and the goodwill and co-operation of our people, we shall, I am firmly convinced, reach our objective". In All African People's Conference, *Speech by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958*, Community Centre, Accra 1959. Interestingly, Nkrumah made reference to the United States of America as the best model for a Union of African States. Some years later, his model turned into the one of USSR.

countries like Liberia would have been more inclined to discuss with Ghana about projects of federations.

Padmore and Nkrumah's confrontation on the "regionalist" option had not ended. For months, Ghana's position on the matter was far from being clear. The Ghana-Guinea union was promoted both as a West African federation and as the base for a Union of African states. According to Armah, this confusion on the nature of the African unity project was the "reflection of the fluidity of the overall concept in the minds of its advocates".¹⁰²

After some months the situation changed: Nkrumah's vision begun to prevail. The Ghana-Guinea union was no more associated only with the West African region. The official declaration of the union ("Conakry declaration"), signed on the 1st of May 1959, referred to a: "Union of Independent African States [...] to be opened to all independent African States or Federations adhering to the principles on which the Union is based".¹⁰³

References to West Africa disappeared also at Sanniquellie, in July 1959, when Ghana, Guinea and Liberia met to discuss a new project of unification. The name of the proposed union was "The Community of Independent African States". Article 8 of the Sanniquellie declaration was practically the copy of the first article of the "Conakry" one.¹⁰⁴

After Sanniquellie, Nkrumah's opposition to the "regionalist" option became even stronger. At the time, Ghana was still involved in several regional boards with colonies or ex-colonies of British West Africa. Since 1959, the Ghanaian Prime Minister gave the order of gradually withdrawing Ghana from all the West African boards (West African Cocoa Research Institute, West African Currency Board, West African Frontier Force, etc.).¹⁰⁵ Nkrumah's move was strongly criticized by the countries involved in the Boards, particularly by Nigeria. They considered such a choice in contradiction with Ghana's call for unity in the continent. In reality, Nkrumah considered such boards as colonial entities.

¹⁰² K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.93.

¹⁰³ Article 1 of the Basic Principles of the Union of Independent African States - also known as "The Conakry Declaration"; in C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, pp.160-61.

¹⁰⁴ AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued "Gabon File", "The principles of the Sanniquellie declaration, July 19, 1959". The complete declaration can also be found in C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, pp.162-63.

¹⁰⁵ See O. Aluko, *Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70, a Study in Inter-African Discord*, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1976, pp.63-66.

The Ghanaian leader was defining step by step his vision of regionalism. He considered all the projects of regional union in Africa as colonial or semi-colonial bodies. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland - also known as Central African Federation (CAF) - became the favorite target of his attacks. The clash between Nkrumah and the CAF's Prime Minister Roy Welensky - begun in 1958 - was bound to continue in the next years together with Ghana's actions against the CAF and other federations.

While in 1958 Nkrumah was defining Ghana's policy on African unity, he and Padmore had also to clarify its position on African liberation. In the months before the AAPC, Padmore's Office had begun to provide practical support to African nationalists. Moreover, Padmore and Nkrumah had also to deal with the UAR, the other protagonist of the African liberation struggle among the independent African states.

1.7. African Liberation and Cold War in 1958: Accra's Troubled Relationship with Cairo

In 1958, another important protagonist of the independence process emerged: Nasser's United Arab Republic. Established in February as the union of Syria and Egypt, the new state represented another source of support for the liberation movements. Indeed, the UAR promoted a radical foreign policy, based on the support to African liberation and a call for the unity of Africans and Arabs. From many perspectives, Nasser's UAR and Nkrumah's Ghana had a similar foreign policy. As the AAPC was approaching, Accra needed to define its position towards the UAR, potentially an ally but practically a rival. Cairo was already heavily involved in the African liberation process and Ghana had to choose between competing with it or sign an alliance for achieving common targets. On this choice, it also depended Accra's relationship with the East and the West. Finally, the rivalry between the two prevailed. Thus, Accra was involved in a political confrontation with Cairo in which the influence on liberation movements was at stake. During 1958, questions like the use of

violence in the liberation process and the relationship with USA and USSR were amply discussed by Ghana and the UAR. Nkrumah could not ignore a country which was rising in importance in Africa, very active especially in the fields of interest of Ghana's Pan-African policy. The UAR was established in January 1958 and it inherited Syria and Egypt's political radicalism, even if it still maintained a non-aligned stance. Cairo had also a radical foreign policy, based on both Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism. Thus, similarly to Accra, Cairo was very active on the African scene, especially in the support to liberation movements. The two countries could be both rivals and allies; it only depended on how their relationship would evolve.

Nkrumah was willing to collaborate with Nasser - who shared with him a similar vision of African politics - but he had to face three main problems. First of all, Cairo was close to Moscow and Nkrumah feared to involve the Soviets into the decolonization process. Secondly, Nasser was sponsoring at the same time Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism, a duality which was unacceptable for Nkrumah. Thirdly, the UAR was economically more strong than Ghana and, with Moscow at its back, it could overwhelm Accra politically. Thus, in 1957-1958, Ghana kept a double attitude towards the UAR, studying its moves on the African scene.

At first, Nkrumah tried to sign a political alliance with Nasser, even before Egypt joined Syria into the UAR. The marriage between the Ghanaian leader and the Coptic Egyptian Fathia Rizk – celebrated on the 31st of December 1957 - also contributed to strengthen the relationship between the two states, endangered by Accra's collaboration with Israel.¹⁰⁶

While apparently Nkrumah's operation had been a success, the cracks on the alliance with the UAR started manifesting just immediately after. In fact, the two countries shared different views on how to manage the African liberation process and they had different perspectives on the Cold War. During 1958, they held a political confrontation on these and other matters. The debate between the two states was followed with interest by the Westerns and the Soviets, both interested in understanding how an alliance between Cairo and Accra could affect the decolonization process in Africa.

¹⁰⁶ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.46-51.

The first issue they discussed was the use of violence in the liberation process. It emerged at the IASC, when the Algerian question was faced. Ghana held a relatively moderate position, pushing the IAS to recognize nonviolence as the best way to deal with the liberation of Africa, including Algeria's independence struggle.¹⁰⁷ The Egyptians strongly opposed this vision, as they had no objection to the use of violence in the decolonization process. The clash between Ghana and UAR on the use of violence showed a clear difference of outlook between the two. Nasser did not share the political tradition of Manchester and Nkrumah was not willing to give up on one of the pillars of his Pan-African policy. On the question of violence as well as on many others, the UAR was still more radical than Ghana.

The confrontation between Accra and Cairo was not only limited to the use of violence. At the IASC, they held also very different positions on the role the two superpowers had to play in the African liberation process. In line with the Pan-Africanist strategy of Positive Neutrality, Nkrumah wanted to keep the decolonization out of the Cold War. He wanted to establish a fund for freedom fighters financed only by the independent African states, keeping it independent from both the East and the West. The UAR opposed this fund since it did not want to generate a competition between it and the one of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, a Soviet-backed anti-colonial platform where Cairo was already involved.¹⁰⁸ Nasser did not hesitate to call for Moscow's support in the liberation process - even if officially maintaining a non-aligned stance – whereas Nkrumah opposed any external influence.

In the final analysis, as the IASC had showed, Nkrumah and Nasser were not politically in line. Still, the possibility of a tactical pact between the two was not a remote one. The African liberation process could have been strongly affected by such a measure both in the short period – especially with the upcoming AAPC – and in the long one.

¹⁰⁷ Ghana proposed to add to the final resolutions the term “by peaceful means” to the phrase “to make every possible effort to help the Algerian people towards the attainment of independence”. W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.36. See: Declaration of the IAS conference, Accra, April 15-22 1958, Section 3 – The Question of Algeria, article 6; in C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, p.142.

¹⁰⁸ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.37.

The Western Powers were particularly interested in this question, as they considered a possible alliance between Nasser and Nkrumah as a threat for the political stability of post-colonial Africa. A liberation process led by two allied radical states could open the door to a political revolution in Africa, and this scenario was not acceptable for the West, especially since Moscow could take advantage of the situation.

Since early 1958, London prepared a series of reports on Ghana's foreign policy with a special focus on its relationship with the USSR and the Arab countries, including the UAR. Through the reports, the British wanted to have a clear idea of the situation before the AAPC, so they could take countermeasures in case the conference turned out to be a subversive instrument.

The British discovered soon that Ghana's attitude towards the UAR could be easily defined as cold. One of the first reports, submitted just before the IASC, showed that Nkrumah's Ghana had a scarce interest in associating too much with Nasser's UAR.¹⁰⁹ In Ghana, the "Israeli party" led by Padmore had still more power than the "Egyptian" one.¹¹⁰ Even after the IASC, the situation did not change relevantly.

Still, some personalities of the Western front kept warning against a subversive plan led by Cairo and Accra to rule Africa. One of the strongest voices among them was the one of Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Welensky had no problems in pointing the finger to what he considered a Soviet-backed plan to bring a communist revolution in Africa. According to him, the AAPC was the weapon to organize such an uprising led by Accra and Cairo. Welensky's accusations were taken by the British government with a certain perplexity, since they knew about the mutual contempt between him and Nkrumah. However, it is interesting to go through them in order

¹⁰⁹ During the preparatory trip of the conference, one of the members of the Ghanaian delegation, Kofi, was asked by a British diplomat at Tunis about the political relationship between Nkrumah and Nasser. In particular, the diplomat asked Kofi about UAR's position towards the establishment of the Black Star Line, a maritime company created in Ghana with Israeli funds. Kofi's answer was emblematic of the scarce interest towards the Ghana-UAR alliance by many Ghanaians at the time. He told the British diplomat: "That is why Dr. Nkrumah married an Egyptian!". See BNA, FO/371/131182, Letter, Dearden (British Embassy, Tunis) to Smith (African Department, Foreign Office), March 1, 1958. On the Black Star Line see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.37.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p.47.

to better understand the political implication of Accra and Cairo's relationship in view of the AAPC.

Welensky considered Nkrumah a dangerous crypto-communist, who could lead Africa towards Moscow. As for Nkrumah, he had strongly opposed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and its Prime Minister since before Ghana's independence. According to the Ghanaian Prime Minister, the Federation was not a simple regional union, but in fact a means to strengthen the white rule in Africa. A note of the British Foreign Office of August 1958 underlined that Nkrumah had a better opinion of South Africa than the CAF. At the time, he was considered "anti-Welensky".¹¹¹

In August 1958, Welensky made a speech in which he warned about a plan led by USSR, Egypt and Ghana to transform the African liberation process into a communist uprising. According to him, by supporting the liberation movements through Ghana and the UAR, the Soviets were trying to attract the continent on their side. In this scenario, the AAPC was a call to arms by the communists. The speech is interesting as it allows to understand how certain personalities of the Western world still held suspects towards Nkrumah and his Pan-African policy:

[...] Russia's hand lies behind nationalism in Africa. [...] I cannot think of any African nationalist organization whose activities are not in the long run preparing the way for international Communism. [...] Ghana has emerged as the focus of anti-colonialism for the present, but by marriage and by inclination Ghana and Egypt are walking hand-in-hand, as is shown by the fact that Ghana is supported by Cairo in its object of a continent-wide liberation movement, as well as in its staging of the conference of independent African States in Ghana. This support was clearly endorsed by the establishment of the permanent Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.¹¹²

Nkrumah rejected all the accusations. Accra was very far from being a communist agent of Moscow. Furthermore, Ghana's political relationship with Egypt was not as idyllic as Welensky had described it. On August 25 1958, the British Embassy in Washington wrote

¹¹¹ BNA, FO/371/131182, Front page of file J 1021/5 of 25/28 August 1958.

¹¹² BNA, FO/371/131182, Extract from "East Africa and Rhodesia" of Thursday, September 4, 1958 (the speech was made in August).

to the Foreign Office in London to underline the bad reaction of the Ghanaians to Welensky's speech. Moreover, they added that even the U.S. State Department considered Nkrumah disenchanted about Nasser, even if he kept acting publicly as a friend.¹¹³

Still, London kept an eye open on Welensky's warnings.

During the summer, the Prime Minister of the CAF exchanged views with the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on how to counter communist activities in Africa, including also the AAPC.¹¹⁴ The question was taken seriously by Macmillan who did not want to risk the fall of Africa in the hands of Khrushchev. On the 2nd of September 1958, the Commonwealth Secretary met Nkrumah and discussed with him about the upcoming AAPC. The minute of the conversation clarifies Nkrumah's attitude towards Nasser in 1958 and his position towards African liberation:

Dr. Nkrumah came to lunch today. [...] He [...] spoke a good deal about Nasser whom he distrusted. He thought that Nasser had allowed himself to get into the Russian coils but did not really wish to be anything but neutral. He was skeptical about Arab nationalism, pointing out that the Egyptians were not Arabs and belonged to Africa and not Asia. He was cagey about his Conference of African Political Parties and I warned him that if he were determined to have it we could not of course stop him but that I hoped he would try and be a moderating influence. [...] Dr. Nkrumah is going ahead with his proposed conference of African political parties. [...] Dr. Nkrumah was pleasant and apparently understanding but I am sure he sees himself as champion of "Africa for the Africans". I therefore fear the worst from the conference and I gather scallywags from Colonial territories are already assembling.¹¹⁵

Nkrumah calmed down the British suspects on the real nature of the AAPC. According to him, the conference was going to be only a gathering of African nationalists claiming for their freedom and for the unity of the continent. Neither the UAR nor the USSR had anything to do with it. As in 1958, Nasser was more a rival than an ally.

¹¹³ BNA, FO/371/131182, Letter, Bottomley (British Embassy in Washington D.C) to Smith (Foreign office), August 25, 1958.

¹¹⁴ BNA, PREM/11-3239, Series of Letters between Macmillan and Welensky.

¹¹⁵ BNA, FO/371/131182, The Commonwealth Secretary to British Prime Minister, typescript, 2nd September 1958.

Nkrumah had been very cautious in claiming any alliance with Nasser. There were political reasons, of course, and they had already been presented. But there was also a tactical reason. In view of the AAPC, Ghana did not want to attract the fears of the West on its Pan-African policy. For Nkrumah, the Conference was the best occasion to present officially his ideas on African liberation and unity. Thus, he did not want to throw this chance away by associating Ghana with a radical, pro-Soviet state.

Even though Nkrumah had momentarily reassured the West, Washington, Paris, and London were still keeping an eye on him to see how he would deal with the de-colonization process. In the meantime, however, Ghana could launch its Pan-African policy with the wind in his sails. The AAPC was approaching and Nkrumah and Padmore were working hard on its organization. The actualization of Ghana's Pan-African policy depended on the success of the Conference.

1.8. The Establishment of the African Affairs Centre

One of the first aims of Ghana's Pan-African policy was to attract as many liberation movements as possible towards Ghana and Nkrumah's ideology. The final goal was to create a united front of nationalist parties which could bring a continental government to life. Padmore's Office had a key role in this mission: widening its already ample net of political contacts. However, there was a significant problem in view of the AAPC: Accra had no structures to welcome African freedom fighters. Without a place where to host nationalists in Ghana, the mission of gathering them together in Accra was likely to fail. Makonnen suggested to create a proper center for this purpose, in order to have also an instrument for Ghana's Pan-African policy after the conference. The planned new institution was meant to be at the same time a hostel and a political training center. The new institution was called African Affairs Centre (AAC) and it was bound to be the second "Pan-African" institution of Ghana, directly depending on the first one.

Padmore and Makonnen had decided to invite to the AAPC all the African liberation movements, regardless of their political outlook, as long as they endorsed the political agenda of the conference.¹¹⁶ Still, it was also important to have as many liberation movements as possible on Ghana's side before the AAPC took place. The most important mission of Padmore's Office in 1958 was to find these nationalist parties and link them to Ghana. The Adviser on African Affairs was already in touch with several African political leaders, some of whom he had met in Moscow and in London many years before.¹¹⁷ The Trinidadian Pan-Africanist spent the end of 1957 and the beginning of 1958 strengthening these old contacts and working on new ones to attract their parties to Ghana.

In March 1958, a first count of Padmore's results could be made. During the first independence anniversary, a group of African nationalists was invited. The group included Padmore and Nkrumah's old friends such as Azikiwe and Garba-Jahumpa but also other important personalities like Mboya, Murumbi, Apithy and Djibo Bakary.¹¹⁸ The occasion was propitious to show them and their parties the contents of Ghana's Pan-African policy and to introduce them to the AAPC. This first group became the basis of the list of delegates for the conference to be held in December. Ghana's struggle for influence towards liberation movements had officially begun.

The Office of the Adviser on African Affairs had provided accommodation to the guests of March at Accra's hotels. Indeed, the institution was not capable of hosting directly the nationalists, since its building was only a small bungalow.¹¹⁹ The lack of a proper structure for official guests represented a double problem for Ghana. First of all, accommodating the guests in local hotels was very expensive for the government. Secondly, Ghana's promise to provide support to freedom fighters could not cope with the lack of proper structures to host them. Makonnen was particularly aware of the political risks in case Nkrumah failed to find a solution. He wrote in his autobiography:

¹¹⁶ PRAAD, SC/BAA/165, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 19th August 1958.

¹¹⁷ For instance, Kenyatta and Azikiwe. See G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.6 and 16.

¹¹⁸ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.31. The latter was meant to become the first political refugee hosted in Ghana.

¹¹⁹ For a map of the area of the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs (and the future Bureau of African Affairs) see AGPL, un-catalogued AA/Office Stationery Equipment And Accommodation (BAA-8), map at pag.178.

[...] if we in Ghana were going to provide any lead, it was essential that there should be facilities whereby visiting revolutionaries or freedom fighters could be accommodated and made useful themselves and to the development of an African ideology. There had to be structures, and this was a desperate need, because from time of independence in 1957 there had been groups of stragglers from various countries to be found in Ghana. But they were living like kings, taking a bottle of whisky here and there, and charging it to the government.¹²⁰

Makonnen discussed the matter with Padmore, who was also very critical about the lack of structures. In the summer, other guests arrived, including ministers of other African countries and the Office became overwhelmed by the requests of accommodation. The situation soon turned out to be unmanageable and the need for a solution could not be delayed anymore.

The 19th of August 1958, Padmore wrote to Nkrumah to expose him the issue and to propose a way out. After having provided accommodation to several visitors from Dahomey and Ivory Coast, his Office was having difficulties in hosting six African ministers. Indeed, there was no more money to pay the hotel bills. Thus, Padmore presented him Makonnen's proposal to establish a hostel for freedom fighters and official guests in Accra. It is the first reference of the future project of the African Affairs Centre. Padmore wrote:

This weekend, we are expecting at least six Ministers from various French territories. [...] Our difficulty is in finding accommodation for them. Our hotel bills with the Ambassador Hotel are too expensive. Makonnen informs me that there are a number of empty houses that are used occasionally as government rest house in the Cantonments area. He suggests that one of them should be set aside for use when we have these African visitors, as more of these people shall be visiting Ghana. But this action cannot be taken without your approval.¹²¹

¹²⁰ R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.212.

¹²¹ PRAAD, SC/BAA/165, *Letter*, Padmore to Nkrumah, 19th August 1958.

Padmore sponsored Makonnen for the role of manager of the new hostel. According to him, the Guyanese Pan-Africanist was doing a very good work with the recruitment of African nationalists for the conference. Thus, he had the perfect profile for the job. Thanks to him, the AAPC was expected to be success:

You will be pleased to know that the preparatory work of the conference is well in hand. Mak [Ras Makonnen] is Chairman of the planning committee [...] I have every confidence that it is going to be a tremendous success judging from the number of enquiries that are coming in daily asking for representation. As you know, we have decided to invite all organization regardless of their political outlook as long as they endorse the points of the agenda.¹²²

Nkrumah and Padmore needed a reliable and trustable man to deal with the creation and the running of such an important institution. Makonnen already had years of experience in political activity and management. In the United Kingdom, he had worked as treasurer of the IASB, the PAF and also the Pan-African Congress itself. Moreover, he had successfully run a hostel for African activists in London.¹²³ At the time, Makonnen himself was more than willing to make a more significant contribution to Ghana's Pan-African policy than the one he was making with his work at the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs.

Nkrumah finally accepted Padmore's proposal and he gave Makonnen free hand to work for the new Centre. Makonnen was aware of the difficulties of running such a project, with no big funds and basically no time ahead, but he was ready to take the risk:

¹²² PRAAD, SC/BAA/165, *Letter*, Padmore to Nkrumah, 19th August 1958.

¹²³ James explains the outstanding role of the Guyanese Pan-Africanist in the life of the IASB and PAF: "The Bureau [IASB] needed money and organization in order to live a material existence at all. This had been supplied in the first case by Makonnen, another West Indian, a man of fantastic energy and organizational gifts who found the money, found the premises, kept them in order not only as an office but as a sort of free hostel for Africans and people of African descent and their friends who were in any way connected with the Bureau or needed assistance, organized meetings, interested people and did his share as propagandist and agitator". In C.R.L., James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, p.76

I was considered a seasoned veteran, and it was assumed I'd get on with the job without any program being laid down. It shouldn't be too different from some of the things I'd been doing in African welfare work in Manchester, Liverpool and other places.¹²⁴

The Guyanese Pan-Africanist begun to work to the future African Affairs Centre (AAC) in September. He only had three months to find the resources to run the new institution. His first task was then to find cheap solutions to the needs of the Centre. He finally found an area close to the Accra airport, where there were twenty-five chalets of the pre-independence period. The place was perfect. The buildings did not need serious works of renovation and there was enough room to host the guests of the conference. Furthermore, the Centre was close to the airport, a strategic position which would allow freedom fighters to move quickly in case of danger. The AAC was formally depending on Padmore's office but practically it was run solely by Makonnen, who collected the funds to finance all the works for the Centre.¹²⁵

At the opening of the AAPC, the Centre was ready to work. The new hostel was bound to host African freedom fighters even after the conference. In this sense, it became one of the most important instruments of Ghana's Pan-African policy, since, at the AAC, hundreds of African nationalists were bound to cross their paths. Moreover, it became also a place where to provide members of nationalist parties with ideological training, directly supplied by the Centre or by the CPP.

Ghana had finally the structures to fulfill its targets. The AAPC was the occasion to present them to the liberation movements invited in order to attract them towards Pan-Africanism. With the conference, a new season was beginning. Ghana was ready to lead the African liberation and unity struggles. The next sub-chapter will deal with the AAPC, in the attempt to describe the role it played in African politics and in the evolution of Ghana's Pan-African policy.

¹²⁴ R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.212.

¹²⁵ The land where the chalets were was under the control of the Office of the Adviser and, after Padmore's death (Sept. 1959), of the Bureau of African Affairs. See AGPL, un-catalogued AA/Office Stationery Equipment And Accommodation (BAA-8), "Certificate of Allocation, Accra, site for Taycot Bungalows", 16th October 1959.

1.9. The All-African People's Conference

With the AAPC, Nkrumah and Padmore finally succeeded in gathering most of the liberation movements in Accra. With the opening of the African Affairs Centre, Ghana offered his territory as a shelter and base for every freedom fighter in need. The conference was also an opportunity to promote Nkrumah's ideas on African liberation and unity. It marked what is probably the highest level of popularity ever experienced by Nkrumah in his political career. It also marked the end of the "diplomatic" approach to foreign policy experienced by Ghana during the first year and a half after independence. From then on, the struggle for African liberation was meant to be fought on the field.

The All-African People's Conference was the most important Pan-African gathering ever held since the 1945 Manchester Congress. The name was chosen by Nkrumah, in spite of Padmore's objection: the term "All-African" instead of "Pan-African" underlined the new tradition that came with independent Ghana.¹²⁶ Even if the name was new, the conference was undoubtedly considered in line with the other Pan-African congresses and conferences held since 1900. The only relevant difference was that with the AAPC the Pan-African movement had finally taken roots in Africa. Padmore's dream had become a reality.

The conference gathered together more than two hundred delegates representing thirty-six nationalist organizations.¹²⁷ It was a precious occasion for Nkrumah to expose his plans for African liberation and unity to the rest of the continent. It was also a chance to present the achievements of Ghana and to propose them as examples to be followed by other countries.

At the AAPC, the CPP - the official organizer of the conference - was directly and indirectly presented as a model nationalist party. According to the Ghanaians, the party had proved its organizational efficiency and its ideological integrity during the liberation struggle of the Gold Coast. Moreover, it had successfully responded to the Pan-African call

¹²⁶ Thompson quotes James Markham on this issue. W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.58.

¹²⁷ PRAAD, ADM/16/1/11, "List of Official Delegates" as part of AAPC, News Bulletin of the All African People's Conference, issued by the Permanent Secretariat.

for the use of nonviolence. From this point of view, it was the party which had better applied the Manchester's indications. All the other parties were invited to follow the steps of the CPP, provided the colonial powers granted them the basic political rights. Kojo Botsio, leading figure of the party and head of the steering committee of the conference, stated:

The Secret weapon of the CPP was organization. Together with organization is the demand for universal adult suffrage. The right of one individual to one vote regardless of race, color or creed. Universal adult suffrage is the key to the final attainment of independence. With the united will of the people behind you, the power of the imperialist can be destroyed without the use of violence".¹²⁸

Questions regarding frontiers, regionalism, colonialism, racism, federalism, liberation were discussed. Five committees met each day of the conference (which took place on 5-13 December 1958) to discuss these and other issues.

Before the conference produced its own resolution, Nkrumah tried to provide what he thought were the steps towards the achievement of the "highest standard of life" in Africa: 1) the attainment of freedom and independence; 2) the consolidation of that freedom and independence; 3) the creation of unity and community between the free African states; 4) the economic and social reconstruction of Africa.¹²⁹ The whole Pan-African policy of Ghana was summarized in few words.

In the meantime, very practical discussions on African liberation took place outside the halls of the conference and far from world media ears. The AAC - which was hosting the majority of the delegates – became also the seat of confidential meetings between the liberation movements and the Ghanaian government. According to Makonnen:

There were really two types of meetings; there were the official ones at the conference hall where heads of states would be talking in general terms about the future of Africa; and

¹²⁸ "People's Conference Plans, Permanent Body", Africa Special Report, December 1958, p.4, quoted in H. Adom, *The Role of Ghana in African Liberation and Unity, 1957-1977*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Temple University, 1991 p.84.

¹²⁹ H. Adom, *The Role of Ghana in African Liberation and Unity, 1957-1977*, p.82.

that's where the foreign reporters would be. Then there were the unofficial meetings at the Centre or at the chalets where you'd find the trade union element mixing with the ideological groups from various countries. They kept off the high-level generalizations about African freedom, and dealt with the practical questions of liberation.¹³⁰

The AAPC became the first occasion to spread the Centre's name throughout Africa. All the liberation movements in the continent were invited to send some of their members to the AAC and to keep the contacts with their representative in Ghana. Padmore's Office was coordinating all the operations.

At the conference, Lumumba and Roberto and other important political activists established contacts with Nkrumah's government and their parties begun to collaborate with the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana. Even the Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (FNL), represented at the AAPC by Franz Fanon, established an office in Accra. Thus, after the AAPC, Nkrumah could count on a "network of admirers" in the continent, some of whom, like Kaunda, were going to support him even after his fall.¹³¹

The resolutions of the AAPC covered practically every question concerning African liberation, promoting a Pan-African platform to coordinate the efforts of the freedom fighters against colonialism.¹³² In line with Nkrumah's Pan-African position, the AAPC promoted nonviolence over guerrilla warfare.

The conference achieved also another important target: the establishment of a permanent steering committee and a secretariat to be settled in Accra. The latter had to play a role similar to the one of the AAPSO for the Afro-Asian world. It was meant to gather all the liberation movements under the same umbrella and to coordinate their actions. A "freedom fund" was also created in order to collect all the money provided by the independent African countries. A similar initiative had been unsuccessfully proposed by Ghana at the IASC.

¹³⁰ R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.214

¹³¹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.61.

¹³² For an analysis of the conference and its resolutions see, for instance: J.B. Gewald, *Hands off Africa!!: an overview and analysis of the ideological, political and socio-economic approaches to African Unity expressed at the first All-African People's Congress held in Accra, Ghana in December 1958*, s.n., 1990.

The AAPC proved important to amplify the requests and the protests of the African liberation movements. Africa's political evolutions were under the spotlight in both the East and the West. For what concerns Ghana, the conference was a political success. Accra was proposed as one of the headquarters of the African liberation struggle.

1.10. Conclusions

The period 1957-1958 marked a crucial step towards the fulfillment of Ghana's Pan-African policy. At the end of this period, Accra had won the confidence of hundreds of freedom fighters, ready to count on Nkrumah's support. The Office of the Adviser on African Affairs had done a meticulous and successful work, considering that at the time of the AAPC, it was only one year old. Nkrumah and Padmore's past experiences proved fundamental in this operation, without the two of them it would not have been possible to set up such an efficient institution.

The AAPC marked ideally the end of the first period of Ghana's foreign policy and opened a new phase. The "diplomatic" and relatively moderate approach of 1957/1958 was going to be followed by a more "militant" one. It was time to put the Pan-Africanist theory into practice.

Those two years had been important to give shape to Padmore's Office and to the African Affair Centre. The next step was to develop them in order to support efficiently the African liberation movements. It meant working on their structures, on the composition of their staff and also on the policies they had to perform. The two "Pan-African" institutions had to be completely adapted to the challenges of the African liberation struggle. The next chapter will describe the evolution of Ghana's Pan-African policy and its institutions between January and September 1959.

2. Translating the Theory into Practice (January – September 1959)

Introduction

The first year and half of Nkrumah's rule can be undoubtedly considered as a period of political successes. The next step for the Ghanaian Prime Minister was to capitalize on these results and actualize Ghana's Pan-African policy. In the first months of 1959, together with Padmore he had begun to apply this policy to the African liberation struggle. The theory could be finally turned into practice.

The platform from where to start was solid. Ghana had the structures, the men and the political strength to deal with the challenges of the African political scene. Backed by Nkrumah's prestige, Padmore's Office was ready to operate on a continental scale. The New Year brought even more money, more men and more political power to deal with this mission.

This chapter will describe the making and performance of Ghana's Pan-African policy by Padmore's Office and the AAC between January and September 1959. In this period, Ghana defined for the first time its policies for the support of political refugees, African students and opposition parties. It clarified also its stand towards the use of armed struggle in the liberation process. Finally, Padmore's Office set up the basis for a proper Pan-Africanist propaganda. The chapter will examine one by one all the problems the two Pan-African institutions had to face in 1959.

The period under examination coincides also with Padmore's last months before his death.¹³³ The Trinidadian Pan-Africanist gave his most important contribution to the management of Ghana's "un-orthodox" machinery during this year. His imprint on his Office and the AAC was bound to last for years after his death. One example, which will be described in length in the chapter, is the choice of his "successor": A.K. Barden.

¹³³ Indeed, he died on the 23rd of September, 1959.

Generally speaking, this chapter will deal with a period of changes that were going to influence Ghana's internal and external policies in the short and in the long period. It was in 1959, for instance, that Ghana began to change its position towards the two superpowers, which had definitely entered into African politics. Even the relationship between Ghana, UAR, and Guinea evolved considerably in 1959 and it influenced indirectly the radicalization of the Ghanaian state. The acceleration in the implementation of Ghana's Pan-African policy was also the result of the competition between the three radical states.

The chapter will be opened by an overview of Ghana's foreign policy in Africa after the closing of the AAPC. Thanks to this introduction, it will be easier to understand the choices made by Padmore and Nkrumah in the conception and performance of Ghana's Pan-African policy in this period. Moreover, it will be possible to understand the duties Padmore's Office and the AAC had to perform.

2.1. Ghana's Foreign Policy in Africa after the AAPC

In 1959, Ghana had to face several political challenges in Africa. The process of decolonization was speeding up and the road already traced by Ghana and Guinea in Sub-Saharan Africa was to be undertaken by other African countries. At the AAPC, Ghana had announced its political position. In early 1959, the time was ripe to take a stand in each of the controversial situations that were evolving in the continent.

Just after the AAPC conference, Ghana was called to actively participate to the independence process. The entire continent was in a political turmoil and Ghana had to elaborate accurate strategies for each area of intervention.

The first area of interest was Southern Africa. At the AAPC, three questions regarding this area had been amply discussed and they were bound to evolve during 1959: the protests against the Central African Federation (CAF), the fight against the "apartheid" in South Africa and the increasingly problematic situation in the Portuguese colonies. In

1959, all these territories experienced a high degree of tension, with liberation movements growing in strength. Thus, Ghana began to play an active role in the politics of the region.

Nkrumah's Ghana was not the only actor playing against Welensky and the CAF. The AAPC had showed that the front against the Federation was strong both inside and outside its territory. The unrest within the CAF definitely mounted in 1959. The protests in Nyasaland were led by Hastings Kamuzu Banda, leader of the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) and old friend and ally of Padmore and Nkrumah.¹³⁴ Welensky responded vigorously. The NAC was banned in February 1959 and Banda himself was arrested in March. These events made the situation in the Federation even worse.

At the time, Banda was probably one of Nkrumah's closest political allies. Thus, Ghana's diplomacy and the propaganda machinery were put in motion to attack Welensky and the CAF. Nkrumah had the perfect chance to weaken the Federation and at the same time to win one strong ally after Nyasaland's independence. Meanwhile, even the collaboration with liberation movements in the two Rhodesias was strengthening so as to have a united front against the white-ruled CAF.

In South Africa, the year 1959 turned out to be fundamental for the evolution of the local liberation movements. In April, a new party split out of the ANC: the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The PAC, ideologically more radical than the ANC, was sponsored by Ghana as well as the latter. By 1959, the relationship between ANC and PAC became one of main issues to be faced by Ghana in South Africa.

In the same period, the tension grew even in the Portuguese colonies, where anti-colonial movements reinforced their ranks. At the AAPC the political evolutions of the Lusophone Empire were discussed. Holden Roberto had been invited at the conference and after its closing he stayed at the AAC as one of the first political refugees ever hosted in Ghana.

¹³⁴ Hastings Banda (1898-1997) studied and graduated in medicine both in United States and in Scotland and practiced as a doctor both in the United Kingdom and the Gold Coast/Ghana (1951-1958). In 1958, he went back to Nyasaland to play an active part in politics with the Nyasaland African Congress, known after 1959 as Malawi Congress Party. There, he won the elections in 1961 and he led his country towards independence; the NAC was first mentioned in Ghanaian documents as ANC- Nyasaland.

After the AAPC, other refugees from South Africa and from other neighboring countries were also hosted by Ghana. It was the baptism of fire for the AAC, which in the following years had to manage other waves of refugees from all over Africa.

Ghana's Pan-African policy in Southern Africa was producing the first results. However, the Ghanaians were aware of the difficulties of the liberation struggles in the region and they still did not invest all of their resources in this mission. The freedom of Southern Africa could be achieved only after implementing medium/long term projects. On the contrary, the independence process in Central Africa and West Africa was already advanced and that is where Ghana concentrated most of its strength.¹³⁵

Both the Ghanaian Foreign Service and Padmore's Office were very active in West and Central Africa. Their mission was to support independences and to attract politically the new nations. Ghana's influence in these areas was stronger than in Southern Africa and stronger was also its interest there. In particular, Accra tried to attract French and British West Africa by its side. A good relationship with these countries was fundamental in order to widen the Ghana-Guinea Union project, one the main points of Padmore and Nkrumah's agenda for the year 1959.

Padmore, Nkrumah and the new Ministers of External Affairs (Kodjo Botsio from November '58 to April '59 and his successor, Ako Adjei) worked hard in the winter 1958/59 in order to actualize the Ghana-Guinea Union. Resident Ministers were exchanged and Accra supplied Conakry with several kinds of experts and technicians.¹³⁶ In the

¹³⁵ The countries of British West Africa and French West Africa which achieved independence during 1960 were: Togo, Mali Federation (then Mali and Senegal), Dahomey, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Niger and Mauritania. Furthermore, it must be underlined that the independence of Cameroon (a country which is usually considered as part of the Central Africa) had a direct influence on West African politics. Indeed, during the last years of the 1950s a strong political battle concerned the British Cameroons (at the time part of Nigeria and divided between Northern and Southern Cameroons) which were disputed between Nigeria and the French Cameroons. Finally, after the independence of the French Cameroons in 1960, the British Southern Cameroons joined the new country in 1961, leaving Nigeria definitely. On the other hand, the Northern Cameroons became finally part of the modern Nigeria.

¹³⁶ The Ghanaian resident Ministers in Guinea during this period were: Nathaniel Welbeck (December '58 – February '59) and Ako Adjei (February to September 1959). After being resident Minister in Guinea, Welbeck was *chargé d'affaires* at Leopoldville between October and December 1960. Later he became Executive Secretary of the CPP (1962-1966). Ako Adjei was Minister of External Affairs between April 1959 and May 1961. Between May 1961 and August 1962 he became Foreign Minister. An example of the efforts of Ghana to strengthen the union was the provision of a telegraphic transmission between the two countries. This project was already in place by January 23rd 1959. The communication was obviously a major issue for

meantime, Nkrumah launched a strong political campaign to extend the borders of the Union further than those of Ghana and Guinea. This process reached its climax on May 1, 1959 with the signing of the “Conakry Declaration”. With the declaration, the “Union of Independent African States” (UAS) was officially established. The name was a clear invitation to all the states of the IAS platform to join it. Padmore and Nkrumah were directly involved in the signing of the declaration, spending almost three weeks in Guinea between April and May.¹³⁷ Through the UAS, Ghana could involve other African countries – mainly the West Africans – into a real Pan-African project.

At the same time, Ghana could also keep an eye on Guinea: since in 1959 the latter had deepened its relations with both France and USSR, Ghana was suspicious of Touré’s attitude towards them. Indeed, Paris and Moscow could influence Conakry’s approach to African liberation and unity and also the relationship between Ghana and Guinea itself.¹³⁸

Guinea signed an agreement with France on 7 January 1959. It included also Touré’s promise of keeping his country into the franc zone.¹³⁹ This fact obviously discontented Accra. The project of a monetary union within the UAS faded away. Furthermore, the strong presence of Paris into West African politics could have endangered the development of the UAS project.¹⁴⁰

As regards the USSR, Touré showed immediately a warmer attitude towards the Soviets than Nkrumah’s. Conakry signed a trade agreement with Moscow already in

the union in order to survive, considering that at the time there was no territorial continuity in the Union. See, W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.69.

¹³⁷ At Conakry, Padmore wanted to work side by side with Nkrumah for the Union but at the same time he wanted to check on the involvement of Guinea in the AAPC organization.

¹³⁸ On the attitude of Ghana towards Guinea in 1958/59 see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp.67-73.

¹³⁹ *Ibidem*, p.71.

¹⁴⁰ It must be underlined that a monetary union inside the Ghana-Guinea Union was considered a fundamental step towards a true economical integration. The Guinean promise to France sounded like a delay in this project. Furthermore, it may be added that Ghana always feared the influence of France on its former colonies, as it meant a clear political control of the colonies themselves by Paris. It is in this period that the so-called “Entente” composed by Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger (all of them yet to gain independence) was established. The “Entente” was to be one of Ghana’s main obstacles to the political integration of West Africa and also a rival on the continental scene in the years to come. The Ghanaian policy with Guinea must be read as Accra’s attempt to control the relations with a relatively moderate French West Africa. See *Ibidem*, p.72.

1959.¹⁴¹ At the time, Guinea began also supporting African liberation movements and the USSR financed the operation. In line with its policy of “Positive Neutrality”, Ghana feared Moscow’s involvement. Thus, Padmore worked at the forefront to weaken the Soviet influence on Guinea. In order to achieve this target, he involved it in the AAPC organization already since its establishment. The Guinean Abdoulaye Diallo was appointed secretary of the AAPC Steering Committee. Padmore also proposed Conakry as the first seat of the Committee meeting.¹⁴² Even with the UAR, Ghana’s strategy was similar. Cairo was chosen as the location for the next session of the AAPC Steering Committee in June 1959. In that way, Nkrumah could attract Nasser closer to him and far from Kruhschev.

Both the Ministry of External Affairs and Padmore’s office had to work with the intent of widening the UAS. The countries which attracted most of the attention were: Mali (French Sudan and Senegal), Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo, Liberia and the Cameroons.¹⁴³

The Mali Federation was established in January 1959, and it originally included Senegal, French Sudan, Dahomey and Upper Volta, even though the latter two left the federation shortly after.¹⁴⁴ Right from the start, Ghana obviously considered the Mali Federation as a possible interlocutor for a West African federation project. In the meantime, in May, a sort of association of moderate pro-France African states was formed: it was the so-called “Entente Council”.¹⁴⁵ Its members were: Ivory Coast, Niger and the former Mali Federation members Upper Volta and Dahomey. Having only Guinea on its side, Ghana needed to find good allies within the ranks of those francophone countries in view of

¹⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p.100: Ghana had to wait until 1961 to have a similar treaty.

¹⁴² The Steering Committee of the All-African People’s Conference opened its first session in Conakry on April 15, 1959; in G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.138.

¹⁴³ Once again it must be remembered that the question of British Cameroons automatically pushed the Cameroons into West African politics. Furthermore, it can be also said that French Cameroons had been administered by France with a different status than the AEF (Afrique Équatoriale Française). Indeed, the French Cameroons, like the British ones, were Trust territories of the United Nations, being previously mandates of the League of Nations.

¹⁴⁴ Just after a few days from the first act of establishment of the Federation, Dahomey and Upper Volta had already withdrew from it. There is no doubt that France and Ivory Coast were involved in this decision, since the Dahomey and Upper Volta joined, shortly after, the “*Conseil de l’Entente*”, the pro-France association of states led by Abidjan.

¹⁴⁵ The association was between African states still under colonial rule but in view of independence.

independence.¹⁴⁶ One of the goals of Ghana's foreign policy in 1959 became then to establish contacts with Dakar and Bamako.¹⁴⁷

With regards to Nigeria and Ivory Coast, Ghana undertook two completely different approaches. On one side, the Ghanaians tried to attract politically the two economical giants of West Africa. Without them, indeed, the UAS project was likely to fail. On the other side, the Ghanaians tried to weaken the political strength held by Abidjan and Lagos. Indeed, the moderate attitude of the two countries was considered dangerous for Nkrumah's unification plans in West Africa.

Nigeria deserved Ghana's particular attention as it was its "sister colony". Nkrumah visited the country in February 1959 together with Kojo Botsio and George Padmore.¹⁴⁸ Over the year, they worked hard to attract Lagos on Accra's side. The main problem in achieving this target was that the two countries had already several clashes on crucial questions. First of all, Nigerian politicians did not like Nkrumah's suppression of the West African boards, which had united British West Africa for decades. Secondly, Nigeria criticized Ghana's involvement in the politics of Southern Cameroons, where Nkrumah supported the all-Cameroon option. They considered it as a violation of the sovereignty of another African state, even if not yet independent. Moreover, they considered it a threat to the territorial integrity of Nigeria. This second question needs an in-depth examination.

In 1959, Nkrumah financed the electoral campaign of Foncha, who became Prime Minister of Southern Cameroons on 1st February 1959, replacing Endeley. According to Thompson, Foncha's Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) received at least £10000 from Ghana.¹⁴⁹ Accra backed Foncha as he was pushing the two Cameroons to merge together, obviously at the expenses of Nigeria.¹⁵⁰ Most probably Nkrumah counted

¹⁴⁶ See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.72.

¹⁴⁷ It was a successful project, even if in the long period. Indeed, once the experience of the Mali Federation ended, in August 1960, Bamako was the first (and only) country to join the Ghana-Guinea Union. The name of the union became then, in 1961, the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. See C.E. Welch, *Dream of Unity*, pp.306-316.

¹⁴⁸ See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, AAPC conference secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959.

¹⁴⁹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.66-67.

¹⁵⁰ At the time, Padmore was carefully monitoring the Cameroonian situation, in both the French and the British sides. For instance, in March 1959 Padmore received a report on the Cameroons from the Ghanaian ambassador in Washington. In particular, the report was about the political situation in French Cameroon

on the political return of having a new ally in francophone Africa (French Cameroon). Moreover, he could weaken the wide and moderate Nigeria, a political threat for Ghana's radical Pan-African policy in West Africa. Nkrumah's support to Foncha led to an opened political confrontation with Lagos, bound to become worst in the following years. It can be considered as the first case in which Ghana's radical and unscrupulous foreign policy caused the resentment of another African country. Other cases followed in the subsequent years.

Similarly to the one with Nigeria, even the relationship with Ivory Coast was problematic. In 1959, Nkrumah worked to attract Abidjan to the UAS project. At the same time, however, Accra also began to support the struggle of the Ivorian separatist Sanwi Kingdom. The representatives of the Kingdom, haunted in Ivory Coast, sought refuge in Ghana in April, establishing the Sanwi Liberation Movement and the Sanwi government in exile. The "Sanwi Affair" generated the first of a series of diplomatic incidents between Accra and Abidjan. It was also one of the first cases in which Ghana supported an opposition group of another African state. Similar cases would later involve Niger, Togo and the Southern Cameroons.

Meanwhile, in Togo, Ghana supported both Olympio's party and the youth movement Juvento. His reasons were clarified soon after the independence of Lomè (27th April, 1960), when Nkrumah started to push Olympio for establishing a union between Togo and Ghana.¹⁵¹

The last West African country which particularly attracted Accra's attention was Liberia. Monrovia had lost most of its appeal in Africa during the 1930s.¹⁵² However, it was still considered a fundamental actor of the regional and continental politics. For this reason, Nkrumah worked to bring Liberia close to the Pan-Africanist positions. For its part,

(elections, transfer of power, independence) and the prospects on a referendum on the unification of the Cameroons. It confirms Nkrumah and Padmore's will to support the unification and Foncha's efforts to unite the Southern Cameroons with Douala. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK/General Correspondence with Ministry of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 24th March 1959.

¹⁵¹ The question of unity between Ghana and Togo had its roots in the division of the German Togoland after World War I and the division of the Ewe people between Togo and the Gold Coast which both supported the unity of the ethnic group. In 1956, Nkrumah could claim a first success after giving recognition (with a referendum) to the fusion between the Gold Coast and the British Togoland, renamed Volta Region.

¹⁵² See R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p. 211.

the African state was not willing to join a strict political union that could endanger its political autonomy. Conakry and Accra were also radical countries, not suitable with Liberia's moderate pro-West approach. In 1959, the Liberian President Tubman launched an alternative plan for West African unity, so as not to completely close the doors to Ghana and Guinea. The plan was to establish a union of "Associated States of Africa". The details would be discussed in a dedicated conference. Both Ghana and Guinea agreed and the conference took place in Sanniquellie, Liberia, in July 1959. Even this time Padmore was involved and so was his office.¹⁵³ The Ghanaian hopes were, however, to remain unfulfilled. The result of the Sanniquellie conference was just a declaration of principles for the establishment, in a non-defined future, of "The Community of Independent African States". The final decision for this plan was postponed to a further conference to be held in 1960.¹⁵⁴

The question of Liberia closes this brief excursus of the challenges of the African scene in 1959 and Accra's responses to them. During the year, Nkrumah and Padmore started actualizing Ghana's Pan-African policy in the different African contexts. If the targets were clear – African liberation from colonialism and neo-colonialism and African unity – the means to achieve them were still different from one case to another. Ghana's foreign policy emerged at the same time as both aggressive and assertive, radical and moderate, depending on the situation where Accra was involved.

While diplomacy was called to sedate the growing fears against Ghana, the "Pan-African" institutions started working to support African liberation and unity on the field. Over the year 1959, Padmore's Office and the AAC had begun dealing with the first missions of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Nkrumah and Padmore made it clear that the two institutions were going to play a decisive role in Ghana.

The previous pages showed the complexity of the situation Ghana had to face. In the next ones, it will be possible to understand the difficulties in modeling Ghana's institutions to the needs of the struggle for African liberation and unity. Specific policies had to be re-formulated and the Ghanaian institutions – particularly the "Pan-African" ones - had to be

¹⁵³ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, "Sanniquellie – seat of West Africa's summit conference", p. 19.

¹⁵⁴ For the "Sanniquellie Declaration" see C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, pp.162-63.

re-modeled. The impacts of these changes were to be enormous. One by one every aspect of Ghana's Pan-African policy will be put under the scope and it will be particularly underlined the role played by Padmore's Office and the AAC in each issue.

2.2. Press and Radio as Weapons for African Liberation and Unity

The first point of Nkrumah and Padmore's agenda in 1959 was to improve Ghana's propaganda machinery. Press and radio were considered the best instruments for spreading Pan-Africanism both in Ghana and in Africa. In this period, Ghana made the first moves to build a broadcasting system to support African liberation movements and to give publicity to Nkrumah's plans for a united Africa. Moreover, Padmore's Office had begun distributing political materials throughout Africa. Even in this field, the experience of the Adviser on African Affairs proved very useful, since he already had worked for decades on the production and distribution of anti-colonial press worldwide.

In January 1959, Padmore and Nkrumah met to discuss new strategies to face the challenges of the African political scene.¹⁵⁵ Ghana needed to extend the Pan-African front, taking advantage of the turmoil in the continent. The first solution that emerged during the meeting was to develop a proper Pan-African propaganda machinery and Padmore's Office was directly involved. One of the first duties of the Office was the distribution of Pan-Africanist press, in order to extend Nkrumah's political influence worldwide. On 17 March 1959, Padmore wrote: "in January [...] the Prime Minister had instructed my office to undertake certain additional work beyond our normal functions namely: the dispatch of

¹⁵⁵ Padmore refers to a meeting with Nkrumah to discuss about the "recent developments in West Africa as well as other Independent and dependent African countries affairs" in AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959. As usual, this meeting was a private one. See also AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC/All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959.

newspapers to the world press, as well as certain leaders of public opinion in a number of countries in Europe, Asia and America”.¹⁵⁶

Padmore’s Office dealt also with the editing and distribution of the AAPC and IAS publications.¹⁵⁷ Through this action, Ghana could achieve two targets: supporting the AAPC and IAS platforms and spreading the Pan-Africanist principles in the whole world. Interestingly, the publications were distributed free of charge, a relevant cost but also a political benefit for Ghana. The aim of the operation was to “effect as wide publicity as possible” both to the conferences and indirectly to Ghana itself.¹⁵⁸

These publications, together with radical Ghanaian press, were also sent to the African parties that were politically close to Accra. For instance, in 1959, the Nakuru District Congress (NDC) was provided with Ghanaian newspapers and booklets.¹⁵⁹ In May, the President of the party also requested financial assistance from Ghana.¹⁶⁰ Padmore’s Office not only sent the money but also the press materials, including the “Evening News” and “Ghana News”.¹⁶¹

Through the distribution of political press - including materials of the CPP - Padmore’s Office could spread Nkrumah’s influence within the liberation movements. It was a long-term strategy. In the following years, the Office refined this policy by producing and distributing brand-new Pan-Africanist newspapers and reviews. Voice of Africa

¹⁵⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People’s Conference, Letter, Padmore to Okoh, 17th March 1959.

¹⁵⁷ Archival sources show that at least since 1959 - but perhaps even before - Padmore’s office had undertaken this duty. It is quoted, for the first time, as one of the duties of James Markham in a letter undated but linked with others which date back to February 1959. See AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued “Gabon File”, *Present Duties of Mr. Markham*, undated typescript and the following *letters* in the same file.

¹⁵⁸ On 15 September 1959, Barden (at the time Padmore’s Private Secretary) wrote to a book distributor in London: “As our office is directly responsible for the production and distribution of all documents in connection with the Conference of Independent African States held in April 1958, your letter of the 5th August 1959 addressed to the Government Printer had been passed on to us for action. [...] You may be delighted to know that in order to effect as wide publicity as possible of these documents they are issued free of charge”. See AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Stevens and Brown Ltd., 15th September 1959. Another letter of Barden, dated 11th September 1959 and delivered to Addis Ababa made reference to the other responsibility of the office: “[...] our office is directly responsible for production and distribution of all documents of the All African People’s Conference”. In AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Y.M.C.A. Library, Addis Ababa, 11th September 1959.

¹⁵⁹ The Nakuru District Congress was a Kenyan nationalist party, which merged into KANU (Kenya African National Union) in 1960.

¹⁶⁰ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BB-Secretary’s Personal Correspondence, Letter, Kuboka to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13th May 1959.

¹⁶¹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BB-Secretary’s personal correspondence, Letter, Kuboka to Padmore, 26th September 1959.

(published since 1961) and *The Spark* (published since 1962) were drawn specifically to promote the Pan-African ideals in Ghana and in Africa. Even if they were published only after Padmore's death, his imprint on them was strong.¹⁶²

Padmore's Office invested relevant resources and men in the work with medias. James Markham had a particularly important role in this field, being he responsible for press production and distribution. Padmore had chosen him in the first place for his experience in the press. As a matter of fact, even after leaving the Office in October 1959 he kept working for media production at the Ghanaian broadcasting agency.¹⁶³ Even Ras Makonnen had an important role in the production and distribution of political press. He was responsible for the collaboration between Padmore's Office and its official editor Guinea Press.¹⁶⁴ The agreement with the editor was signed in January 1959, shortly after the meeting between Padmore and Nkrumah. The Guinea Press itself provided a new employee for Padmore's Office, since he needed a man to deal with the "tremendous amount of labor" that the new duties had brought.¹⁶⁵

The press was not the only media developed in this period to spread Pan-Africanist propaganda. Since 1959, Accra invested in the famous Radio Ghana. The latter was conceived as an instrument to spread Nkrumah's thoughts and it was planned also to be a platform for African liberation movements. Important messages could be broadcasted from Ghana on behalf of the nationalist parties. For instance, in September 1959, Radio Ghana broadcasted in English and French a message presented at the congress of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA) by Assi C. Adams, the President of the

¹⁶² The linking between Padmore and the future project of the publication of *Voice of Africa* (first published on January 1961) is symbolized by the drawing on the cover of the review. Indeed, the man represented on the cover of *Voice of Africa* is very similar to the one on the cover of Padmore's 1931 book (G. Padmore, *The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers*, Red International of Labour of Union Magazine for the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, 1931); G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.22.

¹⁶³ See AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Barden to Odoi, 14th July 1960 and Letter, Odoi to Barden, 20th June 1960, both of which are included in the file. See also AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Closed (BAA/1A), Letter, Barden to the Permanent Secretary of the Establishment Office, 21st April 1960.

¹⁶⁴ R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.221.

¹⁶⁵ Bannerman was hired only as a short-term assistant. In March he already left the Office to go back to the Guinea Press. This is the first document in which the name "Guinea Press" is quoted. The importance of this editor was to be great in the years to come. For information about the employment of Bannerman see AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959 and Letter, Padmore to Okoh, 17th March 1959, doc n°33, in the same file.

“National Committee for the Liberation of Ivory Coast”.¹⁶⁶ The request came to the desk of Kofi Baako - at the time Minister of Education and Information - from Padmore’s office, which was interested in backing a friendly party. The Office had also provided Assi C. Adams with flight tickets to Abidjan and back to Accra.¹⁶⁷

In the following years, several freedom fighters hosted in Accra made good use of Radio Ghana. They even produced their own programs to present the news concerning their parties and to broadcast important messages. In the long run, Radio Ghana started to broadcast in other languages than English in order to be useful for francophone and Lusophone nationalist parties and also to spread Nkrumah’s messages in the neighboring countries. The first foreign language used in Radio Ghana was French, introduced in September 1959. The reason for this choice is self-evident: one of the main targets of Nkrumah’s African policy was to draw the attention of francophone countries, especially those of West Africa. For the same reason, the most important publications of the Bureau of African Affairs were also published in French.

Ghana’s Pan-Africanist propaganda was developed thanks to the instruments set up by Padmore in 1959. Until his death in September, he worked hard to plant the seeds of this operation. As the political net of Ghana widened in the following years, the production and distribution of Pan-Africanist press increased. By 1961, Ghana was able to produce and distribute propaganda materials practically everywhere in the world.

¹⁶⁶ Barden wrote on behalf of George Padmore to both Nkrumah and Baako (Minister of Education and Information of Ghana) on the issue. See AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 3rd September 1959 and Letter, Barden to Baako, 3rd September 1959, in the same file.

¹⁶⁷ AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Massoud (Air Liban), 8th September 1959.

2.3. Ghana's Support to African Liberation Movements outside the Country

Ghana's support to African liberation movements was channeled in two main directions: inside and outside Ghana. In the latter case, through Padmore's Office Ghana financed parties and movements in their own territories. They provided them with everything they needed, from money to political backing in international gatherings. In this field, even the Ghanaian Foreign Service became more active during 1959, thanks also to a first wave of radicalization which interested the Ministry of External Affairs.

Since the closing of the AAPC, Ghana had begun financing extensively African nationalist parties, selecting them among those politically in line with Ghana. The list of liberation movements supported by Ghana, which was managed by Padmore under the constant supervision of Nkrumah, grew considerably since 1957. Ghana provided the nationalist parties with funds for election campaigns (the first one was Foncha's), for travels, propaganda and even for arms, when the use of violence was considered necessary.¹⁶⁸

Ghana's support to liberation movements was managed by Nkrumah and Padmore independently from any other government or organization. Such an attitude was apparently strange, since Ghana itself had pushed the other independent African states to form a common platform for supporting African liberation. At both the IASC and the AAPC, funds for nationalist parties had been officially established. At the AAPC, a secretariat was also formed with the purpose of managing a "Freedom Fund" for African liberation movements. This secretariat was based in Accra and the most important figures of the organization were Ghanaians or Guineans.¹⁶⁹ Still, Nkrumah and Padmore never truly supported it nor the "freedom fund".¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Padmore and Foncha were in contact during all 1959. Indeed, in September, Barden was sending Nkrumah a copy of the correspondence between Padmore and the premier of the Southern Cameroons. See AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 9th September 1959.

¹⁶⁹ The Secretary-General of the organization was a Guinean: Abdoulaye Diallo and the Ghanaians Botsio, Addison and Du Plan were all members of the organization. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, AAPC conference secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959. Kojo Addison and Edwin DuPlan were appointed in May 1959. The former, a Marxist, became the head of the

In reality, they did not want to delegate Ghana's Pan-African policy to any country or organization, including the AAPC. Such a move could have endangered their autonomy in decisions, weakening Ghana's radical policies. For this reason, the AAPC was never provided with a real financial and political support, but instead Nkrumah and Padmore strengthened Ghana's "Pan-African" Institutions.¹⁷¹ The AAPC became soon a sort of parallel office to Padmore's one.¹⁷²

Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in 1961. The latter was a fundamental figure of the African Affairs Centre and, later, of the Bureau of African Affairs.

¹⁷⁰ In the same occasion, the secretariat presented to both Padmore and Botsio a plan to raise money for the "Freedom Fund". At the time, Ghana was still supporting such fund even by promoting it within the IAS ground. Attached to the above report on African affairs, there is a draft of a formal request for funds submitted by the AAPC and addressed to the "9 Independent African States". Interestingly, once again the IAS conference and the All-African People's Conference were depicted as part of the same struggle for African independence. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Draft of request of money for the "freedom fund", from AAPC secretariat (Painstil, Adm. Secretary) to the IAS governments, undated (c.Feb.1959). The report on African Affairs already quoted, includes some details on the establishment of the "Freedom Fund". The Secretariat wrote that Mboya had traveled to Ethiopia and Sudan in order to prepare the ground for the two states to contribute to the fund. According to Mboya, both countries had un-formally accepted and were waiting for a formal request. Up ahead in the text, the Secretariat stated that the "Freedom Fund" was meant to be financed not only by the IAS states, but also by the strongest African political parties. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter re: "Report on African affairs", AAPC Secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959. It was, however, not contributing to the fund in any way.

¹⁷¹ According to Thompson, Nkrumah's support to the AAPC was merely instrumental, as soon after its establishment, he wanted already to discharge the organization. W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.57.

¹⁷² Some of the liberation movements demanded affiliation to the AAPC, often together with a request for financial aid from Ghana. This type of dual requests were to become quite common in the ensuing years. It is the case, for instance, of the request for both affiliations to the AAPC and for financial aid submitted by the Swazi Progressive Association (SPA). See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BB-Secretary's Personal Correspondence, Letter, Barden to Nquku (SPA), 6th January 1960, and AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Nquku (SPA) to Barden, 5th April 1960. References to the death of Padmore in these letters led the author to the conclusion that contacts between the SPA and the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs dated back even before Padmore's death, occurred in September 1959. Padmore's Office was supporting the activities of the AAPC, while at the same time it was following its own duties and policies. For instance, in February, the AAPC secretariat demanded Padmore to be the chairman of a mass rally, organized by the CPP and the AAPC secretariat itself. On 20 February 1959, a mass rally was organized by the AAPC secretariat in order to support the case of the French Cameroons at the United Nations. Botsio and Adjei were the main speakers of the rally, which was supposed to take place in other African cities. The 20th of February was called "The Cameroons People's Day". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter Re: "Report on African affairs", AAPC secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959. During the years after the conference of Accra, the AAPC organization held a certain prestige among the liberation movements. Some of these movements referred to the AAPC to ask for help. However, in most of the cases, Ghana alone took the initiative. The AAPC was only a political platform and it could not do much to help the Liberation movements. The periodical meetings of the Steering Committee were the only occasions to spread the voice of the AAPC throughout Africa. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.65-67.

In 1959, through the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs, Ghana developed strong political relationships with several nationalist parties. This type of partnerships were not only limited to the independence processes but also to their aftermath. Indeed, Nkrumah and Padmore wanted to involve these parties in the construction of a Pan-African platform after the independence of their countries.

One of the first long-term collaborations between Ghana and a nationalist party was the one with Hastings Banda's Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), started in 1959. The NAC - already invited at the AAPC - was politically close to Ghana. Its leader, Banda, was bound to become one of Nkrumah's strongest allies in Africa, with regard particularly to its Pan-African policy.¹⁷³ The party received £ 10000 by Ghana, in April.¹⁷⁴ Kanyama Chiume, one of its key figures, was in Accra in March.¹⁷⁵ Shortly after, Padmore's Office was providing several other members of the NAC with flight tickets from London back to Nyasaland.¹⁷⁶

Another example is the one of Kenya, where Ghana strengthened ties with all the parties bound to merge into the KANU. For instance, the Nakuru District Congress (NDC) was backed by Ghana since 1959. Both Padmore and Nkrumah had a personal friendship with the most important Kenyan leader, Jomo Kenyatta, and they were both very interested in Kenyan affairs.¹⁷⁷ For this reason they tried to create contacts with all the most important Kenyan personalities.

At the time, Tom Mboya was very close to Nkrumah as well as other members of his party. He had been chairman of the All African People's Conference and he was also the founder of one of the regional parties which later formed the KANU: the Nairobi People's Convention Party (NPCP). The NPCP had been invited to the AAPC, and it was

¹⁷³ At the AAPC, the party was represented by Hastings Banda himself and Chiume. See, PRAAD, ADM/16/1/11, AAPC, "List of Official Delegates".

¹⁷⁴ *Ghana Times*, 8 April 1959, quoted in W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.67. Banda's party became a strong ally of the CPP and of the Ghana state.

¹⁷⁵ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Telegram, Markham (from London) to Padmore, 23rd March 1959.

¹⁷⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Telegram, Padmore to Asafu-Adjaye, 4th April 1959,.

¹⁷⁷ Padmore had met Kenyatta for the first time in Russia, in 1930. See J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.16. Nkrumah had met Kenyatta in 1945, when the latter was one of the members of the staff of the Manchester Pan-African Congress.

represented there by some of the key figures of Kenyan politics: Mboya himself, Joseph Murumbi and Peter Mbiu Koinange.¹⁷⁸ These personalities were going to play an important role in the life of Padmore's Office and in the future Bureau of African Affairs. At the time, Koinange was Padmore's main contact in East Africa since Kenyatta was in prison. Later, he became representative of the Bureau of African Affairs in East Africa.¹⁷⁹ In the same period, even Oginga Odinga –a key figure of Kenyan politics- was backed by Padmore's Office.¹⁸⁰ Between 1957 and 1959, both Oginga Odinga and Mboya were equally supported by Ghana, a situation which was going to change radically, after Padmore's death.¹⁸¹

Accra provided the liberation movements not only with money but also with political support. Ghanaian diplomats - especially the ones working at the UN – constantly raised the most problematic questions of Africa in international gatherings.¹⁸² This new attitude of the Ghanaian Foreign Service was also the result of a first wave of radicalization which interested the Ministry in 1959.

A radicalized Foreign Service meant for Nkrumah and Padmore a more powerful and effective Pan-African policy. It also strengthened their position within the Ghanaian state. This process was the result of a progressive fusion between the CPP party ranks and the Ministry. In 1959, several men of the Party were appointed ambassadors. Others gained also prominent positions in the administration. According to Thompson, this process caused an increasing dichotomy between “professional diplomats on the one hand and self-styled militant revolutionaries on the other”.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ PRAAD, ADM/16/1/11, AAPC, “List of Official Delegates”.

¹⁷⁹ For references about the contacts between Padmore and Koinange, see J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.118; The two men met for the first time in 1948 in United Kingdom, *Ibidem*, p.108. This is, once more, the proof that, in the first phase of the establishment of the political network of the office, Padmore had capitalized on personal friendships which often dated back years.

¹⁸⁰ Odinga is quoted in a telegram in which Markham was reporting the activities of African nationalist parties in London. The date is 24th March 1959. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/ BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Telegram, Markham (from London) to Padmore, 24th March 1959.

¹⁸¹ Along with the rise of radicals in Ghana during the period 1960/61, Odinga emerged as their favorite ally in Kenyan politics. The “Red Dean” (as he was called, source: interview with David Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24/7/12) was to be particularly active, for instance, in the support to Freedom Fighters in Kenya.

¹⁸² The question of the Central African Federation was constantly raised by Ghanaian diplomats. On 23 March 1959, Markham, reporting to Padmore from London referred to a “Central African campaign”. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/ BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Telegram, Markham (from London) to Padmore, 23rd March 1959,.

¹⁸³ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.29. According to Thompson, this process dates back to 1957.

The first big change of 1959 was the appointment of the radical Ako Adjei as Minister of External Affairs, occurred in April. The event can be undoubtedly considered as a signal of a new approach in foreign policy. After that, other political appointments in the diplomatic ground followed, and they became quite frequent.¹⁸⁴ The appointment of Alex Quaison-Sackey as the Ghanaian Ambassador to the UN marked also a clear step towards the politicization of the Foreign Service.¹⁸⁵

Ghana also supported liberation movements in international gatherings. When a party or movement was not able to send representatives to a conference or to the UN, its political requests were presented by Ghanaians, constantly in contact with Padmore's Office.

Together, the actions of the Padmore's Office and the radicalized Foreign Service provided the liberation movements with a strong support. Moreover, this policy consolidated the political position of Ghana in Africa, bringing Pan-Africanism everywhere Padmore could create contacts.

¹⁸⁴ According to Thompson, the first steps towards the substitution of the career Foreign Service officers with political appointees started during 1959. He produces some examples, without, however making references to sources other than interviews. Furthermore, a number of examples refer to the new appointees as having a low level education and a scarce sense of professionalism (e.g. T.O. Asare, ambassador in Bonn), in such way linking their affiliation to the CPP with these problems. The operation seems questionable. *Ibidem*, pp.103-106. Padmore's office was still lightly involved in the appointments. However the successor of the office, the Bureau of African Affairs had a fundamental role in the diplomatic designations in the following years.

¹⁸⁵ Alex Quaison-Sackey had been a member of the group of graduates which was trained in 1955 to be the nucleus of the Gold Coast Foreign Service, see M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.11; T. Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's Side*, p.87 and W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.19-20. Furthermore, he was a member of the CPP. He can be considered then as both a member of the civil service and a political appointee (a status similar to the one of Barden, the successor of Padmore at the Office of the Adviser). The reflections of Thompson on the appointment of Quaison-Sackey as ambassador are, at least, contradictory. He first depicts Quaison-Sackey as civil servants far from the political position endorsed by Padmore and Nkrumah. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.19-20. Then, he presents Quaison-Sackey as a political appointee, being him a "conspicuous member of the CPP". References of his status of civil servants practically disappear. *Ibidem*, pp.103-104. In reality, Quaison-Sackey was both a professional diplomat and a party member. His appointment was made of course on the basis of his political beliefs, since he was responsible of endorsing the "policy of positive neutralism and nonalignment" and, in general the "Pan-African viewpoint" of Ghana. See A. Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound*, p. XI.

2.4. Ghana's Support to African Freedom Fighters and Political Refugees within its Borders

Since the opening of the AAPC, Accra had begun hosting political refugees from all over Africa. It was the beginning of a long-term strategy to attract politically African freedom fighters to Ghana and to support their liberation struggles from the Ghanaian territory. The African Affairs Centre was meant to host hundreds of African nationalists, providing them with shelter and linking them with the CPP. At first, however, Accra lacked a proper plan of action for the reception of political refugees. In early 1959, Nkrumah and Padmore worked to solve the problem.

The day after the AAPC closed, Ghana was ready to open its doors to African political refugees, as part of its liberation policy. At the time, other radical states such as Guinea and the UAR were also hosting freedom fighters haunted by colonial authorities. Ghana had to win this competition with the two radical countries if it wanted to lead the African liberation process.

Accra already owned the structures to deal with this mission. The AAC had been established for hosting political refugees and providing them with ideological training.¹⁸⁶ In early 1959, it was ready to work, although it was still run with small funds.¹⁸⁷ In some

¹⁸⁶ The African Affairs Centre was made of thirteen houses plus a common hall where political gatherings were organized. Since 1959, the Centre began to offer ideological courses to the guests. Interestingly, all the houses were named after the motherlands of the freedom fighters. Later on, they were even named after the parties hosted. In August 1959, the houses (or chalets, or taycots) were named after: Ghana, Liberia, Guinea, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Ethiopia, Togoland, Tunisia, U.A.R., Algeria, Nigeria, and Cameroon. See AGPL, BAA/475, Receipt of "Larmie's Studio of Painting" for painting works at the African Affairs Centre, 5th August 1959.

¹⁸⁷ The funds to run the African Affairs Centre were not much in 1959, even if the AAC was considered as an important institution for the actualization of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Makonnen wrote in his autobiography: "[...] as the grant for the running of the Centre was not large, one had to use what influence one could to get things done". In R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.213. Then he added: "[...] on the money side of things, I had to be very careful. I was only given sh. 5/- per day to feed each of the men at the centre. So I had to cater with great care, perhaps driving out into the country once a week to buy so many tons of yams or plantains". *Ibidem*, p.223. Another proof of the small funds provided to the AAC in 1959 was the situation of the sanitation system. In September, the Centre was still not provided with any. Padmore was very sensitive on how both his office and the Centre looked like in front of VIP guests. It was a matter of professionalism on the Ghanaian side. He had written to the Acting Secretary to the Prime Minister on 4 November 1958: "Needles to say, the nature of my office requires that general cleanliness should be maintained at a high level since failure to do this would create unsavory impression on the minds of

cases, the delegates of the AAPC hosted at the Centre became also the first political refugees in Ghana. Indeed, freedom fighters like Holden Roberto remained at the hostel even after the Conference had ended and they built strong relationships between their parties and the Ghanaian government.¹⁸⁸

Accra, however, was still not completely prepared to deal with the whole refugee question. A clear policy on refugees was not ready yet, so the civil service was generally unprepared to deal with the arrival of hundreds of them. The Ghanaian immigration system had to be properly instructed on the matter. Moreover, Ghana could not host any refugee since any of them could be an imperialist spy. A selection system had to be put in place in order to check on the political reliability of the freedom fighters welcomed in Ghana.

Nkrumah and Padmore had to work quickly on the definition of a proper policy on refugees. This was, of course, part of Ghana's Pan-African policy but it was also an implementation of the resolutions of the IASC and AAPC. Indeed, both the Conferences had called for the provision of political asylum to African freedom fighters. On this basis, Padmore examined the situation and he proposed a plan of action. He wrote to Botsio on 27 February 1959 to explain his position. First of all, he underlined the need for an effective policy on refugees:

distinguished visitors". In AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Ag. Secr. Of the P.M., 4th November 1959. The same cleanliness was needed at the Centre, since important African leaders could be hosted for short or long periods there. Padmore had discussed the matter with the Town Engineer of the Accra Municipal Council on 16th September 1959. The Town Engineer had asked why the Office had built latrines without permission. The Office underlined the importance of the AAC and the embarrassment which the lack of a good sanitation had brought to the AAC in the previous months. The Personal Secretary of Padmore's office wrote: "Owing to difficulties in providing accommodation for accredited political leaders and political refugees who cannot by normal civil service administrative procedure be catered for directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was decided upon by the Prime Minister that these buildings be placed at any disposal for this purpose. Incidentally no provision was made for [septic] tank latrines at the bungalows during their time of construction and as our guests, among whom are V.I.P.'s, used to complain bitterly about the nauseous odor of the toilet pans we found it incumbent upon us to safeguard the prestige of the Nation by constructing these [septic] tanks. [...] It is worthwhile mentioning here [...] the little money voted for the running of this centre [...] run as a non-paying concern [...]. I shall therefore, be grateful if you will reconsider your decision about their demolition". See AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Town Engineer, 16th September 1959.

¹⁸⁸ Makonnen, at the time head of the AAC, wrote: "Relations with the group did not end with the conference. Often enough individuals or whole delegations stayed on in Ghana and usually at the Centre.", in R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.217.

On the basis of the Prime Minister's public declarations and Ghana's pledge embodied in the resolutions of the Conference of the Independent African States and confirmed subsequently, we have openly committed ourselves to support "by every possible mean" the struggle of the African peoples for national liberation. [...] If we are pledged to assist the struggle for national freedom in Africa, we have to deal with this whole problem of political refugees, which is an integral part of the struggle.¹⁸⁹

The next point of Padmore's message to Botsio was to analyze how Ghana could practically deal with the refugee question. The main problem was how to define a political refugee, as most of them were considered criminals by the colonial authorities of their countries. Supporting the refugees could have been considered by the same countries as interference in their internal affairs. According to Padmore, Ghana had not managed this question properly. Once more, the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs and the Ministry of External Affairs had showed a substantial distance of outlook on the implementation of Ghana's Pan-African policy. He provided Botsio with one practical case, in order to explain the mistakes of the Foreign Service.

Padmore presented the case of the Kenyan Kimiti Kamau, a man who had just requested political asylum to Ghana. His request had been rejected by Adu who did not consider him a political refugee, but a "fugitive from the law in Kenya". According to Adu, welcoming Kamau in Ghana would have been perceived by Kenya as interference in its internal affairs. Padmore strongly criticized Adu's attitude since, according to him, it was based on wrong assumptions. Kenya could not be considered an African independent state, as it was still under colonial rule. In this sense, Ghana was not only allowed, but even called to support political refugees haunted in colonial territories. In his words:

I fully subscribe to and support this policy [the support to African freedom fighters], which the imperialists may well interpret as subvention and interference. But this is purely legalistic quibbling, for when we use the phrase "non-interference in the internal affairs of other States" we mean independent sovereign States governed by the indigenous people

¹⁸⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/ BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, *Letter*, Padmore to Botsio, 27th February 1959.

[underlined in the text], not territories occupied and governed by Imperialist Powers who maintain themselves by force.¹⁹⁰

Padmore's angry tone, confirms once again how distant was his approach from the one of the Foreign Service, and in particular from Adu's.¹⁹¹ The cautious approach of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry was considered a betrayal of the principles of Ghana's Pan-African policy.¹⁹² According to Padmore, the support given to political refugees had to be considered a fundamental aspect of this policy. If Ghana failed the mission - Padmore wrote to Botsio - the African freedom fighters could turn themselves to other countries, weakening Nkrumah's position in Africa. In the same letter, he wrote:

If we are not prepared to do this [to assist political refugees], then we should let the African peoples know where we stand so that they may turn to Egypt or Moscow, or elsewhere. [...] This man Kamau has [...] found temporary refuge in Sudan. It is quite possible that he can remain there, but the very fact that he has turned to Ghana is a compliment to us and a clear indication that the African peoples south of the Sahara instinctively look to Ghana and

¹⁹⁰ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, *Letter*, Padmore to Botsio, 27th February 1959.

¹⁹¹ *Ibidem*; Quoting from the letter: "[...] I am shocked and horrified that an African, no matter what his position, could indulge in all these legalistic arguments and Jesuistic sophistry. The struggle for African freedom is too serious a business for us to approach it on the basis of imperialist conventions. [...] I find it extraordinary that the opinion of the Permanent Secretary [Adu] should have been solicited on a matter of fundamental political policy."

¹⁹² This case is an example of the various clashes between Padmore and the civil service on the implementation of foreign policy. Padmore usually worked in collaboration with the civil service, particularly the one of the Ministry of External Affairs (and Adu was part of them, being Permanent Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs). However, as it has been underlined in the first chapter, the civil servants felt like being excluded from the policy making. It was, indeed, a precise policy of Nkrumah that of excluding them from this field. Armah explains quite well the reason behind his decision: "In order to forestall the ill-effects of the domestic power competition between the civil service machinery and the political machinery of the Cabinet and/or Ministers of the Government, President Nkrumah made it clear from the outset that top career civil servants were to administer the ministries and advise the ministers", that is not to make policy decisions. In K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.35. It is Adu himself, at the time Permanent Secretary of the Minister of External Affairs and Secretary to the Cabinet, who confirm the duty of civil servants in Nkrumah's Ghana: "the minister's responsibility is to lay down political policy, and it is the duty of the Permanent Secretary and the heads of the Division in the Ministry to execute this policy and translate it into action". In A.L. Adu, *The Civil Service in New African States*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1965, p. 183, quoted in K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.36. However, according to Armah it was the theory, "[...] in practice, certain civil servants [...] made policy decisions". *Ibidem*, p.36. It was apparently the case with Adu himself who had been protagonist of various clashes with Padmore on policy making and implementation. This case is a perfect example of such clashes. Padmore was criticizing Adu on the ground of his resistance towards the implementation of the political line on refugees.

its Prime Minister for assistance in the hours of their troubles and distress. For this we should feel justly proud, and meet their appeals with the sympathy which we should extend as a duty.¹⁹³

In order to fulfill this duty, Ghana had to invest money and men in the assistance to political refugees. Accra could capitalize on its political appeal acquired at the All-African People's Conference, plus it had the AAC to host the freedom fighters. There was no excuse not to act quickly to open the door of Ghana to African nationalists who needed help.

Padmore's advices were not ignored. Ghana definitely opened its frontiers to political refugees and by May the first groups arrived. The AAC and the Office immediately started to deal with this question. On 19 May 1959, the Adviser on African Affairs wrote to Adu:

[...] my office [...] in addition to routine matters has to deal with the accommodation of political refugees. At the present moment, we are taking care of a dozen people from French Camerouns, Ivory Coast, the Belgian Congo, Portuguese Angola, Nyasaland and Mauretania.¹⁹⁴

The first step was made: the freedom fighters were coming. The next step was to provide them with everything they needed, so they linked themselves with Nkrumah's government and supported his Pan-African policy. Since 1959, Padmore's Office not only granted them with shelter and money but also with offices of representation for their parties. Freedom fighters on the battlefields could be constantly connected with Accra. Ghana proposed also to use its territory as the "antenna tower" of the African liberation movements by offering its radio and press to promote their struggles.

The last problem to be solved was the provision of documents to the refugees. Some of them needed passports to travel for political reasons, since the colonial authorities had refused to grant them any. Thus, they had to request documents to other African countries like Ghana, Guinea or the UAR. At the time, Ghana was well equipped in structures to host

¹⁹³ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, *Letter*, Padmore to Botsio, 27th February 1959.

¹⁹⁴ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, *Letter*, Padmore to Adu, 19th May 1959.

the refugees, but it was not prepared for supplying them with documents. It took several months to have a proper legislation on the matter. Nkrumah proposed a proper solution only in October.¹⁹⁵

The question of travel documents was raised for the first time in May. Even in this case, it was a specific case that led to the definition of a proper policy on the matter. The case was the one of the famous Angolan leader Holden Roberto, one of the first freedom fighters ever hosted in Ghana.¹⁹⁶

Roberto had been invited to the AAPC as the representative of the *Uniao dos Povos de Angola* (UPA).¹⁹⁷ After the conference, he was hosted in Ghana as a political refugee.¹⁹⁸ The problem with the documents emerged some months later, when Roberto requested Padmore's Office to provide him with a passport since he had to travel to USA for political reasons.¹⁹⁹ Even though the Ghanaian authorities were called to assist the refugees with every possible means, they did not have a proper legislation on the matter so they could not grant Roberto with the document. On 9 May 1959, Padmore and Adjei - just appointed

¹⁹⁵ Only in October 1959, the Cabinet discussed a proper legislation on travel documents for political refugees. See PRAAD, ADM/13, Cabinet memorandum No. C.M. 731(59) by the Prime Minister[Nkrumah] on "Travel documents for refugees" part of Cabinet Agenda, October 1959.

¹⁹⁶ Holden Roberto (1923-2007) was an Angolan nationalist and politician. He was a member of the *Uniao dos Povos de Angola* (UPA) and then president of the same party. After leaving Ghana, he broke his political alliance with Nkrumah since he was suspected of being an American spy. As a result, Ghana turned to the MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*). Roberto founded its own party, the FNLA (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*) in March 1962. Later he fought for the independence of Angola and also against the Soviet-backed MPLA. For more information about Roberto see J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, the anatomy of an explosion (1950-1962)* [vol.1], the M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1969.

¹⁹⁷ Avriel, the Israeli ambassador in Accra, draw the attention of the conference organizers – Padmore in *primis* - to some liberation movements in Angola, the UPA in particular. See R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.216. Like Lumumba, Roberto was a former Israeli contact. See M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.21 (footnote); see also G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.12 and 135. See also J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, pp.66-69. According to Marcum, Roberto was invited at the conference after a special authorization was issued by Padmore, who had the last word on the admission of freedom fighters. At the conference he was criticized for his "tribal anachronism" having him evoked the resurrection of the old Congo kingdom. It was however an outstanding occasion for him to establish relations with various nationalist leaders, like Lumumba, Kaunda, Mboya and Fanon.

¹⁹⁸ He stayed in Ghana for one year after the closing of the AAPC. See R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.217; He was part of the first group of the political refugees quoted in AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 19th May 1959. While in Accra he worked at Padmore's office as a translator. See J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, p.68.

¹⁹⁹ Padmore wrote to Adjei: "he doesn't possess a passport and travel documents which are very difficult for Portuguese African citizens to obtain, especially those engaged in the struggle against colonialism. Under the circumstances, he has approached my office to see whatever the Ghana Government would grant him a passport even for a limited period so that he can proceed to the United States". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adjei, 9th May 1959.

Ministry of External Affairs - discussed about this question and the way they could conceive a proper policy on the provision of documents to freedom fighters.²⁰⁰ Padmore wrote to Adjei:

His request [Roberto's request for Ghanaian passport] raises another issue, one of defining our policy in circumstances such as the one under review. So apart from trying to secure a passport for Mr. Roberto, I think it will be necessary for the Cabinet to give us a ruling whether or not the Government is prepared to grant temporary passport or travel documents to political refugees engaged in such activities which we approve of. This will enable us to know what steps can be taken in future cases of the kind. [...] I think it is only fair to express my own personal views on this matter in the light of our commitments on the Africa Liberation struggle. I cannot see how we can escape our responsibilities in granting passport facilities to bonafides freedom fighters who may from time to time solicit our support in this direction.²⁰¹

Even this time, one of the first reasons to speed up the definition of the policy was the potential competition with other radical states. In this case, the rivalry was the one with Guinea, which at that time was already providing passports to African freedom fighters. In the same letter, Padmore wrote:

If [we] fail to do so [to grant passports to freedom fighters], we may find ourselves in an embarrassing position as other African countries are rendering such assistance. In the case of Mr. Roberto he has already intimated to me that if he cannot get a passport from Ghana he will seek one from Guinea and I have no doubt that President Sékou Touré will gladly issue him a passport as he generously did in the case of Mr. Chiume from Nyasaland whose British passport was temporarily lost during his visit to Conakry last April.²⁰²

²⁰⁰ See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adjei, 9th May 1959.

²⁰¹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adjei, 9th May 1959.

²⁰² AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adjei, 9th May 1959. Kanyama Chiume (1929-2007) was a Malawian nationalist and politician. Member of the Nyasaland African Congress. At the time he was one of the key figure of the party. After the independence of Nyasaland, renamed Malawi, he was to become Ministry of Education and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ghana was proceeding very slowly, giving Guinea a clear advantage. Finally, Padmore's fears became reality: Roberto submitted the request to Guinea and Touré immediately accepted.²⁰³ The lesson was clear: without a clear policy and a proper legislation on political refugees, Ghana would risk its political power.

In 1959, Padmore made a plan for every aspect of Ghana's policy on refugees. With regard to the legislation, Nkrumah proposed only in October the adoption of a proper convention. As for the many other aspects of Ghana's Pan-African policy, the practical solution for the various problems emerged only after months of work. Transforming the Pan-Africanist theory into practice was often a difficult operation.

2.5. Provision of Scholarships to African Students

The support to education in Africa was one of the main point of Nkrumah's agenda. In line with its Pan-African policy, Ghana committed itself to sustain education in Africa, a field in which colonialism had disastrously failed. Nkrumah worked to replace the colonial administration with a new radical African "intelligentsia". To attain this target, his government invested important resources to provide African students with scholarships for studying in Ghana. After the AAPC, Nkrumah and Padmore had begun working to set up a plan for granting hundreds of students with scholarships. In 1959, they put the basis for a long-term project on education.

Both Padmore and Nkrumah were well aware of the importance of the role of African students in the Pan-Africanist struggle.²⁰⁴ They knew that a well educated generation of

²⁰³ J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, pp.69; W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.76. See also R. Makonnen, pp. 216-217.

²⁰⁴ Both of them had already had various experiences with African students in United States and United Kingdom. Padmore had been a student leader in the United States in the late 1920s and he had also worked with students while in London, since 1935. Even Nkrumah had been a student leader in the United States, almost ten years after Padmore. After coming to London in 1945, he got immediately connected with the West African Students' Union (WASU) of which he became vice-president.

African technicians and intellectuals was fundamental in order to build the new nations. The struggle against colonialism was also a struggle for education.

At the time, Ghana was well equipped with schools and teachers. In line with Ghana's Pan-African policy, Padmore and Nkrumah decided to put the Ghanaian educational system at the service of other African countries. In this case, both the Minister of Education and Padmore's Office were involved.

Since 1959, Ghana had begun to provide scholarships to African students, most of whom were freedom fighters. Moreover, Accra became a hub for students with scholarships provided by other friendly countries.²⁰⁵ In the latter case, most of these countries were linked to, or part of, the socialist bloc. Ghana connected the liberation movements to these countries, and it provided the students with travel documents.

The first three Ghanaian scholarships were established in late 1958, but they were still not part of a proper "Pan-African" plan. Indeed, they were promoted directly by the UN. They were under the full control of the Ministry of Education and dedicated to students from dependent countries, both Africans and not.²⁰⁶

In the meantime, the Minister of Education and Information Kofi Baako was already at work to define a proper Pan-African policy for the support of students. In January 1959, he submitted a plan to extend the number of scholarships from three to six. Moreover, he promoted a plan to give the three new ones only to students from African dependent or

²⁰⁵ Ghana was in contact with countries - German Democratic Republic (GDR), the USSR and China - which were providing scholarships to African students. Ghana put in contact several freedom fighters with these countries and it provided them with travel documents or temporary accommodation in Accra. For instance, on 9 July 1959, Padmore wrote to the Acting Trade Counselor of the GDR's embassy in order to provide the list of students (non Ghanaian) available for benefitting from the scholarships. Interestingly, both Padmore's office and the Ministry of External Affairs had to endorse the candidatures. See AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Padmore to Ag. Trade Counc. GDR, 9th July 1959. See also AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Mwaungulu (one of the candidates), 6th August 1959.

²⁰⁶ Three scholarship of this type were issued, under request of the UN. All the information on these scholarships can be found in AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Draft, Cabinet Memorandum by the Ministry of Education - "Award of Scholarships to peoples of other African states and territories by the Government of Ghana", 2nd January 1959, and Annexure to Cabinet Memorandum by the Ministry of Education on the "Award of Scholarships to[...]"; 2nd January 1959; On February 1959, Ghana received the first requests for one of the three Ghana-UN scholarships. It was submitted by an Ethiopian student, who wrote to both the General Secretary of the UN and the Government of Ghana to receive the scholarship. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Letter, Asaffa Ainalem to Padmore, 5th February 1959.

independent territories. The reason for this choice was clearly political. Quoting from the draft:

I seek the consent of my colleagues for the institution of a scheme under which scholarships can be awarded exclusively to peoples from African states and territories to undertake courses of study in institutions of higher learning in Ghana. My Colleagues will remember that recently Cabinet gave approval to a scheme to award three scholarships annually over the next three years to nationals of non-self-governing territories at the invitation of the United Nations. Although all African dependent territories are covered by this scheme, so are all other dependent territories in the world and competition may be so strong as to prejudice the chances of people from non-self-governing African territories benefiting under it as fully as *we might wish* [italics by the author]. The scheme of course, does not cover independent African states. I propose, therefore, that three scholarships each year should be offered specifically to people from Africa (be they from dependent or independent countries) on the same broad principles as those offered to non-self-governing territories under United Nations auspices.²⁰⁷

Before submitting the plan to Nkrumah, Baako wrote to Padmore in order to have his comments on the draft proposal. The Adviser on African Affairs immediately endorsed it. He also suggested some guidelines for the definition of a proper Pan-African policy on education. First of all, he proposed to focus their attention on dependent territories. According to Padmore, the freedom fighters themselves requested that help. He wrote:

In view of the greater needs of African youths in dependent territories such as Kenya, Tanganyika, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, due either to lack of higher educational facilities or to racial discrimination, I think special consideration should be given to candidates from those areas rather than the British West African dependencies (Nigeria, Sierra Leone) or the independent States (Liberia, Sudan, Ethiopia), where university colleges cater for their

²⁰⁷ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Draft, Cabinet Memorandum by the Ministry of Education – “Award of Scholarships to peoples of other African states and territories by the Government of Ghana”, 2nd January 1959. The costs of the scheme was estimated in £G 13,500 (Ghanaian pound) over five years. The institutions involved were the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of External Affairs and finally Padmore’s Office.

nationals. My office has received a number of applications from the territories indicated above.²⁰⁸

Padmore also recommended establishing several new scholarships for lower levels of education, meeting the requests of the freedom fighters.²⁰⁹ According to Padmore, the new African nations needed primarily a technical and practical expertise, rather than higher levels of education. Thus, he promoted the creation of fifty scholarships of this kind. He wrote:

From the frequent appeals made to my office, it would seem that the most urgent need of African youths in the less advanced territories is for (a) Secondary education and (b) Technical training of a practical kind. To cater for this need, I would recommend the establishment of 50 scholarships or bursaries – 20 for secondary education and 30 for trade schools, valued each at, say, \$100 per annum. By providing such training, I feel certain that Ghana will be making a more valuable contribution to these dependencies by merely offering students from these countries a purely literary and academic education at university level.²¹⁰

This issue is interesting in many respects. First of all, it shows how Padmore had a strong impact on decisions of other ministers, even though he had “enemies” both in the Civil Service and the government. Secondly, it underlines the importance of the support to education in other African territories as part of Ghana’s Pan-African policy.

Baako’s scheme was presented together with Padmore’s suggestions and they agreed to launch it immediately. Some months later, however, the new scheme was still not properly working, despite Padmore insisted on its political significance. In June, the Office lamented that some UAR students had not received a scholarship from Ghana.²¹¹ The

²⁰⁸ See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Letter, Padmore to Sarpong (Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education), 11th February 1959.

²⁰⁹ Until then, all Ghanaian scholarships had been devoted to University level studies.

²¹⁰ See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Letter, Padmore to Sarpong (Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education), 11th February 1959.

²¹¹ AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Martinson (Ministry of Education), 11th June 1959.

Ministry of Education replied that the students were not qualified for the scholarships, but Padmore protested again: no matter how, Ghana had to provide scholarships to the students. The question was not technical, it was political. Markham, on behalf of Padmore, wrote to the Ministry of Education [*italics of the author*]:

Since you have considered that the standard of the above-mentioned petitioners are below our senior secondary school level, we will suggest that this position be made clear to them, but *the doors should not be closed on them*. [...] Should it be approved to grant scholarships for secondary education to these students, we will first of all ask the External Ministry to approach the United Arab Republic Embassy on the matter. This procedure will obviate what you call *impolitic*. On the other hand if the Government cannot give them any such scholarships we shall consider the possibility of persuading the Ghana Educational Trust for some scholarship awards for them [...].²¹²

Scholarships were meant to be an instrument of foreign policy, channeling strategically the countries which could serve better the Pan-Africanist cause.

In 1959, Padmore's Office kept receiving requests for scholarships from African students, especially from non-self-governing countries. In some cases, the requests were also coming from students already abroad who had their previous scholarships suspended or that did not have a scholarship at all.²¹³ Each case was examined before providing any financial and political help.

One case might help to understand the *iter* followed by Padmore's Office in dealing with the provision of scholarships. In early 1959, a Southern Rhodesian student residing in London claimed that his scholarship had been suspended due to political reasons. Consequently, he turned to Ghana for help. Before providing the student with any aid, Padmore needed to know more about him, possibly from a reliable source. In this case, the Adviser had the perfect man for the job. His Office asked Josua Nkomo – who at the time was in London - to check on the credibility of the student and then provide a confidential

²¹² AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Martinson (Ministry of Education), 11th June 1959.

²¹³ It is the case, for instance, of a student from Bechuanaland who begged for funds for his studies in EIRE. See AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Bosele Mosieman to Padmore, 2nd January 1959. See also the reply AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Mosieman, 26th June 1959.

report.²¹⁴ Nkomo was considered absolutely trustworthy: he was Padmore's main ally in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

This type of procedure was meant to be repeated for each case involving single students not sponsored directly by anyone. As for the case of political refugees, no scholarship was granted without a crossed reference check. In case the students were backed by a liberation movement, the procedure was quicker.

Ghana's Pan-African policy on education was still at its early definition. The provision of the first scholarships was only the beginning of a wider plan. In the following years, more scholarships were issued and more educational structures were developed. After Padmore's death, a proper educational institution for freedom fighters was also established in Ghana: the "Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute". Established in 1961, the Ideological Institute was bound to be the last of the three "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana.

2.6. Support to Opposition Parties of Other African States: the Case of UPC, Sanwi, Sawaba and Action Group

Several countries in Africa had more than one nationalist group fighting for independence. Many factors contributed to the success of one instead of the others. Even in Ghana, the CPP had won the battle for freedom only after defeating all the other nationalist parties of the Gold Coast. In line with its Pan-African policy, Ghana usually supported majority groups. In some cases, however, Ghana also backed minority nationalist parties instead of the majority ones, especially when the latter were not willing to endorse Nkrumah's Pan-African agenda. Thus, since 1959, Ghana started supporting several opposition groups of other African countries, even before they achieved independence. There were two main

²¹⁴ Padmore wrote to Nkomo: "We are asking him [the Rhodesian student] to be in touch with you with the understanding that you will be in a position to give us a confidential report about him". See AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Nkomo, 25th June 1959.

reasons for this behavior: either an opposition group was closer to Ghana's political position than the majority one, or Nkrumah had a particular opposition to the policy of the strongest faction. In both cases, the resentment of the majority parties reflected the cold relationships of their countries with Ghana before and after the independence. According to them, by backing opposition groups, Ghana supported sedition and terrorism within the borders of their countries, violating their state sovereignty. They also feared that Nkrumah was trying to weaken them in order to rule the continent.

The Ghanaians rejected these accusations by asserting they backed opposition parties as they did with any other liberation movement. As a matter of fact, they had also invited some of these groups to Ghana's independence celebration and at the AAPC. According to Nkrumah and Padmore, if a corrupt or conservative ruling class led a country, Ghana had to push for a change of leadership. For this reason, Nkrumah's government would back only those parties close to its Pan-Africanist positions, even if they were weaker than the majority ones.

In reality, there were also tactical reasons behind this choice. The majority of the opposition parties backed by Ghana were in West Africa, where Nkrumah had planned to extend the UAS project. Thus, if any of these nationalist groups could seize power - democratically but also militarily - Ghana could push harder towards West African unity. Nkrumah invested in particular in the opposition groups of Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroons and Niger. All of these states, for some reason or other, were considered obstacles towards a West African unity project. In some cases, like the one of Togo, Nkrumah had also planned to absorb the territories of the neighboring states into a single political entity. Through the victory of opposition parties, he could also extend political radicalism in other moderate states, especially the francophone ones.

Since 1959, Ghana hosted members of the opposition parties considering them "freedom fighters" as well as any other political refugee from colonial territories. Among the first refugees registered on 19 May 1959, there were also some members of minority

nationalist movements of French Cameroons and Ivory Coast.²¹⁵ Interestingly, both the countries were already run by an African self-government.²¹⁶

The Cameroonians were members of the *Union du Peuple Camerounaise* (UPC), the main opponents of Ahidjo's *Union Nationale Camerounaise* (UNC). Banned in both French Cameroons (1955) and British Cameroons (1957), the UPC had never agreed on the French-African Community project. Instead, the party endorsed a project for a Pan-African federation of African states, in fact supporting Nkrumah's thought. The ideology of the *upécistes* (as the UPC members were called) was based on socialism, anti-imperialism and Pan-Africanism.²¹⁷

The first contacts between the UPC and Ghana had been already established in 1957. At the 1957 Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) conference, held in Cairo in December, Felix Moumié, the UPC leader, had met Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, and members of the Algerian FLN.²¹⁸ Hence, the UPC sought refuge in Ghana, Guinea and Algeria, which all provided support to its cause. The *upécistes*' ideology was well suited with Nkrumah's one. Thus, since 1958, Ghana opened its doors to Moumié and its party. At the All-African People's Conference, the UPC was the most important Cameroonian party invited and its members were hosted at the AAC.

The invitation of the *upécistes* to the AAPC caused the resentments of both the French government and the Cameroonian one. Thus, Ahidjo rejected Accra's invitation to the conference.²¹⁹ By backing the UPC, Ghana had opened one of the first confrontation

²¹⁵ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 19th May 1959.

²¹⁶ Ahidjo was at the time *chef de l'état* of the French Cameroons. After independence, he became the first president of the united Cameroons. Hophouet-Boigny had been elected Prime Minister of Ivory Coast on 1st May 1959. He maintained the role of Prime Minister up to the independence (Nov. 1960). On 23rd November 1960, he became the first president of Ivory Coast.

²¹⁷ M. Terretta, *Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global: From Forest Maquis to a Pan-African Accra*, *Journal of African History*, 51 (2010), pp.195-196.

²¹⁸ M. Terretta, *Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global*, pp. 201-202; The AAPSO was a Soviet-backed organization which was, *de facto*, a competitor to the Ghanaian Pan-African platform.

²¹⁹ France had already been informed on July 1958 about the invitation of the UPC to the All-African People's Conference. It consequently worked for all the year to support Ahidjo in his struggle against the participation of the "insurrectional organization" to the AAPC. French authorities tried also to work within the *ensemble français* to convince other African leaders such as Sékou Touré, Bakari-Djibo and Apithy to refuse the invitation to the Accra conference as a protest against the UPC's presence. See *Ibidem*, pp. 203-204.

with another African country, Cameroon. Many other clashes that came from Ghana's support to opposition parties were going to follow this one, especially in West Africa.

Moumié divided its forces mainly between Ghana and Guinea. The UPC headquarters were moved to Conakry just after the closing of the AAPC.²²⁰ In Accra, some important *upécistes* managed a local office. Among them there were Ernest Ouandié and Moumié's father, Samuel Mekou, who was a permanent resident of the African Affairs Centre.²²¹

As a member of the AAPC director's Committee, Moumié had worked on the conference resolution on French Cameroons.²²² After the conference, the AAPC secretariat and the Ghanaian government itself supported the implementation of the resolution. Hence, they organized a series of mass rallies on 20 February 1959, the day when the French Cameroons' question was discussed at the UN. The invitation to the rallies was signed by Tom Mboya and Felix Moumié. The latter had clearly an influential role in the AAPC organization.²²³

The *upécistes* in Ghana were hosted at the AAC and they were provided with funds, clothes and other supplies. They were soon divided in two groups: the ones who had already a basic education and those who did not. The former could apply for Ghanaian scholarships, as they were "those who would someday make up the national intelligentsia". The latter were assigned to military training.²²⁴

²²⁰ M. Terretta, *Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global*, p.204.

²²¹ Mekou's was the main UPC's contact in Ghana. See *Ibidem*, p. 206. His presence and his role in the party is testified by a letter, dated 7th December 1959 sent by the South Africa Defence Fund to the Bureau of African Affairs. In the letter, a member of the organization, Mary-Louise Hooper asked for Mekou's help. Hooper needed names of UPC contacts in Douala and Mekou was considered the reference name in Accra for this kind of information. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary's Personal Correspondence, Letter, Hooper to Barden, 7th December 1959.

²²² A copy of the resolution on French Cameroons by the first committee of the AAPC was sent to Padmore's office together with a report on the political situation in Africa. Interestingly, the resolution made reference to the decisions undertaken by the IAS conference (April 1958), considered as the political forerunner of the AAPC. The resolution mainly asked for four things: a) An amnesty to the banned party members. B) The return of all those exiled from the country. c) A referendum on the reunification of the Cameroons. D) The establishment of a special UNO commission on Cameroon. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, "Resolution On Cameroon Adopted By The First Committee On Imperialism And Colonialism Of The All-African People's Conference", attached to "Report on African affairs", AAPC secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959.

²²³ Moumié's address to the AAPC secretariat for organizing the rally can be found in AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, "Report on African Affairs", AAPC secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959.

²²⁴ M. Terretta, *Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global*, p.205.

With regard to military training, at first Ghana supported only the UPC's *maquis* in both British Southern Cameroons (where the UPC was called One Kamerun – OK). Only by 1960, Ghana provided proper military courses to the *upécistes*.²²⁵

Another important opposition group hosted in Ghana since 1959 was the *Comité de Défense du Sanwi*, the ex provisional government of the Sanwi Kingdom (or Krinjabo Kingdom) of the Ivory Coast. The Sanwi - a population living in the eastern part of Ivory Coast - had had clashes with the Ivorian government as they refused to join the country after independence. They claimed that the Sanwi Kingdom was originally independent from any other French possession. Thus, they demanded their own independence from France. The Provisional Government of the Sanwi Kingdom had sent a memorandum to France on 1 March 1959 in which the “Franco-Aowin” Treaty of Protection signed on 4th July 1843 was considered defunct.²²⁶ Then, the Sanwi Kingdom submitted a request of independence on the ground of the extinction of the French protectorate. The reaction of both France and the Ivorian self-government was harsh. In May, Houphoet-Boigny's government arrested the Sanwi's paramount chief, several other chiefs, and members of the Provisional Government (formed on the 19th of May).²²⁷

Being threatened by both France and Ivory Coast, the Sanwi Kingdom turned to Ghana, going back, as it claimed, to “its country of origin.”²²⁸ The Sanwi people were

²²⁵ The marquis were “underground resistance military camps” used by the UPC to fight against the colonial rule and Ahidjo government. They were also based in British Southern Cameroons, where the UPC was called “One Kamerun” (OK). *Ibidem*, p.191.

²²⁶ This treaty - as the Sanwi delegation underlined - was affecting only the Sanwi area and not the whole Ivory Coast. Thus, Ghana was not called to be involved in the whole affair of the Ivorian independence. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, “*Declaration sur la demand de rattachement du Sanwi à l'Etat indépendant du Ghana*” submitted by Amand Kadio Attié (President of the “Comité de Défense du Sanwi Libre”) and addressed to Nkrumah, 7th July 1959.

²²⁷ PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, Minute of a meeting between Adjei, Dzirasa, Padmore, Markham, Petterson and the Sanwi delegation on, 29th June 1959 – “The Sanwi Affair”. On the Sanwi crisis see A. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964. See also C. Boone, “Rural Interests and the Making of Modern African States”, *African Economic History*, n.23 (1995), pp.1-36; C. Boone, *Political Topographies of the African State. Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

²²⁸ PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, “*Declaration sur la demand de rattachement du Sanwi à l'Etat indépendant du Ghana*”, submitted by Amand Kadio Attié (President of the “Comité de Défense du Sanwi Libre”) and addressed to Nkrumah, 7th July 1959

indeed strongly related to the Nzima of Ghana (Nkrumah was an Nzima too).²²⁹ On 28 May 1959, the Sanwi Kingdom submitted a first request of unification of its territory to Ghana, calling *de facto* for a reunification of the Sanwi and Nzima people. The Sanwi requested political asylum to Ghana, due to the “oppression organized by the government of Mr. Houphouët-Boigny”.²³⁰

Ghana welcomed the Sanwi militants as political refugees, but it took several months before the country clarified its position about the “Sanwi affair”. Padmore’s Office began to deal with the unification proposal, while the Sanwi were hosted at the AAC. Among them, there was also Armand Attié, President of the Sanwi Committee.²³¹ In May, Padmore and Markham received a first written draft of the *Sanwi Comité*’s proposal of annexation of the Sanwi territory by Ghana. They had some months to work on it, before the Comité’s planned a vis-à-vis formal meeting with the Ghanaian authorities on the 29th of June.

Interestingly, Padmore suggested to maintain a prudential stance. Political tactics had to be taken in consideration. Ghana could not undertake a direct confrontation with the Ivory Coast only on the ground of the Sanwi’s requests. In a letter dated 23 June 1959, Padmore advised Nkrumah not to support any plan for annexation of the Sanwi area to Ghana.²³² According to him, the best approach was to grant political asylum to the Sanwi refugees, but not to endorse their demands. He suggested to support them, “providing they undertake to abide by the laws of Ghana and refrain from using Ghana as a base to further their present aims and objectives”. Only in the case the UN got also involved, Ghana could assist the Sanwi’s plans: “at this point Ghana will be able to give its support at the United Nations to their new stand for unification”.

²²⁹ The Sanwi people claim their origin from Ghana’s territory. Indeed, the Anjy people moved in the area from modern Ghana approximately in 1740.

²³⁰ The original text is in French. It is not possible to read the draft of this first request. However, it is quoted in a second draft submitted in July to the Ghanaian government by the *Comité*. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, “*Declaration sur la demand de rattachement du Sanwi à l’Etat indépendant du Ghana*”, submitted by Amand Kadio Attié (President of the “Comité de Défence du Sanwi Libre”) and addressed to Nkrumah, 7th July 1959. An English version of the same draft can be found in the same file.

²³¹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.88.

²³² PRAAD, SC/BAA/142/“The Sanwi Affair”, *Letter*, Padmore to Nkrumah, 23rd June 1959.

Although Nkrumah was already competing politically with Houphouet-Boigny, he could not risk an opened conflict with the francophone neighbor.²³³ Padmore was well aware of the dangers of such a confrontation, and this is why he suggested to dismiss the Sanwi's proposal of annexation. This case shows how scrupulous Padmore was when dealing with political refugees before any action was taken in their favor.

Nkrumah endorsed Padmore's position and he authorized his Adviser on African Affairs to present its thoughts at the meeting with the Sanwi delegation on the 29th June 1959, in Accra. In front of Ako Adjei, Markham, Attié, and the rest of the delegation Padmore explained Ghana's position.²³⁴ The Sanwi were welcomed as guests by the Ghanaian government but their requests of annexation could not be fulfilled.

Even if the Ghanaians did not satisfy their expectations, they could still take advantage of the presence of the Ivorian opposition group. In the following years, their presence alone meant a constant pressure against Abidjan. It became also a concrete threat for Houphouet-Boigny by 1964, when the Sanwi began receiving military training by Accra.²³⁵

Another important opposition party backed by Ghana just after the AAPC was the Sawaba party of Niger.²³⁶ The Sawaba (*Mouvement Socialiste Africain* – MSA - Sawaba) was born as a split of the *Parti Progressiste Nigérien* (PPN), led by Diori, the future first President of Niger.²³⁷ Having campaigned against the French-African Community in 1958, the Sawaba had been banned in 1959 and it had sought refuge in Ghana. The party leader

²³³ The rivalry between Ghana and the Ivory Coast was mainly based on different ideological positions and different approaches on the models of development (it is worth to remember the famous “bet” between the two leaders). Moreover, it implied a confrontation of the respective spheres of influence in the region. On the rivalry between the two states in 1959 see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp. 87-89.

²³⁴ PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, Minute of a meeting between and the Sanwi delegation on 29th June 1959 – “The Sanwi Affair”.

²³⁵ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.4.

²³⁶ The complete name of the Sawaba party was “*Mouvement Socialiste Africain* – Sawaba”. For a comprehensive history of the party see K., Van Walraven, *The Yearning for relief: a History of the Sawaba Movement in Niger*, Brill, 2013. References about the links between Ghana and the Sawaba party can be found also in A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations*, p.49.

²³⁷ Diori was also the cousin of the Sawaba party leader, Djibo Bakary.

Djibo Bakary had had contacts with Padmore since 1958.²³⁸ Indeed, he was one of the guests who attended the first anniversary celebrations of Ghana on March 1958.²³⁹

Similarly to what happened with the UPC, Nkrumah backed the Sawaba for its political affinity to the CPP. Indeed, at least since 1958, Djibo Bakary had endorsed a Pan-African position with the aim of extending his political struggle out of the Nigerien boundaries. In order to fulfill this vision, he worked in countries of French West Africa other than Niger. For instance, he worked in French Sudan where he supported a local branch of the MSA, the *Parti Soudanais Progressiste*.²⁴⁰ He also worked for the establishment of a Pan-African party in French West Africa: the *Parti du Regroupement Africain* (PRA), founded at Cotonou in July 1958, with himself as its Secretary-General.²⁴¹

Djibo Bakary strongly campaigned for the “no” vote at the referendum for the French Community on 28 September 1958. He and Sékou Touré were the only leaders of French West Africa to oppose the French Community project, campaigning instead for immediate independence. When asked how he would face Niger’s isolation in case of victory, he claimed he had friends ready to help. According to Fuglestad, those friends were probably the Ghanaians.²⁴²

After the failure of the “no” vote campaign, Djibo Bakary was forced to resign from his position of Deputy President. The Sawaba party became an opposition group and soon after it was banned in Niger (1959). Thus, Djibo Bakary turned to Ghana for help. He needed a new base for Sawaba from where to launch attacks against the new Nigerien government of Diori.²⁴³ The Ghanaians accepted immediately, confirming their close relationship with the party. Since 1959, Bakari and other members of the Sawaba were

²³⁸ At that time Djibo Bakary was not only the Sawaba leader but also head of the government. In 1957, Djibo Bakary had been elected *Vice-Président du Conseil des Ministres*, that is the Deputy Prime Minister of Niger. See, F. Fuglestad, *Djibo Bakary, the French and the Referendum of 1958 in Niger*, The Journal of African History, Vol.14, n°2, 1973.

²³⁹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.31.

²⁴⁰ F. Fuglestad, *Djibo Bakary*, p.320.

²⁴¹ The PRA was established as the union of all the progressive parties of Francophone West Africa that had remained outside the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA). The Sawaba gained its name (which was formerly only *Mouvement Socialiste Africain*) after the return of Djibo Bakary from Cotonou. *Ibidem*, p.321.

²⁴² F. Fuglestad, *Djibo Bakary*, p.324.

²⁴³ Diori became Prime Minister on 18 December 1958 and he later became the first president of Niger (3 August 1960).

hosted at the African Affairs Centre in two houses, named after their party.²⁴⁴ Their representative in Ghana was Yakubu Idirusu (Iddrisa).²⁴⁵ As any other opposition groups hosted in Accra, the Sawaba militants were labeled by the Ghanaian as “freedom fighters”. Their struggle in Niger was considered to all intents and purposes as a “liberation struggle”. As in the other cases, the government involved - in this case Niger - resented Ghana’s support to an opposition group of its country.

The clashes between Ghana and Niger on this question began almost immediately after Djibo Bakary’s arrival in Accra. In the early summer of 1959, the Sawaba party was already operating in Niger from its Ghanaian headquarters and Niger immediately responded to what they considered an aggression. The first reference on operations launched from Ghana is on a letter dated 26 June 1959.²⁴⁶ The letter, prepared by Padmore’s office for internal use, is a report on Sawaba’s activities in Niger. According to some members, there were spies within their ranks and they were requesting Padmore to take care of the matter. Few days before, some members of Sawaba had been arrested in Nyamei by Nigerien authorities, which had been informed by the alleged spies. Interestingly, the Nigerien authorities were already aware of Ghana’s support to the Sawaba party. They were looking for evidences of Ghana’s involvement in a Sawaba-led plot against the Nigerien government. After being tormented, and after having their pictures and fingerprints taken, the members arrested were questioned about their activities:

[...] they are first questioned whatever they know Kwame Nkrumah and Mr. Yakubu Idirusu. [...] the lorry or truck has to be thoroughly searched because the informants had made it known to them that Dr. Nkrumah used to supply members of our party some fire-arms to be delivered to Mr. Zibo Bakare [Djibo Bakary] to fight his opponent. Especially

²⁴⁴ N.L.C., *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*, p.4. In 1959 the houses were still named after African countries. Later, the names were changed into those of the parties hosted there.

²⁴⁵ His name is quoted in a series of document, always as the representative of the party. For instance, he was the one who had to confirm the names of the Sawaba refugees at the Centre. See AGPL, BAA/475/African Affairs Committee Accounts, Ghana, “Catering expenses for French Niger refugees”. The document includes a list of the Nigerien refugees at the Centre on August 1959 (6) and the cost of food for them (£93). The name of Yakubu Idirusu is spelled in this document: “Yacubu Iddrisa”.

²⁴⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary’s Personal Correspondence, Letter (handwritten), Members of the Sawaba party to Padmore, 26th June 1959.

any lorry from Ghana in which occupants are members of our party has to be searched [...].²⁴⁷

In the following years, the Nigerian government openly attacked more and more often Nkrumah accusing him to master plots against Diori.²⁴⁸ With regard to the situation in 1959, it is not possible to confirm that Ghana was providing fire-arms to the Sawaba members. Only by 1961/1962, there are proofs of military training granted to the Nigerian nationalists by Accra.²⁴⁹

Also in 1959, Ghana began to support another party bound to become an opposition group of its country, the Nigerian Action Group (AG). Before 1959, Ghana had primarily backed Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), one of the Action Group's opponent and one of Nigeria's leading parties. During Padmore's last months, the situation changed: Ghana ceased to have a privileged relationship with the NCNC and began to support Awolowo's Action Group.²⁵⁰ Apparently, this choice was not dictated by strong ideological differences between the CPP and the NCNC; Azikiwe was still one of the strongest advocates of Pan-Africanism.²⁵¹ However, Nkrumah had not appreciated his cold attitude towards the UAS project. By backing the AG, Nkrumah wanted to criticize Azikiwe's position and to put political pressure on him and his party.

During the following years, Ghana's support to the AG became a real political alliance, especially since the Nigerian party represented the main opposition group against Balewa's government (1960-1962). Since 1959, members of the Action Group started visiting Ghana for political training and collaborations between their party and the CPP.

²⁴⁷ AGPL, un-catalogued/ AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary's Personal Correspondence, Letter (handwritten), Members of the Sawaba party to Padmore, 26th June 1959.

²⁴⁸ Diori became soon one of Nkrumah's main opponents in West Africa by denouncing Ghana's alleged plans to rule West Africa through the action of opposition parties (clearly considered terrorists). Years later, on 13th April 1965, he accused Nkrumah to be the one behind a failed assassination attempt against him. See, W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp. 375-376.

²⁴⁹ For information about the military training of Sawaba members in Ghana see N.L.C., *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*.

²⁵⁰ Obafemi Awolowo (1909-1987) was one of Nigeria's founding fathers. He was Premier of the Western Region of Nigeria between 1952 and 1959. Later, between 1959 and 1962, he became Balewa's main opponent.

²⁵¹ On the change of attitude of NCNC and AG towards Ghana see Thompson, W.S., *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.80. See also O. Aluko, *Ghana and Nigeria*, pp. 75 and ff.

After 1962, some AG members were hosted in Ghana as political refugees.²⁵² Some of them became also part of Ghana's Pan-African machinery. It is the case of one of the key figures of the Ghanaian Pan-African policy after Padmore's death: Samuel Ikoku.²⁵³

The cases of AG, Sanwi, Sawaba and UPC are very interesting examples of Ghana's support to opposition parties of other African countries. In the following years, Ghana backed other minority groups. Some of them were supported politically and others even militarily. Behind every choice of this type there were considerations linked to the implementations of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Nkrumah sponsored most of these parties to oppose the conservative governments that could weaken his Pan-Africanist project. It was, however, a dangerous policy. Some states considered Ghana's involvement as an aggression and thus they reacted accordingly. As regards to 1959, the situation was still relatively calm, but the clashes between Ghana and some of its neighboring states were bound to increase in the following years.

With the question of opposition parties, this excursus of Ghana's Pan-African policy in 1959 had come to an end. The last two sub-chapters will deal with the fundamental changes in the composition of the staff of Padmore's office in this period. First of all, it will be analyzed how Padmore worked for giving shape to his office in order to transform it into a radical body. Then, the crucial event of 1959 will be described: the death of George Padmore.

²⁵² In 1962, Awolowo and several militants of the Action Group were arrested and convicted for conspiracy against Nigeria (Treasonable Felony Trial). At the trial, Nigeria attacked publicly Nkrumah's policy in the region, as the Ghanaian President was supposed to be a supporter of the plot. After the first wave of arrests, several members of the AG escaped from Nigeria and were hosted in Ghana as political refugees. This fact led to an even harsher confrontation between Ghana and Nigeria. Since then, the two states began to host an increasing number of political refugees escaping from the respective country.

²⁵³ Samuel Ikoku (Julius Sago) was an AG party member and an economist. At the time of Awolowo's trial, he was already in Ghana where he remained until the fall of Nkrumah. There, he worked as a journalist (mainly at *The Spark*) and as lecturer at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba. He left an interesting account of his years in Ghana. See: S.G. Ikoku (Julius Sago), *Le Ghana de Nkrumah, autopsie de la Ire République (1957-1966)*, François Maspero, Paris, 1971.

2.7. Significant Changes in Padmore's Office: the Rise of A.K. Barden

In 1959, the new challenges of the African political scene generated changes in the structures of the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana, especially in the composition of their staff. Padmore adapted his Office to the needs of the African liberation struggle, by proposing the creation of new posts. For instance, he introduced the figure of the French Translator, in order to deal with francophone freedom fighters. Among the new appointees, Aloysius K. Barden emerged. The Ghanaian ex-serviceman became Padmore's personal secretary and, *de facto*, his successor. After the death of the latter, he became one of the protagonists of Ghana's Pan-African policy.

Between late 1958 and early 1959, the need to intensify Ghana's Pan-African policy was strong, leading Padmore's Office to increase its duties. Thus, in November 1958, Padmore asked Nkrumah to provide fresh human resources for his Office as well as the establishment of new posts.²⁵⁴

The proposed figure of French translator was undoubtedly a fundamental one, as the office needed to strengthen its relationship with francophone governments and freedom fighters. Despite the importance of the operation, it took some months before the right man was found.²⁵⁵ Indeed, Padmore had to select carefully a skillful but also reliable man who could deal with delicate political questions. He finally found the perfect profile in Michael K.K. Tuvi, former official French translator at the All-African People's Conference. On 4

²⁵⁴ He wrote to Nkrumah on 3 November 1958: "It is clear that the work and responsibility of this office are growing from day to day. In order to cope with the ever growing work and responsibility it is absolutely important that the staff of the office should be increased from its present state". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 3rd November 1958.

²⁵⁵ In January 1959, the post was assigned temporarily to a young Ghanaian, Mr. Lomotey, who had been deported from Leopoldville in connection with some disturbances (clearly related with the delicate political situation of Belgian Congo before independence). See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959. It was however a temporary solution since on 21 January Padmore was still requesting the appointment of a French Translator. In AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter (title: "*establishment proposals*"), Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959. He had to be Ghanaian and its duties were to be the ones of translating from French to English plus some interpreting. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Markham to Adu, 9th March 1959. This letter was following a request of information from Adu on the duties requested to the French Translator. Adu's request was itself an answer to the previous letter of Padmore already quoted and dated 21st January 1959. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Adu to Padmore, 20th February 1959.

April 1959, Padmore wrote to Adu sponsoring the application of Tuvi to the post.²⁵⁶ The letter provides a picture of the new situation in Padmore's Office: increasingly confidential duties raised the need for a scrupulous selection of the staff. Quoting from the letter:

Security measures in my office are being tightened up and you will, no doubt, agree with me that it would be most unwise on my part to risk working with someone whom I cannot vouch for his loyalty. In the light of the prevailing circumstances, I would prefer Mr. K.K. Tuvi to any other one.²⁵⁷

The appointment of a French translator - finally occurred some months later - was only the first of the measures proposed by Padmore.²⁵⁸ He also suggested the establishment of the post of "Assistant to the Adviser on African Affairs", a reliable figure who could act in his absence. In this case, Padmore had already the right man: James Markham.²⁵⁹ He simply needed to upgrade his current status.

²⁵⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 4th April 1959.

²⁵⁷ Padmore underlined also the fact that he had chosen Tuvi since he was the French translator at the All-African People's Conference and in that occasion he had proven to be "efficient, loyal and hardworking". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 4th April 1959.

²⁵⁸ The establishment proposal of the post of French translator had been accepted already in May. The post had been included in the estimates for 1959/60. See AGPL, BAA/388, Letter, Addy to Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, 18th May 1959; however, later on June, Padmore was still pushing Adu to put the establishment of the post in practice. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 17th June 1959. Adu agreed to the proposal and promised him a quick action on the matter. See *Letter*, Adu to Padmore, 18th June 1959 which can be found in the same previous file. At the end of August, Padmore's office was still waiting for the authorization. Tuvi was however confirmed as the favorite candidate. See AGPL, BAA/388, Letter, Markham to Addy, 27th August 1959.

²⁵⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 3rd November 1958. Interestingly, the qualifications requested for the post practically coincided with the ones of Markham. Thus, it can be argued that Padmore wanted only to upgrade the status of the latter. The qualification was: "Must be a Ghanaian. Must have knowledge of Research work and be fully conversant with the political cultural and economic institutions in the various territories. Must know current developments in those territories with emphasis on the special problems and needs of those territories. Must have high quality of judgment and initiative. Must know how to collect independently information from all territories in Africa especially those still dependent. Must have worked in a similar capacity and must have widely travelled particularly in Africa and Asia thus giving him first-hand knowledge of the problems and conditions in those areas. Must know the working of the United Nations and its specialized Agencies especially UNESCO, NGO. And the Trusteeship Council". Quotation from AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, "Assistant to the Special Adviser on African Affairs – Qualification, Duties, Salary", undated. Markham was at the time one of the key figure of Padmore's office, acting as "Information and Research officer". Padmore did his best in order to obtain the Markham's upgrade. Both Nkrumah and Botsio agreed on the appointment in December. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 18th December 1958. As it was the case with the French translator, it took, however,

What was, however, to be the most important post created by Padmore in this period was that of Personal Secretary. In this case, the Adviser on African Affairs designed the job specifically for one of his employees: Aloysious K. Barden. This figure - at the time relatively unknown in Ghana and elsewhere - was bound to play a fundamental role in the evolution of Ghana's Pan-African policy after Padmore's death. Selected and formed by Padmore himself - who had also to win resistance by elements of the civil service - he became one of the most important men of his Office and, *de facto*, his successor.

Aloysious K. Barden was a Ghanaian ex-serviceman who had been working for Padmore's Office since the summer of 1958.²⁶⁰ Recommended by an ex Officer of the British colonial army, at the time Barden was neither trained for the duties of Padmore's Office nor he had experiences in Pan-African activities, nor was he politicized.²⁶¹ Apparently, his profile did not fit in any way the one drawn by Padmore for the members of the staff of the Office. Most probably, at first, the Adviser on African Affairs selected

some months before Markham was officially upgraded. In February, Padmore was writing directly to Nkrumah as his proposals were not being processed. Even Markham had not yet been upgraded although Adu had promised an action in December. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 13th February 1959. Still in June, Markham's appointment had not been made official. Padmore was complaining with Adu about the delay. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 17th June 1959. Adu accepted the proposal. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Adu to Padmore, 18th June 1959.

²⁶⁰ AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Staff list, 1958-59, typescript.

²⁶¹ At the time of the establishment of the Office, Padmore had proposed the creation of various posts, included the one of Stenographer-Secretary. Padmore had also a name to suggest, the one of S.I. Subero. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Re: "Staff for Adviser on African Affairs", Adu to Padmore, 17 January 1958. However, when the first IAS Conference was approaching, the Office was still without this post. It was necessary as the duties of the office were bound to increase in volume with the approach of the Conference. For this reason, Padmore (through Afflah Addo) asked Ivor Cummings from the Establishment Secretary's Office (ESO) to find someone for the post. In AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued "Gabon File", Letter, Afflah Addo to Cummings, 15th March 1958. Cummings, who was an ex British Colonial Officer, found an ex serviceman, Aloysious K. Barden, who was looking for a job. *Interview* with David Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24/7/12. The latter was a Ghanaian retired sergeant, who had served in the British colonial army. He was appointed in the Office as a typewriter on 13th June 1958. On 20 of August, he had not been interviewed yet for the job of stenographer-secretary. The director of recruitment and training of the ESO wrote: "[...] he has had very limited experience in an office. It will therefore be in his interest to delay the interview to enable him to overcome his deficiency in office management etc., and to acquire experience in the duties which he will be required to perform on promotion to the grade of Stenographer Secretary". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Director of Recruitment and Training of E.S.O. to Padmore, 20th August 1958. Other sources confirm that Barden was not prepared for the job of stenographer-secretary nor was he politicized. Interviews: Richter, Bosumtwi-Sam, Asante; W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107.

Barden only for his military experience.²⁶² He then needed to be properly trained in order to fulfill his duties.²⁶³ In few months, however, Barden proved Padmore's choice wise and he succeeded in winning his confidence.

After only few months, Padmore showed appreciation for Barden's skills, despite his lack of experience. He immediately involved the new appointee in the Office activities, including the fulfillment of confidential duties. In November '58, Padmore requested a new stenographer secretary as he wanted Barden to undertake other duties which involved more responsibilities.²⁶⁴ In January 1959, he finally proposed Barden for the new post of "Private Secretary to the Adviser", a strong position within the Office hierarchies. Padmore had appreciated the way Barden had handled confidential duties and he decided to reward him with a more powerful position. He wrote to Nkrumah:

Mr. A.K. Barden my Stenographer Secretary has [...] efficiently handled in addition to his confidential duties the general administrative work of the office. Besides enjoying his confidence and loyalty, he is painstaking, courteous and one who can always be relied upon to shoulder responsibilities. In view of the highly confidential nature of my work and after having given serious thought to the question of filling the first post above [the one of

²⁶² Barden's military experience must have played a big role in his appointment. Padmore's Office had indeed to be ready to support armed struggle where necessary (at the time, it was still not involved in any, apart from a general support to Algeria's armed struggle). A military expert was a good resource to deal with liberation movements involved in armed struggles. Barden himself was often underlining his experience in military operations. *Ibidem*. This fact is also confirmed by the interviews with K.B. Asante and David Bosumtwi-Sam.

²⁶³ The task of preparing Barden was undertaken by David Bosumtwi-Sam, who at the time was Principal Education Officer of the Ministry of Education. Interview with Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 19th July 2012. See also D. Bosumtwi-Sam, *Landmarks of Dr Kwame Nkrumah*, pp.138-39. The request to train Barden came from Ivor Cummings himself. Bosumtwi-Sam sent Barden to Tamale where he was trained for some months in English and type-writing. Source: Interview with David Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012; it was in this occasion that Bosumtwi-Sam met for the first time George Padmore. The paths of Barden and Bosumtwi-Sam crossed again in 1960, when the latter was appointed Executive Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs, at the time headed by Barden. Those were, actually, the requirements for being appointed at the post of stenographer secretary. In AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", "Qualifications for the positions of stenographer grade I, II and secretary", undated typescript, pp.18-19. On 27 November 1958, Barden was finally promoted. See AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued "Gabon File", Letter, Newall to Barden, 27th November 1958.

²⁶⁴ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 3rd November 1958.

Stenographer Secretary], I strongly recommend that Mr. A.K. Barden should be appointed.²⁶⁵

Padmore made it clear to Nkrumah that he had already taken a decision. He needed only to have the post officially established and he needed the authorization to increase Barden's salary. He had selected Barden on his own, without external interferences, as he already did with the other key figures of his Office (Makonnen and Markham). From Padmore's point of view, only Nkrumah could say something against Barden's appointment.

However, once again, despite his independent role, Padmore had to face criticisms and resistance from the Ghanaian Civil Service and particularly from Adu. The latter opposed the new appointments on the ground of financial matters: there was no money for unjustified expenses. According to Padmore, such an opposition was the reflection of the distance of outlook between him and the Civil Service. He believed the money to cover the new appointments was already available.²⁶⁶ He strongly complained about the delays caused by such resistances and criticized Adu's attitude on the matter, as he considered the new appointments crucial for the fulfillment of the new duties of the Office. On 13 February 1959 he wrote to Adu:

[...] there appears to be uncertainties as to the possibility of getting the staff requested for this office as proposed. This is evident from the passive manner in which my proposals are being dealt with in your office. As you are already aware my establishment proposals are not in any way revolutionary that it should be treated in the manner it is being done; it is only a request for a complement of staff consistent with the duties being carried out by this office. [...] In view of the urgent nature of this request and the extraordinary indifference in which it is being dealt with by your office, I should be extremely grateful if you would take up the matter personally [...].²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Re: "Establishment Proposals", Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959. In another letter written to Nkrumah the same day (included in the same file) Padmore repeated the same concept: "In view of the ever increasing confidential nature of my work, I am recommending the appointment of a Private Secretary [...] I intend to assign this work to Mr. A.K. Barden my present Stenographer Secretary [...] I would appreciate your immediate endorsement of these recommendations [...] I can assure you that with these new arrangements, we shall be able to keep abreast with the ever increasing demands of this office". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959.

²⁶⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 7th February 1959.

²⁶⁷ AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Padmore to Adu, 13th February 1959.

The financial sustainability was not the only problem on the table. The Establishment Secretary Office of the Ministry of Finance, the office responsible for the matter, considered Barden's promotion unusual if compared to the normal career ladder. The secretary wrote to Adu:

You agreed in discussion that Mr. Padmore's proposal for the creation of a post of Private Secretary should not be pursued. [...] Where it is to be created the filling of the post would, of course, have to be by promotion from the grade of Stenographer Secretary, and it will be appreciated that there would be no guarantee that Mr. Barden would be considered the most suitable candidate. His promotion would involve the supersession of many officers who are his seniors.²⁶⁸

Padmore did not give up on the matter. For the rest of the year, he kept pushing both the Establishment Secretary Office and Adu's office to allow the establishment of the new posts, including Barden's. From Padmore's point of view, the bureaucracy of the Ghanaian state was still an obstacle towards the correct fulfillment of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy.

In the meantime, Barden was becoming more and more fundamental for the Office's activities. In March, Padmore wrote again to the Establishment Office to underline the outstanding role he played, pushing again for his upgrade:

Much as I appreciate that it is the normal practice of Stenographer/Secretaries to be engaged on highly confidential documents I wish to point out that the peculiar nature of my office compels Mr. Barden as a matter of necessity to work outside normal office hours but not, as needs be, as in the case of other holders of this grade.²⁶⁹

In May, with the arrival of the first political refugees to Accra, Padmore reasserted the need for Barden's appointment to a higher-level post. At the time, the latter had begun managing the accommodation of political refugees, one of the new duties of Padmore's Office. On 19

²⁶⁸ AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Goble to Adu, 16th February 1959.

²⁶⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Padmore to Gardiner, 25th March 1959.

May 1959, Padmore wrote again to Adu to propose Barden for a new position.²⁷⁰ Interestingly, the letter shows one important detail: at the time, Barden was also in charge of the work with the intelligence. Quoting from the letter:

As the work involves high security risk, it requires a person of executive ability and absolute reliability [...] I propose that such an appointment, if and when created, be offered to my Stenographer/Secretary, in whom I have absolute confidence and who has, in fact, been carrying out such combined duties and responsibilities during the past months with commendable efficiency. This officer is also working in close co-operation with our intelligence under Mr. Kao. I am sure that the appointment will materially improve the efficient running of my office which, in addition to routine matters, has to deal with the accommodation of political refugees.²⁷¹

In June, Barden was finally appointed to the new post and likewise were Markham and Tuvi.²⁷² Padmore had needed to wait for months before the procedures succeeded. During this period, however, he put Markham, Tuvi and Barden to work on their new duties, without waiting for the confirmation of their appointments. Padmore was a pragmatic man. He considered the fulfillment of the targets of Ghana's Pan-African policy more important than formalities. He also needed his employees to be ready in case anything could happen to him.

Tragically, this moment was closer than expected. While Barden's star was rising, Padmore's was fading away. His health conditions were getting worse each month. When he died, in September, Barden emerged as the best candidate to become his "successor". At the time, he was the most powerful figure of the Office. Although contested, his succession to Padmore's position was not a surprise. Padmore himself had prepared him the ground during the months preceding his death. *De facto*, he had "created" Barden. Despite the

²⁷⁰ Padmore proposed the establishment of a new type of post in order to "combine the duties of Confidential Secretary with that of an Administrative Officer": the "Senior Executive Officer". Barden was again sponsored for the new post. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 19th May 1959.

²⁷¹ *Ibidem*.

²⁷² See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 17th June 1959. Adu finally agreed on the appointments. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Adu to Padmore, 18th June 1959.

resistances, Padmore had succeeded in having Barden climbing the steps of his career very quickly. He had trained the Ghanaian ex-serviceman to be a skilled employee but also a Pan-Africanist militant. From this point of view, Barden proved to be a perfect match to Padmore's needs.

Figures like Barden were bound to form the bulk of a radicalized foreign affairs machinery, a process begun just few months before Padmore's death. Since 1959, political appointments became increasingly common both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (particularly among the diplomats) and in the "Pan-African" institutions. Barden can be considered as the first of a series of radicals who gained important posts in the institutions dealing with Ghana's foreign policy.

According to Thompson, this process was far from being transparent. These radicals were often nothing but politicized "self-styled militants" selected only for their ideological dedication to the cause, largely unskilled and bound to bring Ghana to a disaster.²⁷³ Barden, in his study emerges as the typical example of one who made a quick career and gained his position only thanks to his ideological affiliation.

Such an analysis seems rather simplistic. In reality, most of the "political appointees" such as Barden or other who followed him were heavily trained. Their careers paths simply not followed the normal protocol of the civil service. Barden's career was the result of a hard and practical work in the Office, followed step by step by Padmore. In this sense, there can be no comparison, for instance, between the career of a civil servant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the career of a member of a "Pan-African" institution. Barden's path followed the peculiar nature of Padmore's Office. Once the radicalization of Ghana's state reached its peak in 1961, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba was established to form a politicized civil service. This move practically united the two existing types of carriers: the traditional one and the one of the "militants".

Barden's appointment was the last and most important act of George Padmore. Later in September 1959 he passed away. His death signified ideally both the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. Pan-Africanism had finally put its roots in Africa. Ghana was

²⁷³ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 29.

ready to take up the fight for African liberation and unity, even without his presence. His imprint on Ghana's Pan-African policy was meant to last for years after his death.

2.8. Padmore's Death and Legacy

On the 23rd of September 1959 a terrible news shocked Ghana: George Padmore was dead. The Trinidadian Pan-Africanist had been first spectator and then protagonist of almost fifteen years of politics in Ghana. Nkrumah had built his foreign policy on Padmore's ideas and together they had worked to put the Pan-Africanist theories into practice. Without Padmore, the Office to the Adviser on African Affairs would have not been established. Thanks to his contribution, Ghana was now ready for the appointment with Africa's first wave of independences and the further developments of African politics of the following years. His legacy was remarkable. He had contributed to the development of Ghana's institutions and he had trained men ready to take up the Pan-African struggle, in particular A.K. Barden.

Padmore has suffered for cirrhosis of the liver for years. In early 1959, the situation deteriorated. However, he continued to commit in order to achieve the Pan-African targets of Ghana's foreign policy. He worked for the Office and he also participated to trips and conferences, including the Sanniquellie one.²⁷⁴

Padmore was aware that his health conditions were getting worse. In August, he insisted for having Barden and Markham's leaves postponed, since he had "some heavy work to deal with".²⁷⁵ In reality, he had to leave Ghana to be treated. Indeed, in early September he requested Nkrumah the authorization to travel to the UK to undergo a

²⁷⁴ The conditions of Padmore's liver worsened during the last 9 months of his life. See C. Polsgrove, *Ending British Rule in Africa*, Manchester University Press, 2009, pp.162-63. Bad medical treatments, previous history of hepatitis and an alleged consumption of alcohol are among the explanations of the deterioration of his health conditions. According to Hooker, the signs of the disease were already clear at the Sanniquellie meeting. See J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.139.

²⁷⁵ AGPL, BAA/388, Letter, Padmore to Darfoor (Secretary to the Prime Minister), 22nd August 1959 and also AGPL, BAA/388, Letter, Darfoor to Padmore, 11st September 1959.

medical examination.²⁷⁶ It was to be his last trip outside Ghana. A few days after his arrival in London, he died. It was the 23rd of September 1959.

Speculations on his death aroused since the very day after. Some Ghanaians suspected he had been poisoned by “imperialist” agents. However, there was no proof to confirm such hypothesis.²⁷⁷ In any case, the fear of an external intervention is understandable since assassinations of radical African politicians were not uncommon.²⁷⁸ It is worth remembering that Padmore was known to be a Pan-Africanist but also a radical socialist.

In Ghana, the former Adviser on African Affairs was celebrated as a national hero. He was buried at Christianborg Castle, the seat of the Ghanaian government. On the 4th of October 1959, Nkrumah gave a speech at Padmore’s burial in which he underlined particularly the close political and human relationship with the dead friend. He could have not found a better ally:

When I first met George Padmore in London some fifteen years ago, we both realized from the very beginning that we thought along the same lines and talked the same language. There existed between us that rare affinity for which one searches for so long but seldom finds in another human being. We became friends at the moment of our meeting and our friendship developed into that indescribable relationship that exists between two brothers.²⁷⁹

On Radio Ghana, Nkrumah underlined Padmore’s role in the Pan-African struggle and his legacy: “one day the whole of Africa will surely be free and united and when the final tale is told, the significance of George Padmore’s work will be revealed”.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁶ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.139.

²⁷⁷ According to Hooker, Dr. Clarke, who was taking care of Padmore in his last days, did not find any sign of poisoning. *Ibidem*, p.139. Even among the Ghanaian intelligentsia the suspects circulated for a while, but they were soon abandoned. Still, according to David Bosumtwi-Sam the poisoning theory seems plausible. Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 4th September 2012.

²⁷⁸ For instance, just one year after Padmore’s death, Félix Moumié was poisoned in Genève, most probably by the French Intelligence.

²⁷⁹ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.139-140.

²⁸⁰ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*. It is a quotation from Adamafio’s *Hands off Africa!*, pp.45-47.

After his death, a debate inside and outside Ghana followed. His legacy in Ghana was discussed as well as his relationship with Nkrumah. According to some observers, his influence on the Ghanaian Prime Minister had been fundamentally negative. Indeed, Padmore was supposed to have guided Nkrumah far from the concrete achievement of Pan-Africanism. For instance, Smith Hempstone, member of the Institute for Current World Affairs who had interviewed Padmore some months before his death, wrote:

“[Padmore] seemed sincere in his views, but rather out of touch with the new generation of African nationalists, with the exception of Nkrumah, of course, to whom he was very close. I have the feeling that Nkrumah’s reliance on Padmore as an ideologue contributed to the Ghanaian leader’s failure to gain real control of the Pan-Africanist movement. By this I mean that if Nkrumah himself had taken the trouble to ascertain the thinking of the other African leaders on the subject of Pan-Africanism, rather than relying on Padmore’s interpretation of what the shape of Pan-Africanism should be, Nkrumah might have more stature that he has today.”²⁸¹

Even Scott Thompson agrees on this interpretation. According to the historian, although Padmore had guided Nkrumah with rational advices, he had ultimately misguided him by supporting his plans for an implausible project of continental unity.²⁸² As a matter of fact – Thompson underlined – the Adviser on African Affairs had been strongly criticized even by other members of the Ghanaian state.²⁸³

The American author is only partially right. It is true that Padmore was contested by some members of the Ghanaian government, the CPP and the civil service, but the reasons were others than his irrational advices on radical Pan-African policies. The real motive was merely political. Indeed, the civil service – in particular the one of the Minister of External Affairs represented by Adu – had never appreciated the independent role played by

²⁸¹ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.137. These words were written in a letter to Hooker by Hampstone on 19 April 1964. The latter described Padmore as rough and arrogant. According to Hooker: “This version of Padmore is so badly in disagreement with everyone’s accounts of his London days that one can only suppose either that the tropics did not agree with him or that Hampstone did not”. J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.138.

²⁸² W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp.22-23 and 106-107.

²⁸³ He, however, fails once again in producing sources for his statements, quoting only Robert Gardiner in saying: “That fellow seems to me to possess but one idea, and that is a wrong one”. Gardiner’s words are, in reality, a quotation themselves. *Ibidem*, p.23.

Padmore and his Office. Criticisms were coming from the Party ranks and members of the government for similar reasons.²⁸⁴ Many Ghanaians had fought against the independent status of Padmore since they thought that he held too much power, thanks to his privileged relationship with Nkrumah.

In reality, Padmore's death was a great loss for Nkrumah.²⁸⁵ Without him, he could have never planned a Pan-African policy and actualized it in Ghana. After September 1959, he was left alone to deal with the challenges of the African scene. Still, the political heritage of the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist was standing there, waiting to be enacted.

2.9. Conclusions

With the death of Padmore, almost fifteen years of work for giving shape to an effective plan to actualize Pan-Africanism was over. Thanks to the work done before 1957, the theoretical basis of this policy had been settled. Moreover, the work done by the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist between 1957 and 1959 proved fundamental to translate the theory into practice. Padmore's heritage was profound and enduring.

The Office was now ready to deal with the struggle for African liberation and unity in the next years. Moreover, Padmore had left Nkrumah with a qualified staff to support him in every move of his Pan-African policy. In particular, he trained Barden to replace him in the Office. In the next years, Nkrumah counted on the latter as he was doing on Padmore before his death.

The heritage of the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist was bound to last even after his departure. Indeed, many of the policies implemented after October 1959 were still clearly

²⁸⁴ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.128-129 and 133-134.

²⁸⁵ Thompson opposed this interpretation even from another point of view. According to him, Nkrumah himself hardly tolerated Padmore's independence. Thus, he was quite relieved by the death of his Adviser on African Affairs. According to the historian, who quoted interviews with Botsio and Markham, Nkrumah had become increasingly jealous of Padmore during 1959. Based on this assumption, Thompson described Nkrumah after the death of his Adviser on African Affairs as liberated by one of the few "restraints" that had slowed down the pace of his Pan-African plans. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107.

influenced by his ideas on African politics. Moreover, the evolution of the “Pan-African” institutions of Ghana clearly followed Padmore’s plans.

A new political season was beginning. A first wave of independences was meant to take place in the next year. After years and years of preparation, it was time to check on the efficiency of the system created by Nkrumah and Padmore to guide the independence processes towards the greater target of a continental union of African states.

3. The Bureau of African Affairs and Ghana's Pan-African Policy in 1960

Introduction

After Padmore's death, many changes occurred in the foreign policy system of Ghana. The Office of the Adviser on African Affairs immediately changed its name into the new Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), an institution even more independent, better financed and more integrated with the CPP than the former. Barden, who was second in command at the Office, was appointed first secretary and then director of the new BAA.

The whole Pan-African policy was put under revision. A new advisory body, called African Affairs Committee, was established by Nkrumah to reform the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana and to deal with the foreign policy making process. The Committee particularly worked for elaborating specific action plans to deal with the challenges of African politics in 1960. During this year, seventeen countries reached independence, an event which caused a radical change in the political map of the continent. Ghana had to face the different problems emerged in this period, starting with the crisis in the Congo. In order to deal with this question and others, the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana were strengthened. Generally speaking, the whole Ghanaian Pan-African policy was strengthened. Still, all these efforts proved not sufficient. Accra failed its mission in Congo and Nkrumah saw his position heavily damaged at the end of the year.

On the other hand, this period proved successful for Barden and his BAA. The institution developed considerably during the management of the African Affairs Committee. A wide net of BAA agents allowed Barden to work on the different missions imposed by the evolutions of politics in Africa. At the end of the year, he could report to Nkrumah a certain satisfaction about the work done and he even requested more resources for the BAA in the future.

This chapter will be divided in two parts. In the first part, made of eight sub-chapters, it will be analyzed how Ghana's Pan-African policy and its institutions were reformed after Padmore's death. The whole period of management of the African Affairs Committee will be examined, covering the conception and performance of the new policy. The period under examination is September 1959 – March 1960.

The second part will describe the period following the Committee, when the BAA was officially established. There will be a particular focus on the missions performed by Barden and his staff in Southern Africa, Congo, West Africa and East Africa. The end of the chapter also includes a brief analysis of the consequences of the events of 1960 for the later evolution of Ghana's Pan-African policy.

3.1. The Establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs and the African Affairs Committee

Nkrumah's first act after the death of Padmore was to change the name of the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs into that of the Bureau of African Affairs. The new institution was conceived as an evolution of the former office with stronger powers and more resources. Barden was the best candidate to take over the post of Padmore, having been his second in command for months. However, others candidates - backed by the Foreign Service - also tried to run for the same job. The clash between Barden and the Foreign Service on the appointment mirrors what Padmore had experienced two years before.

In early October 1959, Kwame Nkrumah announced in a press release the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs "in order to put the work begun by the late Mr. George Padmore on a permanent basis".²⁸⁶ At first, the BAA was simply an alias of Padmore's Office but it soon became clear that it would have been a far more radical and

²⁸⁶ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107.

powerful institution than the Office ever was. Nkrumah himself became its acting director.²⁸⁷

The secretary of the new institution was A.K. Barden. Already in September, he had practically run the Office by himself, since Padmore was too ill to deal with it. After Padmore's death and Markham's assignment to the Broadcasting department, he was left in charge of the Office activities and he kept the job even after the BAA was established.

Even though he was known to be Padmore's favorite employee, his rise to power was contested and challenged by other figures. The Foreign Service was particularly critical of his appointment as head of the BAA. They did not consider the ex-serviceman sufficiently qualified to deal with the Ghana's Pan-African policy.

At the time of the establishment of the Bureau, other candidates proposed their names for the post of head of the new office. One of them was K.B. Asante, at the time a civil servant of the Ministry of External Affairs.²⁸⁸ He had been quite close to Padmore since 1959, when the latter had insisted to transfer him from Israel (where he was chargé d'affaires at the Ghanaian embassy) to Accra, at the Ministry of External Affairs.²⁸⁹ Even if Asante had never worked for the Office, he proposed himself as a candidate for Padmore's succession. However, despite being backed by Ako Adjei, his candidacy was discarded by Nkrumah, who moved him instead to the Ghanaian embassy in New York. In the case of another opponent, Owusu Ansah, Barden himself got rid of him by weakening his political position and leading him to retire from the competition.²⁹⁰

Barden's position was still too strong for any man of the Foreign Service to challenge it. Padmore had had the ultimate word even after his death. Nkrumah knew well that

²⁸⁷ Although Nkrumah had been appointed acting director of the BAA, soon the post of Director was taken by Kofi Baako. He acted as a director until 9 November 1959, when that position was abolished. The reasons were two. First of all, Baako had been also appointed Minister of Information and Broadcasting and he could not manage the two posts together. Secondly, the Committee was supposed to run the Bureau collegially. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 4th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November 9th 1959 at 12 P.M, "Director to the Bureau". The post of Director was to be re-established later and Barden was going to gain the post.

²⁸⁸ He was bound to become Principal Secretary of the African Affairs Secretariat in 1961.

²⁸⁹ Interview with K.B. Asante, 4th September 2011, Accra. Asante was at the time a young diplomat, acting as chargé d'affaires at Tel Aviv. During one of his trips, Padmore had the chance to meet him. The two men discussed for hours on African affairs. At the end of a long night of discussions, Padmore was convinced of the potentialities of Asante and requested his transfer to Accra.

²⁹⁰ Interview with K.B. Asante, 4th September 2011.

Barden was already trained and experienced in the activities of the Office, and therefore of the BAA. He could not take the risk of appointing someone from outside the Office during such a delicate phase of African politics.

Barden was having problems with the Foreign Service similar to the ones previously experienced by Padmore. It was a reflection of the distance of outlook between the orthodox and unorthodox methods used by the two wings of the Ghanaian foreign policy system. Moreover, the Foreign Service feared particularly Barden's radicalism. The competition between the two systems was bound to become even harsher than it was in Padmore's time.

Barden emerged victorious and obtained the control of the BAA. However, Nkrumah decided to manage Ghana's African policy by himself for some months, controlling also the activities of the Bureau. Thus, he decided to create a proper body to deal with this question: the new African Affairs Committee.

3.2. The African Affairs Committee and the Evolution of the "Pan-African" Institutions

With the death of Padmore, Nkrumah had lost not only a friend but also his Adviser on African Affairs. He needed to fill this gap. Thus, he decided to establish a close council to deal with Ghana's foreign policy in Africa: the African Affairs Committee.²⁹¹ The new body was planned to take all the decisions concerning Ghana's Pan-African policy and the management of the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana. Even the BAA came under the control of the Committee for almost eight months. The Committee introduced important

²⁹¹ An "African Affairs Committee" already existed under Padmore's control even though its nature and aims were different from Nkrumah's one. It was established in 1959 to deal with the new challenges of Ghana's Pan-African policy and, *in primis*, with the issue of refugees. Padmore was the chairman while other members were: Barden, Makonnen, Markham, Djin, Tettegah, Vanderpuje, Asare, Elliot, Amoah Awuah, Heymann, Atta Mensah, Drake and Bediako Poku. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee, typescript, "African Affairs Committee".

changes in the structure of the “Pan-African” institutions, including a more rational division of duties between the different offices.

Thanks to it, Nkrumah could fill the vacuum left by Padmore’s death. He could share views on African Affairs with high-level party members, ministers and men of the “Pan-African” institutions. At the same time, he could also manage the BAA, the AAC and the AAPC secretariat, which all came under the authority of the new body. In the following eight months, the Committee became the most important foreign policy-making body of the Ghanaian government.

The African Affairs Committee reunited once a week at Flagstaff House, gathering together some of the most important figures of the Ghanaian politics. Between ordinary members and guests, the Committee included men like Botsio, Makonnen, Djin, Diallo, Barden, Adjei, Adamafio, Welbeck and Baako.²⁹² Nkrumah attended all meetings since he was chairman of the Committee itself. The main target was to discuss on relevant questions concerning African Affairs and to propose specific policies to be implemented. The organization and the duties of the “Pan-African” institutions of Ghana were also discussed, including the possibility of establishing new ones.

The first meeting took place at Flagstaff House on October 16th 1959.²⁹³ Both Botsio and Welbeck attended as representatives of the government and party which Nkrumah wanted to be strongly involved in the making of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. Welbeck linked himself to the BAA, establishing a close collaboration between the “Pan-African” institution and the CPP and became chairman of the Bureau of African Affairs in May 1960.²⁹⁴

²⁹² The complete list of the personalities who attended at least one meeting of the Committee is the following: A. Y.K. Djin, Amoah Awuah, Joe Fio Meyer, T.R. Makonnen, Edwin Du Plan, A.K. Barden, N.A. Welbeck, P.K. Yankey, Kofi Baako, Abdullay Diallo, Kwaku Boateng, Mbiyu Koinange, Kojo Botsio, Ako Adjei, S.A. Dzirasa, John Tettegah, Tawia Adamafio, Eric Heymann, A.L. Adu, Alfred Hutchinson, J.A. Maimane, Jimmy Markham and, obviously, Kwame Nkrumah. This list has been compiled on the basis of the minutes of the meetings of the African Affairs Committee which are inside the following files: AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin and PRAAD, SC/BAA/251.

²⁹³ AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin, *Minutes* of African Affairs Committee Meeting held at Flagstaff House on October 16th 1959.

²⁹⁴ Welbeck became chairman of the BAA at the end of the period of the African Affairs Committee administration. He was appointed chairman at the act of establishment of the BAA in May 1960. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.107.

The first task of the Committee was to rationalize the duties of the “Pan-African” institutions of Ghana. It was, indeed, important to save resources and, at the same time, to make good use of the personnel of the BAA, the AAC and the AAPC secretariat, also considered part of the same system.

At the first meeting, the participants discussed the “fusion” between the BAA, the AAC and the AAPC Secretariat.²⁹⁵ The latter was planned to be absorbed by the Bureau, which was practically already controlling it.²⁹⁶ In some cases, the personnel had to be shared by the three institutions. For instance, Edwin Du Plan was appointed Administrative Secretary of both the AAPC Secretariat and the African Affairs Centre.²⁹⁷ Even Kwodwo Addison held a position in both the BAA and the AAPC Secretariat and was also meant to become director of the last “Pan-African” institution to be established: the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba.²⁹⁸

The whole “Pan-African” system of Ghana (including the AAPC) was put under the control of the Bureau. With such an organization, the country could save resources and coordinate better the activities of the different institutions. Moreover, Nkrumah could concentrate the chain of command only in the hands of Barden so as to rely only on him on the matters of Pan-African policy. The main aim of the African Affairs Committee was to elaborate such a new system before transferring the power to the BAA.

Although it was practically run as a Ghanaian “Pan-African institution”, the AAPC was not controlled only by Ghanaians. The Secretary General was a Guinean, Abdoulaye Diallo and other Africans were also involved in the project. By transferring all the activities

²⁹⁵ A real fusion which was never made official. Indeed, the three offices kept having proper statutes. The “fusion” consisted mainly in coordinating the policies of the offices and also in making use of the same personnel.

²⁹⁶ Thompson seems to be right when he states that “The Bureau, by late 1959, had virtually absorbed what was left of the AAPC”, in W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107. However, it must be underlined that matters like the one of the organization of the AAPC conference of Tunis (January 1960) were administered by the AAPC Secretariat alone. The BAA was often coordinating the contacts between the liberation movements and the Secretariat (The BAA archives includes many letters with request by nationalist parties to join the AAPC) but it was not organizing the conference. It is exactly what Barden wrote to the “American Friend Service Committee”, which was requesting information about the delegates to the AAPC of Tunis on December 1959. See AGPL, un-catalogued/Secretary's Personal Correspondence (BAA/1A), Letter, Barden to Loft, 28th December 1959.

²⁹⁷ AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin, Minutes of African Affairs Committee Meeting held at Flagstaff House on October 16th 1959, “Appointment of Officers”.

²⁹⁸ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107, footnote n°241.

of the AAPC to the Bureau, Nkrumah showed his will not to share the leadership of the Pan-African struggle. The Committee decided also to move physically the AAPC Secretariat to the BAA building.²⁹⁹

The finances of the AAPC and the AAC were put under the control of the African Affairs Committee. A Finance and Management Committee was established for this purpose. The latter had also to investigate on the refugees of the African Affairs Centre to discover if there was any non-refugee occupying a place. In that case, measures had to be taken to expel the intruders. Interestingly, this committee included men of the AAC, the BAA and the AAPC, a sign of a further integration between the three institutions.³⁰⁰

After dealing with the organization of the Pan-African institutions, the Committee started working on the practical problems of Ghana's Pan-African politics. Every question was discussed: the production of Pan-Africanist press, the accommodation of refugees, the economical and political support to freedom fighters etc.

The next sub-chapters will deal with each one of these questions, trying to explain the role played by the African Affairs Committee. Through this analysis, it will be possible to have a picture of Ghana's Pan-African policy in the period the Committee was operating, from October 1959 to March 1960.

3.3. The African Affairs Committee and Ghana's Policy on Refugees

Ghana's policy on refugees had been elaborated during Padmore's last months. At the time of the establishment of the African Affairs Committee the first waves of refugees were

²⁹⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin, Minutes of African Affairs Committee Meeting held at Flagstaff House on October 16th 1959, "All-African People's Conference Secretariat".

³⁰⁰ AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin, Minutes of African Affairs Committee Meeting held at Flagstaff House on October 16th 1959, "Finance and Management Committee". The members of the committee were: Makonnen, Awuah, Adu, Du Plan and Barden. Djin was added in the following meeting, as he was considered important for his knowledge of financial matters of the AAPC. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin, Minutes of African Affairs Committee Meeting held at Flagstaff House on October, 20th 1959 at 6:30 P.M., "Finance and Management Committee"

knocking at Ghana's doors, demanding adequate accommodation and support. Due to the lack of resources, the Committee had to develop strategies and instruments to deal with the requests.

The accommodation of political refugees in Ghana was managed by the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, the AAC and Padmore's Office / BAA. Since 1959, all these institutions had to coordinate their efforts to meet the demands of the refugees, providing them with shelter and documents. They also had to check on the identities of the Africans requesting political asylum, welcoming only the reliable ones.

The Ministry of Interior was particularly critical about the lack of a proper definition of "bona-fide" refugees. Padmore had insisted on this point but he had not clarified which authority should be considered responsible for controlling the accesses to Ghana.³⁰¹ As long as Padmore had been alive, the final decision was his.

After his death, the African Affairs Committee decided to give the duty to Dzirasa and Barden, made both responsible for the issue of passports.³⁰² The decision on the political "bona fide" of the African nationalists had to be taken by the Committee itself. The first documents issued with the new system of political "checks" were 12 passports for African students (and freedom fighters) in November.³⁰³ From that moment on, every request of this type came to Barden's desk.³⁰⁴

In many cases, a Ghanaian passport was requested to reach destinations other than Ghana. In such a context, Accra worked like a hub for freedom fighters. Members of

³⁰¹ The problem for the Ministry was the actual definition of such a criteria and its implementation. Indeed - as the Dyer-Ball wrote to Padmore - it was difficult to "check the political bona-fides through normal diplomatic and police channels" and it was then necessary to seek help from the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs on the issue. See AGPL, un-catalogued/ BN-African Affairs Committee, Letter, Dyer-Ball (Minister of the Interior) to Padmore, 16th May 1959 and Letter, Goodwin (Min. of the Interior) to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, 15 May 1959. This is a clear confirmation of the fact that the implementation of the so-called "Pan-African" policies was inevitably a task that pertained to Padmore's Office and the other "Pan-African institutions" more than to the civil service.

³⁰² AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin, Minutes of African Affairs Committee Meeting held at Flagstaff House on October 16th 1959, "Issue of Passports".

³⁰³ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 4th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November 9th 1959, "Passport for Freedom Fighters". The question, it is said, was going then to the Foreign Ministry (Ministry of External Affairs) and Ako Adjei was responsible for the implementation of the action.

³⁰⁴ To be precise, the request was forwarded to the BAA only when it involved the political endorsement of a liberation movement. Otherwise, it was the Minister of External Affairs who was in charge of the issue of passports.

nationalist parties demanded documents for participating to conferences and political gatherings, or simply to reach a country where they had won a scholarship (in most of the cases countries of the socialist bloc).³⁰⁵ Freedom fighters like Moumié or Cabral were also moving frequently between Accra, Conakry and Cairo or other destinations. In these cases, a Ghanaian document could be used as well as any other.³⁰⁶

Moreover, the Committee discussed how to check the credentials of the freedom fighters once they were in Ghana. The first reason was economical. The Ghanaian government could not waste its money on people who were not really dedicated to the cause. The second reason was political. Indeed, it was essential for Ghana not to have spies or any kind of “imperialist agents” in its territory, especially in places like the African Affairs Centre. In 1959, the first cases of infiltration of foreign agents had taken place at the AAC. Barden had investigated two of them between April and May 1959, one relating to an alleged British spy and the other to a Portuguese one.³⁰⁷ In the same year, more troubles were caused by a South African journalist who had been hosted at the Centre as a freedom fighter. Once he had gone back to South Africa, he wrote harsh articles against Ghana,

³⁰⁵ It is probably the case of the 12 passport issued on November. And it is also the case, for instance, of two member of the UPC who requested a Ghanaian passport to reach the German Democratic Republic in 1960. Indeed, they had been invited by the GDR Youth to visit the country. See AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Manga and Bei to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the BAA, 12th September 1960. Another example is the issue of travel documents for two students from Bechuanaland who had been awarded with a UN scholarship on 13th September 1960. The BAA requested the supply of detailed information on the students and references by a “recognized leader o party executive”. It practically meant that Ghana was willing to help only recognized and allied freedom fighters. See AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, BAA to S.N. and K.B. (Bechuanaland), 13th September 1960. See also the first letter sent by the students, in which they underlined the presence of their brother in Ghana as a guarantee of their “bona-fides”. In AGPL, BAA/370, Letter (handwriting), S.N. and K.B. to Nkrumah, 30th July 1960. It is worth noting that many requests were addressed directly to Nkrumah and only after they were forwarded to the BAA.

³⁰⁶ During 1959, some members of the UPC were traveling from Accra (they were residents of the African Affairs Centre) to Conakry to meet Moumié at the party headquarters. Of the three of them one had an Egyptian passport, one a Cameroonian one and the last one had none. In this case, Ghana approved his travel to Conakry, probably giving him a special political permit. See AGPL, un-catalogued/Particulars of Residents in the African Affairs Centre -1959, three forms with the title ”Particulars of Residents in the African Affairs Centre – Accra” referring to the individuals: Jean –Marie Manga, Abel Kingue and George Mbaraga. It is interesting to underline that Manga was the same one who submitted the request for a Ghanaian passport for travelling to the GDR quoted above.

³⁰⁷ On the alleged British spy see AGPL, BAA/961, Aide Memoire n.1 and n.2 by Barden. On the alleged Portuguese spy see AGPL, BAA/961, Report, Title: “Mr. Oliveira Moita de Deus Luis Carlos” by Barden. See also in the same file a profile of Mr. Oliveira sent by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Bureau. The date is 4th May 1959.

revealing his real identity.³⁰⁸ At the first meeting of the Committee, the question was discussed and it was approved the creation of a “Screening Committee” in order to ensure no recurrence of such cases.³⁰⁹ Its establishment reflects the increasing needs of Ghana on the ground of internal security.

The new body did not have to work alone. It counted also on the collaboration of Ghana’s allied nationalist parties. Before being screened by the Committee, the freedom fighters had to undergo a control by their parties before they departed for Ghana. Then, once the refugees were at the AAC, they were also checked by the country representatives of their parties in Ghana.

With the crossed-reference of the Screening Committee and the liberation movements, the Centre could be sure to host only real freedom fighters. One example is the reception of a delegation of South African freedom fighters on February 1960. They were received by Makonnen at the Centre, but before going any further with the political screening, he sent them to the local “South African Group” for receiving a preliminary screening by them. Then the question was passed to the Committee.³¹⁰

Welcoming refugees was only one of Ghana’s initiatives to sustain African liberation movements. Accra was also very active on the ground of the independence struggles, supporting the nationalist parties abroad. The next point of the Committee’s agenda was to

³⁰⁸ Hommel was a journalist of the newspaper Johannesburg Star who, on false pretenses had spent some months in Ghana during 1959. He had received the permission to stay in Ghana since he told the Ghanaians he was persecuted by the South African government. He also expressed the desire to stay in Ghana as a teacher. After some months he left Ghana to visit his family. In reality, in November ’59, Barden received news of some articles about Ghana published by Hommel in the Johannesburg Star. Then, he kept in touch with South African freedom fighters to know more about the real identity of Hommel. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary’s Personal Correspondence, Letter, Barden to Peake (South Africa), 14th December 1959. Thanks to this letter, it is also possible to know that Peake was responsible for some articles against Hommel’s. See also AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary’s Personal Correspondence, Letter, Hommel to Barden, 4th November 1959 and, in the same file, also: Letter, Raboroko to Barden, 17th November 1959; Letter, Peake to Barden, 24th November 1959. See also the reaction of the Hommel issue by the PAC in AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Closed, Letter, Potlako Leballo to Barden, 1st December 1959 and also, in the same file: Letter, Hommel to Barden, undated.

³⁰⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin, Minutes of African Affairs Committee Meeting held at Flagstaff House on October 16th 1959, “Screening Committee”. The minutes of the meeting reported the following: “In order to avoid harboring Imperialist inspired Agents at the African Affairs Centre and to safeguard at all times the Security of the State it was resolved that a committee be set up to investigate and report to this committee from time to time the activities and movements of any occupant of the Centre. The members of the committee were: Makonnen, Welbeck, Yankey, Du Plan and Barden.

³¹⁰ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the Finance and Management Committee held on Wednesday 17th February 1960.

discuss on the measures to take in order to strengthen Ghana's presence on the battlefields of African liberation.

3.4. The African Affairs Committee and the Support to Freedom Fighters

In line with Nkrumah's liberation policy, the Committee worked to strengthen Ghana's support to nationalist parties, especially those in Southern Africa. The Prime Minister wanted to support their struggle but also to attract them toward the political model of Ghana. Thus, the CPP became increasingly involved in the activities of the BAA. Ghana also needed more instruments to be informed on the evolution of politics in Africa. For this reason, the Committee approved the establishment of an intelligence service specifically devoted to inform Ghana on the activities of the liberation movements.

Since October 1959, the Bureau had begun investing large resources in a daily work with African liberation movements. Party cadres were trained in Ghana and funds were also delivered to their countries in order to support the liberation struggles.

The Bureau increased its collaboration with the CPP in order to provide a proper political training to the liberation movements. The party facilities and personnel were made available to complete the political training provided by the AAC.³¹¹ In the case of the Sawaba party, the collaboration with the CPP increased so much that in October the Nigerien freedom fighters requested and obtained the affiliation of their party with the CPP. The members were authorized to have a special CPP/Sawaba membership card.³¹² The CPP

³¹¹ Makonnen make reference on usual contacts between the guests of the Centre, CCP and the TUC (trade unions of Ghana). See R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.223.

³¹² AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-Letters for Action by the African Affairs Committee, Letter, Yacuba and other two Sawaba members to the Chairman of the Finance and Management Committee, 28th October 1959. See also PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 4th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November 9th 1959, "Sawaba party".

begun also to request the presence of nationalist parties supported by Ghana at rallies and political gatherings.

In the meantime, the African Affairs Committee worked on the internal structure of the AAPC and the Bureau, in order to make them interact better with liberation movements. The activities of the BAA abroad were divided in regional sections. At the meeting of the 22nd of October 1959, the Committee approved the creation of the first regional section, the Eastern one, appointing Koinange as its head.³¹³ Other sections were planned to be established once they found other “efficient persons” to deal with them.³¹⁴ The regional representative had an outstanding role, since he became the bridge between the nationalist movements in his area and the BAA. Soon after the creation of “regional sections” of the Bureau, the Committee decided to apply the same scheme to the AAPC. It was a clear confirmation of the ongoing process of fusion between the two agencies.³¹⁵

The next step for the Committee was to find new sources of information coming from the fronts and to provide a concrete help to the liberation movements with Ghanaian agents on the spot. At the time, the Committee was counting only on the information gained by Nkrumah’s personal contacts or by the diplomats.³¹⁶

At the meeting of 19 November 1959, the Committee discussed for the first time the establishment of a proper “Intelligence Service” to deal with African Affairs. The question

³¹³ Koinange had been already Padmore’s men in East Africa.

³¹⁴ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, *Minutes* of the 3rd of the African Affairs Committee meeting held on Thursday, October 22nd 1959, “Mr. Koinange”. The minutes state: “It was decided that in order to make the work of the Bureau representative and effective an Eastern Section should be created and as soon as efficient persons for other sections of our continent could be found, other sections could be established. It was resolved that Mr. Koinange should be in charge of the Eastern Section of the Bureau”. In the same meeting it was approved that Koinange was moved to the Centre and provided with a VIP accommodation.

³¹⁵ As for the Bureau, the Committee approved the establishment of zone representatives within the AAPC secretariat structure. The zone where the same proposed for the BAA: 1) Northern Zone 2) West African Zone 3) Eastern Zone 4) Central African Zone 5) South African Zone. It was resolved also that: “Persons appointed to these posts should be active nationalists enjoying the full confidence of the Nationalist movements in their respective Zones and they should first be screened by the Screening Committee before a decision is taken”. In PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 4th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November, 9th 1959, “South African Zone”.

³¹⁶ Indeed, during the meeting of the African Affairs Committee of 9 November 1959, Nkrumah had proposed to examine the information that were coming from his sources. Quoting from the minutes of the meeting: “The Prime Minister stated that it must not be forgotten that he received regularly information from sources near and far regarding day to day happenings in our continent and that it was his intention from time to time to enlighten members of the Committee on these matters”. In PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 4th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November, 9th 1959, “Information”.

emerged from a discussion on Congo. Indeed, the Committee needed a reliable source of information on the actual situation of the country in order to take measures. The Ghanaians could not rely only on local sources, even if they were coming from individuals connected with allied parties, in this case Lumumba's MNC. Quoting from the minutes of the meeting:

Comrade Makonnen pointed out that the situation in the Congo and Ruanda was very grave and since no accurate and comprehensive situation report was forthcoming, he would suggest that steps be taken at once for the wife of Mr. Lomotey, who belonged to a prominent and influential family well known to the two leaders of Abako and the M.N.C. to proceed at once to fish-out reports from the various leaders. The Chairman whilst agreeing to the suggestion, pointed out that in view of the fact that policies in Congo had tribalistic tendencies and as Mrs. Lomotey was herself a Congolese, he felt her reports might under-liberately be influenced by her tribe. Continuing, he remarked that he preferred at least *two loyal and intelligent Ghanaians* (italics of the author) to undertake this task. It was further suggested that the selected Ghanaian should be sent under disguise to find out the shades of opinion of the various political leaders in the Congo.³¹⁷

The case was discussed and Welbeck suggested creating a proper Intelligence Service to provide Ghana with fresh news on African affairs. According to him, Padmore himself had supported this idea before his death. Quoting from the minutes:

It was suggested by Comrade Welbeck, supported by Comrade Amoah Awah that the time was ripe for our men to be trained in intelligent network and sent out on occasions to obtain vital information under the guise of cultural, Football, Athletic, associations, etc., from dependent African territories. This information, he concluded, would assist us in formulating concrete plans towards the accelerated achievement of African Unity. It was pointed out that this suggestion concerning the establishment of intelligent service which would supply the Bureau and the Foreign Ministry with reports had been discussed with the

³¹⁷ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on November 19th 1959 at Flagstaff House, "The Situation of Congo".

late Comrade Padmore who was in favor of the idea. Resolved that steps be taken to accelerate the training of our men in intelligent service.³¹⁸

The Committee discussed also to provide the BAA with the powers of an intelligence agency. Welbeck suggested appointing men of the Bureau as “political attaches” to be sent in each Ghanaian diplomatic mission in Africa. Their task was to collect information on African Affairs and to support the liberation movements by dealing with their local representatives.

[...] Comrade Welbeck pointed out that hitherto the Bureau and the Committee had relied only on newspaper reports and correspondence from friends concerning daily political development from dependent African countries. Continuing, he said that in order to lend concrete support and to ginger up our policy of assisting our brothers now in the heat of the struggle to overthrow imperialism, it was imperative that emissaries should be sent to such countries to revitalize their morale and also to bring up factual information about events there.³¹⁹

Thanks to the political attaches, the Bureau officially entered inside the diplomatic “orthodox” system. In the following years, this process proved to be irreversible as well as problematic.³²⁰

The training of the political attaches was also examined. It was considered essential that they were indoctrinated in the CPP ideology. To be in line with the Party was considered fundamental even for those who worked on the support to African liberation and unity. The Committee decided that the political attaches had to be instructed in party

³¹⁸ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on November 19th 1959 at Flagstaff House, “Intelligent [sic] Service”.

³¹⁹ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, “Political Attaches”.

³²⁰ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, “Political Attaches”. Indeed, the presence of BAA agents in the Ghanaian embassies and high commissions often caused diplomatic incidents and limited the autonomy of diplomats.

ideology at the new “Winneba School”. This school was the first stage of the last of the “Pan-African” institutions in Ghana: the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute.³²¹

After having discussed all the measures adopted in order to improve Ghana’s liberation policy, the Committee examined the establishment of the Institute, a crucial project for Ghana’s Pan-African policy as well as for the reform of the Ghanaian civil service.

3.5. The Roots of the Ideological Institute of Winneba

While working on Ghana’s Pan-African policy, the African Affairs Committee discussed also on the establishment of an institution to be used both for Ghanaian citizens and African freedom fighters. The first reference to a project for the establishment of an ideological institute in Ghana can be found in a meeting of the African Affairs Committee of the 12th of November 1959. Nkrumah himself first suggested the transformation of a college in Winneba into a party school.

He wanted an institute that could serve as a “factory” for a new generation of indoctrinated administrators coming from the ranks of the party. At the same time, such a school could also provide a political and economical training to party cadres of African liberation movements. The Ghanaian Prime Minister could solve two problems at once. He could launch a project to radicalize the state and he could provide the liberation movements with the same training granted to CPP members, bounding them to Ghana. Quoting from the minutes of the meeting:

The Prime Minister stated that he had just returned from a visit to the College site and found the place to be congenial for serious study. The Primary objective of the School, he continued, would be to teach the Party’s ideology to loyal and dedicated party members.

³²¹ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, “Political Attaches”.

Concluding he said he envisaged the possibility of extending this facility to at least two members each of Nationalist Organizations in Africa.³²²

The question was discussed again on 14 January 1960, the same day the political attaches were established. The targets of the school were clarified and three men were made responsible for the project. Quoting from the meeting:

In connection with the Winneba Secondary School, it was decided after lengthy discussions that it should be taken over completely by the Party for the sole purpose of indoctrinating party member into Party's ideology. [...] it was agreed upon that Comrades Boasteng, Adamafio and Welbeck should inspect it and submit a report. The same Comrades were appointed to be directors.³²³

Then, they agreed to send the political attaches to the school so as to receive a proper indoctrination. At the same time, it was also discussed the CPP's take-over of the school. Quoting again from the meeting of 14 January:

[...] it was agreed that emissaries [political attaches] should be sent but that they should receive indoctrination at the party school. It was agreed that Comrade Kojo Botsio should work out a plan for the immediate taking over of the Winneba School by the party and that Comrades Welbeck, Boateng and Adamafio should contact him to this effect.³²⁴

Even if the school began its activities in 1960, it was only in the following year that it was officially established as the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba. The period of the Committee had been, however, important to put the basis of the project and to adapt it to the needs of the CPP and the BAA.

Yet, before the Institute was set, another important intervention had to be made in order to strengthen the Pan-Africanist ideology in Ghana. The Ghanaian civil servants and

³²² PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on November 12th 1960 at Flagstaff House, "Winneba College".

³²³ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, "Winneba School".

³²⁴ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, "Political Attaches".

the CPP party members were not informed on what was happening in Africa at the time. The Committee worked to solve this problem.

3.6. The BAA at the Service of the Party and the State

As the Bureau had gained support by the CPP, the Party requested its collaboration for providing information on African Affairs to Party members and civil servants. The Committee had realized that there was a poor knowledge on African Affairs within the Ghanaian state. Institutions such as the Bureau were supposed to collaborate with the Minister of Information and Broadcasting as well as with the Party to find a solution to this issue.

Between the first actions undertaken by the Committee, there was the establishment of a “Bulletin on African Affairs”. This publication – produced by the BAA - was planned as an internal instrument to provide the party and the most important institutions with fresh news on African affairs. It was officially established on 16 October 1959, as a bi-weekly publication “containing brief but concise, critical analysis and comments on daily events all over Africa”.³²⁵ Its editors were: Makonnen, Heymann (Guinea Press), Dzirasa, Du Plan and Barden.³²⁶

The Bulletin can be considered the first official “pan-African” newspaper in Ghana. It was also the first of a series of publications edited by the BAA. It was not a proper magazine, but a collection of short articles focusing on the most important issues of the African political scene. It also included a section that followed the changes occurred in the institutions of the continent.³²⁷

³²⁵ AGPL, un-catalogued/BN-African Affairs Committee Bulletin, Minutes of African Affairs Committee Meeting held at Flagstaff House on October 16th 1959, “News Bulletin”.

³²⁶ *Ibidem*.

³²⁷ It is not easy to find copies of this bulletin. One copy is kept at the Bureau of African Affairs archive. It is centered around the question of the Mali federation, providing information on Mali and other francophone

The Bulletin was a useful tool also for Ghanaian politicians who had to perform public speeches on African affairs. At the meeting of the 14th of January 1960, the Committee underlined the growing importance of African Affairs in the political life of Ghana. Consequently, it recommended its members to be constantly updated on these issues. Quoting from the meeting:

the Chairman [Nkrumah] said that our position in the African struggle for independence was such that any speech given by every Comrade should be above criticisms. [...] the Chairman remained members [of the Committee] of their present position in world politics and stressed that all speeches made by them should strictly conform to the party's political ideology as well as the Government's Foreign Policy.³²⁸

A similar operation was made in the educational system. Indeed, Nkrumah insisted to have the NASSO working together with members of the Committee to create Study Groups on African Affairs and NASSO groups in every secondary school and university of the country.³²⁹ Ghanaian students were supposed to be constantly informed on African Affairs and the achievements of the government in the fields of African liberation and unity. It was planned to provide "lectures by members of the Committee on the Governments Policy, African Affairs, African unity and International African Opinion".³³⁰ Moreover, it was agreed to form an "African Writers Association", equipped with the Bulletin and other materials produced by the Committee.³³¹

The Committee worked also on creating Radio programs on African Affairs to spread the Pan-Africanist ideology in Ghana and in the rest of the continent. The question was discussed for the first time in November. The issue with the programs broadcasted by Radio Ghana was often the lack of fresh material on the political scene in Africa. Baako - the new Minister of Information and Broadcasting - had tried to modify the situation but

countries. The Bulletin includes at the end a list of African politicians from the francophone African countries quoted in the articles. See AGPL, BAA/14, "Information Bulletin on African Affairs", vol.2, n.21, undated.

³²⁸ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, "Platform Speeches".

³²⁹ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on November 19th 1959 at Flagstaff House, "Establishment of NASSO in the University and Secondary Schools".

³³⁰ *Ibidem.*

³³¹ *Ibidem.*

without success. Thus, the Committee decided to supply the Radio with the same information provided by the Bulletins.³³² It was also established a radio program on African Affairs called “Voice of Africa”, to be broadcasted every Thursday. James Markham had to provide the Committee with reports about it.³³³

In January, the Committee was still unsatisfied with the developments of the radio program on African affairs.³³⁴ The program had a low quality, far from the level requested by the Committee. According to Markham, the manuscripts of the program were sent to the radio already altered, worsening the quality of the information provided. Thus, Nkrumah and the other members of the Committee decided to deal personally with this question. The Broadcasting Department had to respond directly to the Committee for matters of African Affairs. This fact proves the importance of propaganda for Ghana’s Pan-African policy.³³⁵

Nkrumah strongly believed in the efficacy of medias to spread the Pan-Africanist ideology throughout Africa. “Radio Ghana” was considered as probably the most effective, and in the following years, it was developed even further in order to reach several regions of the continent.

Another media that the Committee improved in the same period was that of the press. “Voice of Africa” was going to be the first Pan-Africanist magazine ever published in Ghana, able of reaching all liberation movements in Africa.

³³² They also decided that all commentaries on African Affairs should always “begin with the sign call < This is the Voice of Africa> coming to you from Radio Ghana”. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 4th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November, 9th 1959, “Commentary”. The same name “Voice of Africa” was used for the magazine created by the Committee.

³³³ At the time, Markham had also worked for the AAPC, before being transferred to the Broadcasting Dept. See AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Odoi to Barden, 20th June 1960, and, in the same file, Letter, Barden to Odoi, 14th July 1960.

³³⁴ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, “Manuscripts for Broadcasting”.

³³⁵ Again in March, however, Markham was still lamenting that all his drafts were rigidly revised by the head of the Broadcasting Department before being broadcasted. It was resolved that in no case such things should have happened and that the heads of Broadcasting were requested to see Nkrumah on the issue. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 14th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 10th March 1960, “News Commentary – African Affairs”.

3.7. Voice of Africa

Connecting the African liberation movements to Accra was one of the main targets of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. The Committee had already worked on strengthening the presence of the BAA on the field. The Ghanaian Prime Minister needed another instrument to reach every corner of Africa with his message. The Committee started working on a magazine specifically designed to provide the liberation movements with news on African affairs as well as a Pan-African point of view of the major questions concerning the continent. This project was "Voice of Africa" (VOA), one of the most famous magazine ever produced by Ghana. At its peak, it could reach a relevant number of African countries and many others outside Africa.

The project of a Pan-Africanist magazine was first introduced in a meeting of the Committee on the 9th of November 1959. The BAA had to produce a monthly magazine in order to spread Nkrumah's political message throughout Africa and connect the different fronts of the African liberation struggle. Quoting from the minutes of the meeting:

It was agreed that the Bureau should publish a monthly magazine on African Affairs embodying Ghana views and commentaries on International matters concerning happenings in Africa, and that Ghana views should be couched in a way which can be taken as *directives or guidance to freedom fighters* [italics by the author] all over Africa.³³⁶

The magazine was planned to be completely different from the Bulletin. It was meant to be an important instrument of Ghana's Pan-African foreign policy, influencing indirectly the political position of liberation movements. The Committee also decided to publish it in English and French so as to reach the great part of the continent. The Minister of External Affairs was also involved.³³⁷

³³⁶ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 4th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November, 9th 1959, "Editorial Committee".

³³⁷ The members of the Editorial Committee were: Heymann, Adjei (Minister of External Affairs), Makonnen, Du Plan, Fio Meyer and Adamafio.

At the time, the project was still without a name. In early 1960, the magazine was finally called “Voice of Africa”, the same name of the commentary on African Affairs broadcasted by Radio Ghana. On January, the Editorial Committee had already begun working for the new magazine. At the meeting of the Committee on 14 January 1960, Nkrumah showed appreciation for the first results and he suggested to concentrate the efforts on those countries “in the heat of the struggle for independence”.³³⁸ The Editorial Committee also changed its members with the entry of Welbeck and Barden and the exit of Makonnen. Once again, Welbeck got involved in the most important activities of the BAA.³³⁹

The production officially started that same month and the first copies were immediately shipped abroad. At first, the distribution channels were the same of those that had been used when Padmore was in charge. The BAA sent free copies of VOA to the parties, movements or individuals that were already receiving free copies of Ghanaian newspapers. In 1960, copies of VOA reached the following African countries: Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Swaziland, Basutoland, South Africa, Tanganyika, Uganda and Bechuanaland. Outside the continent, it was distributed in: Sweden, United States (California, Michigan, Ohio, and New York), Jamaica, Czechoslovakia, China, France, United Kingdom, Poland, West Germany, and East Germany.³⁴⁰

The BAA often asked the members of liberation movements to distribute extra copies to all the other members of their parties. Some of them became, *de facto*, local agents of distribution of the BAA press.³⁴¹ In some cases, a whole association offered the BAA to

³³⁸ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, “Manuscripts for Broadcasting”.

³³⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁴⁰ Letters to and from these countries concerning VOA in 1960 can be found in: AGPL, BAA/348; AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Closed; AGPL, BAA/370; AGPL, BAA/349; AGPL, BAA/357; There are evidences of the shipping of materials other than VOA also in Trinidad, Saint Kyttis and Navis and Cote d’Ivoire.

³⁴¹ For instance, it is the case of a man from Nyasaland, who expressed his will to become an agent for VOA, Evening News and Ghana Today in Nyasaland. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Closed, Letter, Mushandira (Nyasaland) to the Editorial Board of the African Affairs Committee, 1st February 1960.

become their local distributors. For example, the Uganda Youth Organization was already working for the BAA in this field at least since autumn 1959.³⁴²

The case of the Cameroonian Alphonse Ebassa is worth noting. He was at the same time a distributor and a local BAA agent and informant in Sierra Leone. Ebassa, probably an *upéciste*, offered his services to the BAA in 1959. From Freetown, he was sending regular reports on Sierra Leonean politics to the BAA, informing them also on the distribution of Ghanaian press in the country. It is interesting to read one of his letters in order to understand what the BAA could expect from the distribution of VOA and other Ghanaian newspapers. The letter is dated 26th May 1960:

[...] Sierra Leone is now confronted with great difficulty about signing a military pact with Britain as the value of independence in 1961. However, the whole country is divided over this issue and many people are very anxious to get large quantity of the Voice of Africa [...] warning all Africa against military pact agreements. [...] There is a great demand for the above mentioned Ghana newspapers ["Ghana Times" and "Evening News"] here, people are very keen to know more and more about the changing wind all over Africa, and the only way to know the facts is to read Ghana's papers which are not available here through imperialists agents. We are asking you therefore to send us reasonable quantity of "Ghana Times" and "Evening News" [...] for free distribution. [...] please don't forget also [...] bulletins for free distribution to counteract imperialists' hostile propaganda against independent African States, especially the Republic of Guinea.³⁴³

The political press was considered very important to spread the influence of Pan-Africanism in Sierra Leone. Ebassa not only asked for more copies of Ghanaian magazines but he even proposed to open himself a local branch of the BAA. Quoting from the same letter:

I am planning to open [a] "Bureau of African Affairs" Agency in this colony, importing about 20000 copies of newspaper from Ghana weekly for sale just to enable 2,5 million

³⁴² AGPL, un-catalogued/BK/Closed, Letter, Uganda Youth Association to Barden, 10th November 1959.

³⁴³ AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Ebassa to Barden, 26th May 1960.

people to enjoy healthy educative reading matters, thereby preventing them to become the victims of various propaganda against African liberation movement.³⁴⁴

At the time, the production and distribution of political materials was becoming an increasingly important weapon to win the battle for influence in Africa. Nkrumah and Barden were both aware of the need to intensify the efforts to win a “war of propaganda” with conservative African countries and imperialist foreign powers. For this reason the VOA project was considered a prior one.

In March 1960, the question was discussed again at a meeting of the African Affairs Committee. Nkrumah underlined the political importance of VOA for his Pan-African policy and he recommended investing in the project as many resources as possible. At the time, VOA was still produced with discontinuity, due to problem with the Guinea Press:

The Chairman [Nkrumah] commenting on the production of the “Voice of Africa” said that he was disappointed to find that a paper which was becoming increasingly popular with the freedom fighters all over Africa had been discontinued. Continuing, he said that the few copies which were printed played an *important role in the propagation of our policy abroad* [italics of the author] and that every effort should be made to continue its regular production.³⁴⁵

VOA had also to achieve another target: involving the freedom fighters themselves in its production. The Committee considered important to increase the collaboration with African nationalists. Thus, parties like the BCP, the PAC and the ANC were asked to publish articles on VOA. Thanks to this initiative, Ghana could attract politically even more the freedom fighters, providing them with a large publicity. The ANC was one of the first

³⁴⁴ AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Ebassa to Barden, 26th May 1960.

³⁴⁵ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 14th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 10th March 1960, “News Commentary – African Affairs”. The Committee resolved that Comrades Tawia Adamafio, John Tettegah and Barden should contact Eric Heymann to find out his difficulties and to ensure that the project became a real success.

parties to collaborate with VOA. In February 1960, Barden wrote to an ANC representative proposing their involvement in the production of a column on South Africa.³⁴⁶

Voice of Africa was soon considered a seditious publication by the colonial authorities. In the Central African Federation, the magazine was banned already in July 1960.³⁴⁷ From Nkrumah's point of view, it was not totally a bad news. It proved that VOA was having success in being the voice of African freedom fighters.

With the establishment of VOA, the BAA had finally an instrument of propaganda ready to be used in the different contexts of African liberation. In 1960 it was still a project under constant revision. In January 1961 the final version of the review was published, correcting all the mistakes in the production and distribution made during 1960.³⁴⁸

After the question of propaganda, one last element of the work of the Committee must be taken in consideration: the use of conferences to improve Ghana's influence on liberation movements and to promote African unity. The second AAPC conference and the Positive Action Conference became fundamental for Ghana's Pan-African policy in this period.

3.8. The AAPC and PAPSA Conferences

Two conferences held in the first months of 1960 ideally closed the period of administration of the African Affairs Committee. The second AAPC and the Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa (PAPSA) were both used by Nkrumah to re-launch his support to the liberation and unity of the continent.

Being the AAPC Secretariat completely dependent on the BAA, the latter was also involved in the organization of this second conference, scheduled at Tunis on 25 January

³⁴⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary's Personal Correspondence, Letter, Barden to Nokwe (ANC), 8th February 1960.

³⁴⁷ AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Millapo (N. Rhodesia) to Barden, 13th July 1960.

³⁴⁸ No copies of 1960 had been found during the research, whereas those of 1961 are available.

1960. All the correspondence relating to the conference was received by the BAA itself. Interestingly, some organization and parties (the PAC, for instance) asked the BAA to participate to the conference on their behalf.³⁴⁹ The Committee, behind the BAA, was the body which was practically running the whole organization.³⁵⁰

The Ghanaian delegates were fourteen, including Botsio, Barden (representing the BAA), Welbeck, Admafi, Adjei, Tettegah and Du Plan.³⁵¹ The aim of the delegation was to push for an acceleration of the liberation and unity processes in Africa. Moreover, they presented the next conference to be held in Ghana: the “Conference of Political Organization”, later known as the Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa (PAPSA).³⁵²

The PAPSA, held in Accra between the 7th and the 10th of April 1960, was called by Nkrumah to protest against the French nuclear tests in the Sahara and to discuss African liberation and unity.³⁵³ With regard to the second point, the PAPSA was going to be very similar to the first AAPC. It was planned to be a gathering of African nationalists in which Nkrumah could promote his views on African affairs. The invitations to the conference

³⁴⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Closed, Letter, Potlako Leballo (PAC) to Barden, 5th February 1960. Leballo wrote to Barden: “[...] the Boer government made it difficult for us to obtain Passports to attend the Conference. I hope your delegation was able to represent our Congress in spite of our absences”. The PAC sent to the BAA also the resolutions of their national conference, which had been held between the 19th and the 20th of December 1959. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK/closed, *Resolutions* of the Pan-Africanist Congress conference held at Johannesburg the 19th to the 20th of December 1959. In the case of “The American Friends Service Committee” (Southern Rhodesia) the Bureau refused, since “its role in the organization of the conference was not so central as it had been during the previous one of Accra”. In AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary's Personal Correspondence, Letter, Barden to Loft (American Friends Service Committee, Southern Rhodesia), 29th December 1959.

³⁵⁰ For example, it was the Committee who dealt with the question of ANC and NCNC which had not been invited at the conference. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, “Invitations to All African People's Conference in Tunis”. The Committee decided to invite them, even because the two parties had protested against the AAPC for having been ignored. It was resolved that Du Plan and Diallo were the ones to work on the matter.

³⁵¹ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, “Report on the 2nd All African People's Conference held in Tunis on 25th January 1960”, submitted by Barden on 4 February 1960. This is a report on the whole AAPC conference of Tunis submitted to the African Affairs Committee by the members of the delegation. The delegation was divided in 1) a political committee 2) economic and trade union committee 3) social and cultural committee 4) press release.

³⁵² *Ibidem*.

³⁵³ Ghana was protesting against French nuclear tests in the Sahara since July 1959, when Ako Adjei had sent a protest note to the embassy of France. The question had been then moved to the UN and in the spring of 1960 was still far from being solved.

were extended to different nationalist parties (UPC, UNIP and Zanzibar National Party), country representatives (UAR, India, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sudan), associations and labor unions (for instance, the Gambia Labour Union).³⁵⁴

The PAPSA was the occasion for Nkrumah to launch the Positive Action as the best political instrument to be used in the liberation process of the continent. At the opening speech, Nkrumah underlined the potentiality of Positive Action for both the struggle against nuclear test and the apartheid. He also presented his idea of providing African freedom fighters with training schools to learn the basis of Positive Action. This can be considered one of the first references on the project of the ideological school, even if there are no direct references to it. Quoting from the speech:

Positive action has already achieved remarkable success in the liberation struggle of our continent [...]. If the direct action that was carried out by the international protest team [against the French Test] were to be repeated on a mass scale, or simultaneously from various parts of Africa, the result could be as powerful and as successful as Gandhi's historic Salt March. [...] positive action with non-violence, as advocated by us, as found expression in South Africa in the defiance of the oppressive passes laws. [...] In my view, therefore, this conference ought to consider the setting up of a training centre where volunteers would learn the essential disciplines of concerted positive action.³⁵⁵

At the PAPSA conference Nkrumah re-launched Ghana's Pan-African policy. After its closing, a lot of changes involved the Bureau and the other institutions controlled by the Committee.

³⁵⁴ The UNIP was invited also at the celebration for the Republic of Ghana (1st July 1960). Mainza Chona, Vice President of the UNIP and representative in U.K. was head of the delegation in both the PAPSA and the Republic celebrations. See AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Mainza Chona to Barden, 10th August 1960. For all the speeches of the delegates see AGPL, BAA/467, Speeches by delegates at the PAPSA Conference held in Accra 7 – 10 April 1960.

³⁵⁵ PRAAD, ADM/16/1/24, Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa, Opening Session, speech of Kwame Nkrumah, 7th April 1960, Community Centre, Accra Ghana, 1960, p.4.

3.9. The End of the Experience of the African Affairs Committee and the Official Establishment of the BAA

With the successful organization of the Positive Action Conference, the African Affairs Committee could consider its goals achieved. At the beginning of 1960, Ghana had a strong political position and could guide other countries towards independence. The BAA was ready to be freed from the control of the Committee and to work autonomously.

In March, the African Affairs Committee met for the last time, having fulfilled all its goals.³⁵⁶ The BAA could finally be established as an independent body the 28th of April 1960.³⁵⁷ A press release of the 4th of May indicates Welbeck as chairman and Tettegah, Makonnen, Koinange, Adamafio and Djinn as members of the board.³⁵⁸ Barden – still holding the post of Secretary - kept running the BAA as acting director.³⁵⁹ He was becoming undoubtedly one of the most powerful men in Ghana, considering also his privileged relationship with Nkrumah.³⁶⁰

David Bosumtwi-Sam was appointed administrative secretary of the BAA. He was the same man who had been responsible for Barden's training before he was hired by Padmore. Barden himself insisted for having him at the Bureau.³⁶¹ The new administrative

³⁵⁶ The last meeting was the one of the 17th of March. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 15th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee to be held on Thursday 17th March 1960 at Flagstaff House. Kwesi Armah refers to the African Affairs Committee working even after 1960. See K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.22. However, according to David Bosumtwi-Sam this body was no more working when he was appointed Administrative Secretary of the BAA, in the spring of 1960. Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 19th July 2012. The author had not found any document concerning the African Affairs Committee which dated after the 17th of March 1960.

³⁵⁷ Daily Graphic, 28th April 1960; quoted in AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Arai (Embassy of Japan, Accra) to Barden, 28th April 1960.

³⁵⁸ Press release of the Government of Ghana, dated 4th of May 1960 and quoted in W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107.

³⁵⁹ Welbeck, the chairman, did not follow all the activities of the BAA. Basically, Barden alone run the office since its establishment. See for example AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Malianga (South. Rhodesia) to Welbeck, 14th July 1960. In the letter a student, Malianga, had to deal with Barden, as Welbeck was unavailable.

³⁶⁰ Both Makonnen and Thompson confirm that Barden became increasingly close to Nkrumah, to the point that, according to both of them, Nkrumah was soon unable to realize that Barden was influencing him in a negative way. See R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.220 and W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107. Even K.B. Asante had confirmed in an interview with the author, Accra, 4th September 2011, that Barden was very close to Nkrumah and "he had a bad influence on him".

³⁶¹ Interviews with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011 and D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 19th July 2012. According to both of them, Bosumtwi-Sam had been chosen for his broad knowledge and competences.

secretary was a competent “neutral” civil servant absolutely reliable for the delicate matters of the BAA. Once he accepted the post, he was also indoctrinated to the socialist and Pan-Africanist ideologies which were more than ever pervading the BAA.³⁶²

Similarly to Padmore’s Office, the BAA was established as a body dependent only on Nkrumah, who had also provided Barden with the funds to support freedom fighters.³⁶³ Only the “African Affairs Annex”, an intelligence body attached to the Office of President, and Nkrumah himself could have access to information concerning the Bureau.³⁶⁴ Again, the reason was political. Nkrumah was aware that part of the Government, the party and the civil service was against Barden and the Bureau.

In the spring of 1960, the Bureau was ready to operate on a bigger scale. Although there were still some problems to be solved, the general structure had been set. Welbeck wrote to Nkrumah to update him on the situation of the BAA and of the other institutions that had to deal with Ghana’s Pan-African policy.³⁶⁵ He underlined the quality of the work done by the Committee in the previous months in preparing the “Pan-African” machinery of Ghana. Quoting from the letter:

The Ghana Government has made its intention clear by public declaration that it would give financial assistance to all Freedom Fighters in their attempt to free themselves from imperialist yoke. By this declaration, it is meant, no doubt, that the assistance is not short of financial aid which the Freedom Fighters everywhere stand sorely in need of. Fortunately, we are in a better position than most, if not more than all the independent African States, who have also pledged themselves to that end. *We are in a better position because we have the effective machinery to deal with the problem* [italics by the author]; our financial

Bosumtwi-Sam remembers to have decided to join the BAA after several attempts by Barden to convince him.

³⁶² Interviews with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 19th July 2012 and E.A. Richter, Accra, 23rd December 2011.

³⁶³ According to Thompson, most of the money used by the BAA came directly from a fund connected with Nkrumah’s office (presidential Contingency Fund). This way, Nkrumah could avoid any check by other members of the party, the government or the state. Thompson, W.S., *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p. 449. However, Thompson does not provide any source for his statement. It is simply a deduction made by the comparison between the official data (the ones of page 449) and the ones published in NLC, *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*.

³⁶⁴ Interview with E.A. Richter, Accra, 23rd December 2011. Nkrumah became president after the proclamation of the republic on July, 1st 1960.

³⁶⁵ AGPL, BAA/370, *Letter*, Welbeck (and Djin) to Nkrumah, undated, title: “Operation Independence, Transfer of Financial Aid to Freedom Fighters”.

position is rosier and besides, we have command of more dollars which, to all financial doors everywhere, is the open sesame; and there is no doubt, whatsoever, that we are pursuing our aim which is broad-minded with more seriousness, vigilance and thoroughness than any of our sister African States and we have well laid flexible plans to suit in each turn, the ever changing maneuvers of the imperialist tactics.

Even the African Affairs Centre was reorganized. It was maintained as a separate body from the BAA, even if the two institutions were collaborating. In June, Nkrumah officially appointed his friend Makonnen as the head of the Centre and he asked the Guyanese Pan-Africanist to give full attention to the institution in order “to formulate vital programs to meet the needs of our African kinsmen”. Interestingly, Makonnen was asked to report only to Nkrumah and never to the BAA.³⁶⁶

Immediately after his appointment, Makonnen began to give shape to the new Centre. He wanted to model it on Nkrumah’s political needs. Indeed, through the political training provided at the Centre he could influence politically the African freedom fighters pushing them towards Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist thoughts. According to Makonnen, before his appointment, the Centre had been run without a precise indication on the political targets to achieve. Since Ghana had entered a new political phase, it was time to take a stand and to make good use of its “Pan African” institutions. In June 1960, he wrote to Nkrumah:

Having followed with interest the uneven development in the life of the Centre, I would like to know really what role or function would you like the Centre to undertake. Do you my dear Prime Minister like the Centre to be a closed shop – an exclusive retreat for people with a mission known only to you and your exclusive lieutenants, or do you want it to be a hospitality centre for dedicated nationalists and their allies in revolt against colonialism and its endemic ills? [...] Or would you want the Centre to take on the appearance of prevailing centers to be found in other countries, for instance international House in New York or Peace and Friendship Centers in England and Stockholm, or Centers for International Friendship found in the People’s Republic? ³⁶⁷

³⁶⁶ AGPL, BAA/357, Letter, Nkrumah to Makonnen, 17th June 1960.

³⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

Even if the reply is not available, the evolution of the Centre indicates that Nkrumah pushed for a large use of ideological training. He wanted the Centre to be not only a place where to host the freedom fighters could be hosted but also one where to provide some basis of ideology and political tactic. The Ideological Institute of Winneba was supposed to complete this political training.

With the BAA and the AAC in full operation, Ghana was ready to deal with the many questions on the table of African politics. Two of them in particular attracted the attention of the country: the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa and the crisis in Congo. The next two sub-chapters will deal with each of them. It will be the occasion to see in practice how the “new” Bureau was working and how Barden got increasingly involved in the making of Ghana’s Pan-African policy.

3.10. Sharpeville, the Question of Refugees and the South African United Front

One of the main problems the BAA had to face in 1960 was the one of South Africa. Verwoerd’s government had showed an increasing hostility towards African nationalist parties. The Sharpeville massacre transformed this hostility in open war. Members of the PAC and ANC had to escape from the country and seek the help, among others, of Ghana.

After Padmore’s death, Southern Africa became more and more important for Ghana’s Pan-African policy. The AAC welcomed an increasing amount of refugees from the area and the BAA deepened its relations with nationalist parties in Basutoland (Basutoland Congress Party - BCP), Nyasaland (Malawi Congress Party - MCP), Bechuanaland (Bechuanaland People’s Party - BPP), Swaziland (Ngwane Liberatory Congress – NLC - and the Swazi Progressive Association - SPA), South West Africa (South West Africa National Union - SWANU), Northern Rhodesia (United National Independence party – UNIP), Southern Rhodesia (National Democratic Party – NDP) and

South Africa, where ANC and PAC were both backed by Ghana.³⁶⁸ It also intensified its activities in the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique so that the whole region was covered.

Ghana intensified its struggle especially against the apartheid system in South Africa. It was not only a semi-colonial and racist entity but it also represented a threat for the African liberation struggle in the whole region. Indeed, the Verwoerd government was acting as the fulcrum of a “white front” between South Africa and the two other white-ruled and anti-communist powers of the area: the CAF and the Portuguese Empire. Damaging the fulcrum could have led to the fall of the whole system.

The BAA supported both the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, the two major nationalist parties of South Africa at the time. In line with Nkrumah’s vision of nationalism, Ghana officially sponsored also the re-unification of the two parties, which had split in early 1959.³⁶⁹ At the same time, however, different Ghanaian factions were backing one of the two parties, leading to a difficult reconciliation between them. At first, Nkrumah’s government backed vigorously only the ANC. Being the strongest nationalist party in the country, it was seen as the only weapon to break the apartheid regime. Still, after a few months from the establishment of the PAC, Nkrumah himself had pushed for an opening to Sobukwe’s party.³⁷⁰ On 12 November 1959, the question was raised at the meeting of the African Affairs Committee:

Comrade Hutchinson explained in detail the moderate tactics of the national congress [ANC] and said that the break-away group, Pan-Africanist Congress, was radicals and extremists who were not prepared to enlist into their fold any European. Continuing he said that the National Congress was apprehensive of the fast moves of the radicals and considered that the Congress would be drawn into serious trouble. The Prime Minister [Nkrumah] said that if the Congress were not prepared to co-operate with this group, it

³⁶⁸ The BAA had also contacts with a significant number of other parties, associations and even individuals. In South Africa, for instance, the Bureau was in contact with an association of Indians. See AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Nutsugah (secretary to the cabinet of Ghana govt.) to Barden and the Principal Secretary of the Minister of external Affairs, 24th October 1960.

³⁶⁹ The PAC was established from a split between factions of the ANC on April 6th 1959. See on the issue R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.218.

³⁷⁰ Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe (1924 – 1978) was the founder and president of the Pan-Africanist Congress.

must nevertheless refrain from vilifying them and said one never knew which of the two could bring about independence and supported his case by quoting the CPP and the UGCC as a convincing example.³⁷¹

In the following months, the position of the PAC became increasingly stronger in Ghana. Indeed, political radicalism was growing in the whole country and in the party, influencing also the balance of the support to the two South African parties. While officially supporting the reunification, the Bureau provided more attention to the PAC. After Nkrumah's indications in November, even the Committee backed it with more vigor. Few months later, however, their expectations were partially betrayed. The PAC was still far weaker than the ANC and he had achieved scarce political results. Thus, Nkrumah's line went back straight to the reunification option.³⁷²

In the meantime, a tragic event occurred in South Africa. On March 1960, a march organized at Sharpeville by the PAC against the so-called "pass laws" turned into a massacre. This bloody event signed the beginning of a process of exacerbation of the political situation of South Africa. Shortly after, all the African parties of South Africa were banned and many members of PAC and ANC had to escape from the state. The BAA was immediately available to come to rescue the refugees.

Hundreds of requests for political asylum and Ghanaian citizenships came to the desk of different ministers, the BAA and Nkrumah himself. The experiences of the refugees were usually very similar. Members of ANC and PAC or other organizations had to flee out of the Union of South Africa to escape from imprisonment after the Declaration of Emergence following the Sharpeville events. Most of them had sought refuge in neighboring countries, especially Basutoland and Bechuanaland. There, local nationalist parties provided them with shelter and protected them from South African agents. Since local parties were all linked to Ghana through the BAA, Barden was constantly informed of

³⁷¹ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on November 12th 1959, "South African National Congress".

³⁷² PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, "Memorandum on South Africa". The "top secret" document, which is undated, was probably submitted by a member of the PAC writing from South Africa. It includes also some considerations on the best tactics Ghana's government should adopt in dealing with South African affairs.

the situation. The BAA itself received many of the letters from the refugees, who were mostly party members. The following is an example of a letter sent to the BAA:

As a full member of African National Congress Youth League and having participated in the Defiance Campaign and boycotts, I knew that the Special Branch Detectives of the Union Government will look high and low for me. They actually did and visited my home and questioned my mother [...]. I found that I would not be safe in any part of the Union of South Africa. I fled to Basutoland and have been ever since the Declaration of the Emergence there. I met my fellow freedom fighters from all parts of the Union of South Africa. The refugees are well looked after there by the Basutoland Congress Party. [...] Time and again we met members of the Special Branch Police of the Union Government [...] I panicked and left Basutoland [...] My intention was to reach Lusaka and then to proceed from there to Ghana. Unfortunately I was stopped at Bulawayo. [...] I was put on the earliest train bound for Bechuanaland. [...] Sir, again, I ask you please to give me any assistance you can to get me out of Bechuanaland. My aims and objectives is to get to Ghana and further my studies.³⁷³

The Ghanaian state was unprepared to manage such a huge wave of refugees. There were not enough structures. Even more importantly, Nkrumah did not want to host too many of them, dividing the nationalist forces of Southern Africa and keeping them away from the front. The only solution was to keep the freedom fighters in the region, delivering men and funds for their assistance directly to the countries where they were hosted. Even Barden supported this line and he reported the Ghanaian position to the South Africans. The following letter is also the response to the previous one:

Much as we have committed ourselves to assist in issuing where possible, travelling documents to active nationalists in South Africa, we do it in such way as to avoid influx of nationalists leaving the battlefield. If such a situation was to happen it would mean that all the nationalist organizations will be leaderless and none suitably staffed to carry on the struggle. In this connection, I hope you will agree with me that you should not be

³⁷³ AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Spencer Joel Thloloe to Barden, 20th July 1960.

discouraged or be afraid to stay in South Africa to carry on the struggle since tree of liberty must all times be watered by the blood of martyrs.³⁷⁴

The BAA undertook the mission of providing support to South African freedom fighters on the field. The solution was perfect to prove the efficiency of the net established by the Bureau in the region. Barden himself held a key role in the mission. Indeed, he had begun traveling throughout Africa, managing connections, delivering funds, and organizing the political training of freedom fighters. Thanks to these travels, he could also be constantly updated on the progress of the African liberation struggle.

Just before the second IAS conference (Addis Ababa, 14-24 June 1960), the acting director of the BAA made a tour of Southern Africa.³⁷⁵ He visited Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, the countries that had the greatest problems with refugees. There, he coordinated the support of the Bureau to the South African freedom fighters. He also worked for deepening the relationship between the local nationalist parties and the Bureau. For instance, he met the representatives of the Basutoland Congress Party, assuring them that Ghana was backing their struggle like it did with the one of South Africans. He also promised an increasing collaboration between their party and the Bureau.³⁷⁶

The issue of refugees in South Africa had been the occasion to see the Bureau in action for the first time after the end of the period of the African Affairs Committee. The result had been quite satisfying. Barden had proved that the BAA net in Africa was wide and strong and that his office could manage any problem concerning African liberation. He had successfully worked in the field to provide support to African freedom fighters and to collect fresh news on the evolution of African Affairs. Paradoxically, Barden was the head of the BAA but also its first agent.

³⁷⁴ AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Barden to Spencer Joel Thloloe, 13th September 1960.

³⁷⁵ References to this tour can be found in a series of letters dated 30th July 1960 sent by the BAA to various parts of Africa. See for instance AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Barden to Khabisi, 30th July 1960.

³⁷⁶ AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Basutoland Congress Party to Barden, 7th June 1960. Quoting from the letter: "You have left behind a name; a name for yourself, a name for Ghana, a name for Basutoland and a name for Africa. Many more people talk about the liberty of Africa and for them Ghana is a real and living country of people like yourselves. That your presence here had a powerful impact is borne by the fact that the office is overflowing with applications of people who want to study motor mechanics, *local government*, cooperatives and diverse other things. You should do something to quench the thirst you have aroused".

The next question Barden and the BAA had to solve was the one of Congo. In this case, the situation was even more complex, since the enemies were both external imperialist forces (the Belgians and the Americans) and internal ones (Tshombe, Kasavubu and Mobutu). In Congo, Nkrumah's Pan-African policy was at stake. From the result of this struggle depended the evolution of politics in the whole continent.

3.11. The Role of the BAA in the Congo Crisis

Ghana got involved in the Congolese politics even before the independence of the country (30th June 1960). Indeed, Lumumba was one of Nkrumah's closest allies in Africa and a supporter of a Pan-African policy similar to Ghana's. As Armah stated: "the Congo Crisis became a test case in the Pan-African struggle for genuine political independence".³⁷⁷ Thus, when the crisis erupted in July, Ghana was in the frontline to support such an independence from the aggression of the "imperialist forces". The BAA was particularly active in this phase, since its agents supported both Lumumba and the Ghanaian army (part of the UN mission) in Congo. Ghana's role in the Crisis had already been described by scholars and non-scholars.³⁷⁸ This sub-chapter will not describe again these events, but it will focus primarily on the work of the BAA in Congo.

Between 1957 and 1959, Nkrumah backed Kasavubu's ABAKO, as the party was considered the most powerful in the Belgian Congo. However, after the AAPC, the Ghanaian Prime Minister started to look at Lumumba as a better candidate for Ghana's support. Indeed, the latter was getting closer and closer to Nkrumah's political position. His Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) was emerging as a modern, non-tribal and

³⁷⁷ K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.50.

³⁷⁸ See K. Nkrumah, *Challenge of the Congo*, PANAf, London, 1969; W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, and J. Mohan, *Ghana, The Congo, and The United Nations*, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7, 3 (1969), pp.369-406 and H.T. Alexander, *African tightrope: My two years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff*, Prager, New York, 1966.

centralist nationalist party, very close to the model of the CPP.³⁷⁹ On the contrary, Kasavubu was controlling a party representing mainly his ethnic group, although at the same time, trying also to present himself as a national leader.

In the winter of 1959/1960, Ghana's support moved definitely towards Lumumba's side. In this period, Nkrumah began supporting publicly the leaders of the MNC and Ghanaian agents were sent to Congo to monitor the situation. Some months before the independence of the country, the Committee had already set up a list of diplomats to be sent to Leopoldville. Between them there was Djin, who was going to become ambassador.³⁸⁰

Congo finally became independent on the 30th of June 1960 and Lumumba became its first Prime Minister. Ghana was the first country to support him. According to Thompson: "Probably no new nation ever brought so much help to a brother state so quickly".³⁸¹ Nkrumah granted Lumumba with help "at almost every level of government" with the transfer of doctors, engineers and civil servants from Ghana.³⁸² By supporting Congo, the Ghanaian Prime Minister wanted to strengthen what at the time was probably his most powerful and precious political ally for the attainment of his Pan-African policy.

Suddenly, however, the situation deteriorated. The Congolese *force publique* announced its mutiny on July 5th to demand the africanization of its ranks and an increase of the salaries. In the meantime, Katanga declared its secession (11th July). The two events mixed together brought the country on the edge of chaos, leading to the beginning of what was to be known as the "Congo crisis".

³⁷⁹ According to Armah (at the time Ghana's High Commissioner in London), the AAPC had a great influence in bringing Lumumba close to Nkrumah's political position. The MNC and CPP shared the same concepts of nationalism and Pan-Africanism. Quoting from K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.51: "Among the hundreds of delegates who attended the Conference were Patrice Lumumba [...] and two party associates. This memorable conference was for them a baptism of fire in the struggle for Africa's liberation. On returning home to Congo, a mass meeting was convened on January 3, 1959 at which Lumumba announced with fiery outcry the need for immediate and total independence for his country".

³⁸⁰ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 13th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee to be held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 25th February 1960 and PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, 14th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 10th March 1960, "Emissaries to Congo"; he was then substituted with Welbeck. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.142.

³⁸¹ *Ibidem*, p.123

³⁸² *Ibidem*.

On the 13th of July, Nkrumah declared that he would support Lumumba in every possible way.³⁸³ He decided, then, to send practically every troop available to Leopoldville in order to defend the government from the rebels and the secessionists. On July 16th, the first Ghanaian soldiers reached the Congo as part of the wider UN forces of the ONUC mission. In the meantime, even BAA agents were sent to Leopoldville in order to provide support to the Congolese government. The whole Ghanaian forces were first put at the service of Lumumba. Solving the Congo crisis was considered by Nkrumah as the most important mission of his Pan-African policy, even though he had to work through the UN to achieve this target.

The African Affairs Committee had already worked in the previous months to prepare a response to a situation of this kind. Thanks to Welbeck, intelligence agents were introduced in Congo.³⁸⁴ Even the BAA had been developed to face increasingly difficult missions like this one.³⁸⁵ When the Congo Crisis erupted, the whole system was put to the test. The Ghanaian intelligence and the BAA agents were asked to give support to Lumumba in every possible way.

Barden himself was involved in the mission in Congo. At the end of July, he moved to Leopoldville to coordinate the work of the BAA agents.³⁸⁶ After going back to Accra to submit a report to Nkrumah, he returned immediately to Congo again.³⁸⁷ The document includes some interesting thoughts on the political situation in the ex-Belgian colony and the actions he suggested to undertake:

[...] events in Africa have moved with remarkable speed. Ghana must act immediately on many fronts if she is to retain the initiative in the African Scene, and to secure the furtherance of complete independence and African Unity. [...] Events in the Congo and the dispatch of Ghana forces there require the setting up of high-level Intelligence Services in

³⁸³ K. Nkrumah, *Challenge of the Congo*, p.20-21

³⁸⁴ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on November 19th 1959 at Flagstaff House, "Intelligent Service".

³⁸⁵ PRAAD, SC/BAA/251, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on Thursday 14th January 1960, "Political Attaches".

³⁸⁶ AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Barden to Ondong (Uganda), 30th July 1960. He wrote to Ondong: "I left for Congo to assist our brothers in consolidating their newly hard-won independence and also to achieve their territorial integrity and sovereignty which are being threatened by mass invasion of Belgium imperialists".

³⁸⁷ AGPL, BAA/370, Report, "Ghana's Role in Emergent Africa", Barden to Nkrumah, 25th July 1960.

the Congo. This will enable the Ghana Government to keep informed of developments not only in the Congo itself, but in the surrounding countries which will receive a vigorous jolt as a result of the Congo events. [...] The Intelligence Services [...] should operate a direct communication service between the Ghana Forces and the President and Minister of Defense [...].³⁸⁸

In August, Barden kept working relentlessly to support Lumumba, even if in the same period the secession attempt of the South Kasai led the situation to become ever worse than before.³⁸⁹ A special “Congo-Coordinating Committee” was also set up by the Ghanaians to coordinate better the efforts to defend the legitimate Congolese government from the aggression of the “imperialists”. Barden was included in the Committee, a sign of his increasing importance within the Ghanaian entourage. At the time, he was also constantly in contact with the Prime Minister for questions concerning African Affairs.³⁹⁰ Nkrumah committed Ghana to the defense of the independence and unity of Congo. Thus, he came to the point of proposing Lumumba a union with his country in August.³⁹¹

Despite Ghana’s total commitment to the cause and despite the BAA’s work in Congo, no solution to the crisis was found and USA and URSS definitely made their entry into Congolese politics. Neither the Ghanaian army as part of the ONUC nor the BAA could prevent the deterioration of Lumumba’s position in Congo after the fight of the Congolese government against the secessionists of South Kasai had turned into a bloodbath. While the troops of the United Nations – including the Ghanaian ones - were unsuccessfully trying to control the situation, Mobutu could dismiss by force Lumumba from the Government (September) and put him under arrest. He also contributed to the capture and the assassination of the former Prime Minister (January 1961) while he was escaping from his house arrest to Stanleyville, the seat of his new opposing government.

³⁸⁸ AGPL, BAA/370, Report, “Ghana’s Role in Emergent Africa”, Barden to Nkrumah, 25th July 1960.

³⁸⁹ AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Barden to Mlobeli (Basutoland), 7th September 1960.

³⁹⁰ See AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Barden to Combs, 9th September 1960.

³⁹¹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.140 He also made a speech on the same day to the Ghanaian National Embassy to confirm the total commitment of Ghana to the mission in Congo. See AGPL, BAA/414, République du Ghana, «*Allocution prononcée devant L’Assemblée Nationale sur Les Affaires Africaines par Osagyefo Le Docteur Kwame Nkrumah* », 8 Aout, 1960.

In December, shortly before Lumumba's murder, Nkrumah had already considered his mission in Congo failed, leading to a re-consideration of his foreign policy. Still, Barden defended the work done by the BAA during the crisis and the one he was doing with the Stanleyville government. According to him, it was true that Ghana had lost the battle for defending Lumumba's government but the war was not over yet and the BAA was ready to fight it. According to him: "[...] In the operations in Congo, the Bureau projected itself significantly for the part it played and is still playing".³⁹²

Paradoxically, while Ghana's Pan-African policy had lost strength in 1960 - mainly because of the failure in Congo - the BAA emerged stronger. Barden had proved that he could work practically everywhere in Africa thanks to the net of agents he had created.

3.12. A Balance of the BAA Work in Africa

The end of 1960 was a period of evaluation of the work of the BAA in Africa. The Bureau was not only involved in Southern Africa and in Congo but in almost every region of Africa. The wide net of agents developed at the time of the management of the African Affairs Committee was working fine. The BAA was surely one of the strongest instruments of Ghana's foreign policy. Barden was also becoming more and more important and he was accounted as Nkrumah's new adviser on African Affairs

The acting director of the BAA was particularly interested in the evolution of politics in West Africa, since this area was considered crucial for widening the UAS project as well as for widening the political influence of Ghana. In late July, he reported the situation of the countries around Ghana to Nkrumah. He also suggested new solutions to attract politically the governments of francophone countries. Indeed, some of them were very suspicious

³⁹² AGPL, BAA/370, "*Report on the activities of the Bureau – January to December 1960*" submitted by Barden to Nkrumah on 16th December 1960.

towards Accra, especially those which had opposition parties backed by the Bureau. Here follows an extract of Barden's report (25th of July):

The acute crisis in the Congo has naturally preoccupied Ghana in recent weeks; developments in West Africa itself, where the French Community countries have achieved independence, as well as in other former French Territories are no less important and must not be over-shadowed and obscured by the more dramatic events in the Congo. [...] It is of the utmost importance in our goal of African Unity to establish firm contacts with the newly independent States of the French Community; at present there seems to be considerable suspicion of Ghana's aims and motives on the part of these former French States. [...] Many of the tensions existing between Ghana and former French Community States are due to nothing more than the lack of contact which has resulted in wrong interpretations of Ghana's aims and her role in Africa. Immediate steps must be taken if these misunderstandings are not to become hardened and to create long term, if not permanent stumbling blocks to African Unity. [...] We suggest that emissaries are sent forthwith to the newly independent States of the former French Community to establish confidence between them and Ghana [...].³⁹³

Ghana's primary mission – according to Barden – was to avoid the strengthening of the influence of other moderate countries such as Tubman's Liberia in the West African region, especially among the Francophone countries. If Nkrumah could extend his influence among the latter, he could achieve two targets of his Pan-African policy: developing the UAS project and weakening France's influence on its former colonies.

At the time, the radical Modibo Keita was the only francophone leader other than Touré who was willing to discuss about African unity. The President of the Mali Federation was already planning with Tubman and Touré a community of African States on the Sanniquellie model. Nkrumah had simply to push Keita to unite immediately his country with Ghana and Guinea. The Ghanaian diplomacy and the Bureau were promptly put to work to accomplish this mission.³⁹⁴ The operation was bound to be successful as in just a

³⁹³ AGPL, BAA/370, Report, "Ghana's Role in Emergent Africa", Barden to Nkrumah, 25th July 1960.

³⁹⁴ Modibo Keita had become president of the Mali Federation, which gained independence on June, 20th 1960 and got dissolved one month later. Nkrumah immediately worked to bring Keita on its side. He wanted to convince the radical Keita to let Mali join Ghana and Guinea in a political union. By doing so, the Ghanaian

few months Keita's new Mali – born out of the split of the federation - joined Ghana and Guinea into a three-states-wide UAS.

The Bureau had to work harder to spread Ghana's influence in the other francophone countries. Barden considered this target so important that he proposed to deal with it personally. In November 1960, while announcing the forthcoming union with Mali, Barden proposed Nkrumah to lead a mission of the BAA in francophone West Africa:

[...] it would appear advisable if arrangement could be made for a fact-finding mission of two to be sent immediately to Niger to assess the climate of opinion with regard to the Ghana-Mali declaration of intentions, and also to find out whether there are any reasonable prospects of establishing closer relationship which could ultimately lead Ghana to a similar union with Niger. The same fact-finding mission could also cover Dahomey and Haut Volta as the three states are contiguous in character. [...]³⁹⁵

Interestingly, he also proposed to involve the Malian Government in the running of the BAA with the appointment of a Malian Under-Secretary at the Bureau. According to Barden, "their participation in the activities of the Bureau [would] prove to the other African States the well-meant intentions of our Government and give reality to the foundation of United Africa".³⁹⁶

After Southern Africa, West Africa, and Congo, the BAA was also involved in another fundamental area of the continent: Eastern Africa. When he returned from Congo, Barden made a trip in the region to collect information and to organize the activities of the Bureau on the spot. Barden's mission started on 11 November 1960 with his visit to Sudan

had also the possibility to weak the position of Senghor in Senegal and also to avoid the interference of moderate countries like Liberia. Barden's report gives the reader a clear understanding of Ghana's policy in this matter: "[...] Monsieur Modibo Keita the Prime Minister of the Mali Federation [he was Prime Minister up to independence and then he became president] left on a trip to Liberia and Guinea. At the end of his four-day visit, Monsieur Modibo Keita issued a joint statement with President Tubman proposing the holding of a Conference of African States to study the possibilities of the creation of the Community of African States [the same name of the Sanniquellie proposal]. The Conference, it was suggested, should have been similar to the one held in Sanniquellie the previous year by the leaders of Liberia, Ghana, and Guinea. *This is an indication of the speed at which President Tubman is moving and unless immediate steps are taken by Ghana to put her case to the Community States the initiatives will pass to him*". See AGPL, BAA/370, Report, "Ghana's Role in Emergent Africa", Barden to Nkrumah, 25th July 1960.

³⁹⁵ AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 30th November 1960.

³⁹⁶ *Ibidem*.

followed by one to Kenya and one to Tanganyika. The trip proved fundamental to understand how to perform Ghana's Pan-African policy in the area. It also helped Barden to have a first-hand impression of the work done by the BAA agents there.

With Barden's trip to East Africa, the year of the activity of the BAA was ideally ending and the first balances of the work accomplished until then could be made. In 1960, Ghana had lost several political battles, *in primis* in Congo, where Nkrumah's Pan-African policy had impacted with Africa's involvement in the Cold War. However, Barden was quite satisfied of the improvements of his Bureau. The "Pan-African" institution had proved fundamental for Ghana's foreign policy and its power within the state was growing. Barden had proved to be one of the main protagonists of Ghana's Pan-African policy, being directly involved in several missions throughout the continent.

In December, the acting director of the BAA provided Nkrumah with a report on the activities of the Bureau in 1960.³⁹⁷ It was the opportunity for Barden to show the Ghanaian Prime Minister the increasing importance of the BAA and its political achievements. First of all, he described the new image that the BAA had gained among the liberation movements:

It is with a sense of great satisfaction that I have to report on the activities of the Bureau during the past 12 months. [...] the Bureau was able to establish itself as a nerve centre and pivot for the crusade of African Liberation, and in this position made a tremendous impact not only on dependent and independent African States, but also on certain parts of the world. Consequently, many dependent African States have come to regard the Bureau as the only source of their political and economic salvation. Conferences held in Accra last year also contributed a great deal to the popularity and prestige of the Bureau.

Then, Barden analyzed the case of Congo, showing him how the work done by the Bureau had strengthened Ghana's position in Africa:

[...] our policy and action in Congo have demonstrated to leaders of dependent African States that in Ghana they have a true and genuine brother on whom they can call in times of

³⁹⁷ AGPL, BAA/370, "Report on the activities of the Bureau – January to December 1960" submitted by Barden to Nkrumah on 16th December 1960.

crisis and need and who always still answer their call with promptitude and unflagging determination.

According to Barden, the Bureau had also played a fundamental role in creating political contacts. His trips all around Africa had proven useful to extend the net of the Bureau and also Ghana's influence among the liberation movements. Even African unity had been successfully promoted through these contacts, proving that the Bureau could be as useful as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the work with foreign diplomats and politicians:

More exchange of visits and contacts were undertaken during the year. I was able to travel extensively to many African States and countries. These visits considerably reinforced my knowledge of the problems confronting many Freedom fighters and gave me ample scope and opportunity to discuss these problems on the spot. In return, apart from visits paid to the Bureau by leaders and members of various political parties and organizations, the Bureau also received no less than six diplomatic missions from abroad. It is, perhaps, pertinent for me to emphasize the political necessity and importance of such exchange of visits and contacts; for not only do they help in bringing about broad understanding of the international political issues and of each country's policy towards them, but they also help to create a fund of goodwill an intimate understanding leading to easy co-operation and promoting the concept of African Unity.

Barden's report to Nkrumah represented not only an evaluation of the past year but also a plan for the future. According to the acting director of the BAA, Ghana's Pan-African policy had to become more radical. Furthermore, he invited Nkrumah to invest more resources in the Bureau, since it was the only institution which could assure concrete results in the struggle for African liberation and Unity.

Nkrumah was persuaded to take Barden's suggestions into serious consideration. The failures of Ghana's foreign policy and the progresses made by the BAA made him re-think the entire plan of Ghana's Pan-African policy.

3.13. Conclusions

As the year 1960 was ending, a report of the achievements and the failures of Ghana's Pan-African policy could be finally made. Undoubtedly, this period proved to be fundamental for giving a new shape to the whole system of foreign affairs. Almost every new policy conceived in this period became the basis for further developments in the following years.

The first and most important mission fulfilled by Nkrumah in 1960 was to continue along the path set up with his mentor George Padmore. His death could have meant the complete failure of a whole political project which had its roots back in 1945. Instead, the bases outlined by Padmore proved to be so solid they could resist the delicate phase which followed his death. Thus, his office survived and evolved into the Bureau of African Affairs. Barden - the new protagonist of Ghana's Pan-African policy - had been trained by Padmore precisely for this purpose.

Nkrumah's choice to involve fundamental figures from the party and the state in the making of Ghana's foreign policy proved wise. The work done by the African Affairs Committee in almost eight months was remarkable. It completely transformed the structure of the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana and it also dictated a new, more radical, political line. After the work done by the Committee, the two "Pan-African" institutions were ready to deal with the challenges of the African scene. In particular, the net of BAA agents built by Barden during the management of the Committee proved to be effective.

In 1960, Accra was involved in almost every region of the continent, supporting African liberation and unity. The Bureau of African Affairs proved very effective in dealing with these questions. Even in Congo, where Ghana had failed to protect Lumumba's government, the BAA had still proved its efficiency.

After the Congo crisis, Nkrumah had to reshape completely Ghana's Pan-African policy. The work done in 1960 was a solid starting point. However, due to the new challenges in the African scene and the entry of the cold war in Africa, Nkrumah had to make some fundamental changes in the structure of the Pan-African institutions and in their policies.

4. The Age of Radicalization (January 1961 – December 1962)

Introduction

The Congo Crisis signed the end of a first phase of Nkrumah's foreign policy and it also had relevant effects on his internal policy. Between 1957 and 1960, the Ghanaian head of government had tried unsuccessfully to sponsor a peaceful path towards the attainment of African liberation and unity. The murder of Lumumba proved this type of approach wrong. The "neo-colonialist" forces were stronger than expected and Nkrumah had failed to counteract them. Moreover, he had also failed in avoiding the entry of the Cold War confrontation in African politics. No Pan-African platform had stopped the intervention of the East and the West in Congo, nor was it going to stop it elsewhere in Africa. Nkrumah could not even count on the UN, which had caused disappointment among the Pan-Africanist ranks for the way it dealt with the Congo crisis.³⁹⁸

The events in the Congo had also caused a split of the independent African states into two groups, one of "radicals" and one of "moderates", respectively represented by the so-called "Casablanca Group" and the "Brazzaville Group" (later merged into the Monrovia one). With this split, the target of a continental government became even more difficult to be achieved than before. Moreover, through the two groups the East and the West could easily have an influence on African politics. It was exactly the opposite of what Nkrumah had planned. Instead of a united and non-aligned Africa, the Congo Crisis had produced a

³⁹⁸ On 6 August 1960, Nkrumah still believed that the United Nations could guarantee a peaceful independence process for Congo, as well as for other African nations. He stated: "The supreme task of the United Nations is to organize, before it is too late, a peaceful transfer of power. [...] Unless we act in concert together through the United Nations, it will be too late to save the ruling minorities of Africa [the reference is on Katanga's secession] from the consequences of their own political blindness and folly. "Africa's Challenge", speech pronounced by Kwame Nkrumah at the Parliament House of Ghana on 6 August 1960. In S. Obeng (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1, Afram Publications, Ghana, 1997, p.124.

divided and political-influenced one. In this new problematic context, Nkrumah had to re-think completely his strategy in Ghana and in Africa.

In 1961, the Ghanaian President decided to respond to the failures of the previous year with a more radical Pan-African policy. Considering the strength of its enemies, Ghana had to invest much more resources in the struggles for African liberation and unity. A new radical “Ministry of foreign affairs” was established to deal specifically with the African continent: the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS). The propaganda machinery had also to be developed in order to reach every corner of Africa and counteract the one of the moderate pro-Western states. Moreover, Ghana had also to invest more resources in the training of African freedom fighters in order to influence them politically. In 1961, the Ideological Institute of Winneba was finally opened to both Ghanaians and freedom fighters. In the same year, Ghana had begun also providing African nationalist with military training, a crucial turning point for Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. Even if he still supported primarily Positive Action, he was now ready even for the use of violence in order to achieve his goals. The first front where to adopt this new approach was Congo itself. There, since early 1961, the Gizenga government was provided with Ghanaian weapons and military training.³⁹⁹

Nkrumah’s new radical policy was not only limited to Ghana’s external affairs but also to the internal ones. The state was interested by a strong wave of radicalization which followed the so-called “dawn broadcast” of April 1961. From then on, Ghana definitely shifted to the left and it opened to the socialist bloc. The ideology of “Nkrumahism” was finally developed and spread throughout Ghana and Africa.

In this phase of radicalism, the BAA became stronger than ever, taking advantage of the high position attained in 1960. Barden strengthened also his power within the Ghanaian hierarchies, influencing the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AAS.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁹ For information on the provision of weapons to the Stanleyville government in exile provided by Ghana see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp-156-157. The weapons were usually sent by Ghana through Uganda. It is also for this reason that since 1961 Uganda received a growing attention by Accra. Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 19th July 2012.

⁴⁰⁰ Dei-Anang described the role played by Barden and the BAA at the peak of its power: “The activities of the Bureau continued to loom large in African affairs. A.K. Barden undertook great risks in perilous journeys under various guises throughout Africa. On these missions he conveyed Nkrumah’s directives, medical

The chapter will be opened by considerations on the consequences of the Congo Crisis on Ghana's policies and institutions. Then, it will be thoroughly described the establishment of the African Affairs Secretariat and the Ideological Institute, both instruments of the new political phase. It will be also clarified the role of the BAA in the life of both institutions. Generally speaking, the focus of the chapter will mostly be on the Bureau, the fulcrum of Ghana's Pan-African policy which will also be described in its concrete actualization. In particular, it will be analyzed how Ghana tried to develop the UAS project and how the BAA worked for this mission. Finally, it will be described the functioning of the new propaganda machinery of the BAA, called during this two year to spread Pan-Africanism and Nkrumahism throughout the continent.

4.1. "African Disunity" and Ghana's New Pan-African Policy

The Congo Crisis had changed significantly the political situation in Africa, leading to a break between two fronts of African states, one of "radicals" (Casablanca Group) and one of "moderates" (Brazzaville Group later merged into the Monrovia Group).⁴⁰¹ The distance between the two was mainly based on their opposite vision on the recognition of the new government in Congo and on the autonomy of Katanga. "Brazzaville" and "Monrovia" sponsored Mobutu, Kasavubu and Tshombe, while "Casablanca" opposed them. Such questions reflected also a deep ideological difference between the two groups, generating a separation which lasted until the establishment of the OAU in May 1963. Ghana had to deal with this new context trying to re-launch African unity and while dealing also with the

supplies, and anti-colonial documents to freedom fighters. Confidence in Barden stemmed from Nkrumah's respect for his willingness to respond at all times to the many demands that were made on his courage and loyalty in the liberation cause". In M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.29.

⁴⁰¹ The two fronts were named after the seat of the Conferences where they were established.

issue of preserving the independence of the continent from the influence of the Cold War.⁴⁰²

The “Brazzaville Group” was formed by twelve moderate newly independent francophone countries and it was established as a result of a conference held by them at Brazzaville in December 1960.⁴⁰³ The gathering was organized to share views on the evolution of African politics – particularly in Congo – and the threat of a Soviet penetration in the continent. The invitation of both Tshombe and Kasavubu implied the sponsorship of a federalist option. The participants also legitimated the coup which had overthrown Lumumba’s government, taking a clearly pro-West position in the Cold War. Finally, the group reserved a cold attitude toward the idea of African unity and a much warmer one toward the French Community.

The news coming from Brazzaville were obviously adverse to Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. As Vincent Bakpetu Thompson wrote, with this conference: “African disunity” deepened.⁴⁰⁴ Ghana needed to find immediately a solution to counteract the power of the new group, since without francophone Africa no continental government could be created.

Barden was already at work. He sent observers to the conference to study the moves of Tshombe, Kasavubu, Houphouet-Boigny and the other francophone leaders, including the Tunisians and the Guineans (which had sent observers as well). He wrote to Nkrumah:

⁴⁰² In reality, the Congo Crisis worked like a detonator to a situation which was already delicate. Prior to the explosion of the Crisis, “moderate” and “radical” States had already clarified their antithetic positions. Ghana had worked since 1957 in order to attract politically those countries which were going to gain independence. This work had been done mostly in West Africa, where Ghana could promote a proper project of African unity. Considering it in this light, the Ghana-Guinea Union was an attempt on Ghana’s side to attract other francophone countries to their political positions at the expense of moderate countries, like Houphouet-Boigny’s Ivory Coast.

⁴⁰³ The twelve members were: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. The Brazzaville Conference was following ideally the meeting of francophone African states called by Houphouet-Boigny at Abidjan in October. See V. Thompson Bakpetu, *Africa and Unity*, p.150 and W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.148. Houphouet-Boigny (together with Senghor) was playing a leading role in this group. It must be remembered that since 1959, Ivory Coast had contested the influence of radical states like Ghana and Guinea by forming the *Conseil de L’Entente*. See chapter 3 and also E.H. Kloman Jr, *African Unification Movements*, International Organisation, v.16, n°2, 1962, p.396. The Brazzaville experience can be seen as in line with the one of the *Entente*. Its main task was the one of organizing and coordinating the majority of the independent francophone African states which were recognizing themselves in a moderate and pro-French stance.

⁴⁰⁴ V. Thompson Bakpetu, *Africa and Unity*, Longman, London, 1969, p.150.

“There can be no doubt that much useful information which could help Ghana to reshape and formulate its policy concerning relationship with the French African Community could be gained from this conference”.⁴⁰⁵

Nkrumah made good use of Barden’s information on the Brazzaville group and he worked on a new political line in Africa. The prior goal was to re-launch African unity in order to counteract the “balkanization” of Africa. Two short-term targets had to be achieved. The first one was to push forward the UAS project, welcoming Mali into the union. The second one was to form Ghana’s own group, made of radical pro-Unity African states.

On Christmas Eve 1960, Nkrumah, Touré, and Keita announced that Mali had joined the Union of African States.⁴⁰⁶ The “Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union” was born. Similarly to the Ghana-Guinea Union, the announcement was made some months before the official declaration, signed in April 1961.⁴⁰⁷ Once again, Nkrumah counted on the impact of this news to hasten the African unity project.

His next step was to gather together all the countries that were not in line with the political stance of the Brazzaville Group in a new Pan-African platform. A Conference was called at Casablanca in January 1961. The countries that attended were: Morocco, Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria (FNL), Libya and UAR.⁴⁰⁸ Nkrumah played immediately a leading

⁴⁰⁵ AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 29th November 1960.

⁴⁰⁶ Welch underlines that Touré and Keita had showed a common political stance at the time of their common militancy in the RDA. Both of them believed in a project of federation. With the UAS, their convictions met Nkrumah’s ones. See C.E. Welch, *Dream of Unity*, p.308-310.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, p.312-313. It was to be, however, only a political declaration. The official establishment of the union was signed in April. See also the declaration of the “Union of African States” in C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, pp.176-179.

⁴⁰⁸ V. Thompson Bakpetu, *Africa and Unity*, p.155; Ceylon was also represented. Algeria was represented by Ferhat Abbas. Thompson Bakpetu forgets about the presence of the UAR delegation when providing the list of members. To be more exact, the countries represented at the conference were not all “radicals”. Libya later left the “Casablanca Group” and joined the “Monrovia Group”, which was formed after the Monrovia Conference of May 1961. Even Morocco was not a radical country. King Mohammed V had called the conference after Morocco’s defeat in the Mauritanian independence issue. In December 1960, the Moroccan claims for hegemony over Mauritania had been rejected at the General Assembly of the UN, leading Rabat closer to the radical African states. The Moroccan adhesion to the project was the result of a political interest more than a sincere belief in the Pan-African cause. See E.H. Kloran Jr., *African Unification Movements*, p.391.

role. As Kloman wrote, the “core” of the “Casablanca Group”, born after the conference, was the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, an entity clearly led by Ghana.⁴⁰⁹

Despite the efforts, Nkrumah could not be totally satisfied with the result of the “Casablanca” operation. The Conference was supposed to provide the radical states with a common political line on African affairs. From this point of view, the target was still far from being achieved. For instance, the members disagreed on how to manage the presence of African troops in Leopoldville, even if they had agreed to adopt a common position.⁴¹⁰ The doubts on this question were a clear signal of the weak nature of the group, since some of its members could not even be considered radicals.⁴¹¹

Still, Nkrumah invested all his resources to strengthen the “Casablanca Group” in the following months. Indeed, through this platform, he wanted to promote African unity and also the establishment of an African High Command.⁴¹² He also wanted to counteract the influence of the moderate African states in the continent.

In May 1961, the front of moderates became even stronger when the “Brazzaville Group” merged into the bigger “Monrovia Group”.⁴¹³ The new platform, established at a conference in Monrovia, was formed by the twelve members of “Brazzaville” plus Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Libya.⁴¹⁴ With the loss of the latter among the ranks of the Casablanca Group and with Nigeria’s adherence to “Monrovia”, the front of radicals was weaker than before. Lagos’ move was particularly critical for Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. A good relationship between Ghana and Nigeria was one of pillars of the Pan-African policy in West Africa and in the continent as a whole. Yet, recent developments had undermined this relationship.

⁴⁰⁹ E.H. Kloman Jr., *African Unification Movements*, p.395.

⁴¹⁰ K. Armah, *Peace Without Power*, p.101 For Nkrumah’s speech at the Casablanca conference see S. Obeng, (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1, pp.252-255.

⁴¹¹ Some observers at the time underlined the weakness of the foundations of the Casablanca Group. For instance, Kloman noticed how the positions of Ghana and the other states of Casablanca were distant with regard to the management of the military forces in Congo. See E.H. Kloman Jr., *African Unification Movements*, p.391.

⁴¹² The idea of creating an “African High Command” to be formed by the independent African states was dating back at the beginning of the Congo Crisis. Nkrumah had officially launched this idea also at the UN General Assembly in New York on 23 September 1960. See S. Obeng, (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1, p.177. See also W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp.137, 149, 156 and 201.

⁴¹³ V. Thompson Bakpetu, *Africa and Unity*, p.157-158 and 172-174.

⁴¹⁴ Libya had left the Casablanca group for the Monrovia one.

There were many reasons for Lagos' cold attitude towards Accra. The giant West African state had always been worried of depending politically on its smaller neighbor. Nkrumah's increasing power in the region had not calmed down Nigeria's fears but it had rather increased them. Even before independence (October 1960), the Nigerians had already expressed their criticisms against the Ghanaian leader. In June 1960, at the IAS conference in Addis Ababa, the leader of the Nigerian delegation Alhajj Maitama Sule had spoken against those who considered themselves "a Messiah" with "a mission to lead Africa".⁴¹⁵ Moreover, he also strongly criticized Nkrumah's suppression of almost all the British West African boards, a move considered in contradiction with his Pan-African policy.⁴¹⁶ Finally, Azikiwe attacked Ghana's support to the Action Group.⁴¹⁷

International politics led to an even harsher confrontation between Accra and Lagos, especially on their position on the Congo affair. Lagos had showed a scarce interest in this question until November 1960.⁴¹⁸ However, Nkrumah's leading role in the region and his support to the Soviet-backed government of Lumumba led Nigeria to get more involved. Thus, it obtained the control of the UN commission on Congo, with which it could work against the influence of the USSR and Ghana in Leopoldville.⁴¹⁹ In the meantime, even Ghana began to show an increasing distrust on Nigeria, especially since the latter signed a defense agreement with the UK.⁴²⁰

Nkrumah's political rivals in Africa were growing day after day. Both the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union and the "Casablanca group" were too weak to diminish the strength of moderate African states, nor were they powerful enough to restrain the influence of the old

⁴¹⁵ O. Aluko, *Ghana and Nigeria*, p.74. In Nigeria, the Muslims of the North particularly disliked the growing cult of personality of Nkrumah. See BNA, DO/177/2, Letter, Kennaway (British High Commission in Ghana) to Mandeville (CRO), 24th May 1961.

⁴¹⁶ In May 1961, the West African Research Office was the only one still active. London was monitoring Nigeria and Ghana on the issue. See, for example, BNA, DO/177/2, Letter, Kennaway (British High Commission in Ghana) to Mandeville (CRO), 24th May 1961.

⁴¹⁷ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.80.

⁴¹⁸ In November, the Prime Minister Balewa had told the parliament that Nigeria had no special interests in the Congo. See O. Aluko, *Ghana and Nigeria*, p.148.

⁴¹⁹ Nigeria obtained in late 1960 the post of chairman of the UN Congo Conciliation Commission (Jaja Wachuku). From Nigeria's point of view, this appointment had an enormous importance for challenging Nkrumah's role in the Congo affairs and in West Africa. *Ibidem*, pp.148-149.

⁴²⁰ For this reason, in November 1960, Ghana had proposed the African High Command project to all the Independent African States (IAS) plus Guinea and Mali, but not to Nigeria. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.149 and 237.

colonial powers and the United States on the newly independent African states. Nkrumah needed to rethink his foreign policy as well as his internal policy in order to provide an adequate response to the new challenges of the African political scene. A process of radicalization invested both fields, while Ghana approached step by step the socialist bloc.

It took almost two years for this political shift to be properly implemented. The process of change within the Ghanaian state began in 1961. It consisted in a revision of internal and external policies and in a political reshuffle both in the party and in the state. But it was only in 1962 that such a process brought a sort of internal “revolution” in Ghana.⁴²¹

4.2. The “Shift to the Left” and Ghana’s Relationship with the East

The death of Lumumba and the increasing political isolation of Ghana led Nkrumah to open his doors progressively to the socialist bloc in order to find a new ally for his Pan-African policy. Such an opening towards the “reds” was also accompanied by a process of radicalization of the Ghanaian state. The former element was not the main cause of the latter, but it only favored the process. Nkrumah had already planned a progressive shift toward socialism, since he considered it part of his political project for Ghana and Africa. He was also convinced that a more radical Ghanaian state was the best solution to perform a progressive and effective Pan-African policy. This process favored also the evolution of “Nkrumahism” in a proper ideology.

The Congo affair worked like a detonator for Nkrumah’s change of perspective towards the East and the West. The balance of Ghana’s non-alignment progressively moved from a pro-West stance to a general pro-East stance. Such a process meant also a struggle

⁴²¹ The CPP’s *Program for Work and Happiness* (1962), announced *de facto* the passage to a socialist society and the launch of the one-party state option (which was to be adopted, however, only in 1964). See J.S. Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism*, p.204.

for powers between moderate and radicals within the CPP and the State.⁴²² A general “shift to the left” interested Ghana since the spring of 1961.

First of all, this shift meant a different approach towards the USSR. The relationship between Ghana and the Soviet State had improved during 1960, but until early 1961 it could be hardly defined as warm. Political and economical exchanges had followed the opening of the Ghanaian embassy in Moscow in early 1960. The protagonists of this year had been Adamafo and Tettegah. Indeed, Nkrumah had sent the two Ghanaians to USSR in the summer of 1960 in order to establish better relations with Khrushchev. Their mission had been accomplished, for they brought back Khrushchev’s support to Ghana and his offer to build the Akosombo Dam in place of the Americans.⁴²³

Adamafo and Tettegah’s mission paved the way for the improvement of the relationships between Accra and Moscow. The common defeat of the two countries in the Congo affair – symbolized by Lumumba’s murder in January 1961 - led Nkrumah and Khrushchev to come even closer. Thus, Nkrumah decided to open definitely Ghana to the Soviets by visiting USSR in a long trip throughout several socialist countries in the summer of 1961.⁴²⁴ The prudence which had characterized Ghana for all the period between 1957 and 1960 was abandoned. Nkrumah’s tour in the socialist world symbolized Ghana’s new radical approach.

It must be made clear that in no way Nkrumah was becoming a faithful servant of the Soviets. He was a non-aligned socialist leader, willing to perform an independent foreign policy in line with his Pan-Africanist principles and objectives. In the same year of the trip to the East, Nkrumah also invited to Ghana Josif Broz Tito, a man considered also a non-aligned leader far from being a friend of Moscow. The Yugoslavian President visited Accra on February 1961. During his visit, Nkrumah claimed that Ghana was related to Yugoslavia in political terms. He presented the two countries as: “sharing the same ideals, the same

⁴²² See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.162.

⁴²³ T. Adamafo, *By Nkrumah’s Side*, p.90. The offer was never accepted. However, another dam project, the one of Bui, was followed by the Soviets in the ensuing years.

⁴²⁴ For an account of Nkrumah’s tour to Socialist countries in summer 1961 see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.173-177.

concepts of the development of society and the same objective”.⁴²⁵ Holding this position, Nkrumah also participated to the Belgrade Summit in September 1961, a further attempt to join the group of the “big” nonaligned countries.⁴²⁶

In fact, Ghana was not entering the “communist” world. Nkrumah was only trying to open the doors to the other half of the moon. At the same time, the Soviets were also considered the best supporters of the socialist path for development the Ghanaian President had planned for his country.

Still, Western powers felt threatened by Nkrumah’s moves. Since early 1961, USA and UK had begun to follow closely the evolution of politics in Ghana in order to understand to what extent Nkrumah’s government could be considered an instrument of communist penetration in Africa. Until 1960, Guinea and UAR were considered the most important agents of the Soviets in the continent. After 1961, Ghana was added to the list. The UK was particularly interested in defending its former colonial possession in West Africa from any communist threat. Thus, since 1961 anything concerning the relationship between Nigeria and Ghana was reported and observed, a sign of the British increasing distrust towards Accra.⁴²⁷ The Queen’s visit to Ghana in the same year momentarily calmed down the British fears. However, London kept the level of attention very high.

Nkrumah’s opening to the East also affected his foreign policy. This process included a first revision of the very structure of the system deputized to manage the external relations of Ghana.

⁴²⁵ “A speech at a Dinner in honor of President Tito, Accra, March 1, 1961”. In S. Obeng (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1, pp.295-296.

⁴²⁶ See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.177-183.

⁴²⁷ The British file BNA, DO/177/2”Subversive activities by Ghanaians in Nigeria” includes some documents on the development of socialism in Ghana and others concerning Ghana’s new measures to spread its political message in Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa. These documents will be used further in the thesis to describe Ghana’s new tactics towards the support to political movements in West Africa.

4.3. The Establishment of the African Affairs Secretariat

While Nkrumah was opening to the East, a general process of radicalization affected both the CPP and the Ghanaian State.⁴²⁸ The foreign policy machinery was completely reformed and aligned to the needs of a new, radical Pan-African policy. Important changes involved the Foreign Service, the BAA and the AAC.

The Bureau confirmed its increasing importance in the system to the point of reducing the power held by the Foreign Service itself. Barden was becoming the very key figure of Ghana's Pan-African policy and the BAA agents became a constant presence in the Ghanaian embassies and high commissions in Africa. Even the appointment of ambassadors and high commissioners was now strongly influenced by the Bureau.

The Foreign Service was also revolutionized. The first relevant change was the establishment of the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS), a new Ministry of foreign affairs specifically designed for dealing with African issues. Nkrumah created the new body so to have a diplomacy completely dedicated to the continent. The project was announced for the first time on 8 April 1961. The circumstances of its launch were quite revealing. Nkrumah included the news in his famous "Dawn Broadcast", a speech to inform Ghana of the forthcoming shift to socialism. Indeed, the President considered a new and more effective foreign policy as an integral part of his socialist revolution.

Like it had been for the BAA, the establishment of the AAS was also announced before the office was properly set up.⁴²⁹ Nkrumah needed badly a new instrument for his

⁴²⁸ See for example "Building a Socialist State", Speech made by Kwame Nkrumah to the CPP Study Group on 22nd April 1961, included in S. Obeng (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1, pp.322-335. Nkrumah did not make references to Soviet socialism, but to a socialism which could allow Ghana to achieve wellness and industrialization. From this point of view, Nkrumah's attitude towards Socialism can be easily considered as pragmatic. For instance at pag.323: "As our party has proclaimed, and as I have asserted time and again, socialism is the only pattern that can within the shortest possible time bring the good life to the people. [...] One point, however, we have to get clear at this juncture, Ghana is not a socialist state. Not only do the people as yet not own all the major means of production and distribution, but we have still to lay the actual foundations upon which socialism can be built, namely, the complete industrialization of our country. All talk of socialism, economic and social reconstruction, are just empty words, if we do not seriously address ourselves to the question of basic industrialization and agricultural revolution in our country, just as much as we must concentrate on socialist education".

⁴²⁹ According to Asante, the African Affairs Secretariat "was established without any formal instrument". From the statement of K.B. Asante, undated, included in a footnote in M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of*

new Pan-African policy and he needed it also to show an immediate reaction to the failures of the Congo. He did not have time to plan the project in every detail. It was more than ever important to include it in his plan for a socialist revolution.

The AAS was also another attempt of Nkrumah to reduce the influence of the old Foreign Service in the making of Ghana's foreign policy, a problem which dated back to Padmore's times. The President needed a more "radical" Ministry of foreign affairs for Africa, with a staff composed mainly by "militants". By establishing the AAS, Nkrumah sent a message to the Service. Either they followed the new political line or they had to leave their posts to others that were more dedicated to the cause. The "Dawn Broadcast" included also a passage in which Nkrumah warned the civil service for his passive attitude, just before he introduced the establishment of the Ministry of African Affairs, the future AAS:

[...] It amazes me that, up to present, many civil servants do not realize that we are living in a revolutionary era. This Ghana, which had lost so much time serving colonial masters, cannot afford to be tied down to archaic snail-pace methods of work which obstruct expeditious progress. We have lost so much time we need to do in ten years what has taken others a hundred years to accomplish. Civil Servants, therefore, must develop a new orientation, a sense of mission and urgency to enable them to eliminate all tendencies towards red tape-ism, bureaucracy and waste.⁴³⁰

Immediately after this passage, Nkrumah announced various changes in the Ghanaian State, including the establishment of the new Ministry. Such a new institution was going to take control over all the diplomatic missions in Africa, although its relationship with the other "Pan-African" institutions remained obscure. Indeed, Nkrumah announced at first the fusion of the latter with the new Ministry. Even if this hypothesis was soon discarded, it was clear that the new institutions was bound to be much more radical than a normal Ministry of foreign affairs.

Ghana's Foreign Relations, p.25. The same thing had happened at the time of the establishment of the BAA. Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.

⁴³⁰ Kwame Nkrumah, the "Dawn Broadcast", 8th April 1961 in S. Obeng (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1, p.315.

In order to promote greater efficiency in the machinery of the Government, I have decided to re-organize slightly the existing ministerial set-up. In view of the increasingly important part being played by Ghana at the present time in the African liberation movement, I have decided to create a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This new Ministry will be responsible for all African matters, including the present duties undertaken by the Bureau of African Affairs and the African Affairs Centre. It will also liaise with the All-African People's Secretariat and the All-African Trade Union Federation.⁴³¹

The Ministry of African Affairs was meant to be an ephemeral body. Imoru Egala was appointed Minister, but his office did not last long. The Ministry was suppressed less than a month later and it was turned into the African Affairs Secretariat.⁴³² The new AAS was not a proper ministry but an office attached to Flagstaff House. Thus, Nkrumah could control it even better, like he did before with Padmore's Office. At the time, a small office to report Nkrumah on African Affairs was already working at Flagstaff House, but it was now absorbed by the AAS.⁴³³

The whole African section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was moved to the Secretariat, which begun coordinating also the Ghanaian missions in Africa. Many men were transferred from one institution to the other. Among them, there was also K.B. Asante, a man "discovered" by Padmore and already involved in the run for the post of director of the BAA.⁴³⁴ He became Principal Secretary of the AAS. Michael Dei-Anang - who had been Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1959 - was appointed head of the AAS.

⁴³¹ Obeng (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1. The All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) was the first attempt to realize a Pan-African trade union organization. It was established at the Casablanca Conference a few months before. For information on the AATUF see, for instance, E.H. Kloran Jr, *African Unification Movements*, pp. 393-394.

⁴³² On Egala's appointment see BNA, FCO/141/6735, Letter, Flack (British High Commission in Accra) to Browne (Commonwealth Relations Office), 31st May 1961. See also on the same subject: W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.199.

⁴³³ In January 1961, shortly after the Casablanca Conference, he had asked the Minister of External Affairs for an officer to deal with African Affairs at Flagstaff House. Statement of K.B. Asante, undated, included in a footnote in M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.25.

⁴³⁴ Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.

The establishment of the AAS did not take place without protests. Nkrumah could have launched the project even before April but he was held back by Adjei's opposition.⁴³⁵ The Minister of Foreign Affairs criticized the new body, as he thought that the Ministry itself could lose most of its efficiency. Moreover, Adjei tried to convince Nkrumah that two different Ministries were going to weaken Ghana's foreign policy, since actions were no more coordinated. Even if the President eventually ignored Adjei's criticisms, the problem remained and it was bound to influence the relationship between the AAS and the Ministry. Thanks to the Secretariat, Ghana's African policy was now totally under Nkrumah's control. As Thompson underlined, with the new body, revolutionary Pan-Africanism had won the day, at the expenses of a coordinated policy.⁴³⁶

The BAA and the AAC were still entirely independent from the AAS. The Bureau had not been absorbed since it had too much political power at the time.⁴³⁷ Moreover, Barden's Office had even different duties to perform. The Bureau was still using unorthodox methods, whereas the AAS was a radical, yet "orthodox" institution.⁴³⁸ From that moment, the AAS had begun supporting the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana, while at the time it tried to solve diplomatically every incident caused by them in Africa. The relationship between the AAS and the BAA is one of the crucial aspects of the history of Ghana's Pan-African policy since 1961.

The Secretariat became the main protagonist of the following years. With its establishment, Ghana's Pan-African policy could be performed through an institution completely dedicated to the continent and its needs. However, the establishment of the AAS was only one element of a wider institutional reform in Ghana. Nkrumah's intervention was planned to cover even other aspects, starting from the educational system.

⁴³⁵ M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.25.

⁴³⁶ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign policy*, p.199.

⁴³⁷ The UK High Commission in Accra had received some information on the AAS's establishment by K.B. Asante. According to the new Principal Secretary of the Secretariat: "In the event it had not proved possible for the African Affairs Secretariat to swallow the Bureau of African Affairs, no doubt because of the strong political pressures involved". In BNA, FCO/141/6735, Letter, Flack (British High Commission in Accra) to Browne (Commonwealth Relations Office), 31st May 1961.

⁴³⁸ Michael Dei-Anang's categorization is radically different. He included the AAS as part of the groups of institutions following "Un-orthodox" diplomatic lines. See M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.25. However, he does not explain in details the reasons for this choice.

4.4. Spreading “Nkrumahism” in Ghana and in Africa: the Ideological Institute of Winneba

Part of Nkrumah’s reforms was the investment in the project of an ideological school at Winneba, which dated back to the times of the African Affairs Committee. The President decided for the immediate opening of the Institute in order to train in political activity and administration Ghanaian party members and civil servants and also freedom fighters from others parts of Africa. Thanks to the ideological school, the Nkrumahist ideology could be absorbed by the Ghanaian State and spread out to the whole continent. In this sense, the Institute can be considered at the same time as a “Pan-African” institution and a political instrument used by Ghanaian “radicals” to assess their position in the country. In the following years, the BAA made good use of the Institute to influence diplomatic appointments and, broadly speaking, the whole ideological orientation of Ghana’s Foreign Service.

In 1960, the idea of a party school at Winneba had been very far from being actualized. After the meetings of the committee, the only reference to it had been Nkrumah’s speech at the PAPSA in April.⁴³⁹ With the opening of the new political phase, Nkrumah decided to re-launch the project, which was now crucial for actualizing the radicalization of the country and spread the Pan-Africanist ideology in the continent. On 18th February 1961, the Ghanaian President announced the establishment of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba and he inaugurated its first course.⁴⁴⁰ The decision of opening the Institute had been so quick that the actual building was not yet ready. Thus, the first course took place outside its perimeter.

In the opening speech, Nkrumah made it clear that the Institute was meant to change dramatically both the State and the party. He also referred to it as a new weapon for the African liberation and unity struggles. Indeed, a young generation of African nationalists

⁴³⁹ *Opening Session, speech of Kwame Nkrumah, 7th April 1960 in Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa, Community Centre, Accra Ghana, 1960, p.4.*

⁴⁴⁰ The fact that the Institute was named after Nkrumah himself is worth noting. In this period, the cult of personality became increasingly visible. Few years later, a statue of the President was also placed in front of the Institute.

trained at the Institute could follow Ghana's political model and strengthen the Pan-African front in the continent.⁴⁴¹ The references to the Congo Crisis as an acceleration factor for the opening of Winneba's Institute are also worth noting. Quoting from the speech:

From my days in London up to the present, I have never once stopped shouting to all Africa about African unity. The sad episode in the Congo more than justifies my fears; the unwinsdom to stand alone, each by itself, in the face of this fierce onslaught by the new colonialists, who are equally (if not more) dangerous and merciless in their come-back endeavors. When, therefore, I have come to this town of Winneba to lay the foundation stone of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute and to inaugurate the first course in ideological training accommodated in temporary premises, I see a beam of hope shooting across our continent, for the things which will taught in the institute will strengthen African youth and manhood and inspire it to scale great heights; and the men and women who will pass through this institute will go out not only armed with analytical knowledge to wage the battle of African socialism, but will also be fortified with a keen spirit of dedication and service to our motherland.⁴⁴²

After presenting the sections of the Institute (Ideological Education Training Centre and the Positive Action Training Centre), Nkrumah underlined that the school was providing the party with an ideological training never supplied before. The CPP was going to be improved thanks to the work of the Institute. In particular, the Party could serve better the

⁴⁴¹ The BAA was already working for exporting the Ghanaian political model (mainly the CPP model). In this sense, the Institute was only a weapon to increase the efficacy of such work. It might be useful to provide one example of the policy performed by the BAA trough the work with liberation movements. It is a secret report on Nyasaland, submitted by the Ghanaian Minister of External Affairs to the Bureau of African Affairs in November 1960, in which the Bureau was informed on the recent development in the politics of the country at the time part of the Central African Federation. In the part concerning politics, the minister underlined the successes of the Ghanaian policy in influencing the Malawi Congress Party. Quoting from the text: "Dr. Banda's position as President of the Party is supreme and unchallenged and he enjoys the fanatic adoration of the masses. There is no doubt whatsoever that he has full effective control of the party machinery. He has modelled his party on the organizational techniques he acquired from the Convention People's Party in Ghana including the slogans, procedures at rallies, the organization of women, youth and party activists, the organization and function of the Executive and even the basic policies. These have proved very effective. [...] [The Malawi Congress Party] is completely aligned in policy and practice to the stand taken by Ghana in international, particularly African affairs". In AGPL, BAA/370, Report from the Minister of External Affairs to the Bureau of African Affairs, "Political Survey of Nyasaland", 22nd November 1960.

⁴⁴² Kwame Nkrumah, speech for the opening of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Winneba and the first course of the institute on 18th February 1961. In S. Obeng (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1, pp.272-273.

Pan-African struggle. According to Nkrumah, the Convention People's Party was "pitch forked by historical circumstances into the spear-head and vanguard of the gigantic struggle for the total liberation of Africa and the independence and unity of African States".⁴⁴³

The CPP itself was going to be a model for other nationalist parties in the continent. The Institute was called to spread nationalism, socialism and Pan-Africanism in other countries, coordinating the establishment of a united front of liberation movements. Such a front would finally lead to the establishment of a sort of continental party. Quoting from the opening speech (italics by the author):

The Kwame Nkrumah Institute will not cater for Ghana alone. Its doors will be opened to all from Africa and the world, both seek knowledge to fit themselves for the great freedom fight against imperialism and colonialism old or new, and the consolidation of peace throughout the world for the progress of mankind. I can envisage the future possibilities of this arrangement. When African freedom fighters from all over Africa have come into this institute and quenched their thirst for ideological knowledge, *they will go back fortified in the same principle and beliefs, pursue the same objectives and aims, appreciate the same values and advocate the same themes. I see before my mind's eye a great monolithic party growing up out of this process, united and strong, spreading its protective wings over the whole Africa* – from Algiers in the north to Cape Town in the south; from Cape Guardafui in the east to Dakar in the west.⁴⁴⁴

Nkrumah made the aims of the Institute very clear. However, he did not mention in details the content of the ideological training that would have been provided. At the time, "Nkrumahism" was still being developed as a coherent and comprehensive ideology. First conceived by Kofi Baako, it was planned to be the sum of all Nkrumah's ideals and principles.⁴⁴⁵ Quoted for the first time at the celebration for the Republic (July 1960), the

⁴⁴³ S. Obeng (Ed. by), *Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah*, vol.1, pp.273-274.

⁴⁴⁴ Kwame Nkrumah, speech for the opening of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Winneba and the first course of the institute on 18th February 1961. *Ibidem*.

⁴⁴⁵ K. Agyeman, *Ideological Education*, p.7. See also W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 257.

term “Nkrumahism” had not been used for the rest of the year.⁴⁴⁶ It was not even quoted at the opening speech of Winneba’s Institute or in its first course.

The Institute itself had not received clear indications on the political and organizational models to be followed. There had been no time to discuss these questions before Nkrumah ordered to start off with the courses. The development of the Institution into a solid project took all the following years with continuous changes and adaptations to the needs of Nkrumah’s internal and external policies. According to Tibor Szamuely - who was lecturer at the Institute - it was “a kind of cross between Socratic Athens, the London School of Economics and the Moscow Institute of Marxism-Leninism”.⁴⁴⁷ As Agyeman had rightly pointed out, the Ideological Institute “lacked a systematic foundation”.⁴⁴⁸

The managing of the Institution was in the hands of both the CPP and the BAA. Both bodies were called to work on the definition of the structure of the courses and their content. While the BAA was becoming more and more influenced by the party ideology, the CPP was increasingly linked to the office.⁴⁴⁹

The Bureau had the duty to organize courses on African liberation and unity for both Ghanaians and foreigners. It was also responsible to check on the identities of all the non-

⁴⁴⁶ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p. 113. In the same page, Thompson quotes an article of Evening News (1st July 1960) devoted to “Nkrumahism”. Talking about the new ideology the author of the articles states: “Nkrumahism, [...] is launched today [...] to the initiate Nkrumahism is a complex political and social philosophy which is still in gestation so long as the leader continues to add to the principles by words and deeds”.

⁴⁴⁷ Quoted in P. Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: the anatomy of an African dictatorship*, p.121 Interestingly, the subjects taught at Winneba remind those of Kutvu, the Ideological school where Padmore had lectured on colonialism in the early 1930s. see G. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, p.318.

⁴⁴⁸ K. Agyeman, *Ideological Education*, p.11.

⁴⁴⁹ In September 1961, shortly after Nkrumah’s trip to the Socialist countries and some months after the “Dawn Broadcast”, the BAA was re-organized and new office duties were distributed. The first instructions for the staff of the BAA were: “You will be loyal to the President of the Republic, the nation, the government and the CPP”. See AGPL, BAA/376, circular, “General Office Instructions – All-Staff”, sent by the Director (Barden), 5th September 1961. As a result of the process of politicization of the BAA, the staff became increasingly composed by indoctrinated members. Interviews with K.B. Asante and David Bosumtwi-Sam. The BAA became a sort of “radical wing” of the CPP.

Ghanaian students enrolled at the Institute.⁴⁵⁰ The director Kwodwo Addison was also strictly connected with the BAA and he was constantly in contact with Barden.⁴⁵¹

The Bureau immediately started working for organizing courses at Winneba. In June, it set up a seminar involving a number of Builder Brigadiers, a proof of the increasing collaboration between the party and Barden's Office.⁴⁵² The first real course for freedom fighters was organized some month later, in autumn. It was a three-month course first planned in October and then moved to November. Two elements can be considered interesting about this first experimental course: the list of students invited and its contents.

The students were members of the most important parties supported by Accra, particularly those of Southern Africa. Their tuition was free and the government provided them also with flight tickets to reach Ghana. The parties involved were those politically in line with Accra. Thus, the list of students invited at the first course reveals also which parties Nkrumah favored the most.⁴⁵³ A first list included:

⁴⁵⁰ The Bureau was constantly updated on the news concerning African freedom fighters, even those who attended the courses at the Institute. See AGPL, BAA/376, service regulation, "Clerical Officer (Records)", sent by the Director (Barden), 15th September 1961.

⁴⁵¹ Addison had worked for the AAPC from May 1959 to February 1961. He was a trade union leader and he also worked as Administrative Secretary of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. Interview with Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012. He was a notorious Marxist and he had benefited from the process of radicalization of Ghana. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.112. According to Asante, it was due to his political convictions, more than to his skills, if he gained the post of director of the Institute. Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.

⁴⁵² On 22nd June 1961, the Bureau requested 30 Brigadiers (15 young girls and 15 young boys) to the Builders Brigade for a seminar to be held at Winneba (they were then reduced to 15). The costs were completely covered by the BAA and not by the Institute, a sign of the involvement of the Bureau in the organization of the seminar. See AGPL, BAA/325, Letter, Bosumtwi-Sam (BAA) to the National Organiser of the Builders Brigadiers and Armah, 22nd June 1961. See also in the same file: Letter, Bosumtwi-Sam (BAA) to the National Organizer of the Builders Brigade and Armah, 23rd June 1961.

⁴⁵³ AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organisations of Dependent African States, "List of Political Organisation of Dependent African States for the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological School at Winneba – Commencing 15th November 1961", undated.

**List of Political Organisations of Dependent African States for the Kwame Nkrumah
Ideological School at Winneba, Commencing:**

15th November, 1961

<i>Organisations</i>	<i>Nations</i>	<i>No.</i>
United National Independence Party (UNIP)	Northern Rhodesia	6
Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP)	Swaziland	10
Democratic Congress Alliance (DCA)	Gambia	4
Union of Population of Angola (UPA)	Angola	4
Afro-Shirazi Party*	Zanzibar	6
Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	Uganda	4
UDENAMO	Tanganyika	10
Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP)**	Bechuanaland	10
National Democratic Party (NDP)	South Rhodesia	10
Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)	Basutoland	12
<i>Total</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>76</i>

(*) In the original list, the Afro-Shirazi party name is misspelled.

(*) In the original list, the BPP is wrongly reported as Bechuanaland Congress Party.

Other parties or individuals were involved at the last minute. Some of them were invited by Accra and some others requested to participate after having received news about the course. The Kenyan KANU related to the first group. The reason for the delay of

Ghana's offer is unknown. However, Barden sent a last-minute invitation to the course for four KANU students, providing them also with flight tickets.⁴⁵⁴

Some unsuccessful attempts were also made to involve Somali students. In this case, the initiative came from Ghana's Ambassador at Mogadishu K. Budu-Acquah. Interestingly - as Budu-Acquah wrote to Dei-Anang - his attempts to convince Somali students to attend the course was part of a major strategy for strengthening the Ghanaian influence and for spreading Pan-Africanism in Somalia, hence reducing Nasser's influence in the country.⁴⁵⁵ Still, Barden had rejected his proposal, opening one of the first cases of clashes between the BAA and the AAS on African Affairs.⁴⁵⁶

Autonomous requests came from the Sierra Leonean party All People's Congress and also from a country linked to Ghana through men of the "Diaspora", the British Guyana.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁴ AGPL, un-catalogued /BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, draft for telegram, Barden to Executive Officer of KANU, 14th November 1961.

⁴⁵⁵ AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organisations of Dependent African States, Letter, Budu-Acquah to Dei-Anang, 14th November 1961. Interestingly, according to Budu-Acquah, his policy in Somalia was opposed both by the British and the Arabs of the UAR (called "adversaries"). While announcing his success in inviting the students to the course (a personal initiative, without apparently any indication from above in that respect), Budu-Acquah pled also for his transfer to Europe on the ground of his increasingly difficult position in Mogadishu. Quoting from the letter: "Although I have succeeded in arousing the forces of Pan-Africanism in this area and thus routing the Arab forces, the fact remains that I am going to be a target. At the moment, every evil that besets the British Embassy is attributed to me. The UAR, you know, has blue-booked me. I must jump clear off the scene so as to prepare myself for yet such difficult assignment. Meanwhile, I am working hard to get an agreement with the Somali Government for the abolishment of visas between our two countries. In spite of the fact that many people do not visit here from Ghana and vice-versa it will be yet another moral victory over our adversaries – the Arabs".

⁴⁵⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued /BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to Dei-Anang, 29th November 1961. Conflicts on the attribution of the duties between AAS and BAA became common in the ensuing years. As it will be showed in the next subchapter, behind this conflict there was still a deep diversity in conception between the "orthodox" AAS and the "un-orthodox" BAA. In this case, Barden limited himself to criticize Budu-Acquah for not having used the proper channels (namely the BAA, instead of the AAS). See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organisations of Dependent African States, Letter, Dei-Anang to Barden, 5th December 1961 and AGPL, un-catalogued /BK-Ideological Course for Political Organisations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to Dei-Anang, 6th December 1961.

⁴⁵⁷ Sierra Leone's request came after a visit of the All People's Congress' leader, Siaka Stevens. He wrote to Barden to propose three of their young party members for attending the course. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter (handwritten), Siaka Stevens to Barden, 30th November 1961 (and the following transcript). Barden, who showed appreciation for their request, accepted and sent them three tickets. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to Siaka Stevens, 2nd December 1961. The request from Guyana came directly to Nkrumah's office and consequently it was forwarded to Barden's. See AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Ibrahima (Office of the President) to Barden, 5th October 1961. However, even though Barden had accepted the Guyanese's requests, a plan for proper scholarship was not yet ready. It took

The course was still experimental. Barden himself considered it as “only a ‘sandwich’ course” as its first aim was to prepare the ground for a two-years one.⁴⁵⁸ Still, it is interesting to go through its contents in order to understand the general educational approach of the Institute and the basis for the subsequent developments. The course - finally reduced to a two-month one - was divided in three main parts: Theory, Practical and Evaluation.

In the theoretical part, there was no reference to Nkrumahism (officially adopted only after this course) nor to socialism. The reasons for this were tactical, as underlined in a note of the BAA.⁴⁵⁹ Indeed, most freedom fighters were coming from “dependent” countries and references to socialism could raise even more suspects on the part of the colonial authorities. The theoretical part included lessons on Nationalism, propaganda, Positive Action, the functioning of Trade Unions, local government and administration, Pan-Africanism, African Personality and Constitutional Conferences works.⁴⁶⁰ The political models proposed were obviously all related to Ghana. The CPP was presented as the best form of nationalist party and the same was for the Ghanaian TUC and the Pan-Africanist AATUF for what concerned trade unions.⁴⁶¹

The Practical part included an insight into the work of the CPP and the Ghanaian Institutions. It included visits to: CPP headquarters, TUC, Young Pioneers, Builders

some months before the issue was solved. See AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Iprahim, 6th October 1961. The scholarships for the Guyana’s students were approved only for the next course scheduled. See AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Chinebuah to Barden, 3rd February 1962. The latter case is interesting as it shows Ghana’s will to extend its influence even outside of Africa. Indeed, by supporting the Guyanese (with scholarships), Ghana was once again strengthening the ties between countries populated by African descendants and Africa itself. From this point of view, Ghana’s link with the African Diaspora had not ended with Padmore’s death, nor it was with Du Bois’ in 1963.

⁴⁵⁸ AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Iprahim, 6th February 1962.

⁴⁵⁹ AGPL, BAA/423, Note, “Curriculum”, undated.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶¹ According to the authors of *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*, the Ghanaian President pushed to teach at Winneba a sort of religious cult linked to the party. The students – he thought - should be “made to realize the Party’s ideology is a religion and should be carried out faithfully and fervently”. Unfortunately, as usual in this book, there is no reference to any source for this statement. See NLC, *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*, p.44. TUC stands for Trade Union Congress and it was the main trade union federation in Ghana. The AATUF stands for “All-African Trade Union Federation” and it was an attempt to create a Pan-African trade union federation. For further information on AATUF see for instance J. Kloman, *African Unification Movements*, pp.393-394; see also D.Z. Poe, *Kwame Nkrumah’s Contribution to Pan-African Agency*, p.113..

Brigade, National Council of Ghana Women and the Farmers Council.⁴⁶² The students were also invited to participate to rallies. Finally, the most important figures of the Ghanaian State and the Party gave lectures on various aspects of ideology and administration.⁴⁶³

In the same period, other two important ventures took place at Winneba. Two conferences were held for the Ghanaian ambassadors, the first one for those on duty in Africa and the second one for those working outside the continent. The diplomats had to be updated on the new approach of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. With the establishment of the AAS, the Ghanaian President had given more instruments to deal with African Affairs. Thus, all the ambassadors were called to be constantly informed on the developments of politics in the continent. Moreover, they were also requested to adhere to the new ideological orientation of the state. The Institute was bound to check on this orientation before any ambassador was appointed and sent to a mission. In case the candidates were not considered ideologically aligned, proper courses would re-educate them. Interestingly, the conference for Ghanaian ambassadors of non-African countries dealt, among the other things, with the functioning of the Bureau of African Affairs and the African Affairs Centre.⁴⁶⁴ The conference was meant to explain the actual functioning of the whole system of foreign policy of Ghana.

In January, with the last conference of ambassadors (4-10th January) and the end of the course for freedom fighters (28th January), the Institute ended its first year of activity. It had been a year of experimentation. All the data and the criticisms collected in the past year

⁴⁶² AGPL, BAA/423, Note, "Curriculum", undated. In order to have the best possible training for local governments, Barden also requested to the Ministry of Local Government to provide lecturers for the course. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter Barden to the Minister of Local Government, 31st October 1961. The Minister agreed and sent two members of his staff to speak about Local Government Administration. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Addai to Barden, 11th November 1961.

⁴⁶³ On 8th January 1962, Barden wrote to almost all the Ministers, Party executives, and high rank civil servants to involve them as lecturers in the ongoing course. This is a further proof that the course had been scarcely organized in advance and that it could be considered an experimental one. See AGPL, un-catalogued/ BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Addai to Barden, 11th November 1961. Some of the most important personalities of Ghana, including Ako Adjei, accepted.

⁴⁶⁴ AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Principal Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dei-Anang and Barden, 5th December 1961. The letter includes the following list of the contents of the conference: a) Policy towards Africa; b) The Casablanca powers; c) Ghana's relations with Ivory Coast and Togoland; d) Ghana's relations with Liberia and Sierra Leone; e) The Bureau of African Affairs and African Affairs Centre; See also AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Asante to Principal Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 12th December 1961.

were used to plan major changes. The Institute was planned to be completely transformed into a sort of University providing two-year courses. Changes also occurred in the contents of the classes.

The BAA was directly involved in the elaboration of a new plan. In January, the National Council for Higher Education and Research (NCHER) sent Barden a draft proposal for the conversion of the Institute.⁴⁶⁵ The first question was the change of the name of the school - proposed by Nkrumah himself - into “Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science”.⁴⁶⁶ The second and more important question was a revision of the very nature of the institution. The NCHER had analyzed criticisms and suggestions made by the students of the previous courses. On these bases, it proposed the establishment of three different levels of courses in place of the existing two: a main course on Political science, a short one for Ghanaian party members and civil servants, and a last one specifically designed for African nationalists.

The pillar of the new Institute was planned to be the two-year course in Political Science, meant to provide “sound education at the level of a University institution along the lines of institutes such as Ruskin or People’s college”.⁴⁶⁷ The NCHER wanted to transform the school into a sort of University, modeling it on other famous educational institutions in the world. In the name of Positive neutralism, its model would be half a way between the West and the East. However, the Institute was not losing its character of ideological school. In the following years the name “Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute” was often used informally in place of the official one. Even after 1966, the National Liberation Council always referred to it with this name.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁵ AGPL, BAA/423, Draft Memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of Political Science”, 24th January 1962.

⁴⁶⁶ The plans for the changes in the Institute had been prepared by the National Council for Higher Education and Research (NCHER). The Council wrote to Barden in January just to have his endorsement on the plan to be submitted to Nkrumah. See AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Adu (Secretary of NCHER) to Barden, 24th January 1962.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶⁸ See for example the files of the NLC administration (dating after the coup, in February 1966): PRAAD, RG3/5/1635; PRAAD, RG3/5/1636; PRAAD, RG11/1/148; PRAAD, RG11/1/154; PRAAD, RG11/1/357; see also NLC, *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*, p.44, ff.

As a result of its investigations, the NCHER considered the previous courses inadequate.⁴⁶⁹ According to Barden, criticisms on the Positive Action course (the one organized by the BAA) were amply unjustified.⁴⁷⁰ Indeed, several parties had showed appreciation for the results of the course organized by the BAA, even if it was an experimental one.⁴⁷¹

The courses were re-designed according to the proposals and suggestions of both the NCHER and the BAA, in order to increase the efficiency of the Institute. The most important change was the introduction of Nkrumahism as the official ideology to be taught. It was a sign of the changing times. Indeed, during 1962, the wave of radicalization reached its peak and Ghana entered definitely into the Socialist era.

Freedom fighters, sponsored by allied parties, were invited to attend the new courses, without having to pay for any tuition. The new courses were finally defined and they comprehended everything concerning the state administration, the functioning of the party machinery, communication, and economics.⁴⁷² The subjects taught at the Institute were now very similar to the ones granted by political institutes in the socialist world.

Important changes involved also the staff of the Institute. The NCHER had particularly criticized the lack of graduate teachers in 1961. Thus, it proposed the enrollment of three resident tutors, preferably Ghanaians and graduates. Only in case this solution was not possible, they suggested hiring socialist foreigners.⁴⁷³ Barden added an important detail to the NCHER's observations. According to him, any Ghanaian lecturer

⁴⁶⁹ AGPL, BAA/423, Draft Memorandum, "Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of Political Science", 24th January 1962.

⁴⁷⁰ AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Adu (NCHER), 1st February 1962.

⁴⁷¹ The Secretary-General of the Democratic Congress Alliance of Gambia, Garba-Jahumpa, wrote to Barden shortly after the Positive Action course was finished to thank him for the "valuable training received" by his party members. He also underlined that they were "making very good use of these comrades" for the independence struggle. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Garba-Jahumpa to Barden, 12th February 1962. See also the answer: AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to Garba-Jahumpa, 20th February 1962. It is interesting to underline that Garba-Jahumpa was one of the participants in the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress. It is once again a case of a political contact dating from the time of Padmore's activity.

⁴⁷² Diploma courses comprehended the following subjects: Nkrumahism (theory and practice), Economics, Political institutions, constitutional law, African studies, leadership, communication techniques, office management.

⁴⁷³ AGPL, BAA/423, Draft Memorandum, "Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of Political Science", 24th January 1962.

had to be ideologically aligned. Such a characteristic was even more important than owning a graduate degree:

I do not wholly agree that the tutorial staff should be strictly recruited from the graduate cadre only, as very few graduates in Ghana today have any idea of the fundamental concept of Nkrumahism on which the party machinery is based. Nor are there any known graduates who have identified themselves with the nationalist organizations abroad and who have appreciation of the material required to assist these organizations in their liberation struggle. I consider the best means of recruiting tutorial staff for the School would be to look out for persons with reasonable background education who are loyal to the party have made a proper study of Socialism as related to Nkrumahism and who understand the African liberation struggle.⁴⁷⁴

In line with this plan, Barden proposed to send some indoctrinated Ghanaians to USSR or Yugoslavia in order to train them as tutors for the Institute.⁴⁷⁵ According to the NCHER, the main problem with Barden's plan was the lack of candidates. Indeed, few Ghanaian graduates had "identified themselves with this ideological form of activity [Nkrumahism]".⁴⁷⁶

The lack of Ghanaian personnel eventually led the institution to hire foreigners from socialist countries like the GDR.⁴⁷⁷ For this reason, the influence of the East on the Institute increased considerably through the years.

After all the changes made in early 1962, the Institute had been transformed. It was now ready to spread Nkrumahism both in Ghana and abroad. The BAA had been a fundamental for the evolution of the institution and the Institute itself became one of

⁴⁷⁴ AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Adu (NCHER), 1st February 1962.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷⁶ AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Adu (NCHER) to Barden, 3rd February 1962.

⁴⁷⁷ The NCHER had proposed socialist tutors coming from both the East and the West (for instance British ones). AGPL, BAA/423, Draft Memorandum, "Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of Political Science", 24th January 1962. Barden, ironically, commented on the last point: "I do not know the sort of "Socialism" practised in the United Kingdom which makes you to suggest that we might draw tutors from that country". AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Adu (NCHER), 1st February 1962. The NCHER replied: "I imagine that it is possible, even in the United Kingdom, to find a sincere socialist who would sympathize with the ideology embodied in Ghanaian Nkrumahism to be an acceptable tutor". AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Adu (NCHER) to Barden, 3rd February 1962.

Barden's instruments to influence Ghana's internal and external policies. Thanks to Winneba's school, the "militants" were bound to strengthen their position at the expense of the "diplomats" of the AAS. The relationship between the two institutions became a major issue in this period.

4.5. The Confrontation between the AAS and the BAA

The new phase of Ghana's foreign policy led to frictions between the three institutions deputized to its performance, the new Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the BAA. The Ideological Institute of Winneba became the ground where the clashes between the three Ghanaian bodies took place. The main source of friction was the management of the political "visa" issued by the Institute before several "political" diplomatic appointments. Barden increasingly extended his control over the Institute, taking also care of these appointments. Such interference in the management of the Foreign Service was resented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also by the newly established AAS.

The establishment of the AAS had already complicated the work of Ghana's foreign policy machinery even for what concerned the "traditional" diplomacy. As Dei-Anang rightly pointed out, the presence of the AAS had strongly complicated the work of the "foreign office" which was now completely duplicated in all its forms.⁴⁷⁸ According to him, in this new system of "parallel agencies", the strongest frictions were those between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat. First of all, the Secretariat was physically very close to Nkrumah's Office and so constantly in contact with it. This fact led the Ministry to be always one step behind the AAS in every question since 1961.⁴⁷⁹ Secondly, the two institutions were completely different in their nature and aims and Nkrumah clearly gave more power to the Secretariat than to the Ministry. The AAS had been established by

⁴⁷⁸ M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.28 It might be useful to recall Thompson's comment on the issue. He wrote that with the establishment of the Secretariat a "cohesive policy was lost" and that the foreign policy machinery in Ghana was in general weakened.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, p.28.

Nkrumah only to solve the problems of the latter. According to Dei-Anang: “in the mind of Nkrumah, the Foreign Ministry was identified with a slow, inactive, and orthodox service incapable of reacting effectively to his needs”.⁴⁸⁰ The Secretariat was indeed established to be rather the opposite.

Even if considered an “unorthodox” foreign ministry, the Secretariat was still following the traditional diplomatic procedures. From this point of view, the BAA was also different from the new institution in its nature and aims. Since 1961, every mission concerning African liberation and unity was faced by the BAA and the AAS with two completely different approaches. In many cases, this fact led to clashes between the two institutions, often following diplomatic accidents caused by the BAA activities. The frictions between the AAS and the BAA became soon even stronger than the ones between the AAS and the Ministry.

The basis of the contrast between the AAS and the BAA was the increasing power of the Bureau within the Ghanaian apparatus of foreign policy. Indeed, after the Congo Crisis, Barden had succeeded in convincing Nkrumah to grant him more resources and more freedom of action. In this period, the Bureau extended also its influence on the embassies to the detriment of both the Ministry and the AAS. The net of BAA agents was getting very wide and likewise their contribution to the making of Ghana’s foreign policy in Africa was becoming quite relevant. Barden himself had proposed Nkrumah to rely more on his agents for the running of the Ghanaian embassies.⁴⁸¹

The BAA held stronger position, but it also had new duties to perform. Since 1961, Barden had to develop all the activities of the Bureau (production and distribution of Pan-African press, use of agents on the field etc.) and he also had to start working on the new tasks his office required. The most important of them was the provision of military training

⁴⁸⁰ M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations*, p.29.

⁴⁸¹ In December, the director of the BAA had proposed to Nkrumah a reform of the Ministry, presenting observations collected in his East African trip. Indeed, during this trip, Barden lamented a lack of communication between Accra and its embassies. The circulation of information was essential in order to fulfill Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. A lack of coordination with the embassies was also damaging the work of the political attaches, directly depending on the BAA. For this reason, Barden proposed the Ministry to make good use of the experience of the men of the Bureau, who had been already successful in creating a net of information in Congo and other fronts of the Pan-African struggle. See AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 1st December 1960.

to freedom fighters. Such a new strategy was the result of a clear tactical change in the Pan-African policy of the President.

At first, Nkrumah had strongly sponsored non-violence. Until 1961, Ghana did not support guerrilla warfare, unless strictly necessary. Instead, it tried to push the liberation movements towards the use of Positive Action.⁴⁸² Everything changed after the fall of Lumumba. Nkrumah had failed to create a strong Pan-African front to counteract the presence of the “imperialist” forces. It was time to find a solution to the political and military weakness of the radical forces in Africa. Even if, theoretically, Ghana kept sponsoring non-violence, Nkrumah ordered to invest more resources in the military training of African freedom fighters. The first example of this new course was Congo, where Ghana started providing arms and military trainers to Gizenga’s government. Soon after, similar initiatives followed in Southern Africa and in the Portuguese territories.

The BAA’s first task was to connect the frontline with Accra. There, agents of the Bureau constantly updated Barden on the needs of the African liberation movements in term of funds, supplies and arms. The second task of the Office was to provide military and political training to African freedom fighters. In order to achieve this target, Barden set up specific courses to be attended by men selected by their nationalist parties. The supervision of the operation was, once again, in the hands of the agents on the spot. The courses took place in secret military camps, specifically established for this purpose and known only to Barden, Nkrumah, and few others.

The first military training course in Ghana dates back to the end of 1961. In November, the first of a series of four secret camps, the one of Mankrong, was opened to secretly train the African political refugees hosted in Ghana to guerrilla warfare.⁴⁸³ According to the information collected by the National Liberation Council after the coup of

⁴⁸² According to K.B. Asante, Nkrumah’s attitude towards the use of violence was pragmatic. Even though he was generally contrasting such strategy, he was also aware than sooner or later (and the Congo Crisis was a clear signal) the “imperialists” would have driven forcefully Ghana in that direction. Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 6th September 2012.

⁴⁸³ NLC, *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*, p.6.

February 1966, the first course began on 3 December 1961 and ended on 23 June 1962. The instructors were Russians.⁴⁸⁴

The courses were also making use of Winneba's structures, most of the times for teaching politics.⁴⁸⁵ No military training was usually taught at the Institute.⁴⁸⁶ However, occasionally, some students did receive such training there. The proof of this assertion can be found in a letter sent by the Bureau to the Ministry of Interior dated 10 July 1962.⁴⁸⁷ In the document, the director of the BAA was informing the Ministry of the danger represented by the freedom fighters trained at Winneba. In line with Nkrumah's new dispositions, every African nationalist trained in military tactics and guerrilla had to be expelled from Ghana. Indeed, they were considered useless unless they reached the frontlines of the Africa liberation struggles. Moreover, they could also represent a threat for Ghana itself, in case they turned against their allies. Quoting from the letter:

The students, whose names are attached, have completed a course at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Winneba and have returned to their respective countries. The course, which was intensive, was designed to fit them for the African liberation struggle. The knowledge and experience they have acquired in military tactics and sabotage are such that we consider their re-entry into the country a security risk.⁴⁸⁸

The same military courses were also attended by members of opposition parties supported by Ghana. This fact attracted the suspects and the hostility of the majority of Ghana's neighboring countries. The BAA became soon one of the most infamous organizations in Africa, since it was known to be behind the military training of "terrorists". To make the things even worse, the Bureau also increased its intelligence activities in all the "moderate" African states.

⁴⁸⁴ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.6.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibidem.*, p.4.

⁴⁸⁶ Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012.

⁴⁸⁷ AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to the Principal Immigration Officer, Ministry of the Interior and Local Government, 10th July 1962.

⁴⁸⁸ AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to the Principal Immigration Officer, Ministry of the Interior and Local Government, 10th July 1962.

With these premises it is no mystery that the BAA came into friction with the AAS, which was still using traditional diplomatic lines. According to Michael Dei-Anang:

As the liberation struggle in Africa gained momentum, further friction developed. Within the Bureau there was the tendency to adopt the unorthodox line of diplomacy which invariably provoked foreign governments. Since it was entrusted with responsibility for the guerrilla training of freedom fighters, other governments in Africa, particularly those in neighboring territories, saw Ghana as the source of most of their domestic difficulties.⁴⁸⁹

In this context, the AAS was usually called to solve serious diplomatic accidents caused by the missions performed by the BAA. It was the case, for instance, of Ivory Coast, where the Secretariat had to work constantly to calm down the fears of Houphoet Boigny about the activities of the Sanwi in the country.⁴⁹⁰ As a result, the AAS and the BAA developed an increasing reciprocal resentment.

To make the position of the AAS even more difficult, the Bureau was usually not informing the Secretariat about its missions. Still, it was using Ghanaian embassies for transferring information or weapons.⁴⁹¹ This fact is confirmed by both Armah and Dei-Anang.⁴⁹² The latter gives an account of the consequences on the relationship with the AAS:

In my job I was constantly required to confirm with the President that he had instructed Barden to undertake certain activities in independent Africa about which I had heard from other sources. The Bureau had its own organization but was also able to use the orthodox diplomatic channels. For example, the Bureau often worked through a member of one of the established missions in Africa, who would be permitted to use the wireless transmitter but employed a separate code for communication with his headquarters. The Bureau was also able to use the diplomatic bag for the transmission of messages and supplies, but under

⁴⁸⁹ M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.29.

⁴⁹⁰ Interviews with K.B. Asante.

⁴⁹¹ Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012.

⁴⁹² For Armah's comments on the issue see K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.29.

a separate seal. The Foreign Office was thus not always in a position to censor communication between Barden and his field associates.⁴⁹³

The Bureau was operating independently from the foreign office, Secretariat included, and this fact contributed to the tension between Barden's office and Dei-Anang's one.

Meanwhile, Barden began to extend his influence on the appointments of ambassadors. This fact led the relationship between the BAA and the Foreign Service to its lowest point.⁴⁹⁴ In order to achieve this target, the director of the Bureau counted on his control of the Institute and his close relationship with Nkrumah. Thus, political appointments became common. The consequence of Barden's policy was the increasing isolation of the BAA within the Ghanaian State. The institution was thought to be too powerful and too independent. Since 1961, Barden became surrounded by enemies both outside and inside Ghana.

One of the first and maybe the most important "political" appointment made by the Bureau in this period was the one of David Bosumtwi-Sam, former Administrative Secretary of the BAA itself. He became ambassador in Uganda in 1962 specifically to fulfill a mission requested by Nkrumah and Barden: working against the project of the East African Federation.

With the extension of his influence on diplomatic appointments, Barden reached the peak of his power. In the period 1961-1964, thanks to his agents and political attaches he was able to control several Ghanaian missions. Barden's negative reports to Nkrumah could cause the removal of any diplomat in Africa.⁴⁹⁵ However, the strong power of Barden and his BAA revealed also the weakness of the whole system of foreign policy. Indeed, the disputes between the "parallel agencies" caused often the failures of the targets of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Such problems particularly involved the BAA and the AAS.

⁴⁹³ M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, pp.30-31.

⁴⁹⁴ Dei-Anang gave also an account of this fact as one of the main point of friction between the AAS and the BAA. He wrote: "A stage was even reached where certain diplomatic representatives were selected by the President from the "activists" operating within the Bureau". *Ibidem*, p.29.

⁴⁹⁵ Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011, and interview with Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012.

4.6. The Struggle for African Unity between 1961 and 1962

Once again, West Africa was the main battle ground for the unity project, since it was around the UAS that most of the Ghanaian strategy on the matter was based. Until the Organization of African Unity was established (May 1963), Ghana made every effort to extend its traditional area of influence. The BAA was the real protagonist of this new season of Pan-African politics.

Even after Mali had joined the UAS, the Union was still a fragile body. Touré, Keita, and Nkrumah himself were absolutely skeptical towards the idea of surrendering their sovereignty to the inter-state entity. Still, the latter kept promoting the UAS as the basis for a Continental Union Government and he kept inviting other countries to join in. The goal of Nkrumah's unity policy between 1961-63 was to involve other African states to enlarge the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. Some attempts were even made outside this region. For instance, in August 1960, Nkrumah had discussed with Lumumba the possibility of establishing a Ghana-Congo union to join the UAS.⁴⁹⁶ In early 1961, even the Malawi Congress Party had proposed Nyasaland as a new member of the Union, once it become independent.⁴⁹⁷ Such a proposal was a confirmation of the strong relationship between the party and the Ghanaian government.

In West Africa, the battle for improving the union was fought with the strongest vigor. Between 1961 and 1962, a constant work was made to attract Upper Volta towards the Union of African States. Eventually, in the summer of 1962, an attempt on the life of Nkrumah just after a journey in Upper Volta closed all the possibilities of further actions in that direction.⁴⁹⁸ A similar work was made also with other countries such as Niger and Togo. In these cases, two policies were performed by Ghana. First of all, Nkrumah worked at a diplomatic level to involve them in the union. At the same time, he also financed the opposition parties of the same countries, providing military training to their militants. In the latter case, a change of government in Niger or Togo was considered as the key to speed up

⁴⁹⁶ See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.123, 125-126, 140 and 430.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, p.204. In February 1961, Chiume promised, that his party would join the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. See also Daily Graphic, 3rd February 1961.

⁴⁹⁸ See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.204-205 and 207, ff.

the process of unity. Clearly, this policy was considered subversive by the African governments involved, which accused Ghana of fomenting terrorism within their borders. In the case of Niger, the Sawaba party was still heavily supported by Accra, both financially and militarily. The presence of the party leader Djibo Bakary in Accra is confirmed in April 1961.⁴⁹⁹ Sawaba party members are reported in Ghana at least until the summer of 1965 when they were moved out of the country, just before the OAU conference.⁵⁰⁰ In the case of Togo, Nkrumah worked hard against Olympio's government, since the Togolese President had always refused every proposal of a union with Ghana. However, according to Thompson, the relations between Togo and Ghana were more affected by reciprocal fears of subversion rather than an actual political distance.⁵⁰¹ Indeed, ideologically speaking, Olympio was very close to Nkrumah. He, however, feared that Ghana could absorb geographically and politically Togo. For this reason, he opposed any unity project and he adhered to the "Entente".⁵⁰² But even more than Niger, Togo and Upper Volta, Ghana concentrated its efforts for unity on Ivory Coast and Nigeria.

With Houphouet-Boigny, Nkrumah kept performing a double-face policy. On one hand, he tried to improve the relations with Abidjan. For instance, he met his Ivorian counterpart in autumn 1960 trying unsuccessfully to convince him to join the Union with Guinea.⁵⁰³ On the other, through the Bureau he kept supporting the Sanwi, putting a strong political pressure on Abidjan. At the time, the Sanwi were hosted at the African Affairs Centre but still not active in subversive activities. After 1964, they had also begun to receive a proper military training, becoming a political weapon for Ghana against Ivory Coast.⁵⁰⁴ Clearly, such a double-face policy caused frequent incidents between the two countries.

⁴⁹⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued/AA-Office Stationery Equipment and Accommodation, Letter, Bosumtwi-Sam to the Manager of Avenida Hotel, Accra, 25th April 1961.

⁵⁰⁰ For further information on Sawaba in Ghana see also NLC, *Nkrumah's Deception of Africa*, pp.5-7.

⁵⁰¹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.221-222.

⁵⁰² See V. Austin, "The Uncertain Frontier: Ghana-Togo", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* vol.1, 2 (1963), pp.139-145. See also R. Ragulo Bening, "The Ghana-Togo Boundary, *Africa Spectrum*, vol.18, 2 (1983), pp.191-209.

⁵⁰³ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.148.

⁵⁰⁴ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.4.

With Nigeria, Nkrumah's work was even harder than in the other cases. Lagos was the most important element for any plan of unity in West Africa. However, it had chosen the field of moderate African states almost immediately after its independence (1st October 1960), opposing Nkrumah's radical Pan-Africanism. In order to put pressure on Azikiwe and Balewa, Accra had turned to the Action Group, the most important Yoruba party led by Obafemi Awolowo. In 1962, while Ghana was strengthening its relationship with the AG, the party was accused of plotting against the Nigerian government. Awolowo and his fellow party members were put on trial with the accusation of supporting the secession of the Western part of Nigeria.⁵⁰⁵ Even Ghana was quoted in the trial as the *longa manus* behind the AG. For the first time, a clear attack against Nkrumah was made by another African country. Evidences were also produced of the military training granted to the Action Group militants by Ghana. Between 1961-1962, Nigeria increasingly criticized Ghana's radicalization.⁵⁰⁶ The Nigerian leaders even prepared a defense plan in the event of a Ghanaian invasion of Yorubaland in support to the Action Group.⁵⁰⁷ At the time, Nigerians were also paying attention to Ghana's moves in the neighboring Cameroon, where Accra was active since 1959. Information on a "path" that led UPC members from the Cameroons to Ghana and then to China came to the desk of Nigerians.⁵⁰⁸

Ghana was attracting the suspects of practically every neighboring country. Nkrumah reacted to this suspects investing even more resources on the BAA activities and to support opposition parties. The time was running fast and Nkrumah wanted to speed up the unity process. According to him, the more they waited, the more difficult it would have been to

⁵⁰⁵ On the process and also on the internal political struggle in Nigeria at the time see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.239-242.

⁵⁰⁶ The Nigerian press was strongly criticizing Ghana during 1961. They were particularly disapproving the despotic attitude of Nkrumah's government showed during the year in which "the road of socialism" was launched. The titles of the Nigerian newspaper West African Pilot speaks for themselves: "Nightfall in Ghana"; "The Sun Goes Down"; "Brink of Chaos" and "Reign of Terror Dawns in Ghana". See BNA, DO/177/2, "Subversive Activities by Ghanaians in Nigeria", Extract of "Nigerian Fortnightly Summary", 29th September-12th October 1961.

⁵⁰⁷ A series of documents of the Dominions Office and Commonwealth Office shows how Nigeria was cooperating militarily with the UK in the event of a Ghanaian plan of regional "subversion". See particularly BNA, DO/177/2, "Subversive Activities by Ghanaians in Nigeria", "Ghanaian Armed Intervention in Western Nigeria in the Event of the Latter's Secession from the Federation", 13th July 1961.

⁵⁰⁸ BNA, DO/177/2, "Subversive Activities by Ghanaians in Nigeria", "Ghanaian Interference in Nigeria", undated.

actualize such a project. History was going to prove Nkrumah right, as the establishment of the OAU in spring 1963 definitely crystallized the project of African unity.

In the same period, Nkrumah invested also huge resources to support African liberation. In this field, the Bureau became more and more powerful but it also became the target of criticisms by the same freedom fighters. Indeed, Barden's management was often seen as particularly dictatorial and his strategies were judged as wrong and counterproductive. For instance, strong criticisms against Barden and his BAA came from Nelson Mandela, when describing the relations between ANC and Ghana at his trial.⁵⁰⁹

Even if Ghana was suffering several political defeats, its position among the liberation movements was still strong. Nkrumah was far from being defeated by his enemies. In this phase of radical Pan-African policy, the role of the Bureau was predominant and it conquered a leading stature in the foreign policy machinery of Ghana.

4.7. Voice of Africa and Radio Ghana in the Age of Radicalization

The last field of operation of the BAA between 1961 and 1962 was the production and distribution of Pan-Africanist press and radio programs. Since early 1961, Barden's office improved its means of propaganda in order to support Nkrumah's new political line. Indeed, it was essential to give visibility to Ghana's shift towards socialism and to explain "Nkrumahism" to the African freedom fighters, considering that only few of them could attend the courses at Winneba. A plan for the production of Pan-Africanist propaganda had already been launched in 1959 by the African Affairs Committee with the projects of Radio

⁵⁰⁹ See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.222-223. For the attitude of Ghana, particularly the BAA towards ANC and PAC see S. Thomas, *The Diplomacy of Liberation: the Foreign Relations of the ANC since 1960*, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 1996, pp.30-34; Kofi Batsa, recalled in his autobiography the bad relationship between Mandela and Barden. He wrote: "Nelson Mandela, for example, did not get as much support, as an ANC man, from the Bureau of African Affairs, as he would have had otherwise, and eventually he told me he was being messed around so much by these conflicts and by A K Barden [...] that he was going back to South Africa to fight". In K. Batsa, *The Spark*, p.17.

Ghana and Voice of Africa (VOA). In the years 1961 and 1962, both the radio and the magazine were developed and other publications were also conceived and produced.

At the end of 1960, Barden reported Nkrumah on the developments of Voice of Africa.⁵¹⁰ The review had a good reception. However, according to the director of the BAA, the whole project had to be revisited in terms of quality and quantity in view of the new political phase. First of all, he suggested raising the production – about Ten Thousand copies - to at least Twenty Thousands. Secondly, he proposed to change completely the contents in order to transform it in an effective political instrument. In the new phase, it was essential to find the way to promote Nkrumah's ideology over the others. He wrote to the Ghanaian President [*italics by the author*]:

The snag in our political campaign abroad, particularly in the African States, is the lack of a qualitative national magazine capable of projecting Ghana and its national policy and disseminating its political ideologies and aspirations in such convincing terms *as to arrest the political thoughts and imaginations of other African countries*. Such a paper should have as its primary objective, strong propaganda campaign in canvassing political opinions abroad in support of Ghana's policy of United Africa.⁵¹¹

Barden added also some comments on the use of propaganda in Ghana. He criticized the weakness of the actual system since, according to him, it had proved unable to support properly Nkrumah's influence on African politics. The new Voice of Africa was the solution to this problem:

It has been observed that your important policy speeches and statements setting out the course of African destiny "die at birth", i.e. no sooner they are broadcast[ed] and published in local papers than they are forgotten. This is the result of lack of effective machinery to follow them up. I consider that such speeches and statements can have a profound impact on other African states and influence them to a considerable degree if we had a magazine of the stature and quality capable of giving them a wide publicity by amplifying in a

⁵¹⁰ AGPL, BAA/370, "*Report of the Activities of the Bureau – January to December 1960*", Barden to Nkrumah, 16th December 1960.

⁵¹¹ AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 30th December 1960.

continuous and sustained manner the salient points which will appeal to other African countries. [...] it is my intention to convert the "Voice of Africa" into such a magazine.⁵¹²

The new Voice of Africa had to be launched immediately in order to counteract the growing political power of moderate African countries. Moreover, it had to win the competition with similar magazines in countries like UAR or Cameroon.⁵¹³ Ghana had to prevail in this "war of propaganda" at all costs.

Nkrumah approved the plan and he granted Barden with new funds and men for strengthening VOA and the rest of the BAA propaganda machinery. The most relevant new appointment was the one of Kofi Batsa, a Ghanaian journalist known for his communist sympathies. Interestingly, Batsa had first come into contact with journalism and political radicalism through James Markham, former key figure of Padmore's office and of the African Affairs Committee.⁵¹⁴ Even if he had been politically "sacrificed" during Nkrumah's rise, he had never lost contact with politics. When the project of the new Voice of Africa was launched, Nkrumah immediately accepted Barden's proposal of hiring Batsa, a sign of the trust which surrounded the latter both politically and professionally.⁵¹⁵ At the time, Batsa was already involved in Radio Ghana with the daily commentaries on African Affairs, the radio programs launched by the African Affairs Committee in 1959. According to Batsa himself, Adamafio was the one who put him in contact with the Bureau of African Affairs. The journalist could not refuse to take the post of editor of VOA and "almost immediately [he] was plunged into the middle of the propaganda machine which was spreading Kwame Nkrumah's views to the whole Africa".⁵¹⁶

Voice of Africa was re-launched as a weekly "magazine of African News and Views" on January 1961. However, already in the following issue it was transformed into a

⁵¹² AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 30th December 1960. It is interesting to observe the level of confidence that existed between Barden and Nkrumah at the time. Indeed, this letter was marked as "secret", meaning that it was intended as a very important and private correspondence.

⁵¹³ AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 30th December 1960.

⁵¹⁴ Indeed, in the late 1940s, he had spent a lot of time at the Evening News offices in the company of James Markham, who at the time worked for the newspaper as editor. K. Batsa, *The Spark*, p.6.

⁵¹⁵ For Nkrumah's approval to the appointment of Batsa as "Research Officer and Editor of the Bureau's Publications" see AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Erica Powell (Personal Secretary of Kwame Nkrumah) to Barden, 10th January 1961.

⁵¹⁶ K. Batsa, *The Spark*, p.13.

monthly publication. Interestingly, as Hooker underlined, the cover showed a drawing very similar to the one depicted on Padmore's book "Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers", published in 1931.⁵¹⁷ It was probably a tribute to the memory of the man who practically created the BAA and who contributed to the conception of Ghana's Pan-African policy.⁵¹⁸

VOA was made primarily to promote Nkrumah's thoughts in Africa. The cover always presented a space devoted to one of the quotations of the Ghanaian President. Interestingly, the very first article of VOA, "Birth of my Party", was written by Nkrumah himself.⁵¹⁹ References to the CPP were not uncommon, being the party presented as a model for other nationalist parties. The majority of the articles dealt with Pan-Africanism, such as, for instance, A.K. Barden's "African Unity Now", also published in the first issue.⁵²⁰

At the same time, VOA was meant as well to be the voice of freedom fighters. Thus, a relevant space was devoted to articles written by members of friendly liberation movements like, for instance, the Pan-Africanist Congress. In the case of South Africa, even the ANC had articles published in VOA, but it received less space than the PAC.⁵²¹

Voice of Africa was now produced and distributed on a larger scale than it was before. According to Batsa, the review soon reached one hundred thousand copies.⁵²² It was

⁵¹⁷ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.22.

⁵¹⁸ The most important tribute to Padmore was the establishment of the George Padmore Research Library on African Affairs in Accra. Opened officially in June 1961, the project of the Library was ready at the times of the African Affairs Committee. The issue was one of the first ever discussed by Nkrumah at the Committee meetings. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/251/African Affairs Committee, 4th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November, 9th 1959. At the speech made by Nkrumah the day of the opening of the library, the Ghanaian President presented Padmore as one of the most important figures of Ghana and Africa. See "Padmore the Missionary", speech made by Kwame Nkrumah in the occasion of the opening of the George Padmore Memorial Library, 30th June 1961 in S. Obeng, *Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah*, pp.375-379.

⁵¹⁹ K. Nkrumah, "Birth of my Party", *Voice of Africa*, vol.1, 1(1961), pp.2-4.

⁵²⁰ A.K. Barden, "African Unity Now", *Voice of Africa*, vol.1, 1(1961), pp.8-9.

⁵²¹ See for example: N. Mandela, "We Shall Win", *Voice of Africa*, vol.2, 3(1962), pp.16-19; N. Mandela, "The United Nations and South Africa", *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 7-8(1964), pp.28-29; N. Mandela, "Why I am ready to Die", *Voice of Africa*, vol.5, 1(1965), pp.11-18; It is even interesting to notice how, apparently, the clash between Barden and Mandela was not considered much by the former. Indeed, Mandela is never presented critically in the magazine.

⁵²² K. Batsa, *The Spark*, p.13. During 1961, the printing system of the BAA was also improved by importing Chinese printing machines. The challenge was not only the one of printing an increasingly high number of copies of VOA. Barden wanted also to challenge Guinea and UAR on the production of materials for nationalist parties. Barden aimed to attract the sympathies of Nationalist parties by providing space to display

a remarkable achievement, but it also implied a considerable effort, since in most of the cases liberation movements were receiving VOA free of charge. Distributing the magazine on the frontline of the liberation struggles was also a difficult task, as VOA was being banned everywhere by colonial authorities. Still, according to Batsa, Voice of Africa could be delivered practically anywhere in the continent and outside it.⁵²³ Soon, VOA was also published in French, leading to an even wider distribution.⁵²⁴

Voice of Africa was becoming a fundamental instrument of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Together with the Ideological Institute and the secret camps, the review was one of the most important political innovations of 1961. At the end of November, a satisfied Barden wrote to Nkrumah to describe the achievements of the review. It is interesting to notice Barden's focus on the impact of the magazine in the East and in the West:

It is no exaggeration to say that since its appearance on the African political scene, it has been accepted (painfully though it may be to them) by the Western Imperialist countries, as the most progressive publication representing all shades of popular African nationalist views and projecting their real aspirations. In East European countries, its influence is profound.⁵²⁵

Kofi Batsa was doing a good job with VOA. In the meantime, the Ghanaian journalist was also contributing to the training of freedom fighters in the secret camps or abroad. As Batsa himself wrote: "Nkrumah's all-Africa view involved practical help as well as verbal".⁵²⁶ He was at the same time the chief editor of the BAA, a lecturer for the training camps, and a BAA agent. A similar profile was that of Samuel Ikoku. A Member of the Action Group of Nigeria, he had to escape from his country after his party had fallen in disgrace in 1962.

their struggles. See AGPL, un-catalogued/AA-Office Stationery Equipment And Accommodation, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 21st November 1961.

⁵²³ K. Batsa, *The Spark*, p.13-14. Batsa wrote: "We were banned in many countries still under colonial rule, but we managed to reach most countries by one means or another. The distribution system of the Voice of Africa was in fact one of the largest and most ingenious distribution systems that could be imagined, and no frontier was safe!"

⁵²⁴ One of the first references to a French version of VOA is in AGPL, BAA/325, Letter, Linguistic Secretary to Batsa, 3rd June 1961.

⁵²⁵ See AGPL, un-catalogued/AA-Office Stationery Equipment and Accommodation, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 21st November 1961.

⁵²⁶ K. Batsa, *The Spark*, p.14.

Considered a terrorist by the Nigerians, he moved to Ghana and he worked for Nkrumah's government until the time of the coup.⁵²⁷ Being an esteemed economist, Ikoku lectured at Winneba and he became the editor of *The Spark*, a new political review established in 1962 and edited also by Batsa.

In the meantime, even the radio was further developed. With the establishment of the External Service of the Ghana Broadcasting System on 27 October 1961, the whole Radio distribution was widened, covering almost the entire continent. Twenty-one daily news bulletins and various news talks and newsreel were broadcasted in Portuguese, Hausa, Arabic, Swahili, French and obviously English. Nkrumah himself pronounced the opening speech of the new service called "Voice of Africa", the same name used for the review. He particularly underlined how important it was to counteract the "imperialist" propaganda against Ghana and Pan-Africanism:

[...] The news is presented from an African standpoint [...] From this station, we shall broadcast all-African news bulletins presented without concealment or distortion. Our compatriots in Africa and our friends now have the opportunity of hearing each day, in the language they understand, accurate and factual accounts of day-to-day events which may not be available to them from foreign-controlled and foreign-dominated radio stations operating in and broadcasting to their countries. From this station, commentaries and news talks will be broadcasted every day, giving Ghana's standpoint in international and African political affairs. [...] the voice which will go out will be truly African – African in content, outlook and imagination.⁵²⁸

In Nkrumah's plans, Radio Ghana had to become the means to reach every part of the continent spreading his political message for African liberation and unity. He was well aware that a "propaganda war" was mounting in Africa and that Ghana had to be ready to fight it. If Accra failed in providing its voice to Africans, the Pan-Africanist ideal would certainly be defeated.

⁵²⁷ He wrote a book on his experience in Ghana. It is: S.G. Ikoku (Julius Sago), *Le Ghana de Nkrumah*.

⁵²⁸ See Speech for the opening of the Ghana External Broadcasting Service "Voice of Africa" by Kwame Nkrumah on 27 October 1961, in S. Obeng, *Selected Speeches*, pp.386-388.

Radio Ghana and VOA worked together on the same target. Materials coming from the review were commonly used in radio programs and African freedom fighters were requested to either write articles on VOA or talk in dedicated programs. Radio Ghana was also constantly advertised in Voice of Africa:

RADIO GHANA VOICE OF AFRICA <i>Transmission Times and Wavelengths</i>			
ENGLISH SERVICE		PORTUGUESE SERVICE	
(i) SUDAN, ETHIOPIA, SOMALILAND		(i) ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE	
1415—1500 GMT	21.545 Mcs	13.92 Metres	
1830—1915 GMT	11.805 Mcs	25.41 Metres	
(ii) EAST AFRICA		1415—1500 GMT 17.740 Mcs 16.91 Metres	
1500—1545 GMT	21.545 Mcs	13.92 Metres	
(iii) SOUTH, SOUTH WEST AND SOUTH EAST AFRICA		1630—1715 GMT 17.740 Mcs 16.91 Metres	
1500—1545 GMT	17.740 Mcs	16.91 Metres	
2000—2045 GMT	15.285 Mcs	19.62 Metres	
(iv) WEST AFRICA		GUINEA ANGOLA	
1500—1545 GMT	9.545 Mcs	31.43 Metres	
1700—1745 GMT	9.545 Mcs	31.43 Metres	
2000—2045 GMT	9.545 Mcs	31.43 Metres	
2130—2215 GMT	6.070 Mcs	49.42 Metres	
FRENCH SERVICE		1630—1715 GMT 9.545 Mcs 31.43 Metres	
(i) CONGO, CENTRAL AFRICA, MADAGASCAR		HAUSA SERVICE	
1745—1830 GMT	11.805 Mcs	25.41 Metres	
1915—2000 GMT	11.805 Mcs	25.41 Metres	
(ii) WEST AFRICA		(i) WEST AFRICA	
1745—1830 GMT	9.545 Mcs	31.43 Metres	
1915—2000 GMT	9.545 Mcs	31.43 Metres	
2045—2130 GMT	9.545 Mcs	31.43 Metres	
		1545—1630 GMT 9.545 Mcs 31.43 Metres	
		ARABIC SERVICE	
		(i) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, SUDAN, LIBYA	
		1630—1715 GMT 21.545 Mcs 13.92 Metres	
		(ii) MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNIS	
		2000—2045 GMT 11.805 Mcs 21.41 Metres	
		SWAHILI SERVICE	
		(i) EAST AFRICA	
		1715—1800 GMT 21.545 Mcs 13.92 Metres	
		(ii) EAST AFRICA, NORTH EAST CONGO	
		1830—1915 GMT 21.545 Mcs 13.92 Metres	
		11.805 Mcs 25.41 Metres	
		SPECIAL ENGLISH SERVICE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND EUROPE	
		2045—2130 GMT 11.805 Mcs 25.41 Metres	

Voice of Africa, vol.1, 9 (1961), p.32.

With the support of an effective propaganda, Nkrumah was ready to fight his battle for spreading Pan-Africanism in the continent. His enemies were growing day after day and he needed to counteract their propaganda in order to prevail politically. The BAA had proved to be the perfect instrument to deal with this task. Barden had been able to develop every aspect of propaganda production, from the contents to the distribution net. From this point of view, Nkrumah could be satisfied by the result achieved by his “Pan-African” institution.

4.8. Conclusions

After two years of work, Ghana's Pan-African policy had finally a new, more radical shape. Nkrumah was ready to fight the battle for African liberation and unity with all the strength and the resources of the Ghanaian state. At the end of this process, the BAA had emerged stronger. To a certain extent, the Bureau was becoming even more influential than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AAS with regard to Ghana's foreign policy.

Ghana had proved ready to fight for African liberation and unity on many different fronts. However, its enemies were also becoming stronger and Accra's political isolation was constantly growing. Nkrumah had decided to radicalize the country to strengthen its political position in Ghana and in Africa. On the other hand, the move also proved to be dangerous, as the moderate countries backed by UK, France, and USA had multiplied their efforts to debunk Nkrumah's influence on African politics. The prospects for the future development of Ghana's Pan-African policy were problematic.

To make things worse, Nkrumah suffered a life attempt at Kulungugu in the summer of 1962. This event was bound to change definitely his approach to internal and foreign policy, leading radicalization to its final stage. The "diplomatic approach" towards African Unity was definitely abandoned only to be proposed again and unsuccessfully shortly before the coup of February 1966. The BAA increased its activities and the "war of propaganda" between Ghana and the moderate countries grew larger.

A second event also contributed to a further change of pace of Ghana's Pan-African policy, the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (May 1963). This new body – the product of a political victory of "moderates" – soon became Ghana's concurrent in Africa. In particular, the OAU Liberation Committee was going to compete with Ghana on the support to freedom fighters. As a result, Nkrumah became even more isolated, while other figures began to attract the sympathies of radicals in Africa.

The next chapter - which will comprehend the years 1963-1966 - will open with these two events, which marked the beginning of the last phase of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy and of his leadership as well. In this period, the political successes of the years 1957-1959 were only a distant memory.

5. Between Diplomacy and Revolution (January 1963 - February 1966)

Introduction

In 1963, Nkrumah's government entered its last phase. Between 1963 and 1966, the Ghanaian President led his country towards a harsh confrontation with other independent African states and the Western powers. A more "militant" and "military" approach had been adopted. As a result, Accra became increasingly isolated. Nkrumah's political influence was reduced progressively to just a few radical governments and liberation movements. Furthermore, Ghana's close relations with the East and the BAA's "unorthodox" methods had attracted the fears of London and Washington. Thus, Ghana became known in Africa as the source of "subversive" and "terrorist" activities. Nkrumah himself was accused of being the head of a plan to pave the way for communism in the continent. The conclusion of this phase was the end of Nkrumah's rule itself, when his government was overthrown by a military coup on February 1966.

The goal of this chapter is to outline the history of the last phase of Nkrumah's government, focusing the analysis on Ghana's radical Pan-African policy. It will be explained how the policy was conceived after 1963 and how the BAA worked to attain its targets. Moreover, the reaction of the West to Barden's moves in Africa will be described. Finally, the chapter will close with an analysis of the changes occurred in 1965. This year proved to be crucial as Ghana's foreign policy was totally put under revision in order to cope with the failures of the previous years. Changes occurred particularly in both the structures and the policies performed by the Bureau. The most important event of 1965 was Barden's removal as director. Two different approaches emerged. On one side, Nkrumah made a last attempt to use diplomacy for re-launching his Pan-African policy. On the other side, he kept supporting radical liberation movements and he also planned a vast military

intervention to solve the Southern Rhodesia question. The latter mission – never put into practice - was going to be the last one of Ghana's Pan-African policy.

The analysis of this last period will start with the definition of the new political phase in Ghana. Since the second half of 1962, Ghana speeded up the ongoing process of radicalization. Two events particularly influenced Nkrumah's policies in this period and led Ghana towards the new phase, the life attempt suffered by Nkrumah at Kulungugu on August 1962 and the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963.

The chapter will begin with the description of these two events in order to explain the basis of the new Pan-African policy of Ghana and why, up to spring 1965, Barden and his BAA gained more power than ever within the system of Ghana's foreign policy.

5.1. Kulungugu and its Consequences

On August 11th 1962, Nkrumah was injured as a result of a terrorist attack at Kulungugu (Northern Ghana) while on his way back from a meeting with the Voltaic President Yameogo. This event shocked Ghana and it led to a dramatic change of Nkrumah's political approach. Accra's internal and external policies were deeply affected by it. In the short term, Nkrumah closed politically to any of his political rivals in Africa. In the long term, his reaction was to push forward on the radicalization path, a decision that had important consequences on the composition of the CPP party ranks and also on his foreign policy. It represented the final victory for radicals like Barden who were willing to take a clear militant and military stance.

Before Kulungugu, Nkrumah had worked hard to give new impetus to the African unity project in West Africa, but with scarce results. He had even used traditional diplomacy to promote such a project. However, the activities of the BAA had obscured the work done diplomatically. The majority of the other West African states feared the strengthening of the Ghanaian influence in the region and they strongly opposed any

project of federation which was seen as Nkrumah's Trojan horse to extend his control to any adhering state.

The only relevant success had been to involve Yameogo in a project of federation, adopting more or less the same strategy used in 1958-1959 with Guinea and in 1960-1961 with Mali. Nkrumah had offered him better terms for the use of harbors (the Upper Volta was bound to the Ivory Coast for its exports) and he also offered a loan on the model of those granted to Guinea and Mali in the previous years. The meeting between Yameogo and Nkrumah on the eve of the bomb attack was just the final step before a proper federation agreement between the two states was signed.

While Nkrumah had succeeded in tightening his relations with Yameogo, the majority of the other West African states were still looking at Ghana with suspicion. Indeed, Nkrumah was accused of plotting against other West African governments. The presence of members of opposition parties at the African Affair Centre was considered as a proof of the subversive plans orchestrated by Nkrumah. Hosted as "freedom fighters", these men were considered terrorists by the countries involved. Thus, Ghana itself was accused of planning terrorist attacks in Africa.

For its part, Ghana was turning the accusations towards the same West African countries. According to Adamafo and Ikoku, before Kulungugu, there were proofs that Togo, Nigeria and Ivory Coast were working together with the United Party (UP) – the Ghanaian main opposition party in exile - to overthrow Nkrumah. The bomb attack confirmed such suspects.⁵²⁹ According to UP members - who admitted their involvement in 1966 - the bomb attack of Kulungugu had been planned in Togo by the UP and executed by Ghanaians trained in Lomè.⁵³⁰ The same UP members in exile were responsible for terrorist attacks in Accra one month later.

The Kulungugu affair was not a surprise. It simply confirmed Nkrumah's fears of murder plots against him. Moreover, it proved right the radicals who were pushing Nkrumah for a more active (and aggressive) foreign policy. From this point of view, the bomb attack marked the very end of a "diplomatic approach" towards Pan-Africanism. In

⁵²⁹ See T. Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's side*, pp.124 ff. and S. Ikoku, *Le Ghana de Nkrumah*, pp.196-199.

⁵³⁰ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.266.

Ghana, the Bureau of African Affairs consolidated its leading position in the foreign policy machinery. Ghana entered a new phase in which its foreign policy became as radical as ever.

First of all, Nkrumah closed every political negotiation with the three neighboring states, investing more resources in the BAA activities there. All the borders of Ghana were closed immediately after the bomb attack. The fear of subversive plots against Ghana was raised not just by “traditional” enemies (Togo and Ivory Coast) but also by Upper Volta. Such suspects led to the end of the project of federation with Ouagadougou, which consequently turned back to Abidjan, which emerged stronger than before. The relationship between Ghana and the three neighboring states reached the lowest level.

Nkrumah’s third move was to use the freedom fighters as a political weapons for strengthening his consensus both in Ghana and in Africa. Soon after Kulungugu, he invited the nationalists hosted at the AAC to protest against the life attempt he suffered. Just two months before, a conference of freedom fighters had been held at Winneba. In that occasion, Ghana had re-launched its role as the torch-bearer of African liberation. Now, the same freedom fighters were called to support Nkrumah in the difficult situation after the assassination attempt. Such an action was presented as part of the struggle for African liberation and unity, since without Nkrumah’s Ghana the Pan-African struggle was doomed to fail. It was the first time the Ghanaian President was clearly exploiting the net of freedom fighters built throughout Africa. From this point of view, his Pan-African policy could be also evaluated for its political return. The operation has also another target: checking within the ranks of freedom fighters in Ghana those who were loyal to Nkrumah and those who were not.

To reach all these purposes, a public demonstration was organized in Accra on August 17th 1962. Several of the parties which had a representative office in Accra took part to the rally. They were: UPC, BPP, UNIP, Sawaba Party, Sanwi Movement and the Union for Togo Liberation.⁵³¹ With the rally, Nkrumah showed his political strength to both his citizens and his rivals.

⁵³¹ The text of the speech of the freedom fighters representatives at the rally can be found in the article “All Africans must answer to the call of Osagyefo against colonialism” in Evening News, 21st August 1962. They

The BAA was behind the demonstration. Nkrumah had personally instructed Barden to organize it. It was the proof that the President had an absolute trust in the Bureau and that he was ready to rely on it in the new political phase.⁵³² Barden himself undertook the organization of the whole event. In September, the BAA tried also unsuccessfully to create a proper organization to gather together all the freedom fighters hosted in Accra in order to coordinate their actions better. Such an fragile body included: Sawaba Party, UPC (Cameroon), Sanwi Movement, BCP, UNIP and the Union for Togo Liberation.⁵³³

In the following months, Ghana attempt to reconcile with its neighbors partially succeeded.⁵³⁴ However, in the long period the consequences of Kulungugu proved dramatic. Nkrumah's attitude after the bomb attack convinced every moderate African state not to adhere to any plan of federation led by Ghana. Thus, in early 1963, Ghana became strongly isolated. While Nkrumah launched an even more radical campaign for African unity, the rest of the continent discussed on alternative solutions to achieve the same target.

5.2. Defense of Sovereignty and Fears of Subversion: the Togo Affair and the Road to the OAU

In 1962, the UAS project suffered its final crisis. Touré showed his will to abandon the Union in order to give shape to a new project of African unity, this time involving Ethiopia as its favorite partner. Together with Emperor Haile Selassie, he launched the idea of establishing a continental organization of African states. The two leaders met on 28 June at Asmara to discuss the possibility of merging the Monrovia and Casablanca groups

can also be found in AGPL, un-catalogued file, Speeches delivered on the occasion of the freedom fighters' demonstration at Accra on the 17th August 1962. The BCP sent an apology to Barden for their absence at the rally. See AGPL, BAA/424, Letter, BCP representatives in Ghana to Barden, 31st October 1962.

⁵³² Barden himself wrote to the main representatives of the party and the state for calling to the demonstration. See AGPL, BAA/424, Letters, 12th August 1962.

⁵³³ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.267. Thompson wrongly refers to Union for Togo Liberation as "United Front" from Togo.

⁵³⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 305 and 307.

together.⁵³⁵ Consequently, in August, Diallo Telli was sent by Touré to eighteen African states to propose a conference to be held in Addis Ababa on May 1963. These turned out to be the first steps towards the establishment of the Organization of African unity.⁵³⁶ Although Nkrumah had always sponsored a Pan-African union of states, he was not involved in the talks between Touré and Haile Selassie nor in the following preparation of the conference.⁵³⁷

At least since 1961, Touré had increasingly criticized Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. He had particularly contested the choice of establishing the Casablanca group, as he feared Guinea could suffer a political isolation from the rest of the African states. In several occasions, Guinea and Mali had showed willingness to join the Monrovia group, even if it was the expression of a moderate attitude towards African unity and socialism.⁵³⁸ Only Ghana's intervention had prevented them to adhere to the group. The charter of the new Union of African States of July 1961 was signed only after Nkrumah's promise to grant other funds to the other two members.⁵³⁹ However, despite Nkrumah's efforts, the UAS was still weak and Touré's opening towards Selassie marked its final failure.

Most of the independent African states were supporting African unity, but they opposed Nkrumah's radical plan for a Continental Union Government and considered Touré and Selassie's moderate Pan-African platform as the best solution for uniting the continent.

In contrast, the "radicals" were losing power and Ghana had lost most of its influence among them. Still, Nkrumah's road towards radicalization did not stop, but it affected more and more his Pan-African policy. The Ghanaian propaganda machinery definitely put the revolution in Ghana and Africa on the same ground. Socialism made its final entry into the Nkrumahist Pan-African discourse. Moreover, by that time, the Ghanaian President had begun attacking several independent African countries, defining them as "neo-colonialist

⁵³⁵ Z. Červenka, *The Organization of African Unity and its charter*, C.Hurst & Company, London 1968, p.2.

⁵³⁶ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.307.

⁵³⁷ Dzirasa, Ghana's resident minister in Conakry, was not informed of Guinea's moves, included the establishment of a seven-state group to work on the dissolution of Africa's blocs before the conference. *Ibidem*.

⁵³⁸ Both countries were radical, but they were also willing to join a wider platform of states in order to promote cooperation in Africa.

⁵³⁹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.202-203.

regimes”. In such way, he justified his support to opposition parties coming from the same states.⁵⁴⁰

The response of moderate Africa to Ghana’s campaigns was even stronger. Mutual accusations of subversive plans between Ghana and its political opponents characterized the whole period before the conference. The questions of subversion and the defense of sovereignty almost overshadowed the discussions on the draft proposals for the charter to be signed at the Addis Ababa conference. That was the situation when the “Togo Affair” came on the scene. This crucial event channeled more and more the fears of moderate Africa on Ghana and it influenced the road to the OAU.

The 13th of January 1963, the Togolese army overthrown and assassinated the President of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio. Few days later, Nicolas Grunitzky was appointed as the new President of the West African country. It was the first coup d’état in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Almost immediately after Olympio’s overthrown, moderate African countries and the Western world suspected Ghana was involved in the coup. Knowing the bitter relationship between Olympio and Nkrumah, Accra’s involvement was considered plausible. Indeed, at least since 1959, Olympio had lost Nkrumah’s support, despite their close political stance. Since then, Accra had supported Olympio’s political opponents and the Togolese President did the same with Nkrumah’s adversaries. The most evident proof was the Kulungugu

⁵⁴⁰ The article “The Theory of African Revolutionary Struggle” published on the Bulletin on African Affairs in November 1962 analyses in detail the new political line. The BAA journal - created for the internal use of the members of the State and the CPP - described neo-colonialism in independent Africa and the way to fight it: “In some of the independent African States the old colonial masters have skillfully handed over political power to an upper class in such way as to safeguard their economic and military interest. While these countries are nominally independent in the political scene, they are not in the position to use this political independence to achieve economic, social and cultural emancipation. Here the forces of the African revolution are the masses organized against the upper (usually feudal and capitalist) classes in the drive for total freedom from any form of foreign control. [...] whereas the reactionary forces depend on support from, and collaboration with, imperialism and colonialism, *the progressive forces draw their strength and inspiration from all those sovereign African states that have travelled the road of complete independence from foreign control and from the mass movements all over Africa*”. In “The Theory of African Revolutionary Struggle”, Bulletin on African Affairs, vol.2, n°124, 22 November 1962. A copy of the article can be found in AGPL, BAA/2.

affair. The main reason of resentment between the two leaders was Olympio's refusal to join a union with Ghana.⁵⁴¹

Even if Nkrumah immediately rejected all the allegations, his opponents used the coup in Togo to attack Ghana's Pan-African policy. In the mind of Nkrumah's rivals, the fall of Olympio was the proof that Nkrumah was ready to physically eliminate his enemies in order to rule a united and revolutionary Africa. Thus, the questions of sovereignty and subversion came at the top of the agenda of OAU conference.

These issues had been discussed in Africa since 1958. They had been part of the themes of the IAS conference, of the first All-African People's Conference and they had even been raised at Sanniquellie.⁵⁴² Every time Nkrumah had proposed his plans for African unity to other independent African states, they had responded with talks about the defense of sovereignty and the integrity of their territories. This cautious attitude towards Ghana turned into suspect after Nkrumah began financing opposition parties of other independent African states. Just before the OAU, the suspect on Nkrumah's plans evolved into an open attack against his government. On mid-February 1963, Touré, Keita, and Houphouët met to discuss Ghana's role in the Togo Affairs and in an alleged coup attempt in Ivory Coast in the same period.⁵⁴³ Despite Nkrumah's attempts to heal the divisions with Houphouët-Boigny, the Ivorian President, backed by his Malian and Guinean counterparts, was ready to present the question of subversion at the Addis Ababa conference.⁵⁴⁴

The Togo Affair had further increased Nkrumah's political isolation. The campaign against the Ghanaian President and his foreign policy was taking place just before the most important gathering ever held in Africa. It was probably the last opportunity for Nkrumah to present his ideas on African unity in a diplomatic way. For this reason, despite the

⁵⁴¹ Interviews with K.B. Asante. Olympio had always refused a project of political union with Ghana as he feared Togo would have been absorbed by Ghana losing its identity and independence, as it has been the case with British Togoland in 1956.

⁵⁴² For references on discussions on subversion and sovereignty in Africa at the IASC see A. Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound*, p.66. For discussion on the same issues at the AAPC see A. Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound*, p.72. See also Legum 42-45 Bakpetu., pp.126-140. For Sanniquellie see A. Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound*, pp.77-78 and Legum 45 and 162-163.

⁵⁴³ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.315-316.

⁵⁴⁴ In this period, Nkrumah sent K.B. Asante to conduct private talks with Houphouët-Boigny, in order to work for a reconciliation. Interviews with K.B. Asante.

general suspect surrounding his government, the Ghanaian President launched a final campaign to support his vision of a Continental Union Government just before the OAU.

5.3. The Addis Ababa Conference and the Confrontation between Models of Political Unity

In the months before the Addis Ababa conference, Nkrumah tried to renew his call for a continental government and he also tried to re-launch his role as a political guide of a the Pan-Africanist front. The Ghanaian President made every effort to recall the times when Ghana was leading the political scene in Africa. The aim was to counteract the negative propaganda which was damaging Ghana and his political vision in order to influence the talks of the OAU.

The Bureau played a fundamental role in this phase, as it controlled an effective propaganda machinery which could reach hundreds of influential African nationalists. BAA publications such as *Voice of Africa* and the new-born political journal *The Spark* (established in December 1962) worked hard for connecting the conference of Addis Ababa with the previous Pan-African platforms established by Ghana.⁵⁴⁵

Nkrumah tried also to renew the IAS platform in order to influence the works of Addis Ababa. First of all, he tried to deepen the relations with Tubman.⁵⁴⁶ Then, he also attempted to call a new IAS conference at Tunis in late 1962, but he failed. Finally, just before the Addis Ababa conference, Ghana celebrated the “African Freedom Day”, the anniversary of the IAS conference. By celebrating it, Nkrumah wanted to remind to Africans that Ghana had hosted the first ever pan-African organization in the continent. In

⁵⁴⁵ See, for instance, “Africa! The Clarion Call”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.3, 2-4(1963), pp.2-14 and 35; A.K. Barden, “The evolution of African unity”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.3, 2-4(1963), pp.20-32; “Towards Continental Unity” *Voice of Africa*, vol.3, 5-7(1963), pp.1-2.

⁵⁴⁶ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 305.

such a way, he tried to link any new organization coming out of the Addis Ababa conference to the IAS experience.⁵⁴⁷

In the meantime, Nkrumah also launched a campaign to explain in detail his vision of African Unity. The model he wanted to promote at Addis Ababa was a continental union of States with common institutions, common currency and common foreign policy. The proposed union of states was to be based on a strong central body to coordinate the policies of its members. Plans for establishing only an economical union were also discarded, as the political side was supposed to lead the economical.

The concrete elaboration of these proposals was the product of both Nkrumah's thoughts and the work of other Ghanaian radicals. The BAA had already published in September 1962 the pamphlet "Awakening Africa" in order to present Ghana's new Pan-African policy after Kulungugu. The booklet - distributed through the BAA channels - became the first draft of the Ghanaian proposals for Addis Ababa.⁵⁴⁸ It included reflections on the heritage of the 1958 IAS Conference and on the need for a common continental foreign policy. Furthermore, it presented a clear attack against the so-called "neo-colonial" states in the wake of the Kulungugu events.⁵⁴⁹ The author of part of the pamphlet was A.K. Barden, even if, according to Červenka, the real author was Ikoku.⁵⁵⁰

Barden himself had an important role in the preparation for the Addis Ababa conference. His articles on African unity were a constant presence on the BAA press but equally important was his work among the BAA contacts. Before Nkrumah submitted the first official proposal for Addis Ababa, Barden worked through his channels to win the favors of as many Africans as possible, being them freedom fighters or not. Some of Barden's letters from this period show Ghana's position on African unity as it was presented at Addis Ababa. For instance, in a letter to a Liberian supporter dated 12th December 1962, Barden introduced the core of Nkrumah's unity policy:

⁵⁴⁷ AGPL, BAA/429, "Speech by Mr. A.K. Barden, director of Bureau of African Affairs on the 5th Anniversary of Africa Freedom Day, 15th April 1963". See also A.K. Barden, "Why African Freedom Day" *Voice of Africa*, vol.3, 2-4(1963), pp.37-38.

⁵⁴⁸ See Review of "Awakening Africa" in *Voice of Africa*, vol.3, 1(1963), p.40. For a quotation from "Awakening Africa" see "The evolution of African unity", *Voice of Africa*, vol.3, 2-4(1963), pp.20-21.

⁵⁴⁹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 317.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, Červenka quoted in Thompson.

“On the question of African unity, we the people of Ghana are not Radicals, Idealists or Moderates. We are cautious realists who believe that it is only upon the foundation of political unity that scientific, economic and cultural advancements can be built. We also believe that any attempt at Pan-Africanism by means of economic association, as some so-called moderates believe, will subject that unity to the strains and stresses of internal political instability and disruption, and external collective imperialism and neo-colonialism. A study of the Organisation of American States, the Common Market, the Outer six and the Warsaw Pact countries reveals that all these associations have been based first and foremost on a measure of political cohesion either explicitly enunciated or implicitly conceived”.⁵⁵¹

Just a few days before the coup in Togo, Nkrumah officially presented its project to the heads of the Independent African States, explaining in detail its structure.⁵⁵² Nkrumah’s proposal was a union of states run by an Upper House (with two representatives from each state) and a Lower House (with proportional representation). Interestingly, the union was supposed to be called Union of African States, a clear way to present the new body as the heir of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union project. Still, Nkrumah wanted also to reassure the moderate African states that the new union would not deprive its members of their sovereignty. In his speech, he claimed: “This proposal does not in any way interfere with the internal constitutional arrangements of any State”. Moreover, he wanted to be clear that he did not want to rule the organization. For this reason, he proposed the Central African Republic as the best seat for the government.⁵⁵³

In January, Nkrumah sent emissaries all over the continent in order to discuss a model of charter close to his position. At the time, a charter based on Ethiopia’s and Liberia’s designs was ready to be presented at the conference. Thus, the Ghanaian President wanted to prepare an alternative draft charter before May.⁵⁵⁴

Nkrumah appointed a new ambassador to Addis Ababa in order to be sure to have the right man to submit the charter before the conference and to make Ghana’s case

⁵⁵¹ AGPL, un-catalogued/BG-Liberia, Letter, Barden to T. Doe, 12th December 1962.

⁵⁵² Quotation of Nkrumah’s proposal to the heads of Independent African States (1st January 1963) can be found in the text of the lecture on Nkrumahism held at Winneba the 11th of October 1963 by Gaituah. See AGPL, BAA/437, Lecture on Nkrumahism by Comrade Gaituah, 11th October 1963.

⁵⁵³ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁵⁴ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, 318.

convincingly. The appointee was Ebenezer Debrah, a name suggested by Barden. Debrah was even sent to Winneba before going to Ethiopia in order to be tested on his ideological convictions.⁵⁵⁵ In such way, Nkrumah could be sure to have a true “Nkrumahist” ambassador in Addis, ready to work for African unity. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the AAS had been once again bypassed by the Bureau.⁵⁵⁶ On 28 April 1963, Debrah presented to Selassie the Ghanaian official proposal for the “Creation of a Political Union of African States”.⁵⁵⁷

Just before the conference, Nkrumah made his last move. He published his most famous book, *Africa Must Unite*.⁵⁵⁸ It was, *de facto*, a *vademecum* of all his thoughts on African unity, including his proposal for the establishment of an effective Continental Union Government. Interestingly, the book included also many references on Ghana, such as its road to independence and its path towards socialism.

On May 24th, Nkrumah officially presented his ideas at the conference. First of all, he cleared the air from any possible misunderstanding. His vision of a united Africa was not an association of economic cooperation. The development of Africa needed a strong political basis: “The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way around”.⁵⁵⁹ For those who knew Nkrumah’s speeches and writings, this sentence was clearly referring to a phrase pronounced during Ghana’s struggle for freedom. Indeed, it was paraphrasing his famous statement “Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else shall be added unto you!”. Once again, as it was the case with the book *Africa Must Unite*, the Ghanaian experience was put virtually at the service of Africa.

Despite Nkrumah’s efforts, the conference was a political disaster for Ghana. Nkrumah’s proposals were only backed openly by Uganda. Algeria, Mali, UAR and Tanzania supported to a certain extent African unity, but none of their leaders backed

⁵⁵⁵ Interviews with K.B. Asante and D. Bosumtwi-Sam.

⁵⁵⁶ At the time, another diplomat had already been selected by the AAS for the post of ambassador in Ethiopia. He was even waiting at the airport for a flight to Addis Ababa, when the BAA informed the Secretariat that Debrah had already been appointed to the post. Interviews with K.B. Asante.

⁵⁵⁷ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p. 319.

⁵⁵⁸ Nkrumah, K., *Africa Must Unite*, Heinemann, London, 1963

⁵⁵⁹ Z. Červenka, *The Organization of African Unity*, p.9.

officially Nkrumah's proposals.⁵⁶⁰ On the contrary, many leaders introduced the question of the respect for sovereignties, attacking directly or indirectly Nkrumah's Ghana. African unity at a political level was rejected.⁵⁶¹ None of the African countries apart from Ghana and Uganda was willing to sacrifice its sovereignty for a continental entity. From this point of view, the OAU was based on a concept of Pan-Africanism far from the one imagined by Nkrumah and Padmore.

The OAU not only rejected the project for a political union but it supported the creation of regional regroupings.⁵⁶² Nkrumah strongly opposed this decision. Indeed, he had always opposed regionalism (and he had been criticized even by Padmore on this matter) as he thought that such projects would have slowed the process of unity of the continent. Moreover, he had always considered such projects as Trojan-horses of the old colonial powers for controlling the African territory through small and weak federations. From Nkrumah's point of view, the case of the Central African Federation had proved him right. The OAU was exactly going in the opposite direction. For instance, the OAU sponsored the establishment of the East African Federation, a project which Nkrumah considered only as the product of a colonial plan.

Nkrumah lost another fundamental battle in the quest for African liberation. This time, the attack against Nkrumah was clear and direct. The OAU established a Liberation Committee, made of nine members, in order to coordinate all the efforts of its members in the struggle for African freedom. Ghana was completely excluded from the committee, even if Accra had been for years one of the main shelters for African freedom fighters. The members were: Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Congo (Leopoldville), Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, the UAR and Uganda. The headquarters were in Dar-Es Salaam. The official reason for Ghana's exclusion was that its territory was far from the frontlines of the Liberation struggle. In reality, the reason was merely political, since also other members of the committee were indeed far from the frontline. The other members of the OAU wanted to reduce the influence of Ghana on African liberation movements. With the Liberation

⁵⁶⁰ Z. Červenka, *The Organization of African Unity*, p.9.

⁵⁶¹ See I. Wallerstein, *Africa: the politics of unity, an analysis of a contemporary social movement*, Random House, New York, 1967, p.111.

⁵⁶² Z. Červenka, *The Organization of African Unity*, pp. 139-169 on regional regroupings.

Committee, everything was bound to be coordinated from above and the center of the operation was bound to be far from Accra. According to Thompson, the mind behind the choice of the nine members was Keita and the exclusion of Ghana was also the result of the protests of several freedom fighters against the methods of Barden and his BAA.⁵⁶³

The OAU was nothing like what Nkrumah had planned. Still, he could not attack it directly. He was politically too weak at the time for rejecting the whole organization. He had to act differently, by strengthening a Ghanaian independent liberation policy and by struggling against the two main products of the OAU: regional regroupings and the liberation committee. For these reasons, the day after the conference the entire Ghanaian machinery was set in motion.

5.4. Ghana's Pan-African Policy after the OAU: the Leading Role of the BAA

After the ratification of the OAU charter, Nkrumah had to reconsider completely its Pan-African policy. The liberation Committee became a new rival in the African scene. Ghana had to multiply its efforts to attract politically the African freedom fighters on its side. Moreover, Nkrumah had also to counteract the influence of the OAU in the struggle for African unity. In this new phase, the Ghanaian radicals gained even more power inside the state. The BAA emerged once again as increasingly influential in the foreign policy machinery.

In 1963, the AAS, the BAA, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed on how to manage their relations to cope with the new political phase. With the appointment of Kojo Botsio as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1963, the terms of the balance between the BAA, the AAS and the Minister itself were put under revision. Botsio called a meeting between him, Dei-Anang (head of AAS), Barden (head of the BAA) and Kwesi

⁵⁶³ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 327. Once again, however, Thompson fails in producing sources to back his statements, which seem based primarily on the personal opinions of his informants.

Armah (one of the key figures of the Ghanaian diplomacy) in order to discuss on the tasks of the three institutions.⁵⁶⁴ As Armah himself wrote in his *Peace Without Power*, the meeting had two main effects. First of all, the Minister gained back some power on African affairs from the AAS. Secondly, the BAA was confirmed as a body completely independent in matters of African liberation and the other two institutions were called to support its activities using all the means at their disposal.

In the meantime, the Bureau got involved in the final discussion on the signing of the OAU charter. Barden and Habib Niang both opposed it.⁵⁶⁵ Indeed, for radicals like them, the new organization could deprive Ghana of most of its influence towards the liberation movements. Moreover, the OAU was considered a loose association, not the kind of continental government that was the goal of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Even if Nkrumah finally decided to sign the charter, he also demanded the Bureau to intensify its activities to strengthen Ghana's influence in Africa.

As a result of the meeting between Botsio, Dei-Anang, Barden, and Armah, the BAA had strengthened its position toward the AAS and the Ministry. Thus, Barden informed the diplomatic staff of the AAS of the new political phase and of the increasingly important role the BAA was going to play in Africa. For this purpose, Barden gave a speech at a meeting of the Ghanaian ambassadors of African countries.⁵⁶⁶ This speech was crucial. For the first time, Barden was directly explaining to the staff of the diplomatic missions of Ghana the work of the Bureau and he was asking for their support. First of all, he underlined the "liaison" with the AAS, even if the two institutions had "partially divorced". Then he presented Ghana's new approach to the use of violence in the liberation process, outlining the role played by the BAA in supporting armed rebellions. The message to the missions was clear. The diplomats should not interfere with the operations of the BAA. On the contrary, Barden asked the diplomats to support the missions of the BAA at all costs,

⁵⁶⁴ K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.29.

⁵⁶⁵ They assumed that if Nkrumah did not sign it, then the OUA could collapse. In W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 322. Habib Niang was a Senegalese Marxist who worked with the Bureau and was in close contact with Nkrumah.

⁵⁶⁶ AGPL, BAA/430, "Speech by A.K. Barden, Chairman/Director of Bureau of African Affairs to the Meeting of African Ambassadors", undated.

even if they included military operations in dependent or independent African states [italics by the author]:

In areas where the liberation movements are engaged in paramilitary activities, we do our very best to get at the actual nature of their struggle and give whatever assistance we think we should give to ensure victory. We discourage bloody fight between Africans. *We do not however rule out the struggle against Africans who represent colonialist and neo-colonialists interests.* We always try to use our good offices to settle differences between political factions. [...] Where situations are even dormant we do our very best to stimulate activity and organization and stress the crisis involving Africa today. Practically every day we do our very best to gain insight into the organizational problems involved in building a free united Africa and learn the need for new and specialized approaches to different situations in Africa. We always do our best to accumulate many techniques for developing the African struggle. The most important discovery we made is that the great wave for the total liberation of Africa is gathering everywhere and *practically every African country is willing to take up arms against colonial rule.*

Interestingly, Barden reminded the ambassadors of the constant communications between his office and Flagstaff House. The BAA depended only on the Office of the President and *not* on the AAS:

[...] we always insist that you should consult us on the refuge question. [...] I must state that it is necessary for you to rely on us in solving most of the intricate political situations in Africa, because we are almost always involved in every phase of the African struggle. You must not forget that we always discuss every situation with Osagyefo and take guidance from him.

With the message to the ambassadors, Barden claimed a leading role in the new political phase for the BAA. The AAS was called to support the Bureau in the fulfillment of its duties. Nkrumah himself had given Barden this power.

With a renovated strength, the Bureau was ready to fulfill the mission of extending Nkrumah's influence in Africa. The "Pan-African" institution had two immediate targets to achieve. First of all, it had to sabotage the East African Federation, the very symbol of

African regroupings and also a strong political instrument in the hands of Nkrumah's rival Nyerere. Secondly, it had to work for weakening the influence of the OAU on the liberation struggle (through the Liberation Committee) by reaffirming Ghana's presence on the battlefields. In both missions, the Bureau could use all the political strength acquired in Ghana, counting on the support of the other institutions.

5.5. The Bureau and the Work against the East African Federation

After the establishment of the OAU, Nkrumah demanded Barden to accelerate the work against the East African Federation. It was one of the crucial points of Nkrumah's new strategy in Africa against regional regroupings. At the time, the BAA had already set up a mission to accomplish this target. Barden's man Bosumtwi-Sam had already been appointed high commissioner in Uganda to work against the federation. Thus, after the endorsement of the OAU to the Federation, he was asked to multiply his efforts to sabotage the project in the shortest time possible. Bosumtwi-Sam's mission is as a perfect example of the work of the BAA in this period. It is also one of the most interesting cases of "political appointment" of diplomatic staff in the history of Nkrumah's Ghana.

Ghana was officially opposing any project of regional federation. According to Nkrumah, the biggest danger for Africa was its "balkanization". From his point of view, projects like the East African Federation were only obstacles towards the establishment of a Continental Union Government. Nkrumah considered it similar to the Central African Federation. Quite the opposite, his UAS project had always been presented as the basis for a continental union.

Nkrumah also thought that the East African Federation was in reality a project backed by the UK on a model of federation which dated back to colonial times. Such a project was believed to having been designed by the British to defend their interests and the ones of the white settlers in the three territories. These were the reasons why Nkrumah decided to work

against the project.⁵⁶⁷ On the other hand, Nkrumah's detractors thought that the real reason behind his opposition to the project was his fear of being overshadowed by Nyerere and Kenyatta.⁵⁶⁸

Nkrumah and Barden had been already aware of Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote's plans before 1963. The project, indeed, had begun to have a concrete shape after the establishment of the East African Common Service Organization in 1961, which was inheriting the functions of the former East African High Commission of 1948.⁵⁶⁹ Nkrumah had already criticized this project. The next step was to have a man on the ground to work against the federation.

Barden convinced Nkrumah to give this mission to David Bosumtwi-Sam, at the time executive Secretary of the BAA. His "political" appointment was the most evident proof of the power of the Bureau.⁵⁷⁰ At the time, the Bureau had a strong influence on Ghana's foreign policy and also on the running of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the AAS. Thanks to the daily and personal contact between Barden and Nkrumah, the BAA could also extend this influence to the appointments of diplomats. The BAA could not appoint directly its own ambassadors. However, Barden had a great influence on the appointment of diplomats of the AAS. He could recommend names or he could point out those who were not fulfilling a successful Pan-African policy, pushing for their removal.⁵⁷¹ Debrah was one of the ambassadors "recommended" by Barden. The BAA used this type of influence for the appointment of David Bosumtwi Sam as High Commissioner in Uganda. The ex-executive secretary of the BAA became soon the key men of the Bureau in East Africa.⁵⁷²

⁵⁶⁷ Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.

⁵⁶⁸ BNA, FO/1110/1692, report "The Influence of Ghana in East Africa", Stather Hunt (British High Commissioner in Uganda) to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 12th September 1963.

⁵⁶⁹ E.H. Kloran Jr, *African Unification Movements*, p.398-400.

⁵⁷⁰ As a matter of fact, as any other political appointee, Bosumtwi-Sam was sent to Winneba to "check" on his ideological conviction. Interviews K.B. Asante and Bosumtwi-Sam. As Armah underlines, the one of Bosumtwi-Sam was the Bureau's prominent ambassadorial appointment. K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.29. From this point of view, it can be considered as the most important political appointment in the diplomatic corps ever occurred in Ghana.

⁵⁷¹ Interviews with K.B. Asante and D. Bosumtwi-Sam.

⁵⁷² As Armah underlines, the one of Bosumtwi-Sam was the Bureau's prominent ambassadorial appointment. K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.29. From this point of view it can be considered as the most important political appointment in the diplomatic corps ever occurred in Ghana.

Bosumtwi-Sam's mission in East Africa began in October 1962, some months before the official launch of the project of the East African Federation.⁵⁷³ The first part of the mission was to establish contacts with Obote and his party and to work for deepening the relations between Ghana and Uganda. The second part consisted in convincing Obote to withdraw his country from the EAF. It began after June 5th 1963, when Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika officially announced the plan for the Federation, by signing a declaration of intent.⁵⁷⁴ The EAF received the endorsement of the OAU and Bosumtwi-Sam's work against the Federation became a priority.

Of the three states involved in the project of federation, Uganda was the easiest one for Ghana to attract politically. The ex-administrative secretary of the BAA had begun working within the UPC ranks in order to support the most radical elements of the party. The Ghanaian money and the personal relationships built by the Ghanaian High Commissioner in Kampala proved quite successful. He became soon a friend of Obote and he got very close to some UPC party members.⁵⁷⁵ Thanks to these close relationships, he could extend almost immediately the political influence of Ghana to Uganda. One of the first ways to do that was by sponsoring a pro-Ghanaian and anti-British propaganda.

In September 1963, the British High Commissioner in Kampala D.W. Stather Hunt, reported to London that Bosumtwi-Sam had worked immediately after his arrival to support the establishment of a political paper: the *African Pilot*. Created by the UPC radical Paul Muwanga, the paper was published both in English and Luganda. Stather Hunt had no doubt that Ghana was behind this anti-British and pro-Ghanaian publication. Indeed, Paul Muwanga was not only the editor of the *African Pilot*, but also the agent of distribution of *The Spark* in Uganda. Moreover, the motto of the paper was the same of CPP's: "Forward Ever Backward Never".⁵⁷⁶

In the meantime, Bosumtwi-Sam kept working within the UPC party ranks and the Ugandan Trade Unions. His mission was to attract politically as many Ugandans as

⁵⁷³ He first came to Uganda on the celebration of Uganda's independence on 9th October 1962. Interviews with Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 19th July 2012 and 4th September 2012.

⁵⁷⁴ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 331.

⁵⁷⁵ Interview to Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012.

⁵⁷⁶ BNA, FO/1110/1692, report "The Influence of Ghana in East Africa", Stather Hunt (British High Commissioner in Uganda) to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 12th September 1963.

possible on Ghana's side. He also sponsored the political model of Ghana. The aim of the Ghanaian High Commissioner was to attract Kampala towards Nkrumah's socialist and Pan-Africanist positions. In September 1963, the British High Commissioner commented Bosumtwi-Sam's work in Uganda: "He has made strenuous and successful efforts to gain influence with the Youth Wing of the ruling Uganda People's Congress and frequently appears on UPC platform, in one occasion with Dr. Obote. At a Press conference he gave a few months ago he spoke in favor of one-party rule for Uganda on Ghanaians lines".⁵⁷⁷

Bosumtwi-Sam was not acting alone, anyway. At the time, several agents of the BAA were working in Uganda both to "sabotage" the federation and to connect the BAA with freedom fighters of the East African area. The mission against the East African federation was planned to have two main effects. On one side, it could provoke the failure of a dangerous political project. On the other, it could damage the power held by Nyerere's Tanganyika as the seat of the Liberation Committee.

A net of agents, both Ghanaians and indigenous, was sent by Barden in the three countries involved. The first references to this net date back to October 1963. Barden, Ofori-Bah, and David Bosumtwi-Sam were the minds behind it.⁵⁷⁸ The latter, however, had immediately to regret his decision. In late 1963, the first BAA agents reached Uganda. Being asked not to reveal to anyone outside the Bureau the details of their mission, they did not even inform Bosumtwi-Sam. Even worse, they spied on him and they later accused the Ghanaian diplomat of not fulfilling a "Nkrumahist" policy in Uganda. The High Commissioner was surprised of this behavior because Barden had sent the agents after consulting him on the matter. The question was finally solved by Obote who expelled the agents from Uganda.⁵⁷⁹

⁵⁷⁷ BNA, FO/1110/1692, report "The Influence of Ghana in East Africa", Stather Hunt (British High Commissioner in Uganda) to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 12th September 1963.

⁵⁷⁸ AGPL, BAA/402, Letter, Ofori-Bah to Barden, 2nd October 1963. In the letter, Ofori Bah wrote to Barden, at the time hosted in the Ghanaian embassy in Kampala, and he suggested to create a net of agents in order to keep the embassy far from the dangers of being involved in the secret missions of the BAA. Ofori Bah wrote: "If I may offer any view at all, I would like to suggest for your consideration that in view of the situation with regard to the safety of our Embassy staff in Kampala, that they work through indigenous agents and other channels and less by themselves. In the present circumstances, it would be safer and certainly far more discreet to establish in East Africa a network of agents. I am merely selling this idea but I am sure you and David know better".

⁵⁷⁹ Interview to Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012.

At the time, Barden himself travelled incognito around East and Central Africa in order to coordinate the activities of the Bureau there.⁵⁸⁰ While Ghanaian agents were being sent to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, Barden acted also through the press to back their mission against the federation. For instance, in December 1963, *Voice of Africa* published one article against the EAF.⁵⁸¹ The article made reference specifically to Kenya, the seat of Bosumtwi-Sam's next mission.

In late 1963, after one year and half in Uganda, the Ghanaian High Commissioner could be satisfied with the work done. Obote was getting closer to Nkrumah's position and the two presidents had signed a strict political alliance. Even the UPC had proved very close to the CPP political model. The proof of Uganda's close relationship with Ghana was the endorsement made by Obote to Nkrumah's proposal at the OAU. No other countries apart from Kampala had showed a clear support to the Pan-Africanist plans of the Ghanaian President. Obote's close alliance with Nkrumah led also the Ugandan President to increase his opposition to the federation.

Bosumtwi-Sam's next mission was in Kenya, where he was transferred in 1964. Even there, he had to sabotage the EAF and to promote the Ghanaian political model. In January, another article concerning Nkrumah's opposition to the East African Federation was published in *Voice of Africa*.⁵⁸² In the article, Nkrumah was once again rejecting all the accuses of plotting against the East African governments to let the federation project fail. Still, in the meantime, in Nairobi, Bosumtwi-Sam was replicating the work he had done in Uganda. The work of the diplomat included the sponsorship of the one-party model of state, the same Ghana itself adopted in January 1964.⁵⁸³

In reality, Bosumtwi-Sam's did not have to work hard to break the last resistances of Nyerere and Kenyatta to keep the idea of the Federation alive. Already in the first half of 1964, the project could be considered failed. Obote's criticisms had finally worked in breaking an already weak plan.

⁵⁸⁰ AGPL, BAA/402, Letter, Ofori-Bah to Barden, 2nd October 1963.

⁵⁸¹ "Africa periscope: Kenya's Imperialist Paper Sunday Post", *Voice of Africa*, vol.3, 12(1963), pp.29-32 and 36.

⁵⁸² "East Africa and Dr. Nkrumah", *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 1(1964), .pp.38-40.

⁵⁸³ Interview with Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 4th September 2012.

Ghana could not be considered the only responsible of the failure of the EAF. Bosumtwi-Sam had probably played a secondary role in this failure. However, his mission proved that the Bureau could effectively interfere with the politics of other African independent states in order to support Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. Barden had also proved that he could extend his control to the Ghanaian embassies to the point of choosing the diplomats. Moreover, he proved that he could make use of a net of BAA agents which was already wide and strong. Bosumtwi-Sam had been also able to export Nkrumah's political ideas and the CPP model to another African country, namely Uganda. He did the same – but with less success - in Kenya.

5.6. The Struggle for Influence in Africa and in Ghana after the Establishment of the OAU

After fighting against the East African Federation, the BAA had to fulfill the other important mission of the new course of Ghana's Pan-African policy: counteracting the influence of the Liberation Committee. At first, Nkrumah tried to obtain a seat at the Committee. When he failed, he decided to work outside traditional diplomacy, involving the BAA to regain the prestige lost by Ghana towards the liberation movements after the Addis Ababa conference. This policy was not unchallenged. On the contrary, after the OAU, the clashes between Ghana and its rivals increased.

At the OAU, Nkrumah had suffered the hostility of the majority of the African moderate states. He had been cut out from any important commission created by the new body. Moreover, he also failed to create a special commission for discussing a path for establishing a Continental Union Government. In the summer of 1963, all the Ghanaian diplomats worked to support this project, but every effort was vain. Again, only Uganda supported Nkrumah's proposal.

Even the relationship between Ghana and the new Liberation Committee (or "Committee of Nine") proved complicated since the start. At first, at the OAU conference,

Nkrumah had even welcomed the establishment of the Committee.⁵⁸⁴ Then, after Ghana had been excluded, Nkrumah strongly criticized the management of the new body. In reality, he was worried of losing influence at the advantage of Nyerere's Tanganyika, since Dar-Es-Salaam became the seat of the Committee. Obviously, he could not accept that African freedom fighters could be attracted far from Accra.

Initially, after the conference, Nkrumah pushed for having Ghana represented in the committee. Bosumtwi-Sam tried to use the good relationship with Obote to reserve one of the three positions of undersecretary, but he failed.⁵⁸⁵ Thus, Nkrumah abandoned any hope to control the body and he launched a campaign against the committee itself, criticizing it constantly in the Ghanaian press and the *Spark*.⁵⁸⁶ Moreover, he also refused to send the committee any fund, even if he had promised differently at the OAU. Instead, he instructed the Bureau to keep track of all the activities of the body through the freedom fighters hosted at the Centre.⁵⁸⁷

Since the summer of 1963, Nkrumah invested huge resources to support liberation movements in Southern Africa and in the Portuguese colonies. The BAA activities had been expanded in both the areas in order to counteract the increasing influence of the liberation committee. There, the Bureau pushed for the unity between nationalist parties of the same countries and tried to find any radical movement which was willing to endorse Pan-Africanism as part of their political program. As a result, parties like Neto's MPLA and Cabral's PAIGC deepened their relations with Accra and, in exchange, they received strong support.

In August 1963, Cabral spent 15 days in Accra, where he also met AK Barden.⁵⁸⁸ There, the Bissau-Guinean leader signed a pact of collaboration with Ghana. The Bureau showed immediately its goodwill by supporting Cabral's criticism of a speech made by

⁵⁸⁴ See M. Wolfers, *Politics in the Organization of African Unity*, Methuen, London, 1976, p.167.

⁵⁸⁵ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 328.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁸⁷ The BAA was informed about every communication between the liberation movements and the Liberation Committee. In some cases, these types of communication were between the offices of representation of the liberation movements in Accra and those in Dar Es-Salaam which had become the new headquarters of nationalist parties in Africa. Similarly, liberation movements in Accra and in Cairo were exchanging information.

⁵⁸⁸ "Cabral Leaves", *Ghanaian Times*, 19th August 1963. He left Accra on the 18th of August after a period of 15 days.

Salazar in the same period.⁵⁸⁹ The move proved successful as Cabral publicly showed appreciation for the concrete help provided by Accra and, instead, criticized the lack of response of the Liberation Committee. In the press release of the PAIGC, he stated:

The bureaucratization of the aid to the nationalists risks comprising the efficacy and reasonableness of this aid. We are convinced that African States have to help immediately the fighting organizations, like our Party, by giving us financial and material help in the fight and by helping to form the cadres. Internationally, the time has come for the anti-colonialist forces to give us concrete help, something more than pious intentions.⁵⁹⁰

Even if Cabral did not quote Ghana and Guinea in his speech, he was clearly making reference to the material help granted by them.

In the same period, even the MPLA requested direct aid from Ghana. Since July 1963, the Angolan party (based in Brazzaville but with an important office also in Leopoldville) was working with the Liberation Committee in their “Mission des Bons Offices” at Dar Es-Salaam. In November, despite officially working under the wing of the Committee, Neto wrote directly to Nkrumah for assistance, showing in practice how strong was the link between his party and Accra.⁵⁹¹

Nkrumah was winning a political battle. He had showed that his influence in the continent was not over. In Southern Africa, his rivals had failed to cut out Accra from the battlefields. The political exchanges between Accra and the frontline kept being as strong as before. Ghana was also taking advantage of the rivalry between moderate African states in the OAU. Radical liberation movements kept looking at Accra as a source of practical help and ideological inspiration.

Apparently, those who had reported Nkrumah politically “dead” after Addis Ababa proved wrong. At the time, wise personalities understood that Nkrumah’s failure at the OAU could be turned into a political victory. The British High Commissioner at Kampala

⁵⁸⁹ “Bureau: United Action against Salazar Justified”, *Ghanaian Times*, 16th August 1963.

⁵⁹⁰ AGPL, BAA/430, “Press Release on the Speech of Mr. Salazar”, Amilcar Cabral, undated.

⁵⁹¹ AGPL, BAA/378, Letter, Neto to Nkrumah, 30th November 1963.

was one of them. In September 1963 he presented his thoughts to the Colonial Relations Office, warning of the dangers of underestimating Nkrumah's political strength:

"I have seen reports from a number of commentators which suggests that the Addis Ababa Conference was a defeat for Nkrumah. [...] I maintain, with respect, that if this was a defeat for Nkrumah it was a defeat more valuable than many victories. By the ordinary man in Africa, and in particular by the young men, he will be remembered as the man who said 'Africa must unite'; and though the old fuddy-duddies and Imperialist agents voted him down, and put water in the wine of his generous enthusiasm, his followers believe that his ideas will soon win through. Nkrumah is not interested in carrying with him Houphouët-Boigny in his gold and malachite palace, nor the Mwami of Burundi in his night club. His appeal is to the fierce young secondary school leaver out of a job, the Youth Winger or the struggling trade unionist. He knows that, in Africa, nothing succeeds like excess. [...] *We have a formidable opponent, equipped with every advantage short of nuclear weapons*".⁵⁹²

Ghana had clearly lost most of its political appeal towards moderate governments. However, the Bureau had worked successfully in improving its influence towards liberation movements and radical governments.

In this period, the BAA kept track of the radical organizations that backed Nkrumah's claims for African unity. The office also received suggestions on new solutions to proceed in that direction.⁵⁹³ In the meantime, the Bureau kept using all the propaganda instruments (The Spark, Voice of Africa, Radio Ghana, etc.) for spreading Nkrumah's message throughout Africa. In November 1963, Nkrumah himself wrote in VOA an article to attack the Liberation Committee and the OAU as a whole.⁵⁹⁴ According to the Ghanaian leader,

⁵⁹² BNA, FO/1110/1692, report "The Influence of Ghana in East Africa", Stather Hunt (British High Commissioner in Uganda) to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 12th September 1963.

⁵⁹³ See, for instance, AGPL, BAA/378, Letter, Maouhamadou Phogkou Nankam (Bafang) to Nkrumah (and other 16 heads of state), 19th October 1963 and Letter, Neto to Nkrumah, 30th November 1963.

⁵⁹⁴ Nkrumah, K., "Since Addis Ababa", *Voice of Africa*, vol.3, 11(1963), pp.39-40. Quoting from the article: "The tempo of development in Africa, since Addis Ababa, has been such that this Charter is already being overtaken by events. It has become clear that we must move forward quickly, with a united voice, to a Union Government of Africa. In accordance with the spirit of the Charter, the African States have been able to present a unified front in the United Nations and at other international conferences. [...] It has been achieved as a result of tedious consultations involving long delays and even the risk of failure to agree. Our actions would have been swifter, bolder and more effective if there had been in existence strong, central political machinery for dealing with the wider problems affecting Africa as a whole".

the organization had proved inefficient to deal with African liberation. At the end of 1963, even A.K. Barden criticized the OAU as a “loose association”, infiltrated by “imperialist” agents.⁵⁹⁵

In the meantime, Ghana’s political rivals were making their moves. The press in the Western World and in moderate African countries campaigned strongly against Nkrumah’s government. Nkrumah’s project of a continental government was often presented as a Trojan-horse for the communist penetration in Africa. The Ghanaian President was openly accused of plotting for taking the power in the continent as a dictator.

After the OAU, Nkrumah showed that his political net was still wide. The BAA had also proved that it could counteract – to some extent - the influence of the Liberation Committee. It was time to move the battle on the field of propaganda.

5.7. The Institute of Winneba and the Political Press between 1963 and 1964

While Nkrumah was launching a renovated Pan-African policy, radicalization gained momentum in Ghana. Nkrumahism became the official ideology of the state and Ghana was definitely turned into an “Nkrumahist” state. The “shift to the left” - began in 1961 and developed after the Kulungugu affair - reached its final evolution in January 1964 when Ghana was transformed into a One-Party state. Every chain of the propaganda machinery was put in motion to spread Nkrumahism and the so-called “African revolution” both in Ghana and in Africa. The CPP was promoted more than ever as a model nationalist party and the Ghanaian state itself became an example for all the radicals in Africa. Nkrumahism was proposed as an ideology for the whole continent.

⁵⁹⁵ AGPL, BAA/430, “New Year Message” by A.K. Barden, undated. Quoting from the text: “It will be folly on our part to imagine that the Organisation of African Unity is functioning smoothly. Border disputes, assistance to liberation movements and attitude to economic reconstruction have imposed strains on the Organisation. And so has the new imperialist strategy of paying lip service to African unity while using this cover to impose on some African States arrangements which are fundamentally opposed to African unity.”

In this new political struggle, the BAA – a stronghold of radicals - was again on the frontline. Barden activated the Bureau's propaganda machinery to spread the Nkrumahist message among the freedom fighters. Moreover, he worked for updating the course at the Institute of Winneba to the new political course. As a consequence of this change of pace in the radicalization of Ghana, the Western world began to track every move of the Bureau and any activity organized at Winneba, while promoting a strong campaign against Nkrumah's alleged communist plots to rule Africa under a Soviet-backed dictatorship. Since 1963 a sort of "propaganda war" between Ghana and the western world exploded.

Between late 1963 and 1964, Nkrumahism gained its final shape and it was adopted as the official ideology of the state. The ideology had been quoted for the first time back in 1960. However, only after Kulungugu it developed into a proper political philosophy. The BAA led this phase thanks to its propaganda machinery. Indeed, The Spark became the platform to discuss and spread out the Nkrumahist ideology.⁵⁹⁶ In 1964, all the articles of The Spark on Nkrumahism were published by The Spark itself, in a booklet called "Some essential features of Nkrumahism".⁵⁹⁷

Finally, in 1964, Nkrumah published a book on Nkrumahism. It was his famous "Consciencism".⁵⁹⁸ According to Thompson, the Bureau was once again behind the publication. Indeed, the radicals Habib Niang and Massaga - two of the most influential refugees under the wings of the Bureau - were probably involved.⁵⁹⁹

In the meantime, the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science had already begun teaching Nkrumahism to its students, both Ghanaians and foreigners. In the latter case, the aim of the institution was to form an intelligentsia that could spread Nkrumahism in other African countries. The new ideology became one of the main subjects taught at Institute.

⁵⁹⁶ The Spark had been established in December 1962 and edited by the radical Kofi Batsa. The name of the magazine was a clear reference to Lenin's newspaper "Iskra", published in early 1900s. Unlike VOA, this publication was made primarily for the distribution in the Ghanaian territory.

⁵⁹⁷ VV.AA., *Some Essential Features of Nkrumahism – a compilation of articles from "The Spark"*, The Spark Publications, Accra 1964.

⁵⁹⁸ On *Consciencism* see also S.G. Ikoku (Julius Sago), *Le Ghana de Nkrumah*, pp.81-83.

⁵⁹⁹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.293. Thompson states that Consciencism "had long been written probably by Habib Niang and Massaga". However, he does not quote any source for this statement. Habib Niang, a Senegalese communist, was one of Nkrumah's most close and influential advisers. Massaga, who was close to Nkrumah as well as Niang, was the head of the UPC (Cameroon) radical wing.

A whole course on Nkrumahism was included in the two- year's diploma in Political Science. Even freedom fighters could attend it. The course included lessons on such as "Party Loyalty", "Supremacy of the Party", "African Unity", "Nkrumah's Political Ideology", "Collective Responsibilities", "Nkrumah's Un-comprising Stand Against Imperialism and Colonialism", all starting with an introductory review of Nkrumah's life and its political background.⁶⁰⁰ The Institute offered also lessons on constitutional matters and on the functioning of The Ghana Young Pioneers. At the institute, Ghana and its ruling party were clearly presented as a political model. Nkrumah himself had stressed out the CPP model in "Consciencism".⁶⁰¹ The Institute was actualizing Nkrumah's indications; it was sponsoring the Ghanaian institutional and political models in order to influence the parties of the freedom fighters who attended the courses.

Even the shift to a one-party system was explained in a dedicated lesson. This solution was presented as the natural evolution of the African political system rather than as a shift towards dictatorship.⁶⁰² The first lesson on the one-party system took place on 24th of January 1964, at Cape Coast and was taught by A.K. Gaituah. The lecturer claimed: "The chief, his councilors and the people constitute a sort of one party in the state, everybody in the state belonging to this party".⁶⁰³

Ghanaian diplomats and BAA agents were also called to support the shift towards the one-party system abroad. For instance, David Bosumtwi-Sam - at the time ambassador in Kenya - explained the new political shift to both Ugandans and Kenyans. In the latter case, Kenyatta himself invited the diplomat to talk about the new political system. Unlike Obote, the Kenyan leader was quite interested. On the contrary, the Ugandan President had already too many problems to deal with relating to the ethnic unity of his country to follow that direction.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰⁰ See AGPL, BAA/437 for all the texts of the lectures quoted above. This program refers to a course which took place between October and November 1963.

⁶⁰¹ K. Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, p.100

⁶⁰² The shift towards the one-party system had been realized after a plebiscite organized in January 1964.

⁶⁰³ AGPL, BAA-437, "Why one-party State", Lecture to Mfantsipim School, Cape Coast, by A.K. Gaituah, 24th January 1964.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 4th September 2012.

The shift towards the one party system was also presented to African freedom fighters as the only way possible to defeat neo-colonialism. In February 1964, *Voice of Africa* published two articles on this theme.⁶⁰⁵ In the same issue, Barden explained also the reason why this system had been chosen for Ghana.⁶⁰⁶

The media were considered the best mean to bring the “African revolution” everywhere in Africa. The Institute of Winneba itself was involved in this operation. In November 1963, the second Conference of African journalists was held in Accra and men of the Institute were among the main orators. The aim of the conference was to put the basis for a Pan-African union of journalists in order to spread everywhere Nkrumahism and the “African revolution”. Addison (Dean of the Institute) opened the booklet published after the conference by the Institute with these words:

Africa is reborn and with the coming of Philosophical Consciencism, her ideology and ultimate destiny is more than clear. What is necessary now is the sympathy and understanding of all the masses of the continent. Nkrumahism holds that the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. In this respect, the African journalist has a great role to play towards educating the people to know where Africa is heading to, what she is about and the contribution expected from every individual African to achieve the goal of free, prosperous and united Africa under the banner of Continental Union Government.⁶⁰⁷

Among the authors of the booklet of the Conference, there were some of the most important radical ideologists of Ghana. Two of the articles were written by the most famous refugee in Ghana, Samuel Ikoku, who was also professor of economics at Winneba and who was often working for the BAA publications. He wrote on the use of press in Ghana and the use of propaganda through Radio and television.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁵ “Ghana’s Constitutional Changes – the One Party State”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 2(1964), pp.17-23 and K. Nkrumah, “What is to be done?”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 2(1964), pp.23-24 and 27.

⁶⁰⁶ A.K. Barden, “Evolution of Ghanaian Society”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 2(1964), pp.25-27.

⁶⁰⁷ W.M. Sulemana-Sibidow, (Ed. By), *The African Journalist*, Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Winneba, 1964.

⁶⁰⁸ S.G. Ikoku, *Propaganda Through Radio and Television* in W.M. Sulemana-Sibidow, (Ed. By), *The African Journalist*.

Even Kofi Batsa wrote one of the articles of the booklet.⁶⁰⁹ His magazine *The Spark* was directly involved not only with the Conference, but also with the courses. Indeed, in December 1963, four students of the Institute were sent to the Spark to assist Batsa in his work and to learn from him.⁶¹⁰

The western powers were suspicious about Winneba. The Ideological Institute was reported as one of the most dangerous political training center in Africa, together with similar schools at Cairo, Conakry and Algeri. UK, USA and France thought that behind such Institutes there was the hand of the socialist world. In fact, in all these institutions, European communist lecturers were more than common.

A considerable percentage of the teachers were coming from communist countries in Europe. Between 1961 and 1964, they reached a maximum of 5 on 12 total lecturers. In the year 1963/1964 this figure increased to 6/11.⁶¹¹ For instance, in late 1963, the lessons of Statistics and Political Economy at the Institute were taught by the European professor J.M. Peczynski.⁶¹² The lessons in Political Economy were taught by the East German professor Grace Arnold.⁶¹³

The British and American governments were collecting information about the Institute since its opening. However, only by 1963 they began to refer openly to alleged communist activities there. They knew that the Institute was controlled by the CPP and the BAA. Thus, they supposed it had been influenced by the wave of radicalization of the Ghanaian state.

London considered the institution as an instrument to support Ghana's subversions in Africa. As a matter of fact, before the 1963 Addis Ababa conference, the British wrote to France and USA about alleged Ghanaian plans to create a net of "Nkrumahist" regimes in the continent. Winneba was reported as the center of this plan.⁶¹⁴ Although the British knew

⁶⁰⁹ K. Batsa, *The Work of Pan-African Union of Journalists* in W.M. Sulemana-Sibidow, (Ed. By), *The African Journalist*.

⁶¹⁰ AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Addison to Barden, 17th December 1963. At the time, *The Spark* was not controlled by the BAA anymore. See also PRAAD, SC/BAA/357, *Letter*, Barden to Nkrumah, 20th May 1964.

⁶¹¹ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.44.

⁶¹² See, for instance, AGPL, BAA/437, lectures in statistics by Comrade Prof. J.M. Perczynski.

⁶¹³ See, for instance, AGPL, BAA/437, lecture in Political Economy by Mrs. Grace Arnold.

⁶¹⁴ BNA, DO/195/135, Letter, Wenban-Smith to Martin, 1st of April 1963.

that the Winneba Institute was not the only Ideological Institute to fear (the Conakry one was considered as effective as the Ghanaian one in 1963), they kept their eyes on it.⁶¹⁵

Even the British diplomatic mission in Ghana was at work to study the radicalization of the Ghanaian state and, eventually, the influence of communism on the Ghanaian institutions. In May 1963, the High Commissioner to Ghana Sir Geoffrey De Freitas prepared a report on “Communist Penetration in and from Ghana” for the Head of Mission Meeting in London. He showed evidence of the close relationship between Ghana and the communist countries, especially the USSR and the existence of a “communist group” within the CPP and Ghana state.⁶¹⁶ According to De Freitas, the Bureau was able to influence African freedom fighters through Winneba and through its propaganda machinery (VOA and the Spark above all). Both the institute and the magazines were run by members of the “communist group”. Indeed, the Institute was headed by Addison, a known Marxist and also Honorary President of a Ghana/USSR Friendship Society.⁶¹⁷ Batsa, who also known to be a Marxist, was running the BAA press.

The UK kept track of the BAA activities and the ones of the Institute. Moreover, the British were getting ready to respond to the Ghanaian propaganda. A sort of “war of propaganda” between Ghana and London emerged.

London’s main weapon in this war was the Information Research Department (IRD), an office devoted to counteract the communist propaganda throughout the world. In September 1963, the IRD agent Hornyold was already at work to collect information on the Ideological Institute. Thanks to some contacts inside the institution, he could report interesting details back to London. For instance, he gained information on the courses, including the whole text of the lecture on Marxism-Leninism of the East-German professor Arnold.⁶¹⁸ At the time, both the British and the Americans were working on collecting information at Winneba. While Hornyold was at work for London, the Americans had already a paper on the Institute prepared by the CIA.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁵ BNA, DO/195/135, Letter, Wenban-Smith to Martin, 1st of April 1963.

⁶¹⁶ BNA, DO/195/55, Report “Communist Penetration in and from Ghana”, C.R.O., September 1963.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹⁸ BNA, FO/1110/1967, Letter, Biggin to Ure/Drinkall/Welser/Tucker/Duke, 16th September 1963.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

The IRD was not only collecting information but it was also distributing anti-communist and pro-British propaganda. In 1964, this operation became increasingly difficult. Indeed, the Ghanaian press was almost totally controlled by radicals and every publication had to pass through their censorship.⁶²⁰ However, the IRD did have a certain success. For instance, it was able to distribute its materials at the University of Ghana and at Winneba. In both institutions, the British could influence the new Ghanaian intelligentsia, in order to use it against Nkrumah.⁶²¹

Between 1963 and 1964, the war for political influence in Africa was proving harsh. Ghana had powerful instruments such as the Institute, the BAA, and its propaganda machinery. However, even the Western world was ready to fight the battle and they had powerful instruments as well, such as the IRD.

5.8. The Work with African Freedom Fighters in 1963 - 1964

Immediately after the establishment of the Liberation Committee, Ghana had increased its support to African freedom fighters. Between 1963 and 1964, new efforts were made in that direction. Radical parties were invited to deepen their relations with Ghana and not to count only on the OAU Liberation Committee. Ghana promised money, political and administrative training and, more importantly, it promised arms and military training. The BAA offered also its net of agents to support their struggles. In exchange, Ghana gained a relevant political return. Nkrumah could count on a net of friendly nationalist parties influenced by the CPP model. Through this net, Nkrumahism could potentially reach every corner of the continent.

⁶²⁰ According to the IRD agent Hornyold the speech of Nkrumah at the second conference of African journalist was a clear indication of the new wave of censorship that was going to characterize Ghana. See BNA, FO/1110/1828, Letter, Hornyold to Duke (CRO), 28th February 1964.

⁶²¹ See, for instance, BNA, FO/1110/1967, Letter, Biggin to Ure/Drinkall/Welser/Tucker/Duke, 16th September 1963.

Ghana's provision of political and administrative training to freedom fighters was not only limited to the intelligentsia which attended the courses at Winneba. Other members of the same parties were trained in administration in other institutions of Ghana. In such way, the Bureau was trying to grant the liberation movements with personnel for the state administration after independence. The Africanization of the civil service was considered a fundamental instrument to keep colonialist and "neo-colonialist" away from the newly independent countries. Thanks to this policy, Nkrumah could gain more political support in the continent. In particular, the parties could back his claims for the establishment of a Union Government and an African High Command. Moreover, the BAA could also count on the men trained in Ghana when operating in their countries. For all these reasons, the Bureau had to make Ghana the first choice of liberation movements in case of need.⁶²² Some examples will follow, in order to show the importance of the work with liberation movements in this period.

The first example is the one of the Basutoland Congress Party. At least since 1961, the party was already collaborating with Ghana. In 1963, this collaboration reached a new level and the political relations between Ghana and the BCP were strengthened. At the time, the BCP was working for shifting to self-government, the so-called "Responsible Government".⁶²³ In this context, the party needed an African-run administration with a solid anti-imperialist imprint. As Qhobela - the representative of the BCP in Accra - pointed out to Barden on 5th April 1963: "The Civil Service [...] though already 75% Africanized still requires to be freed from the grip of the undesirable factor of imperialist orientation. The future of Basutoland as an African country cannot be grounded on that rotten structure".⁶²⁴ Barden was clearly interested in supporting the BCP in this mission, since one of the policies of the BAA had always been to support the establishment of a

⁶²² Qhobela (representative of the BCP in Accra) wrote to Barden on 5th April 1963: "This urgent appeal is based on the genuine assurance by Osagyefo the President [Kwame Nkrumah] to the B.C.P. Delegation during the Freedom Fighters Conference (June 1962) at Winneba when he, among other things, positively stated that whenever we urgently need any form of assistance for purpose of furthering our struggle against imperialism, we must always make it a point to contact him first". In AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Qhobela (BCP Ghana representative) to Barden, 5th April 1963.

⁶²³ The Responsible Government was the name given to the self-government of Basutoland which at the time (April 1963) was scheduled on June/July 1965.

⁶²⁴ AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Qhobela (BCP Ghana representative) to Barden, 5th April 1963

radical, African civil service. Thus, the Bureau offered to train several young BCP members in administration and stenography-secretary ship, while top rank party members were still being taught at Winneba.⁶²⁵ In the meantime, Barden also proposed to train other BCP members in political activity, taking advantage of the existing structures of the CPP and the state. Qhobela was informed of the offer and, in the same period, he requested the permission to send members of its youth league to the Ghana Young Pioneers.⁶²⁶ Thanks to this collaboration, Nkrumah could influence the political orientation of BCP, bounding it definitely to Ghana. In order to reach the same target, Accra also provided the BCP with funds for the upcoming electoral campaign for the Responsible Government.⁶²⁷ As a result, Nkrumah could count on a precious political ally. Indeed, it must be remembered that Basutoland was close to the borders with South Africa. Through the collaboration with the BCP, the BAA could use the small African territory as a perfect base to launch attacks against the apartheid regime or to assist political refugees there.⁶²⁸

The second example is the one of Northern Rhodesia's UNIP, a case of collaboration in which Nkrumah's political return was even more evident. The party had a long-term relationship with Ghana. For years, the BAA had provided Kaunda's movement with everything from funds to political training to its members. In 1964, the Bureau planned to take advantage of this relationship, requesting the support of the party in a mission to be fulfilled in Northern Rhodesia which consisted in the creation of an alternative center of operation for the liberation movements of Southern Africa. Zambia was considered the perfect location where to work on such a plan and the UNIP was called to collaborate to the project.

In April, the occasion became propitious to launch the mission. At the time, Dar-as-Salaam was still weak after the mutiny of January and the BAA could take advantage of the

⁶²⁵ See AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Qhobela (BCP Ghana representative) to Barden, 23rd January 1963; AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Qhobela (BCP Ghana representative) to Barden, 5th April 1963; AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, "Special Course for Students from Other African States", Doku to Barden, 18th July 1963; AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Qhobela (BCP Ghana representative) to Barden, 21st August 1963; AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Mokhehle to Qhobela (BCP Ghana representative), 23rd August 1963.

⁶²⁶ AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Qhobela (BCP Ghana representative) to Barden, 5th April 1963.

⁶²⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶²⁸ AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Qhobela (BCP Ghana representative) to Barden, 21st August 1963. According to Qhobela, at the time, Ghana was the only country which offered the BCP training courses for its members.

difficulties of the Liberation Committee in that period. Barden's first move was to send Dwabeng - one of his men - to work to transform Lusaka in a center of operation for liberation movements. Dwabeng was sent months before the independence of the country (planned in October), with the understanding that he would become ambassador immediately after the event. Once again, the BAA proved influential enough in Ghana to send its own diplomat, surpassing the authority of the AAS. The one of Dwabeng was only the last of a series of political appointments planned by Barden.

The Bureau counted on the collaboration of the men of the UNIP in order to accomplish the mission. At the time, some of the most important personalities of the party had been taught at Winneba. Interestingly, Dwabeng had been a member of the staff of the Ideological Institute. Thus, he was expected to count on of the strong relationship with his former students. On 21 April 1964, Barden wrote to Nkrumah to explain the situation and to propose Dwabeng for the mission.⁶²⁹ Thanks to the letter, it is possible to understand Ghana's long-term strategy in associating with Kaunda's UNIP.

As you are no doubt aware, Mr. R. K. Dwabeng who is a member of staff of this Bureau and who *has a long association with the new Cabinet Ministers of Northern Rhodesia and influential politicians*, was suggested by the Bureau to be High Commissioner-designate to Northern Rhodesia until such time that the country would be proclaimed an independent state, when he will, in the normal diplomatic convention, present his credentials as a High Commissioner. Mr. Dwabeng's *association with Northern Rhodesian Freedom Fighters who are now Ministers, Ambassadors and key party functionaries, dates back to the time when he was a member of staff of Kwame Nkrumah Ideological School during its early formative days*.

Before Barden's proposal, Nkrumah had also received one from Botsio. The latter had suggested someone who was not an "activist but had more economic knowledge". Barden disagreed with him and supported Dwabeng. Indeed, this mission was part of the struggle for African liberation and an "activist" was necessary to deal with the delicate political

⁶²⁹ AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 21st April 1964.

matters on the table. At the time, the Bureau had already put the basis for the mission Dwabeng was called to accomplish. Barden wrote to Nkrumah:

[...] I have had occasion to meet the Vice President of the ANC, Mr. Oliver Tambo, Mr. Tabata of the All African Peoples Convention, Representatives of the PAC, Representatives of the Indian Congress and the Coloureds Organisations and leaders of freedom movements from the High Commission Territories who matter, and all of them have expressed the view that with the accession to full Sovereign State of Northern Rhodesia very soon all Revolutionary activities of freedom movements which had hitherto not found full militant expression in Dar-as-Salaam, would rapidly be shifted to Northern Rhodesia. Already moves are being made to establish offices and underground movements in Northern Rhodesia.

Barden was not sure of Kaunda's attitude towards the use of Northern Rhodesia as the base for revolutionary movements. For this reason, he considered the political use of men of the UNIP trained in Ghana fundamental. The appointment of a "militant" like Dwabeng" was essential to manage these contacts:

[...] there exists in Kaunda's Cabinet a preponderant cadre of radical and militant nationalists trained in Ghana and elsewhere who could be relied upon to bring pressure on Mr. Kaunda to accept Northern Rhodesia as one of the subsidiary bases for political onslaught on South Africa. Tanganyika has now fallen and the attached newspaper cutting reflects the views of many. There is very proof that Northern Rhodesia is going to be an effective springboard for a final assault on the Union of South Africa. It is a unique strategic and geographical position. It provides an outlet for Freedom Fighters from South Africa and serves as the only outlet for the High Commission Territories. Presently the second outlet to South Africa and the High Commission Territories is Portuguese territory of Mozambique which is about to be blockaded by Portugal to all Freedom Fighters.


Closing the letter, Barden justified his interference in the appointment of the ambassador. In matters of African liberation - he argued - the BAA was the one institution to be trusted:

It is now clear that the Foreign Minister [Botsio] made his suggestion in good faith not realizing the potential importance and strategic value of Northern Rhodesia to militant wings of liberation movements. In this connection I will strongly suggest that Mr. Dwabeng's appointment must be reinstated. Our operations with liberation movements must be such that only our activists with a long association with the Bureau will understand and appreciate our objectives.

In the meantime, agents of the Bureau kept track of the situation in Zambia in order to outline plans of action to fulfill the mission. At the time of independence, in October 1964, an agent of the Bureau was at work to check on the moves of Kaunda's government and the ones of the main opposition party.⁶³⁰

A third case of fruitful collaboration with a liberation movement was the one with the Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP). The political organization was very close to Ghana to the point of adhering to the CPP structure. The BPP had been established after the Sharpeville Massacre (1960) under the influence of South African refugees (mainly ANC members). Ghana came into contact with the party, while the BAA was dealing with the question of refugees. Immediately after, Barden invited its members to be trained in Ghana and he provided the party with an office of representation in Accra. Symbolically, the BPP showed its link to Ghana by adopting a party flag that was halfway between the Ghanaian flag and the ANC one:

⁶³⁰ PRAAD, SC/BAA/357, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah 1st October 1964 and the attached "Report on Northern Rhodesia", submitted by a BAA "activist". The main opposition party was the ANC, namesake of the South African ANC.



Issue of November 1964 of the BPP “Bechuanaland Newsletter” – AGPL/BAA-639

Even more interestingly, the BAA worked for adapting the political structure of the BPP on the one of the CPP. The BPP program for the year 1963/64 - kept among the BAA papers - was in many ways based on the CPP model.⁶³¹ For instance, the party was organized with specific wings very similar to those of the CPP. Moreover, its program included “Positive Action” as the main instrument for achieving independence. Finally, the tactics of the party were clearly modeled on the aims and object of the CPP constitution of the year 1950 (see below the similarities between the 1950 CPP constitution and the 1963 BPP “tactics”).

⁶³¹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-CONF. OAU 1965, “The BPP’s proposed programme for 1963/1964”.

AIMS AND OBJECTS (NATIONAL)

(I) SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW and the development of (Gold Coast) Ghana on the basis of Socialism.

(II) To fight relentlessly to achieve and maintain independence for the people of (Gold Coast) Ghana and their chiefs.

(III) To serve as the vigorous conscious political vanguard for removing all forms of oppression and for the establishment of a democratic socialist society.

(IV) To secure and maintain the complete unity of the Colony, Ashanti, Northern Territories and Trans-Volta.

(V) To work with and in the interest of the Trade Union Movement, and other kindred organizations, in joint political or other action in harmony with the Constitution and Standing Orders of the Party.

(VI) To work for a speedy reconstruction of a better (Gold Coast) Ghana in which the people and their chiefs shall have the right to live and govern themselves as free people.

(VII) To promote the Political, Social and Economic emancipation of the people, more particularly of those who depend directly upon their own exertions by hand or by brain for the means of life.

(VIII) To establish a Socialist State in which all men and women shall have equal opportunity and where there shall be no capitalist exploitation.

Extract of the Constitution of the Convention People's Party of the Gold Coast, 1950 in G. Padmore, *The Gold Coast Revolution*, pp.254-255, quoted in H. Khon and W. Sokolsky, *African Nationalism in the twentieth Century*, D. Van Nostrand Company, Princeton, 1965, pp.132-134.

II. TACTICS

- (a) To fight relentlessly by all constitutional means for the achievement of full "S.G. NOW" for the chiefs and people of Bechuanaland.
- (b) To serve as the vigorous conscious political vanguard for removing all forms of oppression and for the establishment of democratic government.
- (c) To secure and maintain complete unity among the chiefs and people of all "Reserves"
- (d) To work in the interest of the trade Union movement in the country for better conditions of employment.
- (e) To work for a proper re-construction of a better Bechuanaland in which the people shall have the right to live and govern themselves as free people.
- (f) To assist and facilitate in any way possible the realisation of a United and self-governing Africa.

AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-CONF. OAU 1965, extract of "The BPP's proposed programme for 1963/1964".

In the cases of BCP, UNIP, and BPP, the Bureau and the other Ghanaian institutions worked primarily on the political and administrative training of their members. As a result, the parties were influenced by Ghanaian political and administrative models and the BAA was able to take advantage of this fact. Still, it was not the only strategy to support and to influence African freedom fighters in this period.

For instance, the BAA also followed the writing of constitutions of other African countries. The channels opened between the Bureau and important nationalist parties allowed Barden to keep track of the evolution of the discussions. Thus, it was possible to provide the parties with support in the constitutional talks by the BAA or other Ghanaian bodies. It is not clear to what extent did the Bureau or any other Ghanaian institution influenced these talks. However, there is clear proof that Barden was very interested in following the writing of constitutions in some countries where the BAA supported a

nationalist group. For instance, both the NNLC for Swaziland and BCP for Basutoland kept Ghana informed about the proposals submitted at their respective constitutional commissions during the period between 1964 and 1965.⁶³²

The BAA did not only work with single parties, but sometimes it planned long-term strategies for whole groups of them. In this case, the influence of Ghana could be appreciated at a wider level. The most important of these strategies was the support to the establishment of united front of liberation movements, politically aligned to Ghana. One early example had been the attempt of creating a front of liberation movements in Accra shortly after the Kulungugu life attempt. In June 1962, a similar attempt had been done with the BCP and UNIP to create a common platform. The occasion was the Freedom Fighters Conference at Winneba.⁶³³ In 1964, Ghana repeated a similar experiment by pushing NNLC and BCP to coordinate their activities on the field. In September 1964, the BAA sponsored a meeting between the party representatives to discuss the matter. In this case, the attempt turned into a success. Since then, NNLC and PAC planned to work in close cooperation, exchanging information on their common enemies through code-texts delivered by a special courier system.⁶³⁴

One last field in which Ghana deeply collaborated with liberation movements between 1963 and 1964 was the one of military training. It was also the most controversial question for Ghana as it involved not only freedom fighters from dependent territories but also members of opposition parties in independent African states. It also caused a long wave of resentments in the continent.

Ghana's attitude towards guerrilla warfare had changed dramatically since the defeat suffered in Congo between 1960 and 1961. Since then, the Bureau had developed a series of training camps, investing more resources in the military training of African freedom

⁶³² On the constitution of Basutoland see AGPL, un-catalogued/BC-Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference 1965, Provisional Draft, 24th April 1964. On the constitution of Swaziland see AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Accra to Maseru Headquarters, Letter, Carr to Polycarp, 26th January 1965 and AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Accra to Maseru Headquarters, "National Liberatory Congress on 29/10/65".

⁶³³ AGPL, un-catalogued/BC-*Letters* from Delegates to the Conference, "Confidential Memorandum Submitted to the Right Honorable, the President of Ghana Dr. Kwame Nkrumah from the UNIP and the BCP", undated.

⁶³⁴ AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Accra to Maseru Headquarters, "Minutes of the PAC-NNLC Leaders' Meeting held in Accra – Ghana on the 27th September 1964". See also AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Accra to Maseru Headquarters, "PAC-NNLC Code", 16th October 1964 and AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Accra to Maseru Headquarters, handwriting, code message, 25th September 1964.

fighters. Even in this case, the political return was expected to be very relevant. Indeed, the African nationalist were not only trained in guerrilla warfare but also ideologically. Back on the battlefield, they could influence other freedom fighters and widen the net of supporters of Nkrumah's government.

The presence of freedom fighters from independent African countries was also an important political card for Ghana. By supporting opposition groups of rival nations, Nkrumah could put pressures on their governments. Between 1963 and 1964, most of these freedom fighters were trained not only politically but also militarily. This strategy often followed an open hostility of other moderate African states. For instance, in 1964, the Sanwi began to be trained in secret military camps only after the relationship with Houphouet-Boigny had reached its lowest level.⁶³⁵

However, this last type of "subversive" activities proved to be a political "boomerang" for Nkrumah. Despite all the efforts and the successes of the Bureau in the period 1963-1964, Ghana was targeted by an aggressive campaign by moderate African states and the West. Ghana's subversion became the main theme of most of the conferences in 1964, particularly the one of Cairo in 1964. As a result, Ghana's Pan-African policy emerged as weakened. All the work done with the liberation movements between 1963 and 1964 proved insufficient.

5.9. The Response of the West to Ghana's Radical Policies and Subversive Activities in 1964

Between 1963 and 1964, the BAA had successfully attracted an increasing number of radical liberation movements towards Ghana. However, Barden's unorthodox methods had also worsened Nkrumah's relations with most of the African states and also with the Western powers. In 1964, UK and USA multiplied their efforts to counteract Nkrumah's

⁶³⁵ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.4.

influence in Africa. They provided moderate African states with information on Ghana's activities pushing them to publicly attack Nkrumah. Moreover, they planned common strategies to counteract Nkrumah's "subversive activities". It was the beginning of an anti-Nkrumahist campaign which in two years was bound to bring Nkrumah's Pan-African policy to fail and Nkrumah's government to fall.

At the 1963 OAU conference, Nkrumah had already been the target of accusations from other independent African states. He was supposed to be the mind behind Olympio's murder as well as the one behind plots against Tubman, Houphouet-Boigny and Milton Margai. At the time, this accusation had been launched during the talks for the OAU and they were also channeled through the press.⁶³⁶ The West was already supporting these allegations, trying to weaken Ghana's influence in Africa. In the following years, Ghana's radical Pan-African policy led the West to react even stronger.

One of the main arguments against Nkrumah was the presence of political refugees from independent African states in the Ghanaian training camps. The Sawaba Party, the Sanwi Movement, the Cameroon's UPC and all the other opposition parties were considered to all effects terrorists. Thanks to them - it was argued - Nkrumah wanted to subvert the governments of his political rivals in order to rule Africa as a dictator. From this perspective, the one Continental Government supported by Nkrumah was considered a cover for his real plans.

From the Western point of view, Nkrumah was even more dangerous, since with his policies he could have paved the way for the socialist world in Africa. This fear was based on the observation of recent facts in Ghana. At the time, Accra was deepening the relations with the East. The "reds" were promoting a strong economic cooperation with Ghana and they were also providing the BAA with weapons and military experts. Moreover, socialist countries like USSR, China and GDR were also offering scholarships to both Ghanaians and African freedom fighters. According to Western observers, Ghana was very close to become a communist Trojan-horse in Africa.

The first move of London and Washington was to spy on Ghana, in order to elaborate counter-measures to Nkrumah's plans. In 1963, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) - a

⁶³⁶ See, for instance, "Subversion Incorporated", *Newsweek*, 20 May 1963, p.41.

body of the British Cabinet responsible for coordinating the intelligence – had begun collecting information on Ghana. Among the main points of interest there were of course Ghana's activities in independent African states, the latest discoveries about its training camps, and the role of the East in providing arms and experts.

At the time, the question of Ghanaian subversion in Africa was also emerging in the Western press. Since 1963, American and British newspapers campaigned strongly against Nkrumah and his regime, raising accusations against his alleged plans of ruling Africa under the flag of the East. Ghana was listed among those radical countries which were trying to bring communism in the African continent.

While the JIC was preparing a detailed report on subversive activities in Ghana, the question emerged even in the British parliament. In December 1963, the British conservative MP Victor Goodhew raised the question of Ghana in a motion at the House of Commons on communist subversion in Africa. Goodhew - who was known to be a supporter of the South African and Rhodesian regimes - connected USSR and China's policies in Africa with the peculiar communist presence in Ghana.⁶³⁷ Goodhew was basing his accusations on the information received by a former Ghanaian MP, John Amah, who had become a refugee in Nigeria, establishing there his own party.⁶³⁸ This proves that political refugees were used both by Nkrumah and his rivals as political weapons.

Goodhew's speech had a certain political impact in Britain and in Africa. However, it was considered of scarce interest by the British Government. According to the Foreign Office, Goodhew's considerations regarding Ghana were considered neither interesting nor useful for the British cause. If Nkrumah had to be attacked by the press, it should have been on the ground of precise information on subversive activities in the country and on the communist influence there. The British intelligence agencies as well as the American one were working just to collect this information.

The first two reports of the JIC were prepared between the end of 1963 and the first months of 1964 and they tried to estimate the extension of Ghana's subversion in Africa.

⁶³⁷ BNA, DO/195/257, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, 13th December 1963. According to Goodhew, the connection between communist ideology and Pan-Africanism had to be dated back before 1957 and precisely to Padmore's activities in Russia and Germany in the 1920s.

⁶³⁸ John Alex-Hamah's party was the Ghana Peoples' Democratic Party.

Their titles were respectively: “Ghana’s Subversion in Africa” and “Ghana: the Domestic Scene”.

In the meantime, in late 1963, the British government established a “Counter-Subversion Committee” (CSC), depending on the “Defence and Oversea Policy Committee” (DOPC). It was a body meant to study subversive activities in the world and report the findings to the DOPC.⁶³⁹ Working groups for each region were formed. As for West Africa, Ghana was on the spotlight. The JIC report “Ghana’s Subversion in Africa” was discussed by the working group of the Counter-subversion Committee on two occasions, in January ’64 and March of the same year.⁶⁴⁰ In the meeting held in March, the committee discussed how to provide help to the African countries which were under the attack of Ghana. According to the report of the JIC, at the time Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroon, Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Congo (Leopoldville) were all involved. As for Sierra Leone and Nigeria, they were already supported with information about Ghanaian activities in their territories.⁶⁴¹

In the spring of 1964, despite some victories, Ghana was politically on the retreat. Nkrumah was increasingly isolated and his Pan-African policy was not producing any expected impact. At the time, Ghana tried to batten down the hatches by deepening relations with radical states (as Massamba-Debat’s Congo) and former rivals (as Albert Margai’s Sierra Leone).⁶⁴² Nkrumah’s strategy was to create a political platform to re-launch his Pan-African policy at the upcoming Cairo OAU Conference and at the Commonwealth Conference, both planned in July 1964. The Conferences, however, did not bring the results Nkrumah expected. Indeed, several moderate African states backed by the West attacked publicly Ghana and its interference in other states’ internal politics. In both

⁶³⁹ BNA, CAB/148-15, “Cabinet – Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, Composition and terms of reference”, 1st October 1963.

⁶⁴⁰ See BNA, DO/195/213, Letter “Ghana-JIC Paper”, Martin to Chadwick, 11th March 1964 and BNA, PREM/11/4823, Counter Subversion Committee, “Working Group on Ghana”, record of a meeting held on March 23rd, 1964 at the Commonwealth Relation Office.

⁶⁴¹ BNA, PREM/11/4823, Counter Subversion Committee, “Working Group on Ghana”, record of a meeting held on March 23rd, 1964 at the Commonwealth Relation Office.

⁶⁴² Albert Margai had become Prime Minister of Sierra Leone in April 1964. He succeeded his half-brother Milton Margai, who had died in the same month. The change of premiership brought consequences even on the relationship with Ghana. Indeed, Albert Margai was more willing to cooperate with Nkrumah than his half-brother had been. For references on Nkrumah’s moves towards Albert Margai and Massamba-Debat in spring 1964 see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp.346-347-

the conferences, the British supported criticisms against Ghana coming from members of the Commonwealth, which were even ready to involve the UN in the issue.⁶⁴³

Shortly after, in May, a second JIC paper called “Ghana: the Domestic Scene” was prepared and discussed by the Counter-Subversion Committee. The UK was still monitoring Ghanaian activities in Africa. London was prepared to provide its allies with all the support possible in order to counteract the Ghanaian subversive activities in their countries. Nigeria, for instance, was informed on the new JIC paper. On the contrary, Southern Rhodesia was not.⁶⁴⁴

The Western struggle against Nkrumah’s influence in Africa was turning into a success. Still, Americans and British had sometimes different opinions on the policies to perform against Nkrumah. In particular, the Americans criticized the attempts of the British to mediate with the Ghanaian President. Indeed, Washington was willing to perform a more effective policy to counteract Ghana’s moves in Africa. According to the Americans, the British were acting too “soft” with Ghana. Their opinion on the second JIC paper: “was critical of ‘the British attitude to Nkrumah’. [...] the British were altogether too soft on Nkrumah and tended to treat him as an erring child rather than as a political menace”.⁶⁴⁵

Despite their different approaches, London and Washington still shared the same views on the need to counteract Nkrumah’s influence in Africa. They worked together even on the NATO platform. As part of the military pact, London and Washington worked

⁶⁴³ The British were aware of the incoming attack to Nkrumah at the Cairo Conference months before it was held. The British High commissioner to Ghana, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, was informed in April of the general resentment against Ghana by the new Kenyan Minister of State for Pan African Affairs (and old BAA East African representative) Koinange. According to De Freitas, Koinange had told him that “resentment of many independent African States at Ghana’s continued interference in their internal affairs had reached the stage when it was certain that in July at the African Heads of State Conference in Cairo when would be reeked possibly even publicity”. In the same occasions Koinange and de Freitas agreed also on the need for the UN intervention not only against white dominated African countries but also against “Ghana’s totalitarianism”. See BNA/DO/195/213, Telegram, De Reitas to CRO and others, 20th April 1964. For comments on the position of Ghana as emerged at the Commonwealth Conference see BNA, DO/195/213, Letter, Martin (CRO) to Kellick (British Embassy Washington), 27th August 1964.

⁶⁴⁴ BNA, DO/195/213, Letter, Chadwick to Rogers and Martin, 7th May 1964; BNA, DO/195/213, Letter, Chadwick to Snelling, 1st June 1964; BNA, DO/195/213, Letter, Martin to Sir. Duke and Costley-White, 22nd June 1964.

⁶⁴⁵ BNA, DO/195/213, Letter, Owen (British Embassy, Washington D.C.) to Wool-Lewis (CRO), 15th June 1964. Owen referred on a note of the American State Department about the second JIC paper.

together in 1964 in order to collect information on communist propaganda channeled through Ghana and for programming an effective response to this threat.⁶⁴⁶

The Western world was not afraid of Ghana alone, but even more of the growing presence of the Chinese behind Accra's activities. After the break with Moscow in the early 1960s, Peking was showing its will to penetrate in Africa to compensate the Soviet presence. Thus, in the African continent, the West had to treat the Soviet and Chinese activities on two different grounds.⁶⁴⁷

UK and USA were aware of the growing importance of the Chinese in Ghana, especially in providing weapons and military instructors. After the Soviet experts left in 1962, the training camps of the BAA had been run by Ghanaians with poor results.⁶⁴⁸ The arrival of the Chinese military experts in late 1964 brought the quality of guerrilla training back to a high level. Even the Western fears towards Ghana increased accordingly. Behind the secret agreement which brought the Chinese experts in Ghana there was, as usual, A.K. Barden.⁶⁴⁹

The work of the West was proving effective. In 1964, Ghana was increasingly isolated and any attempt of Nkrumah to re-launch the project of a Continental Union Government or an African High Command had failed. The accusation against his "subversive" plans multiplied during the year and the Ghanaian President lost most of his residual influence in the continent. In a last attempt to correct the route, Nkrumah had to put all the foreign policy system of Ghana under review.

⁶⁴⁶ BNA, FO/1110/1822, Letter, Ure to Drinkall and Barclay, 10th March 1964; BNA, FO/1110/1822, Letter, Clift (UK delegation to NATO) to MacLaren (IRD), 24th January 1964.

⁶⁴⁷ Ure, an IRD officer of the British Foreign Office commenting on NATO papers on countering communist propaganda in Africa stated that "[...] it is no longer possible to lump the Russians and Chinese efforts in Africa together under the heading "Communist Bloc" [...] nor is it accurate to describe the distinction between Russian and Chinese activities as 'only differences of degree'". See BNA, FO/1110/1822, Letter, Ure (IRD-FO) to Goodschild (UK Delegation to NATO), 21st February 1964.

⁶⁴⁸ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.7.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 7-8 and 18.

5.10. The Question of Subversion and the Fall of A.K. Barden

Ghana's growing political isolation was mainly caused by the BAA's "subversive" activities. Between 1963 and 1964, Barden's Bureau became equally infamous in the West and in most of the moderate African countries. This fact complicated Nkrumah's already weak position on the African scene. Any attempt to re-launch diplomatically a continental government failed. At the Cairo Conference, Nkrumah tried to correct the route by proposing Accra to host the next OAU conference to be held in the fall of 1965. However, the situation did not change. The attacks of the West kept being harsh and the BAA began to be heavily ostracized even by the Ghanaian Foreign Service. Eventually, in the spring of 1965, Nkrumah decided to make a clear turn in his Pan-African policy. He decided to dismiss Barden and to re-launch diplomatically the Union Government. In the meantime, he also kept supporting radical nationalist parties.

The roots of Barden's dismissal had to be found much before the spring of 1965. Nkrumah already knew that the work of the director was being criticized not only by the West, but also by moderate African countries and even within Ghana by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AAS. Still, between 1963 and 1964, he kept counting on Barden to enlarge his net of supporters and to perform his radical Pan-African policy.

Most of the activities of the BAA were not depending totally by Nkrumah. For years, he had trusted Barden, like he had done with Padmore before. He only provided the director of the BAA with general guidelines to be followed. He did not have the time nor the will to follow every aspect of Ghana's foreign policy in the field of African liberation and unity, including the selection of the liberation movements to support.⁶⁵⁰ For this reason, Barden was often granted with a free hand.⁶⁵¹ Not every move of the BAA was authorized in advance by Nkrumah. For instance, the net of BAA agents was managed autonomously by Barden and so were the military training camps in Ghana. As for the latter case, not even

⁶⁵⁰ Nkrumah was working on African Affairs in the morning and he was providing a general political line to the Bureau. The rest of the work was done by Barden alone. Interview with Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

other members of the BAA were informed about the camps, a matter which was followed personally by the director.⁶⁵²

Nkrumah began to be aware of the problems caused by the Bureau when the latter became not only the target of the attacks of the West and of “moderate” African states but also of the Ghanaian foreign service. According to them, Barden had failed to coordinate the missions of the BAA with those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AAS. His free hand had had bad consequences in the credibility of the Ghanaian diplomatic network, since not even the Minister and the AAS were informed of the details of the missions of the Bureau in Africa.⁶⁵³ Between 1963 and 1964, the diplomatic incidents involving the BAA increased, causing the question of Ghanaian subversive activities to explode in Africa. Criticisms against the Bureau mounted both outside and inside Ghana.

In early 1964, an incident occurred in Tanganyika caused a new wave of attacks against the BAA coming from the Ghanaian Foreign Service. The same event also caused the final political break between Nkrumah and Nyerere. At the time of the mutiny in Tanganyika (January 1964), Barden sent the BAA agent Ferguson to Dar Es-Salaam in order to deliver weapons and ammunitions for the liberation movements fighting in Southern Africa. These weapons were meant to pass through the Ghanaian High Commission to the front. However, the BAA had not informed the Ghanaian High Commissioner Joi Fo Mir, nor Tanganyika’s authorities, of the content of the boxes delivered to the High Commission. Due to the delicate political situation, the presence of weapons in the Ghanaian High Commission could have been considered as an act of war. The situation got even worse when Ferguson was seen organizing a party at the Ghanaian High Commission to celebrate the mutiny. The situation was finally solved by David Bosumtwi-Sam by involving Asante and Botsio.⁶⁵⁴ Still, the conduct of Barden’s Bureau

⁶⁵² Interviews with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012 and 4th September 2012.

⁶⁵³ Interviews with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012 and 4th September 2012; Interviews with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011 and 6th September 2012.

⁶⁵⁴ Bosumtwi-Sam called the BAA in Accra in order to understand the situation, commanding also to send the weapons back to Ghana. Then, he went with Asante and Botsio to apologize to Nyerere, without mentioning him what happened with Ferguson. Interviews with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012 and 4th September 2012

was put on trial. The question came immediately to the desk of Nkrumah together with a request for the dismissal of Barden.

Barden's free hand in Africa had overstepped the mark. The incident caused the country to be even more isolated, this time also among African radicals. Criticisms against Barden's un-orthodox methods mounted even among men of the government and members of the CPP. For the moment, however, Nkrumah kept supporting Barden, despite doubts on his conduct had begun to arise. Indeed, the mistakes of the director of the BAA were damaging the attempts of the Ghanaian President to re-launch Pan-Africanism in international gatherings such as the Cairo Conference of July 1964.

For the first time, the Bureau was clearly put on trial by the Ghanaians themselves. The Foreign Service was attacking Barden's whole management of BAA agents. The latter were damaging their work abroad. Moreover, there was the suspect, among the diplomats, that some agents were spying on them.⁶⁵⁵ The accusations after the Tanganyika's incident were only the first step towards Barden's fall one year later.⁶⁵⁶

At the time, the director of the BAA felt isolated and thus he decided to write directly to Nkrumah in order to clear the air from the allegations against him. The letter written by Barden to Nkrumah on 20th May 1964 is a document of enormous importance.⁶⁵⁷ It is a sort of summary of all the accusations made to the Bureau both inside and outside Ghana. For this reason, it will be quoted almost entirely hereunder. In the letter, Barden explained to Nkrumah his position towards the relations between the BAA, the Foreign Service and other bodies of the state. According to Barden, the campaign against the BAA within Ghana had its roots in the special duties assigned to the BAA after the Kulungugu life attempt:

“The Bureau's efforts, since then [Kulungugu life attempt], in assisting the State apparatus in unearthing plans and exposing the wicked intentions of people both within the country

⁶⁵⁵ In the case of Bosumtwi-Sam, this fact had been confirmed (see previously in the text).

⁶⁵⁶ According to Bosumtwi Sam, the real cause for Barden's fall was the incident of Dar Es-Salaam, the last of a series of incidents which ultimately convinced Nkrumah that he could not rely anymore on the ex-serviceman. Still, Nkrumah waited another year before taking the final decision of dismissing him. Even Asante agrees with this interpretation. Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012. Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.

⁶⁵⁷ PRAAD, SC/BAA/357, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 20th May 1964.

and outside, have been grossly and wickedly misinterpreted and have consequently incurred the displeasure of many people in key positions. In order to obstruct the work of the Bureau, a group of people have been spreading vicious rumours to the effect that the Bureau is the ears of Osagyefo. This obviously is intended to bring the Bureau into disrepute both inside and outside the country. The campaign to soil the name of the Bureau has, of late, been intensified within the limits of Government and Party official circles with the result that members of the Bureau are ostracized during meetings and parties. [...] there is an avid desire to remove the Bureau from under the direct control of Osagyefo [...]"

The majority of the attacks against the Bureau came from the Ministry of foreign Affairs. Many members of the Ministry were criticizing the work of the BAA abroad, including the use of agents, seen by the diplomats as spies. Their presence was considered all in all "obstructionist" by the men of the Foreign Service. Interestingly, Barden openly accused the officers of the Ministry to be the minds behind the international campaign against the Bureau:

"In Government circles, in particular in the Foreign Ministry, officers have erroneously regarded members of the Bureau as spies, security officers, and subversionists. This unfortunate state of affairs results from the utilization of the external communication system of the Ministry by the Bureau in its secret exercises and operations with freedom fighters outside the country. Some of these officials have special delight in disclosing our activities to the public and foreign agents thus bringing the Bureau into public fear and hate. [...] I must say here that the idea of sending out Activists has not been very well understood both by the Foreign Ministry and by our Missions, and the activities of our Activists have been quoted as some of the obstructionist tactics of the Bureau."

Then, Barden had to respond directly to the accusations that followed the Tanganyika's incident. According to him, no serious problems were registered by BAA in East Africa:

"Externally, we have not been the darling of the foreign imperialist press. In America, the Bureau has been regarded as the C.I.A. and D.I.A. of Osagyefo's Government. In Britain the Bureau is known as a subversive organisation. [...] Some allegations have recently been made to the effect that the Bureau has not been altogether popular in East Africa. I do not believe it. I have yet to hear from East African leaders that the Bureau is not liked in East

Africa. Nor have any tangible reasons been given for this alleged extraordinary attitude, except for references to a few isolated incidents and publications in our newspapers [...]"

Barden closed the letter with an appeal for preserving the independence of the Bureau from the control of the Ministry or any other office or institution of the Ghanaian state. These few lines includes a clear definition of the work of the Bureau and the reason why - according to Barden - its missions and the ones of the Ministry were different and complementary at the same time.

"It is not realised that the Bureau is the only organisation in the country that can achieve political action to reinforce our policy that cannot normally be done through diplomatic processes and yet get away with it. To attempt to place the Bureau under the Foreign Ministry or integrate it with any other organisation is to embarrass the Ministry or organisation concerned and the Government. The Bureau is there to accept blame that would normally be directed against the Government.[...] The Bureau has doggedly adhered to the Government's policy on African Unity, not only because Osagyefo is dedicated to it but because we also believe in it and have worked towards its achievement.[...] Osagyefo is the only one competent to decide whether the functions of the Bureau are to be delimited or not."

With this letter, Barden admitted for the first time that the Bureau had become the target of the attacks of the West as well of some members of the CPP and the Government. Thus, he requested Nkrumah to be backed in order to keep working independently for African freedom and unity.

For the moment, Nkrumah decided not to take any decision concerning Barden or the BAA as a whole. Once again, the director was left free to operate in Ghana and in Africa. The Bureau kept also supporting the opposition parties of independent African states, despite the protests of their governments. According to Thompson, during this year, Barden

proposed to send activists in Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Algeria, Togo and Congo Brazzaville.⁶⁵⁸

In the summer, Barden also worked on guerrilla training. He signed an agreement with China for the supply of instructors for the secret camps, confirming the stand taken by Ghana towards the support of guerrilla warfare. In August he wrote to Nkrumah:

- a) Ghana has made it clear that the stage is reached where imperialism, apartheid and neo-colonialism must be fought by armed revolution.
- b) As the leading African nation fighting against these evils, Ghana must make available to the Freedom Fighters greater facilities for training.⁶⁵⁹

Even if Barden's strategy was being successful among the radicals, it was damaging Ghana's position in the rest of Africa. Indeed, in the same period, the suspects towards Accra caused by the BAA subversive activities overshadowed Nkrumah's attempts to re-launch diplomatically the Union Government and the African High Command as well as his attempts to recover some credibility among the ranks of the moderate OAU members. Both the Union Government option and the African High Command one were unsuccessfully presented at Lagos at the OAU Meeting of Foreign Ministers (24-28 February 1964) and at the Cairo OAU Conference of Heads of State (July 1964).

Still, at the Cairo Conference, Nkrumah decided not to slow down, but to raise the bar: he proposed Accra as the seat of the next OAU Conference of Heads of State, planned to be held in October 1965. Once again, however, this proposal turned into a political "boomerang" as the subversive activities of the Bureau became the main argument against Nkrumah's proposals in the next year and half.

In late 1964, the question of subversion mounted and it finally exploded after Sawaba party members trained in Ghana tried to assassinate Diori.⁶⁶⁰ In January 1965, an incident happened at the border with Togo made the situation even worse.⁶⁶¹

⁶⁵⁸ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 359; Thompson makes no reference to any source for this statement.

⁶⁵⁹ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.8; the book quotes this letter written by Barden to Nkrumah on 21st August 1964 concerning the Half-Assini project.

⁶⁶⁰ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 365.

The West and the moderate African states took advantage of the circumstances to launch another campaign against Ghana. Two questions were on the table: the presence of members of opposition parties as refugees in Accra and the increasingly dangerous relationship between the BAA and the socialist bloc. As for the first point, the majority of the independent African states threatened to boycott the OAU conference in Accra if the question of refugees was not solved. As for the second, the West began to study measures to counteract the growing presence of “reds” in Ghana, especially the Chinese. Both the questions involved Barden and his Bureau.

Between 1964 and 1965, the British and the Americans kept track of the activities of the BAA and of the Institute in order to check on the political and military exchanges with the socialist bloc. The British proved particularly active in this front. They were already fighting relentlessly against Ghana’s radical influence in Africa. They got even more involved in the issue when Ghana campaigned against London on the Southern Rhodesia question.⁶⁶²

In January 1965, a meeting of British High Commissioners and Ambassadors regarding counter-subversion in West Africa was held in Dakar. Interestingly, Nkrumah was listed among the most dangerous enemies of the West, among others such as Castro and Nasser.⁶⁶³ On 12 January, the West Africa group of the British Counter Subversion Committee met. The meeting discussed the dangers of Ghana’s subversion and it proposed solutions, including materials to discredit Winneba. The reference on the links between Ghana and the socialist bloc is worth noting. The regional group of the Counter Subversion Committee stated that: “It would be highly dangerous if Ghanaian, UAR, Russian and Chinese subversive activities in Africa all joined together”.⁶⁶⁴

⁶⁶¹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p. 368

⁶⁶² See, for instance, articles of VOA against the involvement of Great Britain in the Rhodesian question: “Give Southern Rhodesia New Constitution”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 2(1964), p.2; “Our Opinion: Sir Alex Conference”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 3-4(1964), p.1; “The Southern Rhodesian Issue”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 2(1964), pp.15-18. “Britain and Southern Rhodesia”, *Voice of Africa*, vol.4, 5-6(1964), pp.19-21 and 24-28.

⁶⁶³ See, for instance, BNA, FO/371/176000, Letter, Kemp (British embassy, Lomé) to Millard (Foreign Office), 12th May 1964.

⁶⁶⁴ BNA, CAB/148/42, “Counter Subversion Committee- Summary of recent activities of working groups ad hoc meetings – Ghana”, 8th February 1965.

At the time, the British were particularly worried of the Chinese influence in Ghana. As underlined before, Barden had signed an agreement with Chinese experts in 1964 and the same pact was confirmed and made official even by his successor.⁶⁶⁵ The arrival of the first Chinese military experts in August 1964 was only the first step towards a closer association between Accra and Peking, while the USSR was losing its influence. In November '64, a group of six Ghanaians were sent to China in order to take part to a 90 days course to become “instructors” and “assist to the struggle” for African freedom.⁶⁶⁶ Even Kwame Nkrumah showed a growing interest for Maoist theories on guerrilla warfare. The concept of people’s army was becoming more and more interesting to the ears of Ghanaians.⁶⁶⁷

The question of Ghanaian subversion in Africa was discussed again by the British in February.⁶⁶⁸ In April, a new paper of the JIC updated those of 1963 and 1964 with the latest news on Soviet and Chinese activities in Ghana. The paper, named “Supply of Soviet Bloc and Chinese Arms to new Commonwealth Countries”, included information on the movements of arms and weapons from the socialist countries to Ghana. According to the JIC, Nkrumah’s government was running out of funds for any new weapons coming from the East. Still, the economic aid of the West was strongly discouraged. It could only encourage Ghana to keep planning military actions abroad to the advantage of the socialist bloc. In this case, as the JIC report stated:

She [Ghana] would be encouraged to overawe her weaker neighbors; she would be tempted to send troops abroad – to the Congo for instance – to aid the rebels. Though it is unlikely that Nkrumah would use his forces in the furtherance of his aim of African unity, there is always the possibility that in the case of the overthrow of a regime in a neighboring

⁶⁶⁵ AGPL, BAA/357, Letter, Ofori Bah to Nkrumah, 28th April 1965; see also NLC, *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*, pp. 18-20.

⁶⁶⁶ AGPL, BAA/359, Letter, Wilson (Ghana’s Embassy Peking) to Barden, 3rd November 1964.

⁶⁶⁷ At the time of the coup which overthrown Nkrumah (21st February 1966), the NLC staff found a draft copy of Nkrumah’s new book on Guerrilla warfare which was later published in 1968: “Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare”. This book was strongly influenced by Maoist theories on guerrilla warfare war and the use of People’s army. See NLC, *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*, p. 42 and NLC, *Nkrumah’s Deception of Africa*, p. 14.

⁶⁶⁸ In such occasion, the JIC papers on Ghana’s subversion written in 1963 and 1964 were considered outdated, especially since they did not include the latest news on USSR and Chinese advancements in Ghana. See BNA, DO/195/213, Note, Wood Lewis to Rogers, 18th February 1964.

country, Nkrumah might not be able to resist a call from the insurgents for Ghana's armed intervention. The British interest at the moment is to see that Ghana does not expand her forces.⁶⁶⁹

Fortunately for UK, Ghana's army was still partially supported by London through the BJSTT (British Joint Services Training Team). Thanks to this, it was unlikely that Ghana would turn completely against the western world and its allies.⁶⁷⁰ However, it is interesting to note how the attention on Ghana was high and how the UK was working for isolating the country politically and militarily.

London's work against the influence of the East in Ghana and its strategies to counteract the military activities of Accra had the common denominator in the struggle against the Bureau. Barden's office was considered as the most dangerous of the Ghanaian bodies since it was controlled by radicals and it could count on a vast net of agents. In the meantime, the campaign of independent Africa against Ghana reached its apex. Nkrumah was completely isolated politically and most of the OAU states kept threatening to boycott the summit of Accra in October 1965.

It is in this context that Nkrumah finally decided to dismiss Barden from his post at the Bureau. It was the 10th of June 1965.⁶⁷¹ This decision was made as part of a plan to re-organize the Bureau in order to build a more efficient and discreet institution. Moreover, it also worked to cool down the situation in Ghana, since the Foreign Service was increasingly dissatisfied with the work done by the Bureau. Barden had become too much powerful and unpredictable to count on him anymore for the execution of Ghana's Pan-African policy. His dismissal was the perfect solution for solving the problems caused by the Bureau. However, apparently, it also contradicted Nkrumah's radical approach towards African liberation and unity embodied by Barden's Bureau. As a matter of fact, the dismissed director felt betrayed by Nkrumah by being treated as a scapegoat for the failure of Nkrumah's foreign policy. Barden reacted vehemently, to the point of showing signs of

⁶⁶⁹ BNA, DO/195/213, report, "JIC (65) 35 – Supply of Soviet Bloc and Chinese Arms to New Commonwealth Countries – GHANA".

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁷¹ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.3.

madness. Eventually, he was placed in a mental hospital and his place was taken by Ofori Bah which held the position of director until the time of the coup.⁶⁷²

The arrival of Ofori Bah brought a general revision of everything concerning the BAA and its activities. The new director had to resist the attempts of the Foreign Service to attack the already weakened institution and he also had to reorganize it.⁶⁷³ Still, the office maintained its duties, even if they were carried out more carefully. Ghana had to recover its position in view of the conference of Accra. The summer of 1965 signed the beginning of the last season of Ghana's Pan-African policy.

5.11. The Last Season of Nkrumah's Pan-African Policy

With the fall of Barden and the reform of the BAA, Nkrumah and his government could now work to recover a better position for Ghana in the international scene. This does not mean that Ghana had abandoned its path towards the achievement of radical Pan-African goals. During the last months of his rule – while he had to face an increasingly harsh economical crisis in Ghana – Nkrumah promoted two different approaches to African liberation and unity. Both the Foreign Service and the Bureau were called to work for the goals of a continental government and the independence of the continent. The BAA acted more carefully with regard to its subversive activities in independent African states. As a result, Ghana gained back some credibility. Such credibility was used to re-launch - even this time unsuccessfully - African unity at the OAU conference of Accra in October '65.

At the same time, during 1965, Ghana showed also its will to keep the road of radicalization straight. This policy was reflected by a stronger relationship with China and by an increasing involvement of Ghana into the struggles for liberation in southern Africa, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. Just few months before the coup of February 1966,

⁶⁷² PRAAD, SC/BAA/357/KN-294, Letter, Nkrumah to Barden, 10th June; PRAAD, SC/BAA/357/KN-294, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 10th June 1965.

⁶⁷³ PRAAD, SC/BAA/357/KN-294, Letter, Ofori Bah to Nkrumah, 30th June; PRAAD, SC/BAA/357/KN-294, Letter, Ofori Bah to Osei (auditor-general), 30th July 65.

Nkrumah was preparing a military expedition to Smith's country as an extreme attempt to re-launch a revolutionary path towards liberation.

The main mission of the whole system of foreign policy of Nkrumah's government in 1965 was to work for the Accra OAU Conference. This gathering was the last crucial occasion for Nkrumah's government to put the Union Government and the African High Command options in practice. It was also an occasion to strengthen the position of Nkrumah's government internationally and internally, considering that the unrest caused by the increasing economical crisis in the country was mounting day after day. Nkrumah was so aware of the importance of the Conference and so confident of its positive outcome as to invest huge resources for transforming Accra into a sort of "alternative capital city" of the OAU.⁶⁷⁴ The project of a £8 million complex for the dignitaries to be hosted in Accra – the so-called "Job 600" – was sketched by Nkrumah himself during the Cairo OAU Conference of July 1964.⁶⁷⁵ According to Michael Dei-Anang, Nkrumah made every effort possible to have the building completed before the Accra Conference, pretending that the structure was erected in a short time span with almost every material that had to be imported.⁶⁷⁶ It was an extreme attempt to show to the OAU members and the rest of the world that Ghana was still a wealthy country and that Nkrumah's government could be still considered as a model for other African countries.

The African Affairs Secretariat worked through the Ghanaian missions in Africa in order to convince all the Heads of States of the OAU to accept Nkrumah's proposal for the establishment of a Continental Union Government and an African High Command. Several trips were undertaken by Ghanaian delegations during 1965 in order to achieve this target.⁶⁷⁷

However, another problem was putting at risk the whole organization of the Conference: it was the presence of political refugees from independent territories in Ghana. As underlined in the previous sub-chapter, the question of subversion exploded after Accra was accused of being involved in a life attempt against the Nigerien President Diori in late

⁶⁷⁴ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.358.

⁶⁷⁵ M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations*, p.3.

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁷⁷ K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.22.

1964 and after Ghana was involved in the last of a series of border incidents with Togo at the beginning of the new year. A front of moderate African states led by Ivory Coast threatened to boycott the Accra Conference in case Nkrumah would not expel all the “terrorists” from Ghana. Houphouet-Boigny was the most important leader of this group as he was one of the first African heads of state to denounce Ghana’s subversive activities. He was also the one who had been responsible for the inclusion of a specific clause of the OAU charter (1963) against subversion.⁶⁷⁸

On 13 February 1965, thirteen African French-speaking countries met at Nouakchott to discuss the establishment of the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache* (OCAM), an organization which the BAA immediately labeled as a means for destroying the OAU and for bringing Africa “under the egemony of US imperialism”.⁶⁷⁹ The summit was the occasion the denounce publicly Nkrumah’s subversion and to announce that the majority of the moderate African states would not attend the OAU Conference in Accra unless the Ghanaian government would not expel all the members of opposition parties hosted in its territory.

At first, Nkrumah rejected all the allegations of the Ghanaian subversive activities as well as the presence of secret military camps, defending his choice to welcome political refugees for humanitarian reasons. Paradoxically, as Armah points out, the Ghanaian government turned to the Nigerian government for help.⁶⁸⁰ Alex Quaison-Sackey, then Ghanaian Foreign Minister, promised the Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa to guarantee the safety of all the Heads of State invited at the conference and he asked him to support Ghana against the threats of boycott. Balewa himself worked through the OAU to organize an extraordinary Council of Ministers in Lagos on June 1965 in order to discuss about the threat of a boycott and the possible measures to solve the problem.⁶⁸¹ Even at the Lagos Conference, the Ghanaians, represented by Botsio denied any involvement of the BAA or any other Ghanaian body in any subversive activity. Even the existence of secret training

⁶⁷⁸ The clause was the following: “unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other states”. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.333.

⁶⁷⁹ K. Batsa, *The Spark*, pp.33-34.

⁶⁸⁰ K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, pp.159-160.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibidem*, p.160.

camps was again denied.⁶⁸² A definitive solution was not achieved, but it was clear that Ghana had to get rid of the refugees if Nkrumah wanted to gather all the moderate African countries at the Conference.

Nkrumah had already commanded to move some of the Sanwi refugees from Ghana to Algeria just shortly after the Nouakchott meeting. It was a first attempt to show the goodwill of Ghana to Houphoet-Boigny, who was the most influential leader of the group of moderate African states.⁶⁸³ In the summer of 1965, immediately after Lagos, Nkrumah commanded to move other members of opposition parties hosted at the African Affairs Center outside Ghana, at least for the duration of the Conference.⁶⁸⁴ The new director of the BAA dealt with the question. With this move, the Ghanaian President wanted to present again the BAA and the AAC as “Pan-African” instruments rather than centers of “subversions”.

In the meantime, Nkrumah requested also the Bureau to work for strengthening Ghana’s position among the liberation movements in order to get to the appointment of the OAU summit with a sufficient number of supporters. Clearly - as it has been in the previous years - the focus of the BAA mission was on Southern Africa and on the Portuguese territories. With regard to the latter, in early 1965 Kofi Batsa proposed to produce a Portuguese version of the Spark to be distributed among the Lusophone liberation movements. Nkrumah accepted the proposal and asked the BAA to provide assistance for this special edition of the journal.⁶⁸⁵ According to Nkrumah, the Spark could have been a useful instrument for the struggle in the Portuguese territories: “in order to back up the militancy of the nationalist forces with powerful ideological warfare and press exposure”.⁶⁸⁶

Despite the economical crisis in Ghana, Nkrumah’s government kept supporting radical nationalist parties and liberation movements. In exchange, they were expected to

⁶⁸² On the Lagos Conference see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.377-381.

⁶⁸³ NLC, *Nkrumah’s Deception of Africa*, pp.10-11.

⁶⁸⁴ AGPL, BAA/383, Letter, Ofori Bah to the General Manager Ghana Commercial Bank, 30th July 1965 and AGPL, BAA/383, Letter, Ofori Bah to the General Manager Ghana Commercial Bank, 4th August 1965. The first letter refers to a Sawaba member. The second one to an UPC member.

⁶⁸⁵ AGPL, BAA/357, letter, Batsa to Nkrumah, 6th April 1965; AGPL, BAA/357, letter, Nkrumah to Batsa, 8th April 1965.

⁶⁸⁶ AGPL, BAA/357, letter, Batsa to Nkrumah, 6th April 1965.

support Ghana's political positions, especially at the OAU conference. For instance, the BCP was provided with funds for the elections of April 1965 (5000£), similarly to what Ghana had done just earlier with the BPP in Bechuanaland.⁶⁸⁷ In the same period, Nkrumah's government granted also the BCP with scholarship for courses in administration, security and intelligence.⁶⁸⁸ At the time of Nkrumah's overthrown (February 1966) the BCP together with a number of other parties was still strongly backed by Ghana, particularly for activities on the field.⁶⁸⁹

The parties supported by Accra were paying respect to Nkrumah both politically and symbolically. The BCP defined the Continental Union Government as their "cherished ideal".⁶⁹⁰ The NNLC was using the CPP slogan "Forward Ever Backward Never".⁶⁹¹ The PAC and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) - both backed by Ghana for their entry into the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization at the AAPSO conference in Winneba (May '65) - supported Ghana's position towards African liberation and unity. At the conference, the PAC referred to the campaign culminated in 1960 with the Sharpeville Massacre as the "Positive Action Campaign", a clear way to underline the legacy with Ghana and the CPP.⁶⁹² Few months later, at the OAU conference in Accra (October) the

⁶⁸⁷ Ghana granted the BCP with 5000£ for the elections, see AGPL, BAA/357, handwriting, "Financial Assistance", BCP, 29th April 1965. In the meantime, even the BPP had been financed by Accra but it registered a bad outcome. The representatives of the BCP in Accra wrote to Barden to assure him that the same defeat was not going to be repeated with their party. They stated: "Through lack of effective political organization of the broad masses of the people, the Pan-African forces have suffered a terrible setback in Bechuanaland. But with regard to Basutoland, we can confidently assure your government that, all things being equal, we can see no reason why the progressive forces should not stage a brilliant performance which will redound to the credit of all African freedom fighters." See AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Mohale, Mpetla, Qhobela to Barden, 5th March 1965.

⁶⁸⁸ AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Mokhehle to Ofori Bah, 9th November 1965; AGPL/BAA/393, Letter, Mohale to Ofori Bah, 15th November 1965; AGPL/BAA/393, Letter, Mpetla to Ofori Bah, 10th December 1965; see also AGPL, BAA/393, "general meeting Tuesday 24th August 1965".

⁶⁸⁹ AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Chakela to Ofori Bah, 27th January 1966.

⁶⁹⁰ AGPL, BAA/393, Letter, Molale, Mpetla, Qhobela to Barden, 5th March 1965.

⁶⁹¹ AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Accra to Maseru Headquarters, Letter, Khoza (NNLC) to Makoti (PAC), 1st March 1965.

⁶⁹² AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Accra to Maseru Headquarters, "Memorandum of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa submitted to the fourth Afro-Asian Conference held at Winneba, Ghana, from May 9 to May 16, 1965".

PAC proposed also the establishment of united fronts for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Such point was one of the pillars of Ghana's Pan-African policy.⁶⁹³

Once again, Accra invested money and resources in the support to liberation movements not only to achieve the goals of its Pan-African policy but also to gain back a political return. While the Accra conference was approaching, Ghana was facing a terrible economical crisis within its borders and a political crisis abroad. Isolated internally due to the accusation of subversion, Ghana had to count on its prestige among the liberation movements as it had done in other occasions.

The 1965 OAU conference in Accra was the perfect stage for Ghana to show its strength in the arena of African liberation. The list of delegates to be invited clearly reflected Ghana's influence as the host of the conference. Most of the parties invited were supported by Ghana and had their offices of representation in Accra.⁶⁹⁴

As for the liberation movements hosted at the conference, Nkrumah wanted to be sure of their political stand. Consequently, the BAA monitored the liberation movements during their stay in Accra. The duty was fulfilled by the "new" Bureau of Ofori Bah. The BAA had to send officers to welcome and meet freedom fighters in Accra. The assignment of the officers was the following:

1. Lobbying of Freedom Fighters. [...] The officers are going to act as guides to the Freedom Fighters. Every morning the officers will go to the residence of the Freedom Fighters and convey them to the conference.
2. Officers will have to explain the situation at the Bureau now.
3. Officers will discuss with the Freedom Fighters the need for a Continental African Government and then try to let them accept the idea and support.
- 4.

⁶⁹³ AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Accra to Maseru Headquarters, Press release, Pan-Africanist Congress, 24th October 1965.

⁶⁹⁴ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-CONF, OAU 1965, "invitation to the nationalist movements", undated. The liberation movements invited were [in brackets the number of delegates]: PAIGC (2), Liberation Committee of Sao Tome and Principe (2), IPGE (Idea Popular de la Guinea) (2), MPLA (2), SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) (3), SWANU (2), PAC (3), ANC (3), Unity Movement (1), NNLC (2), SPP (1), Imbokodvo National Movement (2), Basutoland National Party (2), BCP (3), Marematlou Freedom Party (1), Marematlou Party (1), Bechuanaland Democratic Party (3), Bechuanaland People's Party (2), Botswana Independence Party (1), Liberation Movement of Comoro Island (2), COREMO (Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique) (3), FRELIMO (2), ZANU (3), ZAPU (3).

The Officers will as well watch the movements of all representatives. 5. Daily report will be submitted to the office by officers.⁶⁹⁵

This assignments had two targets. On one side, Nkrumah wanted to be sure about the identities of the freedom fighters hosted in Ghana as he feared spies to be among them. On the other side, he wanted also the freedom fighters to be perfectly instructed by the BAA on their statements about Ghana at the conference. Nkrumah's main target for the conference was indeed to act as a guide for African liberation movements, trying to recover a certain prestige among the other members of the OAU.

Still, when the day of the Accra summit arrived, nothing that Nkrumah had planned could be turned into practice. Although the Ghanaian President had moved some of the most important political refugees out of Ghana, eight countries did not attend the Accra OAU summit as a protest against the Ghanaian subversive activities. They were: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger, Togo, Gabon, Chad and the Malagasy Republic.⁶⁹⁶ Even the presence of several friendly liberation movements did not change much the position of Ghana at the Conference. Nkrumah was still politically isolated and no one in the continent – apart from several radical liberation movements – was willing to support a Continental Union Government. For this reason, the Conference – which Nkrumah had seen during 1964/1965 as a last attempt to re-launch a political union – became rather unsatisfactory for the Ghanaian plans. Nkrumah himself had to drop the proposal for a Union Government and, instead, he accepted the project for the creation of an OAU Executive Committee of a few Heads of State as the only concession towards a stronger political union.⁶⁹⁷ The accusations of subversion did not end with the expulsion of the members of opposition parties from Ghana, even because some of them went back to Ghana immediately after the conference.⁶⁹⁸

The last diplomatic attempt to support Nkrumah's Pan-African policy failed with the OAU conference of Accra. At the time, Ghana was also in a deep economical crisis which

⁶⁹⁵ PRAAD, SC/BAA/357, Letter, J.A.K. Kyiamh to the Secretary of the BAA, 12th July 1965.

⁶⁹⁶ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.384.

⁶⁹⁷ K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.22.

⁶⁹⁸ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.385.

was bringing the country to a disaster. In this difficult political and economical situation, Nkrumah played his last card: he launched the idea of sending a military expedition to Southern Rhodesia in order to support the struggle for freedom there.

Few day after the conference the news of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Salisbury (11th November 1965) turned into the perfect *casus belli*. On 26th November 1965, the column of the CPP newspaper “The Party Chronicle” published a call for volunteers to Southern Rhodesia:

All Branch Executive Committees are requested to carry out a campaign within their various areas to rouse the masses of the people to join the Volunteer force, otherwise known as the People’s Militia, in order to get the whole of Ghana mobilized in Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s call for combat-readiness to help liberate Southern Rhodesia. At Branch Meeting throughout the whole of next week the Executive Committees should start to organize the masses to join the Militia in their thousands. All District Commissioner should called meeting to the District Executive Committees and they should all go into action in the usual Party dynamic way. No Party district should lag behind in these hours of the Parties clarion call.⁶⁹⁹

In reality, no mission was ever launched to Southern Rhodesia. Nkrumah was so politically weak that he had to align Ghana to the OAU resolutions on this question.⁷⁰⁰ In the last months of 1965 and the beginning of 1966, the Ghanaian President made other attempts to re-launch his vision of African politics, but he had no success. The coup of the 24th of February 1966 brought Nkrumah’s rule to an end and, and it consequently crystallized any further action of Ghana in the fields of African liberation and unity.

With the coup, Nkrumah’s political project, including his attempts to export Pan-Africanism and the so-called “African Revolution” throughout Africa could be declared over and defeated. The end of Nkrumah’s government signified also the end of his Pan-African policy and the end of the “Pan-African” institutions. In one single day an entire system was destroyed. Years and years of political developments were cancelled. Any

⁶⁹⁹ “The Party Chronicle”, vol.2, 12, 26th November 1965.

⁷⁰⁰ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.393.

effort to re-launch a continental government had failed as well as a last attempt to transform the support to liberation movements in a revolutionary war.

The National Liberation council was able to announce the Ghanaians that their country had been freed forever by the former regime. The military authorities could also declare to the whole continent that the new Ghana would never follow the step of the deposed President. Accra was ready to collaborate with those same governments Nkrumah had threatened in the past the years. Immediately after the coup, backed by the Western powers, the NLC launched an anti-Nkrumah campaign in order to legitimize their putsch and counteract the residual influence that the past government could have still claimed in Africa. This operation began with an exposure of the subversive activities Accra had enacted between 1957 and 1966, the evidences of which were collected in the two booklets *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa* and *Nkrumah's Deception of Africa*. The booklets - both published in 1966 – presented Nkrumah's Pan-African project as a way to conceal his actual plan of ruling the entire continent.⁷⁰¹ Indeed, Nkrumah's Pan-African policy was described as contradictory, especially since the Ghanaian President had strongly opposed the OAU, the only organization that could actually embody Pan-Africanism. According to the NLC, the worst crime of Nkrumah's regime had been to work against the governments of other independent African states, threatening the independence that they had conquered just some years before.

Both the publications of the new government focused especially on the activities of the Bureau of African Affairs, the African Affairs Centre, and the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba, the institutions which were presented as the most effective instruments of Nkrumah's subversive plans in Africa. Few references were made to Nkrumah's support to African liberation movements, and when the question was discussed, the work of the BAA was described as counter-productive if not detrimental. Quoting from *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*:

The arrogance that Nkrumah himself displayed towards other Africans was closely reflected in the Bureau's attitude towards refugees from dependent and

⁷⁰¹ NLC, *Nkrumah's subversion in African*, p. iii.

independent countries. People who had come to Ghana for help were so provoked as to become openly hostile. [...] As a result of this kind of treatment, by 1963 few leading African nationalists remained in Ghana. Most of those who did stay on were opportunists tied to Nkrumah by dependence on him for small handouts of cash and occasional gifts.⁷⁰²

The reality was different. At the time of the coup, the most influential liberation movements still had their offices of representation in Accra, even if their headquarters were in Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, or Leopoldville – that is – close to the battlefields of the African liberation struggle. Despite the opposition of the great part of the African independent states, Nkrumah could still claim a vast support among African nationalists. On the eve of the coup, the liberation movements with offices of representation in Accra – excluding the opposition parties and including a representation of the Popular Republic of Congo – were: Pan-Africanist Congress, Basutoland Congress Party, Ngwane National Liberatory Congress, *Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe*, National Unity Democratic Organization of South West Africa, *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*, *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*, *Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial*, All-African Convention Unity Movement of South Africa, African National Congress, *Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique*, Bechuanaland People's Party and the Zimbabwe African National Union.⁷⁰³

The work of the Bureau, the AAC, and the Institute in support of African liberation and unity might not have produced the results Nkrumah expected, that is, to create a network of Nkrumahist nationalist parties sincerely devoted to the unity of the continent. However, the Ghanaian President had undoubtedly succeeded in keeping the freedom fighters close to Accra, even after the establishment of the Liberation Committee and the transfer of the frontline to Southern Africa. Such an achievement can be hardly reduced to a mere mercenary relationship between the freedom fighters and Accra. Nkrumah's target had been accomplished after considerable monetary sacrifices made to support the freedom fighters,

⁷⁰² NLC, *Nkrumah's subversion in Africa*, p. 3.

⁷⁰³ AGPL, BAA/9, "Nationalist Organisations Representatives in Accra" undated, but referable to February 1966.

but also after a constant and effective political work promoted within the ranks of the liberation movements. These efforts would have been worthless without an efficient system such as the one Nkrumah and Padmore had modeled since 1957 and – to some extent – even before.

5.12. Conclusions

It is difficult to trace a balance of the period between 1963 and 1966. In this period, Nkrumah passed through a series of successes and defeats, dictated by different approaches in the performance of his Pan-African policy. The peculiar aspect of this phase was a growing radicalization which affected all the spheres of the political life of Ghana, including the management of its “Pan-African” institutions. The attempt to transfer the “African revolution” to the whole continent was successful only with regard to radical liberation movements. Still, it is interesting to observe that Nkrumah’s influence was still strong in several political circles in Africa practically until the coup of 1966.

Nkrumah was defeated mainly by the government of those African countries that were already independent, who saw the revolutionary agenda of Nkrumah as a pretext to rule the continent. They could not believe in the sincerity of his support to African liberation and unity, since the BAA had threatened their countries sponsoring “terrorists” groups. In fact, the sponsorship of opposition parties was part of Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy.

In this period, even the Bureau itself had been defeated by enemies both outside and inside Ghana. Barden’s “unorthodox” methods had brought the West to counteract vehemently its activities through propaganda and through a strict political and military collaboration with the “moderate” African countries. Inside Ghana, the Foreign Service also pushed for Barden’s removal. It was the same service which had criticized Padmore at the time of his appointment and which had suffered for the growing power of a body perceived as external to the “traditional” state. Still, not even the removal of the controversial figure of Barden had worked to modify the position of Ghana in Africa.

Unfortunately for Nkrumah, his vast net of supporters among the liberation movements was not able to save him nor his government from falling. With the coup of 1966, any attempt to convert Ghana into a revolutionary state and to export its political model crashed with the internal unrest that was mounting in the country. From his exile in Guinea, Nkrumah had plenty of time to think what went wrong, especially with regard to his dream of liberating and uniting the continent under one flag.

Recapitulation of the Thesis and Final Considerations

This thesis has attempted to provide a better understanding of the functioning of the “Pan-African” institutions of Ghana, designed by Nkrumah and Padmore to support African liberation and unity and to spread the Pan-African message in Africa. As the thesis has tried to demonstrate, the BAA, the AAC and the Institutes played a fundamental role in the history of Ghana’s foreign policy and they also strongly influenced the internal political life of the African nation. Radical Pan-Africanism was an integral part of Nkrumah’s political programme in Ghana. In this perspective, the three Pan-African institutions held a key role both in supporting the radicalization of the Ghanaian civil service (with a strong resistance of the latter) and in promoting the Ghanaian institutional and political models throughout Africa. Thanks to the analysis of new sources, this thesis has also offered an insight into the work of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute among the ranks of African liberation movements. Hence, it has been possible to evaluate the degree of influence exerted by Ghana on the African nationalist movements. Furthermore, this study has explained how Nkrumah gained a relevant political return - at least in the first period of his rule in Ghana - by being one of the main supporters of African freedom fighters.

As the thesis has showed, the history of Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy can be divided in five main phases, each one of which has been presented in a specific chapter. Such phases meant changes of strategies for the whole Ghanaian Foreign Service and also for the “Pan-African” institutions. As Nkrumah’s political position changed through the years, also the “Pan-African” institutions had to adapt to the new tasks they had to perform during each new political phase.

This study has been opened by an overview of the theoretical bases of Ghana’s Pan-African policy from its early conception to its actualization. As the thesis has shown, Nkrumah and Padmore defined its lines after years of political elaboration and after considering Ghana as the perfect platform where to actualize Manchester’s call for the liberation and unity of the continent. Together, they transformed Ghana into the torch-

bearer of Pan-Africanism in the continent, making Accra a shelter for any African freedom fighter in need of assistance. Nkrumah and Padmore needed to operate a selection among the liberation movements, in order to create a front of Pan-Africanist parties in the continent. Thus, they elaborated some specific guidelines to be followed by those nationalist parties that were willing to receive Ghana's support. As the thesis has tried to prove, these guidelines were based on the Pan-Africanist theory but also on Nkrumah's political achievements in the struggle for Ghana's independence, that is, the construction of the CPP as a modern mass nationalist party, the use of the "Positive Action", and the adherence to nonalignment. From chapter one to chapter five, several examples have been provided in order to support this hypothesis. In 1957, Padmore and Nkrumah created the first of a series of "Pan-African" institutions in order to attain the targets of Ghana's Pan-African policy: the Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs. Even in this case, as the thesis has tried to demonstrate, Nkrumah and Padmore's past experiences proved fundamental. The Office of the Adviser on African Affairs was *de facto* shaped on anti-colonial agencies such as the International African Service Bureau and the Pan-African Federation where Padmore himself had worked for years. This as well as other past experiences had been quite useful in order to set the foundations of the Office and of the others "Pan-African" institutions. The first chapter has also explained how the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs and the African Affairs Centre were included in the Ghanaian system of foreign policy and how the two institutions worked with the Foreign Service. This operation proved difficult, since it implied a collaboration between different systems of foreign policy, one operating with "orthodox" diplomatic means and the other with "un-orthodox" ones. This difficulty was bound to evolve, eventually, in a direct confrontation between "militants" and civil servants. Even Padmore's involvement in Ghanaian politics had been contested by the service which – as the thesis has showed – was still not willing to yield its power to an independent, radical and non-Ghanaian figure like Padmore. The first chapter has explained how the Ghanaian diplomacy and Padmore's Office worked during the first two years of Nkrumah's rule. In particular, the chapter has provided an insight into the work of Padmore's Office for the Independent African States Conference and the All-African People's Conference, the most important appointments of the period 1957-1958.

After the AAPC (December 1958), Accra could claim to have conquered the confidence of hundreds of freedom fighters, ready to count on Nkrumah's support. The Office of the Adviser on African Affairs proved to be an efficient body considering that at the time of the AAPC it was only one year old. Even the African Affairs Centre, the second "Pan-African" institution created just before the conference, proved its efficiency by opening its doors to the first African political refugees. As the thesis has tried to demonstrate, all these results could not be considered the product of chance but the result of a hard and effective work, based on Padmore and Nkrumah's political expertise and carried out by Padmore and his staff with a remarkable efficiency.

Between January and September 1959, specific policies concerning the support to African liberation and unity were elaborated. Ghana's Pan-African policy was the result of a deep theoretical debate but it was also – and this is one of the crucial points of the thesis – the product of the praxis of the daily struggle for the freedom and unity of the continent. Chapter two has described this process of elaboration and it has also examined the way the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana adapted to the needs of African nationalist parties. The impact of these changes was huge, since their effects lasted until the fall of Nkrumah in February 1966. In this period, Ghana defined for the first time its policies for the support of political refugees, African students, and opposition parties. It also clarified its stand towards the use of armed struggle in the liberation process. Finally, Padmore's Office set up the foundations for a proper Pan-African propaganda machinery. As this study has argued, Padmore's imprint on the definition of these policies was fundamental and it lasted long after his death, occurred in September 1959. Thanks to almost fifteen years of work, Padmore contributed to the establishment of a system of foreign policy that was able to turn the Pan-African theory into practice. At his death, he left the Office and the Centre as institutions perfectly shaped for dealing with the struggle for African liberation and unity in the next years. Indeed, many of the policies implemented after October 1959 were clearly still influenced by his ideas on African politics and his practical indications in terms of political strategy. As a matter of fact, the evolution of the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana followed Padmore's prior plans, as it was the case with the establishment of the BAA (October 1959) and the foundation of the Ideological Institute (1959-1961). Padmore

had also left Nkrumah with a qualified staff, personally selected thanks to his autonomous management of the Office. In particular, this thesis has provided an in-depth examination of the rise of A.K. Barden as Padmore's "successor". As this study has shown, Barden was not only a "militant" but also a skillful and charismatic employee, selected by Padmore for his qualities and trained specifically to deal with the activities of the Office. From this point of view, the account of the rise of Barden offered by Thompson hardly matches the historical reality. Padmore – as the thesis has argued – had no reason for selecting a man only for his military experience and not for his political and managerial skills.

The new BAA – born after Padmore's Office - was an even more independent institution, better financed and more integrated with the CPP than the former Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs. As explained in chapter three, various reforms were put in place to respond to the challenges of the new political phase in Africa, a period in which several countries reached the independence and many others challenged the colonial authorities with a renovated vigor. Nkrumah proved that he could continue along the road traced by Padmore even if his mentor and friend had died. After Padmore's death, the Ghanaian Prime Minister (since July '60, President of the Republic of Ghana) created a specific body to discuss any question concerning African affairs: the African Affairs Committee. Nkrumah appointed all the most important figures of the party and the state as members of this body. Thanks to the documentation of the archives of the Bureau of African Affairs and the so-called "Nkrumah's papers" (kept at the PRAAD – Accra section) –this thesis has provided for the very first time detailed information concerning the work of the Committee, which operated between October 1959 and March 1960. The period of the management of the African Affairs Committee was a crucial one. The "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana were improved and Ghana's Pan-African policy was also radicalized. The Bureau became more powerful than Padmore's Office had ever been and it became a precious instrument of the CPP both in Ghana and in Africa. Barden, new acting director of the BAA, became one of Nkrumah's closest advisers on African affairs and set up a wide net of agents in the whole continent. At the end of 1960, he could report to Nkrumah a satisfying outcome of the work done in Africa, even if, generally speaking, Ghana's Pan-African policy had suffered a harsh defeat in Congo. Through the analysis of

the documentation of the BAA, the author has provided the reader with an insight into the work of Barden's office in Southern Africa and in Congo. Barden worked in first person on the battlefield in order to fulfill the missions Nkrumah had given him. Still, despite his efforts, the fall of Lumumba signed Nkrumah's defeat and it brought the need for a change of pace.

Nkrumah responded to the failures in Congo with a radicalization of his Pan-African policy and a general reform of the "Pan-African" institutions and of the Foreign Service. Between January 1961 and December 1962 – the period examined in chapter four - the whole Ghanaian state was interested by a process of radicalization. Analyzing the documentation of the Bureau of African Affairs, this study has described in the details the nature of the reforms of this period. One of the major changes operated by Nkrumah was the establishment of the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS), a sort of new radical Ministry of Foreign Affairs designed to deal specifically with the African continent. The Ghanaian President also strengthened the propaganda machinery in order to have his Pan-African message delivered throughout Africa and also counteract the anti-Nkrumahist propaganda which was mounting among moderate African states. Moreover, as the thesis has shown, Ghana increased its investments in the training of African freedom fighters so as to influence them politically and have their support for the creation of a front of Pan-Africanist (and Nkrumahist) states. In 1961, Nkrumah finally opened the Ideological Institute of Winneba to both Ghanaians and freedom fighters. Ghanaians were expected to be trained ideologically in order to form a new radicalized civil service, while freedom fighters were supposed to bring back to their countries what they had learnt at the Institute. This way, as this study has argued, Nkrumah hoped to spread Pan-Africanism and Nkrumahism in Africa and to export the Ghanaian political and institutional models to other countries. In 1961, Ghana also began providing African nationalists with military training, a crucial turning point for Nkrumah's Pan-African policy, which until the Congo Crisis had been based on nonviolence. The Bureau emerged stronger from this process of radicalization. To a certain extent, the BAA was becoming even more influential than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AAS. As a result, the confrontation between "orthodox" and "un-orthodox" agencies progressively increased. As the thesis has

explained, the main source of friction between the “parallel agencies” in this period was Barden’s influence on the appointments of diplomats and within the Ghanaian embassies. In the meantime, while Ghana’s Pan-African policy was following the radical course dictated by Nkrumah, Accra had to face an increasing number of enemies. Nkrumah’s new radical policies attracted the fears of moderate African countries backed by UK, France, and USA. The Western powers and countries like Ivory Coast or Nigeria multiplied their efforts to debunk Nkrumah’s influence on African politics. In the forth and in the fifth chapters of the thesis there are evidences of the use of anti-Nkrumahist propaganda by these countries.

In the period between January 1963 and February 1966, Kwame Nkrumah Ghana speeded up the ongoing process of radicalization. As a result, even Nkrumah’s foreign policy was radicalized. A harsh confrontation with other independent African states and Western powers emerged. Barden kept working to improve the power of the Bureau both in Ghana and in Africa and to spread the Nkrumahist ideology in the continent. The thesis has provided a detailed analysis of the mission of the BAA against the East African Federation, an interesting case study in order to understand how the Bureau worked abroad and the way it was influencing the appointments of diplomats in Ghana. As this study has argued, at first Barden’s work in Africa proved successful, at least in attracting the support of the most radical freedom fighters towards Ghana. However, in the long run, as Nkrumah suffered a growing political isolation, Barden became the scapegoat of the failures of Ghana’s foreign policy. The director of the BAA had to pay the political price of the use of “unorthodox” methods to sustain African liberation and unity. In 1965, the Ghanaian President finally decided to discard the director of the BAA. It was a last attempt to regain some credibility in the African scene and to calm down the fears of the Ghanaian Foreign Service over the increasing power of the director of the Bureau. Barden was defeated by enemies both outside and inside Ghana. Still, not even the removal of his controversial figure was enough to modify the difficult position of Ghana in Africa. At the Accra OAU Conference (October 1965) Nkrumah suffered an harsh political defeat which, *de facto*, signified the failure of his Pan-African policy as a whole. At the time of coup (February 1966), the Ghanaian President was politically isolated by most of the other African leaders.

As underlined in the introduction, one of the crucial points of this thesis was the use of new sources and a more detached analysis of known sources in order to challenge the most ideological visions which flourished among the scholars after the fall of Kwame Nkrumah. After the 24th of February 1966, the NLC launched a process aimed at the removal of Nkrumah's political influence in Africa, starting obviously from Ghana itself. At the end of this operation, few countries openly admitted having been supported and influenced politically by Nkrumah's Ghana. The Anti-Nkrumah campaign also affected most of the early studies on this period. Authors like Thompson, Bretton and, later, Mazrui, severely criticized both the conception and the execution of the foreign policy of the government of the deposed President. However, for decades, these and other scholars could base their statements only on few sources, with regard, in particular, to the activities of the BAA, the AAC, and the Institute. As this thesis has tried to demonstrate, a detailed analysis of the activities of the "Pan-African" institutions can provide a clear understanding of the real degree of influence which Nkrumah's Ghana exerted in Africa until the coup of 1966 and, therefore, to reconsider the history of Nkrumah's foreign policy in a new light. This dissertation tried to accomplish this target through the use of new sources and analyzing the history of Ghana's Pan-African policy from Accra's perspective. The papers of the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs in Accra, the "Nkrumah's papers", and the documents of the British Intelligence have proved to be precious instruments to accomplish this goal. Still, the work is far from being over. This study can be considered only as a first phase of research, before the whole history of Nkrumah's foreign policy can be put under revision. This dissertation has tried to provide a first overview of the argument and it has introduced new elements for further discussions. Other researches should follow this one, and the author himself hopes to develop the path of research opened by his dissertation in a variety of directions.

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